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Introduction 
 
This thesis analyses the first day of the Battle of the Sambre, 4 November 1918,
1
 with 
specific reference to the actions of Third and Fourth Armies.
2
 This was the last large-scale 
battle fought by the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] on the Western Front. If the battle is 
known at all in the public domain, it is for the death of the poet Wilfred Owen.
3
 The battle 
was on a huge scale: thirteen divisions of the BEF led the assault on a frontage of 
approximately twenty miles, supported by over a thousand guns, with initial plans presuming 
an involvement of up to seventy tanks and armoured cars. This engagement was therefore not 
dissimilar in scale to the attack of 1 July 1916 on the Somme, yet other battles of the summer 
and autumn of 1918 overshadow this one in current historiography, notably the Battle of 
Amiens (8 – 11 August), and the Hindenburg Line, including the crossing of the Canal du 
Nord (27 September  - 1 October). 
 
Questions to be Addressed 
Analysis of the last large-scale set-piece attack of the Great War by the BEF raises a number 
of questions. Was the battle decisive? What had the BEF learnt in the previous four years‟ 
fighting and therefore where does the Battle of the Sambre fit in the context of the „learning 
curve‟?  To what extent was this engagement an „all-arms‟ battle? This raises the further 
question of plan versus reality: did the battle go entirely to plan? If objectives were not 
reached, did it matter? Was it necessary for officers on the spot to adopt a pragmatic 
                                                 
1
 The battle ran officially from 4 to 6 November 1918 
2
 Commanded by General Hon. Sir Julian Byng (Third Army) and General Sir Henry Rawlinson Bt. (Fourth 
Army) 
3
 Lieutenant Wilfred Edward Salter Owen, 5
th
 Battalion (attached 2
nd
 Battalion) Manchester Regiment, 32nd 
Division, was killed in action on the Sambre-Oise Canal, approximately 1,000 yards north of the village of Ors. 
He is buried in Ors Communal Cemetery, Grave A.3. 
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approach rather than adhere strictly to instructions?  The battle cannot be viewed in isolation: 
what other factors influenced the rapidity of the German Army‟s disintegration and was it 
necessary for the BEF to fight the battle at all? 
 
This work focuses on the level of tactical and operational effectiveness of the BEF at the very 
end of the „learning curve‟ and shows how it managed to storm a challenging, prepared 
defensive position without involvement of the much-vaunted Australian and Canadian 
divisions.
4
 This assault also gives a fascinating and starring role to the Field Companies of 
the Royal Engineers who rarely receive the attention and recognition they deserve and is also 
a battle with immediate strategic and political consequences. The thesis also argues that the 
British victory was decisive - at the strategic level it expedited the Armistice – and that it was 
necessary to fight the battle: until the German Army was pushed off its last prepared 
defensive line, German High Command [OHL
5
] was still hoping to be able to make a 
strategic withdrawal to an as yet incomplete line between Antwerp and the Meuse, to hold out 
through the winter and pursue a more favourable negotiated peace settlement in the spring of 
1919. What the BEF had learned in the previous four years‟ fighting is examined and the 
extent to which this final battle was its ultimate expression analysed. 
 
By describing and analysing the fighting methods used, the question to what extent this 
engagement was an „all-arms‟ battle can also be answered. At the operational level, the 
dilemma that dogged British High Command was that of which methodology would best lead 
                                                 
4
 There were Dominion troops involved: the 3 New Zealand Rifle Brigade and 1
 
New Zealand Infantry Brigade 
assaulted the fortified town of Le Quesnoy, and a small contingent of the 1
st
 Australian Tunnelling Company 
were involved in building a bridge over the Lock near the village of Rejet de Beaulieu at the southernmost point 
of the attack frontage.  
5
 OHL – Oberste Heeresleitung 
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to the strategic victory that would defeat the German Army on the field of battle and throw it 
out of France and Belgium. Breakthrough or attrition? The repeated failure of the former led 
eventually to an acceptance of the latter in the form of „bite and hold‟ tactics, where attacks 
would be limited in both time and geographical scope so as to avoid overstretching attacking 
troops and ensure that ground captured could be held against counter attacks. This thesis 
explains how this tactic developed and shows how the methods of late 1918 fit into this 
paradigm. 
 
It also demonstrates that the levels of fighting efficiency and of training were not uniform, 
showing how some units fared better than others. In places the assault went largely to plan. In 
others, it took improvisation, the adaptation or discarding of original plans, for some units to 
achieve success in the face of serious initial setbacks. The execution of the battle plan is 
shown to be far from perfect, with some units underperforming at the tactical level. 
 
The nature of the Hundred Days campaign is examined, along with the effect on the German 
leadership of the collapse of their Allies. The battle of 4 November did not initiate German 
requests for an armistice. Negotiations had been ongoing since early October 1918, but the 
effect of the defeat on the Sambre will be shown as pivotal in the process. The concepts of 
„bite and hold‟, „all-arms battle‟, the „learning curve‟ and an overview of the Hundred Days 
campaign, including Germany‟s peace negotiations, are dealt with in Chapter 1, “Contexts”. 
The performance of the German Army is not examined except through the eyes of its 
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opponent. Detailed analysis of this kind is beyond the scope of this work, but an overview 
can be found in Jonathan Boff‟s Winning and Losing on the Western Front.6 
 
Malcolm Brown‟s The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918, Year of Victory covers the 
events of 4 November in a little under two pages,
7
 focusing on the Victoria Cross winners 
and the unfortunate poet. He does, however, in one sentence, evoke the question of the need 
for the battle: in quoting an officer present at the time (John Glubb, later Lieutenant-General 
Sir John Glubb), who commented “The enemy has melted away before us like snow”,8 he 
raises the matter of whether the battle was necessary at all, with the BEF by now pushing on 
what was surely an open door with the Armistice an imminent certainty. Gary Sheffield, in 
Forgotten Victory – The First World War, Myths and Realities,9 hints at a possible answer, 
reinforcing Niall Barr‟s opinion that it was defeat on the Sambre-Oise Canal and in the 
villages in front of the Forêt de Mormal that persuaded the OHL that the game was finally 
up.
10
 
 
General Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s diary gives us a brief insight into his own opinion on this 
matter. On 20 October he wrote: “I think the Boche mean to go back gradually to the line of 
the Meuse. [ ...] Our railways are not getting on as fast as I should like”.11 Indeed, on 22 
                                                 
6
 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front. The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany 
in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See pp. 16-17, 45-53, 68-69, 105-122, 160-178, 226-
242 
7
 M. Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918 – The Year of Victory (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 
1998) 
8
 Ibid. p. 281 
9
 G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The First World War, Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 2001). 
10
 Ibid. p. 215 
11
 Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge: Rawlinson Papers, RWLN 1/11. 
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October, when contemplating the progress of peace talks, he was envisaging the possibility of 
the war continuing into 1919:  
The negotiations are like selling a horse:- we have to fix the reserve price – If it is too 
high the Boch won‟t buy and we shall go on fighting. – I am inclined to keep up the 
pace and to insist on unconditional surrender. It will probably prolong the war but it is 
better so than having an unsatisfactory peace. If the Bosch continues to destroy all 
railways we shall not be able to get to the German frontier before Feb‟y [ ... ] we will 
then enter Germany and dictate terms. After all it is worth another 3 or 4 months‟ 
delay.
12
  
 
 
After a conference of the commanders of First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies on 31 
October, Field-Marshal Haig wrote in his diary that after each commander had expressed his 
views on the current situation, the consensus was that  
The Enemy is fighting a very good rear guard action and we are all agreed that from a 
military standpoint, the Enemy has not yet been sufficiently beaten as to cause him to 
accept an ignominious peace.
13
 
 
 
The attitude of the Germans varied from day to day during the last weeks of the war,
14
 but the 
OHL stubbornly clung on to the possibility of a negotiated peace that would allow Germany 
to keep some of its conquered territories and the Army to remain largely intact. Hindenburg 
wrote: “By the end of October the collapse was complete at all points. It was only on the 
Western Front that we still thought we could avert it”.15 Delaying the Allied advance at the 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. It is interesting to note that throughout his journal, Rawlinson never adopts a consistent spelling of the 
word „Boche‟.  
13
 Sheffield & Bourne (eds), Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, p. 483 
14
 See Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 Vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson), pp. 739-71 
15
 Quoted in Barr, „The Last Battle: the Crossing of the Sambre-Oise Canal, 4th November 1918‟, in Changing 
War, p.74. Originally taken from Charles Messenger, ed., Field Marshal Hindenburg, The Great War (London: 
Greenhill, 2006), p.222. 
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line of the Sambre-Oise Canal and the Forêt de Mormal could keep alive the possibility of a 
compromise peace. The success of this rearguard action thus assumed huge importance. 
 
Historiography 
The Military History of the BEF on the Western Front 
The historiography of the BEF on the Western Front is vast. This review therefore 
concentrates on recent works and cannot claim to be exhaustive. Divisional or Regimental 
histories produced in the decades following the conflict gave their readers largely non-critical 
accounts of events, basking to some extent in the reflected glories of recent victory. It is the 
next wave of literature that remains deeply rooted in the public perception of the conduct of 
the war. Graves, Liddell Hart, Lloyd George, Sassoon and Owen portray a war of shattered 
ideals, of futility, suffering, of a generation of innocents sacrificed by incompetent and 
uncaring generals. This view is perpetuated post-Second World War by Taylor, Clark, Laffin 
and Winter.
16
  
 
John Terraine offered a reappraisal of the BEF‟s Commander in Chief in 1963 and his 
vindication of Haig has stood the test of time, serving as a catalyst to new waves of historians 
prepared to take a more dispassionate view of events.
17
 Bidwell and Graham
18
 and Tim 
                                                 
16
 A.J.P.Taylor, The First World War. An Illustrated History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963);  Alan Clark, 
The Donkeys, (London: Random House UK, 1961); John Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War 
One, (Stroud: Alan Sutton Publishing, 1988); Denis Winter, Death’s Men. Soldiers of the Great War (London: 
Allen Lane, 1978) 
17
 John Terraine, Douglas Haig. The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1963) See also Gary 
Sheffield, The Chief. Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press Ltd., 2011); Walter Reid, 
Douglas Haig. Architect of Victory (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd., 2006); Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, eds, 
Douglas Haig. War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005) 
18
 S.Bidwell & D.Graham, Firepower. British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1982) 
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Travers
19
 took up the argument, the former championing the BEF‟s achievement in 
developing an all-arms system of warfare, the latter echoing this, but with the claim that it 
was achieved within a system where high-level commanders failed to come to terms with the 
technological advances and the tactical changes required to integrate and implement them 
successfully. Paddy Griffith
20
 accepts the importance of technology, but concludes that High 
Command, through the dissemination of ideas, can claim some responsibility for the levels of 
skill and tactical awareness of the BEF in 1918. 
 
Much of the literature of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s prefers the worm‟s eye view of battle 
and attempts to reclaim the war for the common man: this includes works by Martin 
Middlebrook, Lyn MacDonald and the series of „Pals‟ histories. The emphasis is on the major 
attritional battles of the middle years of the war and little is said on the subject of tactical, 
operational or strategic development.  
 
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson‟s military biography of Sir Henry Rawlinson21 looks at the 
development of the formations under his command and assesses his contribution to “the 
ultimate success of British arms”.22 They conclude that the victories of 1918 were as much 
due to the decentralisation of command as to the applied wisdom of the upper echelons of the 
command structure. John Bourne‟s Britain and the Great War23 takes the evolution of the 
BEF from imperial police force to modern, mass army and places it within its military, 
                                                 
19
 T.Travers, The Killing Ground. The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 
1900-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 
20
 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front. The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (London: Yale 
University Press, 1994) 
21 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 
22
 Ibid, p.3 
23
 J.M.Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989) 
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political and social contexts and argues that objectivity of viewpoint is skewed by the prism 
of the Second World War. 
 
The last fifteen years have seen a continuation of serious scholarship on the development of 
the BEF: Simon Robbins examines the BEF‟s path toward a winning formula at the strategic 
level, affirming that divisional commanders were the key leaders;
 24
 Andy Simpson looks at 
British Corps command and shows how this level of the command structure became 
instrumental in the planning and execution of operations, recognising a flexibility that 
allowed the Corps commander to centralise control where necessary, but delegate to 
subordinates when appropriate.
 25
 
 
Revisionist literature is now accepted within academic circles and emerging views have 
appeared in volumes of collected essays by respected historians. Strategic, operational and 
tactical developments are treated in detail in works edited by Gary Sheffield and Dan 
Todman
26
, and by Spencer Jones
27
 and Gary Sheffield and Peter Simkins have compiled 
some of their writings into single volumes,
28
 the former looking at the nature of the war from 
the viewpoints of politicians and the exercise of command at all levels, the latter reassessing 
the theory and practice of the BEF as it developed into a war-winning army in 1918. 
                                                 
24
 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918. Defeat into Victory (London: Frank 
Cass, 2005) 
25
 Andy Simpson, Directing Operations. British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Stroud: 
Spellmount, 2006) 
26
 Gary Sheffield & Dan Todman, eds., Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army’s 
Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004) 
27
 Spencer Jones, ed., Stemming the Tide. Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914 
(Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013) and Courage Without Glory. The British Army on the Western Front 1915 
(Solihull: Helion & Company, 2015). This series will expand to one volume for each year of the war. 
28
 Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale. The British Army on the western Front 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword Books, 2014) and Peter Simkins, From the Somme to Victory. The British Army’s Experience on the 
Western Front 1916-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2014) 
13 
 
 
Studies of the Great War in single volumes cannot delve into the operational and tactical 
levels of warfare, but any campaign must be viewed within its wider context, and David 
Stevenson
29
 and Ian Beckett
30
 have produced recent works that combine breadth of approach 
with clarity of thought to debunk comprehensively many of the myths that still linger in the 
public perception of the conflict. Stevenson has also produced a detailed work on 1918, in 
which he bemoans also that “whereas comprehensive investigations now exist into the 
outcomes of other modern conflicts, the First World War still lacks one”.31 Stevenson then 
goes on to provide one. His wide-ranging assessment of 1918 rarely dips below the military 
strategic level but includes analysis of technology, logistics, manpower levels and morale. 
The study widens in scope to include sea-power and the war economies and politics of the 
belligerent nations. He divides the war in the west into three distinct phases: 1914-17 was an 
era of deadlock, dominated by the superiority of the defence, where countless attacks by both 
sides of varying scale failed to break through the increasingly complex trench lines. 1918 saw 
both sides throw all they had into attempts at decisive victory. The first, the German Spring 
Offensives, prompted by victory in the east and the threat of growing American involvement 
in the west, failed through strategic miscalculation and logistic deficiencies. Thereafter, they 
“had no alternative but to attempt a desperate exercise in damage limitation, which largely 
failed them.”32 The second, the Allies‟ Hundred Days offensives, proved victorious. The 
German Army was pushed back from a series of defensive lines until it was forced into 
headlong retreat once the Battle of the Sambre had “settled the matter”.33 
                                                 
29
 David Stevenson, 1914-1918. The History of the First World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004) 
30
 Ian F.W.Beckett, The Great War 1914-1918 (Harlow: Pearson Educational, 2001) 
31
 David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall. Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 20111)  p. 
xvii 
32
 Ibid, p.xviii 
33
 Ibid, p.168 
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The major attritional battles such as the Somme or Third Ypres have been studied in 
exhaustive detail at the operational and tactical levels. This treatment has yet to be applied to 
the battles of the Hundred Days. 
 
The Hundred Days 
The historiography of the Hundred Days and of the operational and tactical methodology of 
these sequential attacks is not yet definitive, but there has been a surge of interest amongst 
historians over recent years in the events of 1918. Published accounts are still few and far 
between, however. The histories of the two British armies, Third and Fourth, that played the 
major roles in the events of the Hundred Days were published ninety-two years apart. 
Archibald Montgomery‟s volume on Fourth Army appeared in 1920 and in style resembles 
many of the formation histories written at that time:
34
 General Rawlinson‟s preface is a 
justification of BEF strategy, claiming that the events of the summer and autumn of 1918 
“constitute the greatest military triumph the world has ever seen”,35 and goes on to praise the 
“genius and foresight”36 of Foch37 and Haig. The text traces Fourth Army‟s advance in a style 
that is less self-congratulatory, but that nevertheless constantly honours the memory and 
efforts of the officers and men of an “army [with] the will to conquer, and the confidence in 
victory, that foreshadow success”.38 Montgomery‟s closing chapter, rather than concluding as 
its title might suggest, reads like a tactical manual for use in future conflicts, giving advice 
                                                 
34
 Sir A. Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8
th
 to November 
11
th
 1918 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920) 
35
 Ibid, p. vii 
36
 Ibid, p. viii 
37
 Maréchal Ferdinand Jean Marie Foch (1851-1929) Allied Commander -in-Chief from 26 March 1918. 
38
 Ibid, p.146 
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on, amongst other things, the rate of advance of the creeping artillery barrage, the efficacy of 
the flank attack and the advantage of the surprise assault.
39
 
 
Jonathan Boff‟s book on Third Army is a much more analytical work and sheds much light 
on this neglected period of the Great War, asking important questions on the relative 
performances of the BEF and the German Army, tracing their efforts to adapt methodologies 
to this ever-developing phase of the conflict.
40
 After a brief narrative of events,
41
 he adopts a 
thematic approach, analysing manpower and training, materiel, morale, the BEF‟s combined 
arms tactics and the German response, communications, command and control. Boff 
concludes that the picture is a complicated one: “The armies were locked in a deadly 
evolutionary struggle where measures and counter-measures continually interacted in highly 
dynamic fashion”.42 
 
 
He also argues that „all-arms‟ tactics declined in October and November 1918 and that 
progress along multiple learning curves was hampered by the BEF‟s difficulty in shaking off 
some of the habits of trench fighting.
43
 This thesis, in its detailed treatment of operations and 
tactics, substantially adds to the body of evidence that corroborates these theories. 
 
J.P. Harris and Niall Barr‟s 1998 work constitutes the first single-volume account of the 
BEF‟s advance to victory.44 It is, as Harris explains in the introduction, a “fairly short book 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, pp.263-272 
40
 Boff, op cit. 
41
 Ibid, pp.22-38 
42
 Ibid, pp.248-9 
43
 Ibid, pp.245-6 
44
 J.P. Harris with Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice (London: Brassey‟s, 1998) 
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on a very big campaign”,45 and as such can rarely delve below the operational level of war. 
The BEF‟s contribution (and that of the Dominion Forces) is assessed against that of its allies 
and the fighting methods used are carefully analysed, resulting in an assertion that the allies‟ 
weapon system was “fallible” and that “[t]o think in terms of the constant application of a set 
formula would be to underestimate the dynamism and complexity of the campaign”.46 This 
thesis, by examining the final battle at the tactical level, goes some way toward substantiating 
this premise. 
 
Nick Lloyd tells the story of the Hundred Days in his 2013 work, skilfully weaving together 
the stories and testimonies of individual soldiers and of the military and political leaders of 
the time.
47
 He explores two main questions: how effective were the BEF‟s fighting methods 
and was the German Army actually defeated in 1918? His conclusion on the former is that the 
allies had “finally mastered a tactical and operational system that could achieve victory on the 
battlefield.”48 On the latter, he argues that the allied victory was “partial”,49 that in facing an 
increasingly tired and logistically challenged enemy, “a complete collapse of German 
resistance in 1918 [was] unlikely”,50 but admits that, had the war continued, a collapse in the 
following spring would have been the probable outcome.  
 
A sparse and therefore far from complete historiography of the Hundred Days means that 
some questions on the conduct and outcome of the Great War lack definitive answers. Battles 
                                                 
45
 Ibid, p. xiii 
46
 Ibid, p.298 
47
 NickLloyd, Hundred Days. The End of the Great War (London: Viking, 2013) 
48
 Ibid, p.278 
49
 Ibid, p.278 
50
 Ibid, p.277 
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are won and lost at the tactical level, and it is only through detailed study of these final 
encounters that such gaps may begin to be filled. 
 
Existing accounts of the Battle of the Sambre 
In Amiens to the Armistice,
51
 Harris and Barr devote more than most to this final engagement: 
six pages.
52
 They give a comprehensive, yet brief outline of the day‟s events and sum it up as 
a “grand slam”.53 Peter Hart, in 1918, A Very British Victory,54 devotes three and a half 
pages,
55
 but concentrates almost exclusively on the attack of the 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Sussex at 
Lock No.1 and the two Victoria Crosses won there. Wilfred Owen merits half a page and the 
travails of the eight divisions of Third Army are encapsulated in less than three lines. Niall 
Barr‟s contribution to Changing War runs to seventeen pages, largely devoted once more to 
Fourth Army, but rightly emphasises the role of the Royal Engineers, which was vital to the 
success of the attacks. He concludes with the thought that this battle merits closer and more 
detailed study.  
 
Books that set out to tell the story of 1918 as a whole tend to focus their narratives elsewhere: 
John Terraine, To Win A War – 1918, the Year of Victory,56 sums up the events of 4 
November in one page, concentrating largely on the New Zealanders‟ audacious “storming” 
of the fortified town of Le Quesnoy; J.H. Johnson, 1918 – The Unexpected Victory,57 gives 
two pages of narrative; Simon Robbins, in his brilliant British Generalship on the Western 
                                                 
51
 Harris & Barr, op cit. 
52
 Ibid. pp. 227-83. The account includes a map – a rarity for this battle. 
53
 Ibid, p. 283 
54
 Peter Hart, 1918, A Very British Victory (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008) 
55
 Ibid, pp. 487-90 
56
 John Terraine, To Win A War – 1918, the Year of Victory (London: Papermac, 1978) 
57
 J.H. Johnson, 1918 – The Unexpected Victory (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1997) 
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Front 1914-1918 – Defeat into Victory,58 does not attempt a narrative, but highlights IX 
Corps‟ tactics of reinforcing success and outflanking troublesome pockets of enemy 
resistance.
59
 
 
It is no surprise that Prior and Wilson‟s study of Sir Henry Rawlinson, Command on the 
Western Front,
60
 concentrates on the deeds of the Fourth Army, putting its success down to 
the use of tanks in the villages along the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal, demoralisation 
of defenders at Landrecies, skilled infantry tactics and overwhelming use of artillery. The 
parts played by the British Third Army and French First Armies are dismissed in one 
sentence as supporting roles.
61
 Nick Lloyd‟s Hundred Days62 gives us four pages of narrative 
concentrating on Wilfred Owen and the Manchester Regiment, but includes first-hand 
German testimony. 
 
The two publications that contain the most extensive accounts of the action on 4 November 
1918 are The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8
th
 to 
November 11
th
 1918 by Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery
63
 and the Official History, 
Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Volume V, by Brigadier-General Sir James 
Edmonds and Lieutenant-Colonel R. Maxwell-Hyslop.
64
 The former gives an eighteen page, 
detailed account with numerous photographs; the latter presents twenty-nine pages of 
familiar, if rather dry, narrative, along with its usual short sections on the French, American 
                                                 
58
 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 
59
 Ibid, p.104 
60
 Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front  
61
 Ibid. p. 388 
62
 Lloyd, Hundred Days.  
63
 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days 
64
 J.E. Edmonds & R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Vol. V (London: 
HMSO, 1947) 
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and German perspectives. It is interesting to note its late publication date of 1947 (only two 
Western Front volumes appeared after this one –Passchendaele, 1917 Vol. II and Cambrai, 
1917 Vol. III): in the Preface, written in December 1945, Edmonds bemoans the passing of 
many combatants and the fading memories of others, with the result that he has not been able 
to call upon as much help from them as in previous volumes. Indeed, he comments that 
Montgomery‟s Story of the Fourth Army “has been of considerable value”.65 The sections on 
Third and Fourth Armies, running to twenty-three pages, are narrated in a matter-of-fact tone: 
successes are under-played and setbacks or failures are either glossed over with unwarranted 
brevity or are camouflaged by false positivity. Analysis is notable by its almost total absence: 
the success of tactical and operational methodology is taken for granted. The method of 
advance on Third Army front is described in broad terms whereby three objective lines are 
proposed and units leap-frog onto each subsequent line, thus not overstretching the troops. 
Pauses are built in, during which artillery can be moved forward to support the final stages of 
the assault that were originally out of range.
66
 The initial stages of the assault dominate the 
narrative, the later stages being reduced almost to irrelevance by the repetition of phrases 
such as “[machine guns were] easily overcome”; “resistance then collapsed”; “very little 
opposition”; “success was gained”.67 Indeed, the final summing up of Third Army‟s advance 
suggests a certain effortlessness: “The Third Army‟s objective had, therefore, been reached 
on its whole front, in places overpassed, and little more than the advanced guards of eight of 
its fifteen divisions had been engaged.”68 It was not that simple, as the detailed analysis in 
this thesis shows. 
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Two examples serve to illustrate the lack of interpretive detail. The difficulties encountered 
by 96 Brigade (32
nd
 Division) and their subsequent failure to cross the canal south of 
Landrecies as planned are dealt with in six lines of narrative, devoid of explanation or 
analysis.
69
 The tactical naivety of 17
th
 Division, and in particular 50 Brigade, is not 
mentioned: its failure to gain its objectives, in stark comparison to 38
th
 Division on its 
immediate right, is explained away by the simple assertion that “resistance was obstinate”.70 
 
It is the lack of detail that mars the official narrative. Edmonds makes his excuses for this in 
the volume‟s preface, stating that “[i]n dealing with such large forces it was impossible 
within a reasonable space either to enter into much detail or to mention every unit engaged; 
the scale of the narrative had to be different from that of earlier volumes”.71 The final 
advance did not merit detailed treatment, it would seem, yet the Battle of Cambrai (20 
November - 7 December 1917) was thought worthy of its own 400-page volume. 
 
It is in the „Preface‟ and „Reflections‟ chapters that some analysis – of a general nature – can 
be found. Edmonds bemoans “too much blue, red and green line”, limiting units to fixed 
objectives even when commanders were exhorting them to “go all out”, but argues that “the 
system of limited advance was inevitable”, otherwise troops would have “fallen out of 
control”. At the same time, however, he describes the small-unit tactics used to deal with 
enemy machine guns as “magnificent: the use of ground, the value of the indirect approach 
and envelopment [being] well understood”.72 This thesis expands on these premises, 
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describing the action in sufficient detail to show that the BEF‟s tactical and operational 
methodology was, in November 1918, much more complicated that Edmonds‟ superficial 
treatment suggests. 
 
Other works, formation or unit histories, written for the most part soon after the end of the 
war, are numerous. Some of these are referred to in later chapters, though they largely help to 
add narrative „colour‟: they were never meant to be treatises on operational method, and any 
analysis included can be an attempt to put a positive spin on an unsuccessful episode or to 
defend the reputation of a unit by stating the difficult circumstances under which they had 
been required to operate. They were aimed, after all, at the former officers and men of the 
unit: offending them would do nothing to boost sales. They also rely heavily on battalion war 
diary entries, often transcribing them verbatim, and rarely add anything substantial or 
significant to the original first-hand accounts. 
 
Sources 
This thesis is based upon unpublished, archival sources: the documents contained in over 
three hundred formation or unit War Diaries held at the National Archives, Kew.
73
 War 
Diaries chronicled the day-to-day activities of the BEF and are described by Jonathan Boff in 
his study of the Third Army in the Hundred Days as “the most important single primary 
source”.74 They were kept by all formations, from GHQ down to Battalion and give 
unrivalled insight into the events on the front-line. Each battalion had its own adjutant, one of 
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whose jobs was to complete the War Diary. This was done on a day to day basis, though in 
busy times, entries could be written some time after the events described. Above battalion 
level, the Diary was the domain of the Staff Officer: orders sent down to lower formations, 
narratives of engagements, after-action reports and advisory documents were also compiled 
by these often largely anonymous men. Some of these documents were distributed widely: 
one hundred and seventeen copies of the 32
nd
 Division‟s “Notes on Future Operations”, for 
example, issued 1 November 1918, were sent out to lower formations / units, including 
seventeen to each of the division‟s three brigades, thus ensuring that every company 
commander would receive a copy.  As Majors, Captains and occasionally Lieutenants, the 
Staff Officers were able to sign the documents in the absence of their commanding officer at 
Brigade and Divisional level, and it would seem rare that the Brigadier-General or Major-
General added his signature prior to despatch.  It would seem unlikely that he himself would 
have compiled the document anyway, but one might hope that he had read it. At Corps and 
Army level, it fell largely to the MGGS or BGGS to sign off the documents: illustrative 
examples of this would be Brigadier-General I. Stewart, BGGS XIII Corps, and Major-
General A.A. Montgomery, MGGS Fourth Army, whose signatures adorn almost every 
document issued by these formations in the period leading up to and during the Battle of the 
Sambre. It must be added, as a cautionary note, however, that a signature is not necessarily an 
indicator of authorship.  
 
Some War Diaries are sparse,
75
 but the majority are, thanks to the meticulous approach of 
many of the adjutants charged with their compilation, a rich seam of original, first-hand 
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accounts, including maps, orders received and sent, narratives of battles, casualty figures and 
coherent after action reports that contain valuable operational and tactical analysis. Some are 
incomplete, with appendices lost or misplaced over the years, but careful analysis of division, 
brigade and battalion documents can give a coherent picture of occurrences at the operational 
level: the planning; the events; the outcomes. They were written at the time, by the man on 
the spot, free from a century‟s-worth of hindsight, undistorted by the prism of decades of 
changing attitudes and mores. They cannot be totally free from bias, from omission or error: 
they were written by human beings with opinions of their own, survivors of dramatic and 
even traumatic events, with limited fields of view, but they are honest and leap fresh from the 
page almost a century later. Multiplicity of authorship and viewpoint helps to smooth out the 
wrinkles of inconsistency. An accurate analysis of events cannot be achieved without heavy 
reliance on these invaluable documents. 
 
Secondary sources – listed in the bibliography – serve a dual purpose: they can sometimes be 
used to plug any gaps in the accounts contained within the War Diaries, but more importantly 
are essential in placing the Battle of the Sambre within its wider contexts. 
 
The inclusion of analysis of the battle from the German viewpoint would not materially help 
to answer the questions posed by this thesis. Primary German sources are in any case 
incomplete, particularly for the final months of the war, and relatively difficult to obtain. The 
German Official History is of limited value: as the armistice approaches, the work is lacking 
in operational and tactical detail and concentrates exclusively on the strategy of retreat and 
the political machinations relating to the pressing issue of capitulation. Leutnant Alenfeld‟s 
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account of his tribulations on 4 November 1918 has been included in Chapter 7 as being 
representative of many similar experiences endured by German combatants on that day. 
 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One places this final 
battle into its wider context by examining briefly the events of the „Hundred Days‟, the 
attempts by Germany to broker a peace settlement with the United States, the collapse of 
Germany‟s allies and the different character of the fighting after 4 November. The terms 
„learning curve‟, all-arms battle‟ and „bite and hold‟ are also explained and placed within the 
wider context of the Great War and its historiography. The chapter also considers the 
planning stages of the battle, detailing the orders that were sent down the chain of command, 
the infantry units chosen to execute the assault and their relative performances during the 
hundred days, the viability of the objectives set for the day‟s fighting and the resources 
available across all branches of the services. The expected cooperation between infantry, 
engineers, artillery, tanks and RAF is examined to assess just how much this was to be an 
„all-arms battle‟.  
 
Subsequent chapters involve detailed accounts of the events of 4 November 1918. The 
narrative moves, chapter by chapter, from the north to the south of the battle frontage. 
Chapter Two deals with the attack of XVII Corps. Two divisions, the 19
th
 and 24
th
, already in 
possession of some of their 4 November objectives, were to cross the Petit Aunelle River, 
capture the large twin villages of Wargnies le Grand and Wargnies le Petit and then advance 
up the gentle slopes to the east toward the ridge line where the fortified villages of Eth and 
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Bry blocked their path. The terrain here was “open country”,76 with scattered villages, small 
streams and rivers, orchards and fields. Some fields were cultivated, but “the area as a whole 
was pasture land intersected by hedges and wire”.77  
 
Chapter Three describes the actions of VI Corps, which was faced by similar ground to that 
of their northern neighbours: the ground rose gently to the east and was crossed by the 
Rhonelle and Petit Aunelle rivers which cut the ground into spurs running north-west to 
south-east. The main obstacles of the Guards and 62
nd
 Divisions were the villages of Frasnoy 
and Preux-au-Sart. 
 
The assaults of IV Corps are assessed in Chapter Four. This Corps contained the only non-
British unit involved in the battle, the New Zealand Division, and it was given the task of 
capturing Le Quesnoy. This town was fortified in the 17
th
 Century by Vauban and retains its 
classic star-shaped ramparts, with ditches, moats and fortified gates.
78
 To the south, the 37
th
 
Division, bolstered by the presence of tanks, were to cross the defended railway line east of 
Ghissignies, capture Louvignies and continue their advance into the north-western corner of 
the Forêt de Mormal. 
 
In Chapter Five we reach the southern limits of the Third Army frontage: V Corps. The 17
th
 
Division on the left, again with the help of tanks, was confronted by an area of orchards, 
hedges and villages just west of the Forêt de Mormal and then by an advance through the 
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forest to and then beyond the isolated village of Locquignol in its centre. To the south, 38
th
 
Division, on a narrow, single-brigade front was quickly into the forest and thus deprived of 
armoured assistance. They advanced mainly along its rides and tracks, attempting to outflank 
the isolated German machine-gun posts. 
 
Chapter Six deals with the left flank of Fourth Army: XIII Corps had three divisions in the 
front line: 18
th
; 50
th
; and 25
th
. Between them, they had twenty-four tanks at their disposal. On 
the left of the Corps frontage 18
th
 Division faced the fortified towns of Hecq and Preux-au-
Bois. With 50
th
 Division to the south, the advance was to continue deep into the forest, where 
vehicles of the 17
th
 Armoured Car Battalion were to cause havoc along the forest tracks. The 
ultimate objective was a spur beyond the eastern limits of the forest overlooking the Sambre 
north-east of Landrecies. This town on the Sambre-Oise Canal was the objective of 25
th
 
Division: it was hoped that a crossing could be forced and the town occupied by the end of 
the day. 
 
Chapter Seven analyses the actions of IX Corps. Its two divisions, 32
nd
 and 1
st
, directly faced 
the obstacle of the Sambre-Oise Canal. The Germans still held ground on the western banks 
and attempts to force a passage across the canal met with mixed fortunes: 32
nd
 Division was 
mauled badly as it came up against determined opposition and was forced to improvise in 
order to ensure the success of the attack; one of the most daring efforts was made by 1
st
 
Division on the right flank of the Corps frontage at Lock No.1, where the width of the canal 
was reduced to seventeen feet at the lock gates. The lock buildings on the eastern bank were 
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heavily defended, but success here would allow a general advance into the open country 
beyond. 
 
Each chapter includes analysis of the number of objectives gained in relation to those 
projected; the levels of casualties suffered; the efficacy of „all-arms cooperation‟ – what were 
the relative values of the contributions of the infantry, the artillery, engineers, tanks and 
aircraft? The question of the difference between „Plan‟ and „Reality‟ is examined: to what 
extent did the plan work, and how far were the successes, failures and recoveries down to the 
„man on the spot‟, the formation or unit commander, who, faced with a faltering or stalled 
attack, was able to adapt or even abandon the original orders and yet still achieve his overall 
objectives? 
 
The conclusion assesses the extent to which the assault can be deemed a success. It shows 
that the BEF was able to adapt its operational and tactical methodology to suit the conditions 
it faced and that it was a dynamic force that could learn from experience and assimilate new 
technologies. It also demonstrates clearly, however, that the Battle of the Sambre was not a 
true „all-arms‟ battle, for reasons logistical, meteorological and topographical, but one where 
victory could nevertheless be won by an army confident enough in its own abilities to attack 
with the resources available. Neither was this battle a true example of „bite and hold‟: 
Professor William Philpott describes the „Hundred Days‟ battles as a “sophisticated attritional 
offensive” that would go on “until one side or the other broke”.79 By 4 November the German 
Army was on the point of breaking and the „bite‟ could be repeated a number of times as 
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units leapfrogged each other into the attack, the „hold‟ becoming largely irrelevant as the 
paucity of German reserves rendered meaningful counter attacks impracticable.  
 
The conclusion also shows that it was necessary for the BEF to fight the Battle of the Sambre. 
Foch‟s great offensive “never broke the German front”, advancing at “less than a mile a day  
[ ... ] over the period from 8 August to 11 November”, and the German defence remained 
tenacious, “exacting a steady toll on their pursuers”.80 It was the victory on the Sambre that 
finally broke the will of the German Army and prompted OHL to accept peace at any price. 
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Chapter 1 
Contexts 
 
 
The historiographical context was dealt with in the „Literature Review‟ in the Introduction. 
This chapter places the Battle of the Sambre into its political, strategic, operational and 
tactical contexts before looking at the formations involved and outlining the planning 
process. 
 
The Political Context 
This section examines Germany‟s increasingly fraught attempts to broker a peace settlement, 
which run concurrent to their desperate defensive battles of the autumn. It then shows how 
the loss of its allies, as they exited the military stage one by one, each comprehensively 
defeated, left Germany alone in its attempts to hold out. Not only was she alone, but she was 
facing an ever-growing number of enemy troops. The entry of the USA into the war - as an 
„associate‟ power, rather than an „ally‟ - had helped to precipitate the German Spring 
Offensives in March 1918. In the autumn it was the rate at which the number of American 
troops was growing that alarmed OHL: the Americans were still tactically naive and 
logistically inefficient, but sheer weight of numbers was becoming a decisive long-term 
factor.  
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It was on 28 September, two days after the start of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, at OHL‟s 
headquarters in Spa, Belgium, that Ludendorff, faced with news of a German collapse in 
Flanders, and possibly suffering a nervous breakdown,
1
 confided to Hindenburg that an armistice offer must be made as soon as possible. He was 
“responding not only to events in the West, but also to the news that Bulgaria was suing for 
peace”.2 An offensive begun on 25 September had broken the Bulgarian lines and German 
reinforcements were sent too late to avert the crisis. A ceasefire agreement was signed on the 
29
th
.  
 
Austro-Hungarian forces were also on the verge of collapse: “defeat and rout”3 at the Battle 
of Vittorio Veneto, which began on 24 October, prompting the surrender of half a million 
men to the Italians, led to a rapid disintegration of the Habsburg Empire with Austria signing 
an armistice on 3 November. Meanwhile, the Turkish army had been defeated at Megiddo, 
with Damascus and Beirut falling to Allenby‟s4 troops on 1 and 2 October respectively, but it 
was the Bulgarian surrender that expedited the Ottoman Empire‟s final collapse. Turkey‟s 
best divisions were still centred in the Caucasus, leaving only four divisions guarding 
Constantinople and the Straits. Rather than helping to prop up Germany, the boot was on the 
other foot: in order to defend their territory, Turkey needed money and armaments from 
Germany, but the allied offensives against Bulgaria had cut the rail link. General Milne,
5
 
commanding officer of British forces in Salonika, would also soon be in a position to move 
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on Constantinople, prompting the Turks to request peace terms on 16 October. The armistice 
document was signed two weeks later.  
 
By the time of the Battle of the Sambre, Germany had therefore lost all its main allies, but 
“although [their] surrenders coincided, they were all defeated separately, and tellingly, each 
negotiated for an armistice independently. [Defeats] on other fronts did not determine the 
outcome of the battle in the west, or have much impact on the cohesion of an alliance which 
existed in name only by this point.”6 The mood at OHL remained belligerent: they were 
aware of the deteriorating condition of the German army: they were being driven back step 
by step on the Western Front, unit strengths were falling, owing to battle casualties and to 
sickness,
7
  and there were almost no reserves left. Nevertheless, Germany was not yet 
prepared to accept unconditional surrender: if nothing else, the army must remain intact to 
serve as a buffer against revolution at home. Paul von Hintze, Secretary of State,
8
 saw a 
chance to “play off America against Britain and France”9 by appealing directly to President 
Wilson, proposing acceptance of peace terms based on his Fourteen Points, but also realised 
that a change of political system might win Germany better terms: he tried to instigate a 
“stage-managed democratisation”, a revolution from above to avert one from below.10 
The German government resigned on 3 October and the new Imperial Chancellor, Max von 
Baden, head of a government with a majority comprising the SPD,
11
 the Catholic Centre and 
the Liberals was empowered to salvage what he could from an increasingly perilous situation. 
Max was not at first inclined to take precipitate action, but on Ludendorff‟s insistence the 
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cabinet was persuaded to send a note to the American President. Despatched on 4 October, it 
was “short and simple, requesting Wilson to take in hand arrangements for an immediate 
armistice and for peace negotiations in which Germany would accept as a basis the Fourteen 
Points”.12 
 
In the exchange that followed, with Wilson sending three notes on 8, 14 and 23 October and 
the Germans replying on 12, 20 and 27 October, the American President‟s stance gradually 
hardened. By 20 October, Wilson was insisting that a ceasefire “must render Germany unable 
to resist any eventual peace treaty [ ...] and that he must demand an end to Wilhelm‟s control 
of policy. His minimum requirements were for a fully constitutional monarchy and 
parliamentary control over the high command”.13 The Germans must also agree to Allied 
commanders dictating the terms of any armistice. 
 
As early as 9 October, however, Ludendorff had emerged from his breakdown and insisted to 
the new Chancellor that “the Army could defend the frontiers for a long time yet”.14 The 
cabinet met on 17 October and discussed the current situation. Ludendorff advised that an 
allied breakthrough was possible rather than probable and that Germany could achieve better 
peace terms by continuing the war into 1919. David Stevenson states: “In fact there were 
genuine grounds for saying that with the campaigning season ending and the army retreating 
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in good order, Ludendorff had [earlier] overestimated the danger and his new opinion was 
more realistic.”15 
 
The German government was unconvinced and decided that negotiations must continue. 
Wilson‟s third note brought the situation to a head: essentially it stated that the USA would 
enter into negotiations, but not while the Kaiser and OHL continued to dictate policy: “if it 
had to deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats then America would 
demand not peace negotiation but surrender.”16 
 
This was the end for Ludendorff: he and Hindenburg issued a proclamation to the army 
denouncing, as they saw it, Wilson‟s threat of unconditional surrender, and imploring the 
soldiers to continue their resistance. This document blatantly undermined the authority of the 
Chancellor and his government and on 26 October the Kaiser dismissed Ludendorff, 
replacing him with Wilhelm Groener,
17
 who was recalled from his post as Chief of Staff of 
Army Group Kiev. On arrival in Spa, he soon formed the opinion that the retreat to the 
Antwerp-Meuse line could not be postponed for long. His troops would have to hold out on 
the Hermann Line in order to allow all the vehicles and ordnance currently stranded between 
the two positions to be moved east to safety, or risk losing a huge amount of materiel should 
the retreat come too soon. It was the allied success on the Sambre on 4 November that was to 
precipitate his decision, orders for the retreat being issued that day. 
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So, by the end of the day on 4 November, the German High Command knew that their efforts 
to hold out against Allied attacks until the winter had failed. 
 Am 4. November wurden die Bedingungen für Deutschland endgültig festgesetzt.
18
 
 
Groener was desperate for an armistice: on 5 November he spoke to the cabinet, intimating 
that the army could “hold out long enough for negotiations”, but adding, on the following 
day, that “even Monday will be too late: it must be Saturday19 at the latest”.20 Later that day, 
the German armistice delegates set off for the front. Ideas of a negotiated peace in the spring 
of 1919 with Germany still holding on to occupied territories were dashed.  
 
The situation in Germany was grave: the Navy had mutinied at Wilhelmshaven on 27 
October and this had spread to several other northern ports; within days “most of the 
provincial capitals were in revolutionary hands”.21 It was announced by Max von Baden that 
Kaiser Wilhelm had abdicated and a Republic was declared from the Reichstag building by 
SPD leader Scheidemann on 9 November. The declaration of the abdication was premature: 
Wilhelm only agreed to step down once his generals had been consulted. Thirty-nine of them 
were gathered at Spa and asked whether they would march back to Germany and “recapture 
the homeland”22 in the name of the Kaiser. Only one answered in the affirmative, with fifteen 
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unsure and the rest against. Without the backing of the army, Wilhelm could hang on no 
longer: he left for exile in Holland the following day. 
 
All the political machinations had, by this stage, been rendered irrelevant by the fact that the 
German representatives had already crossed French lines and had been presented with the 
Allied conditions for surrender by Maréchal Foch. These terms had been decided not by 
President Wilson, but by two Allied conferences in Paris, running from 6 to 9 October and 
from 29 October to 4 November. The demands were as follows: cessation of hostilities within 
six hours of signing; evacuation of occupied France and Belgium, including Alsace and 
Lorraine, within two weeks; the surrender of 5,000 artillery pieces, 36,000 machine guns, 
2,000 aircraft, along with rolling stock and military stores. The allies would occupy the left 
bank of the Rhine with substantial bridgeheads at Mainz, Cologne and Koblenz. There would 
be no cessation of hostilities until a signature was received. Matthias Erzberger, leader of the 
German delegation, countered these with a document claiming that the terms were too severe. 
Foch dismissed it, making only minor concessions. A courier was sent back to Berlin 
carrying Erzberger‟s advice that Germany accept the terms. By the time he arrived, Prince 
Max‟s government had fallen. The new Chancellor, Friedrich Ebert, instructed Erzberger to 
sign on any terms. The signature was duly appended at 5:10 a.m. on 11 November. 
 
The Strategic Context 
Being the last large-scale set-piece attack by the BEF in the Great War, the Battle of the 
Sambre fits neatly into the pattern of events that punctuate the Hundred Days, demonstrating 
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the “new operational art”,23 which comprehensively defeated the German army on the 
Western Front. This battle has so far escaped detailed study: it has, as Niall Barr puts it, been 
“overlooked perhaps because of the rush to reach the Armistice which seems to afflict most 
studies of the Great War”.24 It was the last of a sequence of battles that began on 18 July 
1918, not with the BEF, but with the French Tenth Army under General Mangin.
25
 They had 
stopped in its tracks the last German offensive of the war, which had aimed to capture the city 
of Rheims, and turned the tables with a counter attack by 18
th
 Division of XX Corps, 
including American troops from 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Divisions, spearheaded by almost 500 tanks. 
There was no preliminary bombardment, “nothing to warn the Germans of the impending 
assault”.26 A creeping barrage commenced at Zero Hour as the infantry and tanks began their 
advance. The resulting French victory, which cleared German forces from the Marne salient, 
shocked the OHL into suspending all plans for future offensives. “They had lost the initiative. 
The tide had turned irrevocably, and on 2 August 1918 Ludendorff ordered his subordinates 
to adopt a strategic defensive policy”,27 although he also resisted requests to fall back 
immediately to the Hindenburg Line and to begin preparations for a new defensive position 
running from Antwerp to the Meuse. It would therefore be incumbent upon the Allies to push 
the German army back step by step, with the last big effort coming on the banks of the 
Sambre-Oise Canal on 4 November 1918. 
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Haig required Rawlinson, now commanding Fourth Army, to plan an assault that would drive 
the Germans away from the strategically vital rail hub of Amiens. In what was almost a 
throwback to the days of 1916, Rawlinson‟s initial idea was for an advance of seven miles, 
but Haig was looking for something rather more ambitious: twenty-seven miles. What 
emerged was a plan with many similarities to that implemented by the French on the Marne, 
and arguably a scaled-up version of the Battle of Hamel (4 July 1918), a “laboratory for 
ideas”, where Australian and Canadian infantry (again with some American involvement) had 
captured the town in two hours, helped by gas shells, a creeping barrage, sixty tanks and a 
liberal scattering of Lewis Guns and grenade-throwing rifles.
28
  
 
Some historians argue that the assault launched on 8 August 1918 east of Amiens was the 
apogee of this methodology, when artillery, infantry, armour and aircraft were used together 
in “one of the most remarkable days of the war”:29 counter-battery work had severely 
disrupted German artillery capabilities and over 400 tanks had rumbled forward in support of 
the infantry. Over 1,000 aircraft were employed in reconnaissance, ground attack, contact 
patrols, artillery spotting, bombing and the suppression of German aerial response. An 
advance of around six to eight miles was achieved with casualties of around 48,000 (33,000 
of those being taken prisoner or missing) inflicted upon the defenders. 
 
This kind of effort took its toll, however. Advances on subsequent days struggled against 
stiffening German resolve as reserves were rushed in from other sectors to stem the tide.
30
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The levels of artillery support could not be maintained and on the second day, less than half 
the tanks were still operational. “Almost as significant as the attack itself, however, was its 
suspension.”31 On 11 August Rawlinson called a halt. Foch was all for a resumption of the 
attack at the earliest possible moment, but Haig resisted these demands. “The Allies would no 
longer batter away along the same sector beyond the point of diminishing returns. The secret 
of success lay not only in the new technology and good preparation, but also in a willingness 
to halt while the going was good before starting again elsewhere.”32 
 
Gary Sheffield calls the Battle of Amiens “an unrepeatable one-off”.33 Indeed, British 
commanders would never be able to call upon such numbers of armoured vehicles again: by 4 
November the Tank Corps could only muster forty tanks to support the planned attack. 
Diminishing hours of daylight and adverse weather conditions would also restrict RAF 
involvement as the summer turned into autumn. The BEF fell back inevitably on the two 
mainstays of contemporary operational practice: artillery and infantry.
34
 
 
Ten days later the emphasis shifted to Third Army, who opened the Battle of Albert. This was 
not a repeat of Amiens, but showed that the “optimum conditions” of 8 August “were not 
essential for success”, and that “[s]tandard British Divisions with weaker artillery and 
armoured support could win dramatic victories as well”.35 
 
                                                 
31
 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p.426 
32
 Ibid, p.427 
33
 Sheffield, The Chief, p.308 
34
 See Boff. Winning and Losing on the Western Front, pp.245-46  
35
 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 308 
39 
 
Fourth Army took up the cudgel again astride the Somme two days later and on 2 September 
the Canadians “smashed one of the strongest German defences”,36 the Drocourt-Quéant Line. 
By the evening of the same day, Australian troops had captured Mont St Quentin and the 
town of Péronne was in their hands. OHL immediately ordered Below‟s Second Army to 
retreat to the Hindenburg Line, other Armies following suit in the next few days. At an OHL 
conference at Avesnes on 6 September, Lossberg
37
 suggested an immediate withdrawal to the 
Meuse. Ludendorff would not countenance such advice, even if it was “sensible and 
realistic”.38 Instead he ordered the construction of the „Hermann Stellung‟, part of which 
would form the defences assaulted on 4 November. 
 
Allied attacks continued: the Franco-American offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector began 
on 26 September; British First and Third Armies launched attacks towards Cambrai the 
following day and on the 28
th
, Belgian and British forces pushed eastwards from what 
remained of the Ypres Salient. By this time, the Allies were facing an enemy who no longer 
had sufficient reserves available to replace losses, and although allied losses were also 
mounting, “Foch would accept the reciprocal wearing down of his own forces‟ fighting 
strength, secure in the knowledge that a steady supply of new American divisions [ ... ] would 
be able to support them if the French and British armies could not complete his grand design 
that year.”39 
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On 29 September, in what was another set-piece attack – the British had been nibbling away 
at the German defences in the days leading up to the attack in order to establish realistic 
jumping-off positions – the Fourth Army “punched through” the Hindenburg Line, the 
highlight being IX Corps‟ audacious crossing of the Canal du Nord: “46th Division‟s assault 
[here] unhinged the German position. A three-mile deep gash had been ripped in the 
Hindenburg Line.”40 Six days later the BEF was “through the last of the prepared defences 
and could look to contesting „unfortified‟ ground”.41 Other „fortified‟ positions, even if 
hastily prepared, would cause the BEF to pause and prepare further „set-piece‟ assaults. 
 
It was becoming clear to Haig, if not to the politicians in London, that a victory in 1918 was 
possible. Henry Wilson (CIGS) had warned Haig that incurring heavy losses against the 
Hindenburg Line would be unacceptable and a memorandum from Churchill had advised the 
conservation of resources in readiness for 1919 and 1920. Haig replied to the latter on 3 
October, re-emphasising his desire to “beat the enemy as soon as possible”, having scrawled 
“What rubbish” on the original document adjacent to the mention of 1920.42 
 
It was also becoming clear that the onus for this victory lay squarely with the BEF: the 
offensives in Flanders and the Meuse-Argonne sector having stalled owing to serious 
logistical problems, decisive results could best be achieved against the sector facing the 
British Third and Fourth Armies and French First Army. Haig consulted Byng and Rawlinson 
on 1 October and recorded in his diary that “both consider that Enemy has suffered very 
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much and it is merely a question of our continuing our pressure to ensure his breaking”.43 It 
was a question of how many more setbacks the German army suffered, and which one would 
prove ultimately decisive. It would be the fourth, the Battle of the Sambre, that would cause 
the crumbling house of cards finally to collapse. 
 
Cambrai fell on 9 October and the forcing of the Selle river began eight days later, the BEF 
coming up against stronger than anticipated resistance.
44
 The Germans had, however, begun 
construction of the Hermann Stellung on 30 September and assurances were given that 
“within eight days artillery positions could be posted, sites selected for anti-tank guns, and 
dug outs and machine gun nests built”.45 The reality fell somewhat short of these estimations: 
by the end of October “nowhere had there been the time to construct the concrete dug outs 
and pill boxes and string out the acres of barbed wire that might have held the Allies up for 
any extended period”.46 The Germans would instead rely on natural obstacles such as forest, 
water courses and fortified villages to prevent any breakthrough. Douglas Haig, his forces 
taking a logistics-enforced breather after inching their way during that month up to the 
Sambre-Oise Canal and the Forêt de Mormal, was of the opinion that the job was not yet 
done. On the other side of the canal OHL believed in the possibility of continued resistance: 
Hindenburg still thought that all was not yet lost. The Battle of the Sambre was acquiring 
crucial significance. 
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The Operational Context 
An army does not suddenly acquire the skills and techniques to defeat its enemy. The 
learning process had been a long and tortuous one: Professor William Philpott defines the 
term „learning curve‟ as “a process of improvement based on battlefield experience”.47 The 
phrase appears to have been coined by Professor Peter Simkins in 1991
48
 and was meant as a 
shorthand term for rejecting the „Lions led by Donkeys‟ approach adopted by some 
historians. It has been criticised as being too simplistic, but the basic principle is now 
commonly accepted in academic circles. It is equally understood that the process was neither 
smooth nor constant. Philpott asserts that it was a “dynamic process of adjustment to new 
technologies, more sophisticated and flexible tactics, novel operational doctrines, complex 
logistics and fundamental change in the systems of command, control, communications and 
intelligence”.49 Christopher Duffy challenges the idea that the learning curve was a smooth 
one, declaring that “it was more of a series of steps, some of which led downwards”50 - these 
would include the failure to learn from the successful use of artillery in the opening phase of 
the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10 March 1915, when a short but intense bombardment of 
sufficient concentration allowed the attacking troops to break into the German forward 
positions – but it is correct to say that the curve was both steep and significant. Paddy Griffith 
argues that “the first two years of the [ ... ] war effort [ ... ] represent the time of greatest 
amateurism, blundering and fumbling”51 and later asserts that pamphlet SS143 (February 
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1917) was “a stormtrooper‟s handbook”.52 It is argued by Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray that 
some of the developments achieved by the BEF represent a “Revolution in Military Affairs”, 
particularly in the fields of artillery and airpower, adding that “operations in 1914 looked 
back to Napoleon. In 1918 they were very different”.53 
 
The concept of multiple learning curves is a compelling one: the advances ranged widely in 
the areas of infantry tactics, developments in weapon technology, the invention and 
integration of light machine guns, grenades, mortars, tanks and aircraft; the emergence of the 
platoon as an effective fighting formation, a miniature all-arms unit in its own right as it 
evolved to include rifle grenade and Lewis Gun sections. Field survey and the consequent 
production of large-scale maps became vital to the planning of infantry attacks and artillery 
barrages. Battlefield communication remained problematic throughout the war: wireless 
technology never properly replaced the need for visual signalling or the simple „runner‟. In 
the field of artillery emerged the creeping barrage, improved fuses and effective counter-
battery work.
54
 Training pamphlets proliferated and lessons learnt were disseminated and 
integrated into infantry training schemes. At the operational level in 1918 the BEF was 
capable of maintaining a high tempo of attacks that the Germans could not withstand; 
sufficient materiel and a logistics system capable of delivering it; the decentralisation of 
command in order to allow the „man on the spot‟ both input into planning and the freedom to 
improvise on the battlefield;
55
 the gradual move from successive deep assaults aimed at 
breakthrough that characterised most allied attacks of 1915-17 to sequential, limited 
offensives on a widening front through the summer and autumn of 1918 -  a programme of 
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rolling „bite and hold‟ operations. The acceptance that the German Army could not be 
defeated by one single blow
56
 was slow to reach prominence: there was no sudden damascene 
conversion of the General Staff. Bite and hold had been suggested by Lieutenant-General Sir 
Henry Rawlinson (commanding IV Corps) and Major-General Sir Thompson Capper 
(commanding 7
th
 Division) for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, but Sir Douglas 
Haig (then commanding First Army) insisted on deepening the range of objectives to include 
Aubers Ridge. The break in succeeded, the breakthrough did not.
57
 The “chimera” of the 
breakthrough
58
 persisted, and British soldiers were sacrificed on its altar at Aubers Ridge, 
Festubert, Loos, Somme and the early phases of Third Ypres. Attacks with limited objectives, 
such as Bazentin Ridge (14 July 1916), Flers-Courcelette (25 September 1916) and Messines 
Ridge (7 June 1917) are notable for their scarcity, but Simon Robbins asserts that the General 
Staff became more predisposed to the latter method by the second half of 1917,
59
 with 
Plumer‟s successive, methodical and limited assaults through September and October 1917 
on the approaches to the Passchendaele Ridge lighting the way forward.
60
 Indeed, Haig had 
told a conference of Army Commanders at Doullens on 7 May 1917 that he “intended to use 
„step by step‟ methods” and an official communication to Armies on 7 August 1917 
“advocated striking a series of blows in each of which „our furthest objective must not only 
be within the power of our artillery, but within the power of our infantry‟”.61 
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The Battle of Amiens, 8 – 11 August 1918, is often cited as the high point of British 
operational „all-arms‟ art, but it also serves to illustrate the General Staff‟s disinclination to 
persist in the idea of the breakthrough when Haig brought it to a halt after four days, as 
diminishing returns and stiffening German opposition persuaded him to defy Foch‟s order to 
continue. Thereafter it was a series of “shallow battles” that defeated the German Army in 
autumn 1918 rather than “futile attempts to fight deep battles of penetration”.62 
 
Jonathan Boff suggests, however, that the use of “combined arms declined” through October 
and November 1918,
63
 leaving the infantry and artillery as the major components of an 
assault as they came to terms with dwindling numbers of available tanks, problems associated 
with a struggling logistics system, the curtailments of RAF involvement as daylight hours 
shortened, less favourable terrain (including forest and water courses) and suggests a renewed 
“de-skilling” of the BEF by persistent high casualty rates.64  
 
This study will illustrate and expand the main points of this contention, while taking issue 
with the final point, showing that the British Army, by the end of the war, had progressed to a 
point where it was able to adapt to circumstances and defeat the German defenders with 
whatever means were at its disposal, unhampered by the absence or paucity of certain 
weapons or where their use was prohibited or limited by topography or weather. It will also 
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show, however, that whereas some units had “reached [this] high level of sophistication, [ ... ] 
some had not”.65 
 
This thesis will locate the Battle of the Sambre firmly on the learning curve, demonstrating 
that the BEF had developed tactics that were well-suited to the prevailing conditions and that 
developments in weapons technology, along with a renewed faith in the doctrine of fire and 
movement were well understood, on the whole, and that the integration of artillery, tanks and  
aircraft with the infantry, plus the ingenuity and bravery of the Royal Engineers combined to 
defeat the German Army and push it from its last prepared defences on the Western Front.  
 
Any attempt to discern a smooth learning process for the British Army within this series of 
encounters would prove difficult: the tempo of the attacks differed, owing to logistical issues, 
geography, the rate of German withdrawal and the strength of their defensive positions. On 
occasion it was deemed advisable to be at the Germans‟ heels. At others, an operational pause 
prior to an assault on prepared defensive positions was preferred, if indeed it was not imposed 
by external factors. The battles of Canal du Nord, Selle and Sambre are examples of the 
latter, where substantial topographical obstacles, such as water courses or forests, faced the 
attacker. The need for artillery pieces and sufficient ordnance to be brought forward to ensure 
that well-coordinated and appropriately heavy artillery support along a broad front could be 
relied on was required at a time when the British transportation system was beginning to 
reach breaking point.
66
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The British had also known for a long time that artillery support was by far and away the 
most vital requirement for operational success, and were forced to respect the limitations of 
the logistical systems and thereby abandoned the idea of breakout: “the BEF settled on the 
less glamorous, but more logistically feasible, limited-objective, set-piece attack”.67 They 
were not going to repeat their mistakes of 1915 – 17, nor those of the German offensives of 
Spring 1918. Bite and hold, albeit on a large scale, was the way forward. 
 
The concept of „bite and hold‟ is summed up by Paddy Griffith as “occupy[ing] a limited 
portion of the defender‟s front line before the latter could react. The attacker could then 
rapidly revert to a defensive posture on his newly won position, to beat off the inevitable 
counterattacks”.68 Peter Simkins adds the longer term view to this tactic: “...the BEF would 
capture a section of the German trenches, hold it against counter attack and – when the 
enemy had exhausted themselves – carry out the process again”.69 
 
Defeating the German army by such means would be a long and costly business, and British 
High Command clung onto the hope of breakthrough and cavalry exploitation even as realism 
slowly began to set in. Assaults with limited objectives and with any advance not exceeding 
the range of the attacker‟s artillery had proven successful as early as March 1915 at Neuve 
Chapelle, even if bite and hold was not the original intention. Bazentin Ridge and Delville 
Wood in July 1916, Vimy Ridge in April 1917, Messines Ridge two months later and the 
                                                 
67
 Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919,  pp.201-202 
68
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics, p.32 
69 Peter Simkins, From the Somme to Victory, p.43 
48 
 
three limited offensive battles of Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde in September 
and October 1917, just before Third Ypres ground to its costly and exhausting conclusion, all 
serve as examples of the efficacy of this “not only entirely sensible but probably [ ... ] only 
successful form of warfare which lay open to Britain”.70  
 
By 1918, once the German offensives had again proven that breakthrough was beyond the 
capabilities of either side, the Allies, now fighting a war with almost unlimited materiel 
available, were able to “conduct a series of operations, both concurrent and sequential, which 
allowed [them] to place enormous pressure on the German defenders. It enabled the 
tactically-effective bite and hold techniques [ ... ] at long last to have operational 
significance”. 71 It was by this method that the BEF finally defeated the German Army. 
 
The Battle of the Sambre does not, however, fit neatly into the accepted definition of bite and 
hold: by November 1918, as this thesis will illustrate, the „bite‟ was effective; the „hold‟ was 
almost unnecessary, as the risk of counter attack had all but disappeared. As a result, the 
„bite‟ stages could be extended and there was the acceptance that three forward bounds, as 
brigades leapfrogged each other onto increasingly distant objectives – the last of those with 
(or occasionally without) improvised artillery support – constituted a good day‟s work. 
German units, by the end of 4 November 1918, had received orders to withdraw, so not only 
had the threat of counter attack evaporated, but also any objectives not gained that day as 
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troops declined to over-extend themselves were often taken unopposed the following 
morning. “Tactical possibilities were at last allowed to dictate the course of events.”72 
 
By November 1918 most of the nails had already been driven into the German coffin: the 
Third and Fourth Armies were about to hammer in the final, decisive one and the fighting 
after 4 November 1918 took on a very different character. General Rawlinson wrote in 1919 
that the “rapidity with which the armistice was forced upon the enemy [ ... ] was the direct 
consequence of overwhelming defeat on the field of battle”.73 Sir Archibald Montgomery 
states that the Battle of the Sambre was instrumental in breaking the enemy‟s resistance, 
adding that “after this defeat, the German forces had no alternative but to fall back along the 
whole front, and the Allied pursuit only required to be pressed home in order to compel the 
enemy to accept whatever terms the Allies were prepared to offer”.74 From 5 November a 
completely new „end phase‟ of the Hundred days emerged. The German army, whose 
battalion strength was now estimated at an average of 150 men,
75
 was beaten and in full 
retreat. Its fleeing infantry, screened largely by machine gun teams and occasionally artillery 
batteries, made a series of temporary stands where battlefield topography allowed, along the 
line of watercourses, railway lines and embankments
76
 or in farm buildings and villages. All 
the BEF had to do, it seemed, was to continue to pressure the German rearguards, giving 
them no opportunity or time to create another viable line of resistance. 
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There is a great deal of compelling evidence in both contemporary and secondary sources that 
this „end phase‟ was one of „pursuit‟ by the BEF. Indeed, the title of the chapter in the British 
Official History covering events from 5 – 7 November 1918 is entitled “The Pursuit after the 
Battle of the Sambre”.77 Fourth Army War Diary of 5 November states that “yesterday‟s 
success [was] exploited along the whole army front. [ ... ] With the exception of isolated 
machine gun nests there was no opposition”.78 VI Corps War Diary also states that “the 
enemy not offering much resistance except for the machine Guns covering his rear Guards 
(sic)”.79 In divisional war diaries phrases such as “without opposition”, “little opposition 
met”, “resistance slight or negligible” and “progress unopposed” are numerous. The Germans 
had no reserves left: the additional losses of men and materiel on 4 November meant that no 
units of “fighting strength” were available to send forward.80  
 
Jonathan Boff describes the BEF‟s advance as a pursuit, but adds that the rate of advance was 
never spectacular, “at least two miles per day, but never more than three”.81 There are reasons 
for this: firstly, German resistance in some places was stubborn, notably on Third Army 
front, particularly on the banks of the Sambre river north-east of Landrecies and on the 
Hogneau river opposite 24
th
 Division. It was sometimes deemed necessary to assault these 
positions under artillery barrages, with all the inherent delays that this tactic involves. On 
occasion, however, the German units had retired before the prepared assault could go in.
82
 
Secondly, the BEF had to battle against the weather conditions: “The heavy drizzly rain [ ... ] 
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restricted observation and the rate of advance was slow”.83 The rain turned the roads and 
tracks into quagmires. These “dreadful”84 conditions slowed the advance. It was difficult to 
get the guns forward and food and ammunition supplies were subject to serious but 
unavoidable delays. 
 
Thirdly, Jonathan Boff argues that British commanders, perhaps understandably, “took their 
foot off the pedal” after 8 November as it became clearer that an armistice might be 
imminent. By that time the German armistice delegates had arrived behind French lines, but it 
would not be surprising if this phenomenon predated that event. Lieutenant-General 
Fergusson, GOC XVII Corps, is not so kind. His diary entry of 5 November 1918 sums up 
the situation as he saw it: “Wet day. We made very fair progress in the morning, but 
somehow it fizzled out later and the general impression of the whole day was stickiness.”85 
Fourthly, the retreating German army left a trail of destruction in its wake. Roads and 
railways were damaged, bridges were demolished and craters were blown at most road 
junctions. If this were not enough, those men of the BEF toiling to repair them had to face the 
danger of delayed-action mines.
86
 Getting materiel forward was no easy task. The BEF was 
working, by this stage, under logistical, topographical and meteorological constraints, and 
with reduced manpower.  Logistics had dictated a pause after the advances made on 24 – 25 
October. Supplies of ammunition, weapons, food, engineering equipment and other materiel 
had to be brought forward from railheads that had not advanced significantly since the Selle 
crossings of 17 to 25 October. These railheads were around twelve miles from the front line 
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as the crow flies,
87
 but geography dictated that journeys of over fifteen miles were necessary 
to re-supply forward units by road. The roads along which the supplies were being 
transported had until recently been behind German lines, and as the occupiers had paid little 
attention to their upkeep, unprecedented levels of traffic meant that road surfaces were 
continually breaking up, requiring constant maintenance, and thus lengthening journey times. 
There was no shortage of materiel – shipments into France were keeping up with demand – 
but delays were inevitable along the last links of the supply chain.
88
 
 
The experience of the British troops varied depending upon the stubbornness of German 
resistance, which was uneven along both army fronts. Isolated machine gun nests “concealed 
in hedges or enclosures necessitate[ed] in most cases a turning movement for their capture”.89 
Resistance could always be overcome by the advance of troops on either flank. Where 
resistance was met, small unit tactics were up to the challenge. 
 
In places there were echoes of 1914: on IX Corps front, a thin cavalry screen preceded the 
advance, with the infantry of 46
th
 and 32
nd
 Divisions struggling along the roads behind them. 
“The cavalry successfully prevented the enemy‟s rearguards offering any serious resistance 
and captured a number of guns.”90  
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The German retreat continued even as the British advance slowed. By 8 November V Corps 
had lost touch with the enemy and once the Avesnes-Maubeuge road was reached it was 
decided, largely, it seems, for logistical reasons, that the majority of units would halt and 
consolidate their positions, allowing “the task of keeping touch with the enemy on the whole 
[Third] Army front [ ... ] to be taken over by an advanced guard under the command of GOC 
VI Corps. 4 Cavalry Brigade would form a screen”.91 V, IV and XVII Corps troops would be 
responsible for the road, but were ordered to thin out their men and echelon as far back as 
possible “in order to facilitate the supply of the advanced guard”.92 On Fourth Army front 
similar orders were issued and „Bethell‟s Force‟93 was formed and designated as advanced 
guard, 5 Cavalry Brigade forming the screen. 
 
It can be shown, therefore, that the Battle of the Sambre, 4 November 1918, instigated the 
„end phase‟ of the war on the Western Front. The German Army was defeated and forced into 
headlong retreat with no hope of turning back the tide. Rearguards could only delay the 
inevitable for a short time and the rate of the BEF‟s advance was in the end not dictated by 
the strength of German resistance, but by topographical, meteorological and logistical factors. 
 
The Tactical Context 
 
In order for „bite and hold‟ to be effective, there had to be a parallel development of the 
weapons systems that would give attackers the necessary advantage over the defenders. New 
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weapons had to be integrated, often by trial and error, into battle plans. The move toward an 
„all-arms‟ system was inexorable, if uneven.  
 
War accelerates technical and scientific advancements: the British infantryman of 1918 was 
very different from his 1914 counterpart. The overriding problem facing commanders once 
the deadlock of trench warfare had established itself was how to overcome enemy defences. 
Concealment by, and protection of, earthworks, quick firing rifles, machine guns and artillery 
allowed dominance over the attackers who, by necessity, were forced to advance across open 
ground armed only with the weapons they could carry, albeit with the support of their own 
artillery. The problem ranges wider than this purely tactical conundrum: “the [ ... ] object was 
to break through a highly organised defensive system protected by fire-power of hitherto 
unimagined intensity and occupied by some of the best and bravest soldiers in history, 
coupled with the flow of new weapons, new methods, new inventions, and the base 
administrative apparatus that had to be built to support the new citizen armies, and the 
difficulties of training this mass of men who, unlike their opponents, had no military tradition 
– it is hardly surprising that costly mistakes were made, but truly amazing that the efforts of 
the staff and fighting soldiers were finally crowned with such an overwhelming success.”94 
The fire-power balance had to be reversed to favour the attacker, but the development of an 
all-arms system that could deliver this would take time. 
 
Inventions, both lethal and non-lethal, were, sometimes reluctantly, introduced and attempts 
made to integrate them into the operational and tactical art of the attack. In 1914 the 
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infantry‟s „weapons system‟, such as it was, consisted of the rifle, the bayonet and the 
entrenching tool. External support came from artillery that was largely limited to firing 
shrapnel at targets that could be directly observed. By 1918, this arsenal had widened 
considerably to include grenades, rifle-grenades, trench mortars and the Lewis Gun: the re-
organisation of the structure of the platoon to include all these weapons produced an 
integrated combined-arms unit capable of fire and manoeuvre tactics supported by its own 
increased fire-power capabilities. They were supported by an artillery arm firing not only 
shrapnel, but also high explosive, gas and smoke shells; the 106 instant percussion fuse 
allowed easier destruction of barbed wire and other obstacles without cratering the ground; 
the creeping barrage had been developed into a highly sophisticated entity and effective 
counter-battery work was facilitated by aerial photographic reconnaissance, sound-ranging 
and flash-spotting; to these can be added machine gun barrages, tanks, armoured-cars and 
aeroplanes, the latter performing contact patrols, artillery spotting, ground-attack and 
bombing of the enemy‟s rear areas. All these innovations had to be tried and tested through 
the painful and often costly process of trial and error, acquired wisdom in their use being 
disseminated through „after action reports‟ and pamphlets, their efficacy improved through 
training, until a functioning weapons system that crosses inter-service boundaries finally 
reversed the fire-power equation. 
 
Mistakes were made, and two examples will serve to illustrate the point. Long artillery 
bombardments prior to assaults, such as before the first day of the Battle of the Somme, could 
be ineffective and would rob the attacker of the element of surprise: artillery barrages that 
began only as the infantry advanced from their jumping-off positions eventually allowed fire 
and manoeuvre to replace the fire then manoeuvre doctrine that had held sway through the 
56 
 
middle years of the war. This latter system is described by John Bourne as a “crucial 
mistake”.95 
 
The tank was seen by some, after the war, as a potentially war-winning weapon: it took time 
to realise that it was not. Its vulnerability to enemy artillery fire (not to mention mechanical 
breakdown) was illustrated, for example, at Cambrai when tanks were pushed ahead well in 
advance of the infantry resulting in heavy losses for both, the latter from machine guns that 
the tanks had failed to neutralise. It was eventually conceded that the tank “had no effective 
independent role. [It was] essentially [an] infantry support weapon”. 96 They would learn to 
advance together, thus allowing mutual protection. 
 
The battles of Hamel (4 July 1918) and Amiens (8-12 August 1918) are often heralded as the 
shining examples of successful all-arms co-operation on the Great War battlefield. It is not 
within the scope of this work to justify or counter this claim, but it will show how, and to 
what extent, the Battle of the Sambre fits into this paradigm, particularly as it took place in a 
period when “the use of combined arms declined, leaving the infantry and artillery as the 
major components of the assault”.97 
 
To borrow the metaphor of the orchestral score,
98
 this thesis will show that the BEF was 
capable of adapting to circumstances and of mounting a successful assault when some 
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sections of the orchestra were either absent or much reduced in number. “Firepower-based 
combined arms tactics were central to success”99 against a German army that was 
demoralised, out-manned and out-gunned, but the BEF‟s weapons system had reached a level 
of “maturity”100 which meant that victory could be extemporised from what resources were at 
hand. Combined arms need not imply all arms. 
 
Both sides fought the final encounters of the war with dwindling numbers of infantry, the 
Germans having lost a huge number of their best fighting men during their abortive spring 
offensives, being “reduced not just in size but, very markedly, in quality”.101 As mentioned 
above, however, this kind of “mobile attrition”102 also cost the Allies dear. German estimates 
for the end of October 1918 were that French battalions were, on average, 600 strong, the 
British 700, the Americans 1,200 and their own 500.
103
 These figures are backed up by 
Jonathan Boff, who states: “In 37th Division battalions on average went into action with fewer 
than 500 fighting men during the campaign. The Guards Division worked on the assumption 
that even an „up to strength‟ battalion could now place only 400 rifles (including Lewis 
gunners) in the firing line”.104 Average German figures for 17th Army went from 807 in 
February 1918 to 456 by 30 October, but with the caveat that although rifle strength had 
almost halved, “Machine gun firepower declined by less than a quarter”.105 The Germans 
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were to rely more and more on machine guns as the mainstay of their defence as the autumn 
encounters were played out. 
 
The Institutional Context 
The battle frontage was occupied by Third Army (General Sir J.H.G. Byng) in the north, and 
Fourth Army (General Sir H.S. Rawlinson) to the south. Third Army was made up of four 
corps: XVII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir C. Fergusson); VI Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir 
J.A.L. Haldane); IV Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir G.M. Harper) and V Corps (Lieutenant-
General C.D. Shute). Fourth Army had two corps in the line: XIII Corps (Lieutenant-General 
Sir T.L.N. Morland) and IX Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir W.P. Braithwaite). The following 
British divisions formed up in the firing line on 4 November 1918, north to south: 19
th
, 24
th
, 
Guards, 62
nd
, New Zealand, 37
th
, 17
th
, 38
th
, 18
th
, 50
th
, 25
th
, 32
nd
 and 1
st
, the first eight listed 
being part of Third Army, the rest belonging to Fourth Army.
106
 
 
All these divisions had been involved in attacks launched since 8 August – a total of 332 
between them, the New Zealanders being the most frequently engaged on forty-two 
occasions, the 19
th
 Division at the other end of the scale on twelve. Their success rates can be 
seen in the bar-chart overleaf.
107
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The selective use of statistics can prove almost anything, but it is interesting to note that eight 
out of the thirteen divisions crowd into the 75 – 60% success rate bracket. Only three exceed 
this figure and two fall short. The disappointing performances of 17
th
 and 32
nd
 Divisions on 4 
November do provide instant correlation, however.
108
 Paddy Griffith identifies the elite 
„assault spearhead‟, naming most of the Regular divisions, but only the 18th and 19th from our 
list.
 109
 
 
 
The efficacy of a unit is often linked to the reputation of its commanding officer. John 
Bourne asserts that the quality of the army‟s „middle-management‟ was , by 1918, high, most 
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of those then in command of battalions, brigades and divisions having survived, learnt and, 
tellingly, proven themselves where it mattered, on the battlefield. They were in position on 
merit. It is perhaps enlightening to take a snapshot of this middle-management layer of Third 
and Fourth Armies in November 1918. 
 
The average length of service of the six corps commanders was 316 days, Fergusson of XVII 
Corps having served longest with 894 days, with Haldane of VI Corps a close second with 
819, whereas the rest had only 690 days between them, with Braithwaite of IX Corps having 
only been in post since the middle of September 1918.
110
 
 
Divisional commanders had been in position, on average, for 445 days, the three longest 
serving being  Russell (New Zealand Division), 1086 days, Strickland (1
st
 Division) 876 
days, and Robertson (17
th
 Division) 845 days. Pure length of service was no guarantee of 
quality, however. Indeed, 25
th
 Division, which had been recently reconstituted, faced one of 
the more challenging tasks on 4 November – a 2,000 yard opposed advance, followed by the 
forcing of a canal crossing and the capture of a town, all of which were completed 
successfully – and was commanded by Major-General J.R.E. Charles, who had been 
appointed only three months before. 
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The position of Brigadier-General was inevitably more fluid: average time spent in post being 
203 days. Of the thirty-eight brigade commanders, only ten had been there for more than ten 
months. Ten had tenures of less than two months. 
 
A full analysis of all commanders‟ career paths is beyond the scope of this work, but two 
examples of divisional commanders will serve as pointers to the calibre of men who planned 
and led the attack on 4 November. The choice of 1
st
 and 17
th
 Divisions will contrast a regular 
and a „New Army‟ formation, the former performing well throughout its involvement in the 
Hundred Days advance, the latter struggling to implement the latest tactical methodology and 
performing less well as a result. 1
st
 Division had experienced no outright failures in the attack 
during the summer and autumn of 1918, whereas 17
th
 Division had made no progress at all in 
almost a quarter of its engagements, succeeding in less than half. 
 
1
st
 Division had been involved in the war since the Battle of Mons and the subsequent retreat. 
It saw action in, amongst others, First Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Loos, Somme, Third Ypres and 
Lys. During the advance to victory it joined Fourth Army from First Army on 11 September 
and then spent the best part of a month in the front line, taking part in the Battle of Epéhy, the 
advance to and capture of the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Beaurevoir. Thirteen days 
out of the line was followed by the crossing of the Selle, with 1
st
 Division troops reaching the 
outskirts of Catillon on the west bank of the Sambre-Oise Canal. 
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The division had had six commanding officers during the war, Major-General A.E.A. 
Holland being the longest in post, from 11 September 1915 to 12 June 1916, before Major-
General Strickland took over and then remained in command for the rest of the conflict. 
 
Edward Peter Strickland („Strick‟) was born on 3 August 1869 and was educated at Warwick 
School. He was commissioned into the Norfolk Regiment in 1888 and served in Upper 
Burma before fighting at Atbara and Omdurman in 1898. Service then took him to Nigeria 
where in 1909 he commanded the North Nigeria Regiment. At the outbreak of war in 1914 he 
was in India, commanding 1
st
 Battalion Manchester Regiment, part of the 8
th
 Jullunder 
Brigade, 3
rd
 (Lahore) Indian Division. They reached the Western Front in October 1914, just 
in time to meet the German onslaught at First Ypres. By the time of the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle, Strickland was in command of the Jullunder Brigade. He also took them through 
Second Ypres in April 1915, before assuming command of 98 Infantry Brigade, 33
rd
 Division 
on 16 November that year. On 12 June 1916 he was promoted to command 1
st
 Division. 
Between August and November 1918, the division took part in sixteen opposed attacks, 
succeeding almost seventy percent of the time, and failing completely in none.
111
 It is surely 
not by accident that 1
st
 Division was given one of the more demanding sectors of the attack 
frontage on 4 November – the forcing of the canal at Lock No.1 and the capture of Catillon, 
one of the few places where German troops were still occupying the western bank of the 
canal.  
 
17
th
 Division came into being as part of Kitchener‟s Second New Army in September 1914. It 
was sent out to France in July 1915 and spent some time in the trenches in the Ypres Salient 
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before taking part in the actions on the Somme the following summer, then at Arras and the 
latter stages of Third Ypres during 1917. They were involved in stemming the German 
„Operation Michael‟ offensive in March 1918, and after three months‟ respite were almost 
continually involved in the „Hundred Days‟ advance, being instrumental at Albert, Bapaume, 
Havrincourt, Epéhy, Cambrai and the Selle. In August alone, the division had lost “over 30 
per cent of [its] officers and men”,112 and this almost continuous involvement in the front 
lines meant that opportunities for training were very limited. 
It had hoped for three weeks of open warfare practice in early August, but was instead 
called up as a possible reserve for the Amiens attack. Consequently, it was „not up to 
that [standard] required for successful open warfare offensive operations. The main 
deficiencies were lack of tactical knowledge, which resulted in formations not being 
adapted to suit ground, and a lack of power to apply the principles of fire and 
movement, also a lack of intelligent patrolling‟.113 
 
Their commanding officer on 4 November was Major-General Philip Rynd Robertson, 
nicknamed „Blobs‟. He was commissioned in the Cameronians in 1886 and took the 1st 
Battalion of that regiment to war as Lieutenant-Colonel in 1914. In June 1915 he was 
promoted Brigadier-General and took command of 19 Brigade. Its only involvement in major 
offensive action during his tenure was at the Battle of Loos in September that year. It was 
here that he demonstrated his readiness to challenge higher authority, firstly requesting that 
the release of gas on his front be cancelled on account of unfavourable climatic conditions
114
 
and two days later calling off an infantry attack on his own authority after some of his 
officers had pointed out to him the futility of the exercise. As John Bourne has written, “Self 
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confidence of this kind was unusual in brigade commanders at this stage of the war”.115 
Robertson was promoted to command of 17
th
 Division on 13 July 1916 at the age of 50. “He 
treated his new command as if it were a big battalion”,116 his style of command emphasising 
discipline and efficiency. This regular army approach did little to make him popular amongst 
the men of this New Army division, but he “had only contempt for popularity”.117 The 17th 
Division may have been efficient, but innovative and forward-looking it was not. Jonathan 
Boff asserts that “Divisions [ ... ] began the [Hundred Days] campaign at different stages of 
readiness”.118 17th Division may well have been rather low on that list: German intelligence 
reports of 13 and 20 October 1918 concluded that 37
th
 Division was “fully battle-worthy”, 
with 38
th
 Division “average”, but 17th Division “creates no good impression”.119 
 
Why were these particular thirteen divisions in the front line on the morning of 4 November 
1918? In some cases, it was just „their turn‟ – 17th Division and 21st Division had been 
„leapfrogging‟ each other for most of the autumn and in that sector 21st Division had 
spearheaded the attack on 23-24 October that had pushed the front line to the edges of the 
Forêt de Mormal.
120
 This pattern was repeated along most of the Third Army front: of the 
divisions involved in the attack on 24 October,
121
 only the 19
th
 was expected to be in the 
firing line on 4 November. On Fourth Army front, a different story emerges: on 24 October, 
1
st
, 18
th
 and 25
th
 Divisions took part in the attacks. All three, plus 32
nd
 and 50
th
 Divisions, 
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were to be first out of the blocks eleven days later. Byng, it would seem, was happy for his 
formations to be rotated; Rawlinson was more selective. 
 
The decision to attack on or around the 4 November was of course Haig‟s. Definite orders 
were not issued until 29 October, but a glance at Rawlinson‟s papers reveals a longer process. 
On 25 October he writes: “I cannot force the passage of the canal here until Debeney122 
comes up on my right and he is very, very slow”.123 
 
Three days later it is clear that he had discussed the assault with Byng, saying that “He quite 
approved and will issue an order on the subject”. He continues: “The plans for the next attack 
are quite good – Hope we shall be able to carry them out before the Armistice comes”.124 
 
He was able to approve his Corps Commanders‟ schemes at a Fourth Army conference held 
at Busigny the following day. The date for the attack was settled. After the conference, “after 
tea, [he] went out to III Army to arrange zero hour and the new boundary which shorten[ed 
his] front considerably”.125 Discussions with Third Army did not all go swimmingly: zero 
hour remained a sticking point and on 30 October Rawlinson wrote: 
All arrangements for the attack on the 4 are now practically settled except zero which 
Byng‟s people want to have at 5:30 in the dark.126 I cannot agree for with Tanks this 
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won‟t do. The 25 Dvn have a difficult task at Landrecies for the canal is 2000 yards 
from their starting line.
127
 
 
Rawlinson told Byng the following day that he could not accept a zero hour earlier than 
0615and in the end, zero hours were not uniform.
128
 
 
Rawlinson visited all his divisions on the morning of 3 November and “found everyone in 
good heart and confident of success”. He added his own note of caution: 
He [the Germans] evidently means to put up a fight tomorrow – he has his best Divns 
here on my front including Cyclists, 8, 19 and some Jaeger. The canal is a big 
obstacle and I shall be very pleased if we force all the passages. XIII Corps is going at 
0615 on account of using tanks and wanting the daylight.
129
 
 
Once orders had been issued on 29 October, it was down to Army commanders to draw the 
initial overall objective lines on the map. From there, SS135 (January 1918) had a 
recommended ideal seven-point process: 
1 Corps allots tasks to division and outlines broad artillery plan; 
2 Divisional commander conducts reconnaissance and works up outline plan 
„which will include the task to be carried out by each body of infantry, 
generally how each body is to be disposed prior to the assault, and his general 
intentions as to the action of his reserve‟; 
3 Corps approves divisional plan; 
4 Divisional plan issued to subordinates as „Warning Order‟; 
5 Divisional staff works out details necessary to give effect to plan and issues 
them in a series of „Instructions‟; 
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6 Lower formations issue orders to their subordinates based on these 
„Instructions‟; 
7 Plan is summarised in an „Operations Order‟ under a checklist of up to 
fourteen headings, and issued to subordinates. „If possible not less than 24 
hours should elapse between the time the order leaves Divisional Headquarters 
and the hour fixed for the operation.
130
 
 
 
In this case, all of the above was to happen within a very short timescale. In reality, of course, 
some formations, including Royal Engineer companies, had been working on the problem for 
some days prior to the 29 October Order. They knew that the assault was coming; only the 
actual date was unknown. Infantry units had been patrolling the ground in front of them and 
in places had been able to push their lines forward where German withdrawals allowed. Some 
limited „raids‟ had taken place (not all successful) to improve the jumping off positions for 
the coming assault. The paper trail from GHQ down to individual battalion level can be 
traced in the following example: 
 
 
Example Pathway: GHQ  →  Third Army  → V Corps  → 17th Division  → 51 Brigade  → 
7
th
 Bn Lincolns. 
 
 
Origin / Reference 
 
Date / Time Details 
GHQ: OAD948 29 Oct Order to resume advance on or after 3 
November. 
Third Army: GS 78/4 31 Oct Third, Fourth & First Armies would 
continue the advance, on a date to be 
notified later, towards line Avesnes – 
Maubeuge – Mons. First bound would 
be to line Landrecies – Locquignol, high 
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ground astride Avesnes to Valenciennes 
railway & Rhonelle river, E & NE of 
Jolimetz, spur between Wargnies-le-
Grand & Eth. IV Corps would surround 
Le Quesnoy. 
Third Army: GB 469 & GS 
78/7 
1 Nov Tanks allocated to IV, V & VI Corps. 
8 to V Corps, 5 to IV Corps, 12 
(Whippets) to VI Corps. 
GHQ: OAD 948/1 2 Nov Date fixed for attack – 4 November 
Third Army: GS 78/46 3 Nov / 1125 Zero hour fixed for 4 November. 
Third Army: GS78.38 3 Nov Long range gun programme for 0630 4 
Nov to 0630 5 Nov. 
V Corps: G541 1 Nov / 1100 Notification of conference at Corps HQ 
for GOCs, CRAs, GSOs 1 at 1430 hrs. 
V Corps: G548 1 Nov / 1315 Relief orders – 21 Div to be relieved by 
17 Div. 
V Corps: G556 1 Nov / 1835 GOC 9
th
 Tank Bde to report to 17 & 38 
Divs between 0900 – 1000 on 2 Nov. 
V Corps: Orders 239 & 240 1 Nov / 2245 Details of advance up to Blue, Red & 
Green Line Objectives, including 
allocation of divisions. Appendix A: 
Artillery, Appendix B: Engineers. 
V Corps: Addendum to 
Order 239 (GS 518/24) 
2 Nov Tank allocations, objectives and 
cooperation orders. 
V Corps: Addendum to 
Order 239 (GS 518/43) 
2 Nov Signals, Communications, etc. Use of 
wireless, runners. 
V Corps: Addendum to 
Order 240 (GS 518/71 
3 Nov Operations on Z+1 (5 Nov) 
V Corps: GS 518/57 3 Nov Details of Zero hours. (0545 except for 
right of V Corps – 0615) 
17 Div: Div Order 27 1 Nov / 2000 Orders for relief of 21 Div by 17 Div. 
17 Div: Div Order 28 2 Nov / 0230 Order for resumption of advance, date to 
be notified. Phases 1, 2 & 3 outlined, 
including artillery plan. Appendix A 
adds machine gun barrage plan. 
17 Div: Addendum to Div 
Order 28 
3 Nov / 1500 Tank operations & infantry unit 
movements to assembly positions. 
17 Div: Div Order 29 4 Nov Orders for continuation of attack on Z+1 
51 Bde: Brigade Order 17 1 Nov  Orders for reliefs 2 – 3 Nov. 
51 Bde: Brigade Order 18 3 Nov  Objectives for attack, including maps. 
Dispositions of attacking battalions, 
artillery barrage timings, notification of 
zero hour. 
51 Bde: Brigade Order 19 3 Nov Assembly positions detailed. 
17
th
 Bn Lincolns: 2 Nov Brigade Order 17 received with orders 
for attack. Commanding Officer attends 
Brigade HQ Conference at 1100 hrs. CO 
then meets with his officers and 
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disseminates plan. 
17
th
 Bn Lincolns: „Warning 
Order I‟ issued to 
Companies. 
3 Nov Details of boundaries, direction, 
objectives, formation, assembly & 
communication. 
Appendix B: artillery barrage details 
17
th
 Bn Lincolns: 3 Nov / 1530 Notified of Zero hour. 
 
The amount of paper is not overwhelming, as it had been two years earlier for 1 July 1916, 
when a similar number of divisions had gone into the attack. By this stage of the hostilities, 
much more could be left to lower formations and instructions could be disseminated by word 
of mouth at conferences – by November 1918 the British Army was well practised in 
offensive actions, the average number of attacks made by each of these frontline divisions 
since August 1918 was twenty-five. 
 
Army commanders painted in the broadest of brush strokes: Byng 
gave his Army, as an intermediate objective, the long straight road which runs 
through Pont-sur-Sambre and Bavai (the Bavai road)
131
 which he expected would be 
reached on the 5
th
.
132
 In the path of 4
th
 Corps lay the ancient fortress of Le Quesnoy 
which he ordered to be surrounded but not stormed.
133
 
 
 
Rawlinson pencilled in the two main objectives: 
The first, or red line, extended approximately due north and south from east of Fesmy 
to east of Landrecies, and thence northwards through the Mormal Forest about 3000 
yards from its western edge. [ ... ] The second objective, or line of exploitation, ran 
east of Cartignies, Dompierre and St Remy Chaussée. This was some three miles 
short of the general objective defined by the Commander-in-Chief, namely the 
Avesnes – Maubeuge road, and was considered to be the limit of penetration that 
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could be reached before a halt would be necessary in order to reorganise and complete 
the communications.
134
 
 
  
Corps allocated divisions and devised the artillery plans. Thereafter, divisions, brigades and 
battalions filled in the necessary finer details. These details are contained in the following 
chapters as the actions of each of the six Corps involved are analysed. 
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Chapter 2 
XVII Corps 
 
Introduction 
This chapter shows how XVII Corps was able to adapt a plan of attack to suit the dynamic 
situation along its front, the line of the original first objective becoming the jumping off 
positions at very late notice. With no tanks available the attack was of the (by then) standard 
pattern: infantry units leapfrogging each other under a creeping barrage that began at Zero 
Hour in order to maintain surprise. Command and control was such that a pause could be 
successfully improvised prior to an advance against two fortified villages under an 
extemporised artillery barrage, allowing units to reach their final day‟s objectives with 
relatively few casualties. 
*          *          *          * 
The style of the coming attack was set by a conference of battalion and company 
commanders at 56 Brigade Headquarters on 2 November: “it was the duty of every unit to 
push on in order to gain ground and tactical features irrespective of whatever might be 
happening on the flanks [and] advances were to comprise a series of bounds from one tactical 
feature to another and [ ... ] the unit commander was to use his own discretion to make further 
bounds when he saw the opportunity to do so without waiting for orders. [ ... ] [T]he policy 
was to be to create salients wherever possible. It was to be realised that we were now fighting 
72 
 
against a beaten and partly demoralised enemy who was weak in effectives and therefore not 
likely to put in any strong or determined attack to regain ground lost”.135 
 
The Third Army front, which stretched from Jenlain in the north to just south of the village of 
Englefontaine, itself just west of the Forêt de Mormal, was divided between three Corps: 
XVII Corps (Fergusson), VI Corps (Haldane) and IV Corps (Harper). 
 
Fergusson‟s XVII Corps had been active in support of First Army on the ground between the 
villages of Jenlain and Villers Pol for the previous three days and had already taken some of 
the objectives given it for 4 November. 
 
At 1310 [3 November] XVII Corps had issued orders for divisions in the line to keep 
in touch with the enemy and form a jumping off place for the attack on 4
th
 November. 
At 1530 hrs 24
th
 Division reported their troops advancing to the BLUE objective (i.e. 
LE QUESNOY – JENLAIN road) and an hour later 19th Division reported their troops 
on this line and in touch with 11
th
 Division [First Army] at L.11.c.3.4. XXII Corps 
had reached the line of RAILWAY, JENLAIN – CURGIES with patrols pushed to the 
Aunelle River. 
By nightfall we held the LE QUESNOY – JENLAIN Road and the latter village. 
Hostile artillery fire became heavy from the region E of BRY – ETH. M.G. fire from 
G.8.a and c. The situation of the Corps on our right had not materially altered though 
hostile artillery which had heavily bombarded our positions in the early morning 
ceased about 0500 hrs.
136
 
 
 
The artillery arrangements for the attack required a creeping barrage with lifts of one hundred 
yards every four minutes (see Map 3a), but these were timed to reach the Blue Line two hours 
                                                 
135
TNA: PRO WO95/2077 War Diary 56 Brigade 
136
 TNA: PRO WO95/2077 War Diary 56 Brigade 
73 
 
after Zero. As this was now the jumping off line, hastily adjusted timings had to be sent out to 
the gunners.
137
 
 
 
19
th
 Division
138
 
The 19
th
 Division (Major-General G.D. Jeffreys) on the left of the Corps frontage had 
established themselves on the Blue Line by 1600 hours on 3 November, and “it was decided 
that the „Jumping Off‟ Line for the attack next morning would be the line of the main LE 
QUESNOY – VALENCIENNES road with the opening barrage 5-600 yards beyond it. This 
necessitated withdrawing forward posts and patrols, but it was considered preferable to do 
this than attempt to assemble East of the village”.139 
 
 
The division lined up with 58 Brigade (Brigadier-General A.E. Glasgow) on the left, 56 
Brigade (Brigadier-General R.M. Heath) on the right and 57 Brigade (Brigadier-General 
A.J.F. Eden) in reserve. 56 Brigade had decided at 1830 hours on 3 November that their 
troops on the picquet line along grid line L.18.a.0.0
140
 were to withdraw to the line of the 
Courgies – Jenlain road, this running approximately north-west from the latter village, and 
that the barrage opening line would be the original 163 minute line (see barrage map), this 
being chosen in preference to the line of the Petit Aunelle River (another 500 yards to the 
east) as it was impossible to know whether the houses on the eastern edge of the village still 
concealed pockets of enemy troops. Orders were sent to the effect that the withdrawal of 
forward picquets should take place between 0430 and 0515 hours, and it was decided that 58 
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Brigade would take over their portion of the front during the night instead of during the attack 
as had previously been arranged. The 2
nd
 Battalion Wiltshire Regiment took up their front 
line positions on the left, with 9
th
 Battalion Welsh on their right and 9
th
 Battalion Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers in reserve near the Ferme de Wult, ready to move to square L 16.a at Zero. 
All this was contained in a third Addendum to the original orders,
141
 which still at this late 
stage had Zero as 0530 hours. A signal was sent to brigades at 2015 hours (3 November) 
confirming the start line of the creeping barrage and changing Zero to 0600 hours. 
 
 
The rearrangement and subsequent movements were carried out with “considerable 
difficulties”;142 it was an intensely dark, moonless night and it was raining heavily for most of 
it. There were no guides available and the movements were made over unreconnoitred 
ground. Luckily, enemy shelling was conspicuous only by its almost total absence. 
Nevertheless, the brigade was formed up ready to attack by 0115 hours.
143
 Last in place was 
Brigade Headquarters, which was established at the Ferme de Wult at 0530. 
 
The barrage opened at six o‟clock, remaining on the new opening line for ten minutes before 
moving forward at the previously agreed rate. The rain had stopped, but there was a heavy 
mist lying in the valleys that hung around stubbornly for several hours. 
 
 
The 2
nd
 Wiltshires began the attack on a one-company front as the Brigade frontage was only 
500 yards. This expanded rapidly to nearly 2000 yards on the Green Line Objective and 
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necessitated the change to a two-company front as the Petit Aunelle River was crossed. The 
9
th
 Welsh were on a two-company front from the start. 
 
 
The War Diary of the 2
nd
 Wiltshires records that “little opposition was encountered until the 
Petit Aunelle River was reached”.144 This was a “deep stream running between high banks”145  
around ten yards wide and proved to be a “more serious obstacle than was expected”.146 
Bridging it was the responsibility of one section of 94 Field Company R.E.: initially they 
were to use “trees felled at the site or material brought from Jenlain”.147 Subsequently, “every 
effort [was to be] made to render the crossings practicable for guns and limbers”.148 
 
 
The enemy artillery reply was not heavy and could best be described as patchy: the Brigade 
HQ at the Ferme de Wult suffered more than most, this area being “fairly heavily shelled”149 
for the half hour after Zero. Gas shells bursting in the air both east and west of Jenlain gave 
rise to some consternation amongst the men of the reserve battalion (9
th
 Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers) “caus[ing] a good deal of coughing and some sickness, as the valleys very soon 
became full of gas, but no casualties”.150 
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Once on the banks of the Petit Aunelle, main resistance came, unsurprisingly, from enemy 
machine gun fire. The diary of the 2
nd
 Wiltshires puts it simply: “This was overcome.”151  
Once the first troops were across, resistance rapidly melted away, “the German gunners in 
most cases running away and abandoning their guns before the Infantry could get to close 
quarters. A number of machine guns were captured, but very few prisoners”.152 The Diary of 
2
nd
 Wiltshires reports sadly that “2nd Lt. W. F. Virgin “B” Coy was killed in the advance to 
the first objective”.153 
 
 
The men of 2
nd
 Wiltshires and 9
th
 Welsh were able to push on and reached the Green Line 
objective by 1015 hours. Second-Lieutenant French of 2
nd
 Wiltshires then took out a patrol 
and returned with nine prisoners from the outskirts of the village of Eth.
154
 
 
 
 56 Brigade formed up with 9
th
 Battalion Cheshire Regiment on the left, 1/4
th
 Battalion 
King‟s Shropshire Light Infantry on the right and 8th Battalion The Prince of Wales‟s (North 
Staffordshire Regiment) in reserve. 
 
 
To the right of 56 Brigade front, 24
th
 Division commenced its opening barrage at 0530 and 
the enemy reply strayed into the area west of Jenlain where 1/ 4
th
 Battalion King‟s Shropshire 
Light Infantry, on the right brigade front, were waiting until 0600 before they could move. 
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The “heavy annihilating barrage [caused] a large number of casualties”.155 Our barrage came 
down at 0600 and the forward troops moved off, keeping as close to it as they dared. Their 
experience was very similar to that of 58 Brigade to their left: machine gun fire was 
encountered from the eastern bank of the Petit Aunelle River and from the high ground to the 
north and east of the village of Wargnies-le-Grand.
156
 This was eventually suppressed by 
“covering fire from forward troops”157 and the advance continued. The 1/4th KSLI had 
encountered severe opposition during this phase of the action, suffering, according to the 
Battalion War Diary, 110 casualties “on arriving E. of Jenlain”.158 They reached the Green 
Line by 0730 and “consolidated on a line running N[orth] from Wargnies-le-Grand Rly 
Station”.159 
 
 
The 9
th
 Cheshires were able to keep up, although they too had encountered “considerable 
opposition [ ... ] from the river eastwards”.160 Between the two battalions they had bagged 
100 prisoners west of the river and the Cheshires had captured a German field gun which had 
still been in action. They then became victims of their own guns: “on the capture of the Green 
Line considerable trouble was caused by our own barrage falling very short. Some casualties 
occurred and the left company withdrew for a short time”.161 In fact, the Cheshires had got a 
little ahead of themselves and were probably caught up in the protective barrage, where it 
paused in its advance ahead of the second objective (Green Line) and possibly victim to some 
60 pdr shells falling on the village of Wargnies-le-Grand “and its approaches”.162 
 
 
As soon as the protective barrage ceased, this company moved forward again, past its original 
objective and then swung south, moving down the Eth – Wargnies-le-Grand road, taking 
prisoners and capturing machine guns as it went. All this was done under its own covering 
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rifle fire which was trying to suppress enemy fire emanating from the higher ground to the 
north-east of the village. (Square G15.d – see Map 2) 
 
 
We return briefly to the 58 Brigade sector: at noon, the 2
nd
 Wiltshires, still on the Green Line 
to the south-west of Eth, sent out more “strong patrols [ ... ] with a view to clearing the 
village”.163 They were met by considerable levels of retaliatory artillery and machine gun fire 
and had to return to their original positions. Similarly, patrols sent forward by the 9
th
 Welsh 
were able to reach the outskirts of Bry, but “were heavily fired on and forced to withdraw”.164 
At around the same time, the reserve battalion, 9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were ordered 
forward to occupy the ground in squares L12 a & c just to the west of the Petit Aunelle River. 
The move was completed within the hour and the battalion War Diary notes that they found 
more evidence that “the enemy had hastily evacuated, leaving half-consumed meals behind 
them”.165  
 
 
It was becoming clear now that the villages of Eth and Bry, and more importantly the high 
ground to the east of them, were not going to be occupied without a coordinated assault with 
artillery support. An attack along the entire divisional front under a barrage was proposed for 
1630.  
 
The reserve battalion of 56 Brigade was the 8
th
 North Staffords. They had commenced their 
follow-up advance at 0540, this enabling them to cross the Blue Line at 0620. They were 
hampered slightly by thick mist but managed to maintain their direction of march and crossed 
the line only ten minutes late. It was at this point that they ran into the enemy artillery barrage 
of high explosive and gas shells between Jenlain and the Petit Aunelle. They pushed on and 
reached the Green Line, but had suffered a number of casualties including four of their 
officers.
166
 Their advance drew comment from other units: “The steadiness with which the 
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8/N.Staffs R. moved forward through [the barrage] was very praiseworthy and was 
commented upon by officers of other units who observed it”.167 
 
 
Indeed, Jenlain was evidently still not completely clear of German troops as one company of 
the 8
th
 North Staffords was obliged to mop up an enemy machine gun post, taking eight 
prisoners in the process. 
 
 
Such tribulations meant that the battalion reached the Green Line twenty-five minutes late: 
their task was to leapfrog the 9
th
 Cheshires and continue the advance to the Red Line. Such 
was the rigidity of the artillery timetable that their protective barrage had already ceased and 
the men had to go forward with no artillery support at all. In spite of enemy machine gun fire 
and “close „Pip Squeak‟ fire from a Battery just behind Bry”,168 the leading companies were 
able to get forward, advancing by rushes under covering fire from rifles and Lewis guns 
across terrain offering “no cover of any description”,169 as far as the ridge to the north of the 
track running from Wargnies-le-Grand to Bry through square G15 a., north-north-east of the 
village. An attempt was made by two platoons under Lieutenant Harris to force their way 
around the left flank into Bry itself, but they were driven back, having suffered a number of 
casualties. These troops had been out on a limb, their left flank in the air as there was still at 
this time a 600 yard gap to the right flank unit of 58 Brigade which was still struggling up to 
the Green Line. 
 
On the right of the 8
th
 North Staffords a platoon tried to force their way into the northern 
outskirts of Wargnies-le-Grand, but were halted by machine gun fire from the high ground 
east of the village. With the 24
th
 Division to the south still held up at the river, it was deemed 
appropriate to form a defensive flank facing the village. When the author of the 8
th
 North 
Staffords‟ “Account of Operations” was able later to walk the ground over which his 
battalion had advanced, he “counted 7 M.G. positions close to the WARGNIES-LE-GRAND 
– BRY road alone, each with a large pile of empty cases”.170 Up to this point it was estimated 
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that the battalion had suffered over 100 casualties, including two officers killed and two 
others wounded. The author takes up the story again:  
 
I got forward a section of Vickers Guns, but could not find the Advanced Field Guns 
who were unable to cross the river till later. The Coys dug in, and I asked for Artillery 
Support, without which, until the 24th Division came up, I saw it would be impossible 
to advance. The gas through which the men had passed earlier in JENLAIN was 
beginning to affect some of the Officers and NCOs who had been compelled to take 
off their masks from time to time. At 1530 orders were received that the advance 
would continue under a barrage.
171
 
 
 
With the 24
th
 Division held up, and the right flank of the 19
th
 Division, that is the right of the 
8
th
 North Staffords, exposed to machine gun fire from in and around Wargnies-le-Grand, it 
fell to the 9
th
 Cheshires to remedy the somewhat precarious situation. An unidentified 
Company Commander “determined to mop up [ ... ] the village of WARGNIES-LE-GRAND 
and to attack in the rear some hostile MGs located near G15.d.5.0. This was accomplished, 
the whole village being mopped up (a considerable number of prisoners taken) and platoon 
posts established at G15.d.75.25 [on the Wargnies-le-Grand to Bry road] and G15 d.05.50 by 
1000 hours”.172 Orders were given to consolidate the positions held and await developments. 
It was not yet 1030. At around quarter to eleven two sections of Field Artillery came up onto 
the high ground in square G8 (just to the  rear of the Green Line), were placed under the 
command of the 8
th
 North Staffords Commanding Officer and were to be ready to act as anti-
tank guns should the need arise. Just before midday, the guns commenced the first of three 
artillery shoots on the high ground to the west and south of Bry. These were timed at ten 
minute intervals and were designed to neutralise enemy machine gun posts in that area prior 
to the next assault. 
 
 
The orders for the 1630 attack were received at 1420: the advance would recommence under 
a creeping barrage. The order read as follows:  
 
1. 19th Division will continue the attack at 1630 hours today with the object of 
establishing the line of the road LA MARLIERE – BRY – WARGNIES-LE-GRAND. 
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2. 58th Brigade will attack through G3 to G4 and thence along the spur to the road LA 
MARLIERE – BRY. 
3. 8/N.Staffs will attack due EAST to the road from G.16.a.0.0 to cross roads 
G10.d.3.7. 8/N.Staffs will exploit this attack if possible by sending patrols to occupy 
the spur in G16 central in order to make valley in G16.d and b untenable to the 
enemy. 
4. Attack will take place under creeping barrage moving at rate of 100 yds in 4 
minutes. Barrage will open on the line G15.b.9.0.to G9.d.7.0. to A27.c.3.0 and will 
rest on this initial line for 10 minutes. 
5. Heavy artillery and MGs will barrage Eastern slopes of BRY and ETH and sunken 
road in G16 d and G22 b. 
6. A battalion of 24th Division is passing through Southern portion of WARGNIES 
and endeavouring to establish a position in G15 d and G22 a this afternoon AAA 8 
N/Staffs will take advantage of this battalion as a flank guard if in position if not in 
position Staffords will form a defensive flank. 
  7. Zero hour will be 1630 hours. 
             8. Very urgent. Acknowledge.
173
 
 
 
It had been hoped that a smoke barrage would be put down on the slopes to the east of the 
two villages, but it turned out not to be possible in the time available.
174
 
 
 
Brigade orders were then sent to reorganise the battalions for the attack: on the 56 Brigade 
front the 8
th
 North Staffords were to take over the whole of the Brigade front and spearhead 
the attack. The 1/4
th
 KSLI became the support battalion on the Green Line and 9
th
 Cheshires 
moved back to reserve positions on the Petit Aunelle. The 58 Brigade battalions were to 
remain unchanged, 2
nd
 Wiltshires and 9
th
 Welsh going into the attack. The rear companies of 
each battalion would pass through those currently holding the front line positions and lead the 
assault, the former leading companies following in support. The reserve battalion, 9
th
 Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, would occupy the vacated positions on the Green Line at Zero plus five 
minutes. 
 
 
The 1630 attack on the 56 Brigade front can be quickly told: the reserve and support 
companies of the 8
th
 North Staffords (A & D) leapfrogged their forward companies (B & C) 
and gained their objectives, an advance of 5-600 yards, with few casualties and were soon in 
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touch with troops on both flanks. “The enemy apparently ran as soon as the barrage 
opened”.175 Captain A.H. Buch was wounded and Second-Lieutenant Platt missing. 
 
 
 58 Brigade did not have it so easy. The events are best told by the diarist of the brigade: 
 
The enemy reply to our barrage was heavy and very prompt, coming down on the 
ridge in G8 within two minutes of zero. The attack was also met by heavy machine 
gun fire the moment it started. Both Battalions however pushed on though suffering 
heavy casualties. The Support and Reserve Companies of the 9th Welsh Regt suffered 
most severely. The 2nd Wilts Regt also met with considerable opposition in the 
village of ETH itself, and also from machine gun fire from their left flank as the 
attack by the 11th Division [First Army] did not materialise. Eventually the Right 
Company of the 9th Welsh Regt established itself on the objective (the WARGNIES-
LE-GRAND – LA MARLIERE Road) where touch was gained with 56th Brigade. 
The Left Company swung back to join 2nd Wilts Regt who had captured ETH and 
established a line on the slopes East of it, but were unable to gain the crest of the spur. 
The left of the 2nd Wilts Regt was unable to get touch with anyone as (owing 
apparently to their orders not reaching them in time) the 32nd Brigade of the 11th 
Division had not attacked at all. The Support Company therefore formed a defensive 
flank to protect the Left and Rear of the Battalion. About 50 prisoners were captured 
during this attack.
176
 
 
 
The diary of 2
nd
 Wiltshires also adds that “B” Company under Second-Lieutenant Auton had 
the job of mopping up the village after the leading companies had passed through: they 
captured fifty prisoners from the chateau, bringing their total up to sixty for the day, along 
with six machine guns.
177
 
 
The 19
th
 Division had effectively finished for the day. As darkness fell it held a line in 
advance of its Red Line objectives. On the right flank, a line on the road to the east of the 
spur of land north-east of Wargnies-le-Grand had been established where troops had strayed 
into 24
th
 Division territory. The line followed the road northwards to the north-east of Bry, 
whence it continued in a north-westerly direction, more or less on the 100 metre contour line, 
just shy of the crest of the ridge to the north-east of Eth. The remains of the day‟s objectives, 
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and indeed the town of Roisin beyond them, were taken without opposition the following 
morning. 
 
 
Detailed casualty figures for 58 Brigade are not available, but fatal casualties for the 
battalions can be estimated as follows: 
 
 Officers  Other Ranks 
9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers -   - 
9
th
 Welsh Regt -   23 
2
nd
 Wiltshire Regt 1   16 
 
 
Similarly, for 56 Brigade: 
 
 Officers  Other Ranks 
9
th
 Cheshire Regt -   11 
1/4
th
 King‟s Shropshire Light Infantry 1   11 
8
th
 North Staffordshire Regt. 3   19 
 
 
Detailed figures are available for 56
th
 Brigade for the period 2 – 9 November:  
 
 
Unit                                       Officers   Other Ranks 
                                  K              W             M               K             W            M 
9 Cheshires                1               8              -                 12           110          12 
4 KSLI                       2               2              -                 16           104          13 
8 N.Staffs                   4               7              1                21           101            9 
Total                           7             17             1                 49           315          34
178
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That these figures can be considered „light‟ is backed up by a comment made by the diarist of 
the 9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers in their “Short Account of Operations”: “The country in this 
area was wooded and full of steep valleys with small streams through them and would, had 
the enemy meant to fight seriously, have been most difficult and costly to capture”.179 
 
 
 
24
th
 Division
180
 
 
To the south, 24
th
 Division (Major-General A.C. Daly) frontage was quite narrow; originally 
less than a thousand yards, and it was planned that the attack would be made on a single 
battalion front with the 9
th
 Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment leading the assault, the other 
battalions of 73 Brigade (Brigadier-General R.J. Collins) in close support. The frontage 
widened to two thousand yards at the first objective (the Blue Line) and to approximately 
three thousand yards by the time the Red Line, which ran north-west to south-east, was 
reached. The northern divisional boundary snaked in a more or less east-north-easterly 
direction to include most of the village of Wargnies-le-Grand, and the southern boundary 
followed the east-west grid line on the map that ran just to the south of Wargnies-le-Petit. 
(See Map 3) As we have already seen, troops from 19
th
 Division had encroached into their 
neighbour‟s territory by attempting to clear the more northerly of the two Wargnies villages. 
The southern divisional / corps boundary was obviously purely artificial, not conforming to 
any geographical or strategic features and Operation Order No.39 issued by XVII Corps 
Heavy Artillery noted “the lines depicting objectives are purely diagrammatic, the tactical 
features in their neighbourhood form the real objectives, similarly, lines showing CORPS and 
divisional boundaries are only intended as a guide to frontages. They may always be crossed 
for tactical purposes by arrangement with neighbouring Divisions”.181 
 
 
Just as on the 19
th
 Division frontage, 24
th
 Division found themselves facing an enemy in 
retreat on 3 November: “Leading Brigade as advanced guard to push on and keep touch with 
enemy and if serious opposition is encountered an attack in strength supported by Artillery is 
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to be carried out under Divisional arrangements”.182 The 13th Battalion Middlesex Regiment 
pushed patrols forward in accordance with a XVII Corps General Staff order issued at 1310 
hours requiring the advanced units eventually to “form a jumping off place”183 for the 
forthcoming attack and “reached the Blue Line (1st Objective) with little opposition”184 by 
three o‟clock that afternoon. They were ordered “not to advance beyond this line”,185 thus 
removing the possibility of heavy action that day. At 1515 hours the 9
th
 Sussex “were ordered 
to move forward and assemble 1000 yards in the rear of 13
th
 Bn Middlesex Regiment and be 
prepared to attack through the latter at dawn on the 4
th
 inst”.186 
 
 
At 1930 hours on 3 November the modified orders for the attack on the following morning 
were issued. The original, Order No.259, had stated that the “73rd Brigade will capture the 
BLUE and GREEN LINES, as explained to all concerned at yesterday‟s [1 November] 
Brigade Conference. 17
th
 Infantry Brigade will then pass through the 73
rd
 Infantry Brigade 
and will capture the RED LINE”.187 A further advance was a possibility, but this “will 
however only be carried out on the first day on the initiative of Battalion Commanders by 
patrols to maintain touch with the enemy”.188 
 
 
Even at this stage, the new orders were not definitive. Order No. 259/1 still envisaged 17 
Brigade (Brigadier-General G. Thorpe) leapfrogging their comrades on the Green Line to 
take the two villages and the Red Line positions. The reality was fundamentally different: the 
advance all the way to the Red Line was to be the sole responsibility of 73
 
Brigade. The units 
of 17 Brigade got no further forward than the Blue Line on 4 November. Orders received at 
2200 hours that day required them to pass through the 73 Brigade‟s positions and continue 
the advance the following morning. Even so, as the 1
st
 Battalion Royal Fusiliers (17 Brigade), 
having spent most of 4 November in support positions in the valley west of Jenlain and 
Villers Pol (that is, still west of the Blue Line), entered Jenlain to occupy their billets for the 
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night, they encountered enemy shelling which went on sporadically through the night.
189
 
“Casualties were caused as follows: Killed 5 O[ther] R[anks]       Wounded Lt. J.A. CASE 
and 20 OR”.190 
 
 
 
72 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General R.W. Morgan), in reserve, played no active role on 
the day. All three battalions were billeted on the night 4/5 November in the village of 
Sepmeries, some four miles south-west of Jenlain. The War Diary of the 1
st
 Battalion North 
Staffordshire Regiment notes the great interest taken by members of the battalion in the 380 
or so “Boche prisoners” taken and sent back by 73 Brigade.191 Sepmeries was clearly very 
crowded that night, as the diarist of 8
th
 Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment felt it 
appropriate to comment on “very close billeting”.192 
 
 
The 9
th
 Royal Sussex moved forward to their jumping off positions from Sepmeries at 1600 
hours on 3 November. “The march to the Assembly Positions was made through a good deal 
of enemy shelling particularly in the vicinity of VILLERS POL. Enemy machine guns were 
very active whilst Companies were actually getting into their positions. A number of 
casualties were sustained before ZERO by [sic] these MGs”.193 The battalion lined up with 
„C‟ Company on the left, „A‟ Company in the centre, „B‟ Company on the right and „D‟ 
Company in support. 
 
The advance commenced, in artillery formation, along with the artillery creeping barrage, at 
0600 hours.
194
 The barrage advanced at a rate of 100 yards every four minutes: the 18 
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pounders were firing 45 per cent High Explosive, 45 per cent Shrapnel and 10 per cent 
Smoke at a rate of two rounds per minute, the 4.5” Howitzers managing half that rate.195 The 
front line troops managed to evade the worst of the enemy counter barrage,
196
 but 
encountered very heavy machine gun fire, particularly as they crested the ridge to the west of 
the Brickfields (see map, Square G19 d). Casualties were heavy. At 0630 hours “airmen 
reported enemy apparently on the line G20 a 8.2 – G26 a 9.9 with our troops advancing to 
this line in artillery formation”.197 „A‟ and „B‟ companies on the right were held up by 
machine gun fire from their right flank, but „A‟ Company 24th Battalion Machine Gun Corps 
were able to bring their guns forward to Square G26 c, “facing South East to fire across the 
valley in front.
198
 The 73
rd
 Light Trench Mortar Battery were also able to lend support: they 
sent one “Minenwerfer” under Captain H.H. L‟Estrange MC as far as the Jenlain – Villers 
Pol road and, “ascertaining that the 9th Royal Sussex Regiment were held up by hostile MG 
fire pushed forward to engage, picking up two „minenwerfers‟ on the way – Guns came into 
action at 300 yds range + engaged the MG‟s [ ... ] also 2 Heavy MGs later [ ... ] came into 
action on the right of the „minenwerfer‟ guns. The enemy retired over the river...”199 By 0715 
hours the troops were established on the Green Line, except on the extreme right where 
enemy machine gun fire was still a problem. 
 
 
The 7
th
 Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment had been detailed to support the advance of the 
9
th
 Sussex. „B‟ and „D‟ Companies, under Captains B.Wright and J.A. Elliman respectively, 
had moved off at 0300 hours and by 0800 hours had joined the front line troops in their 
positions overlooking the Petit Aunelle River, „B‟ Company supporting the left flank, „D‟ 
Company the right. „D‟ Company had been “caught in the Hun counter-barrage and a number 
of casualties were caused”.200 Captain Elliman was one of the wounded. „B‟ Company had 
“successfully eluded the counter-barrage on the left (N) flank and succeeded in establishing 
themselves in a position which dominated the small bridge over the river AUNELLE. The 
bridge [G21 c 3.9] carried the main JENLAIN – BAVAY road which separated Wargnies-le-
Grand and Wargnies-le-Petit and by concentrated Lewis Gun and rifle fire and by forward 
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patrols they managed to keep it whole”.201 The Germans were still shelling the roads and the 
ridge was being swept by machine gun fire. The advance had stalled. 
 
 
At 1030 hours, BGC 73 Brigade issued verbal instructions to relieve the pressure by 
outflanking both villages: units of 13
th
 Middlesex were to “move round [the] northern 
outskirts of Wargnies-le-Grand and establish themselves on the high ground east of the 
village in G15 d – 16 c and 22 b. 7th Bn Northamptonshire Regt to dribble troops forward 
between the railway and the river in G21 d and then move forward and occupy the high 
ground in G29 central”,202 thus regaining touch with the 13th Middlesex. 
 
 
This assault was to be timed to coincide with the 19
th
 Division attack at 1630 hours, but the 
13
th
 Middlesex had moved forward from Le Coron, where they had concentrated that 
morning, and were able to advance through Wargnies-le-Grand, reaching its northern and 
eastern outskirts by 1545 hours, in effect mopping up positions already overrun by the 9
th
 
Cheshires (19
th
 Division) earlier in the day. Even so, the War Diary reports “considerable 
opposition being experience [sic] from machine guns. Capt. H.R. Mallett MC was 
wounded”.203 They established positions to the east of the village, as planned, by 1730 hours. 
 
The outflanking of Wargnies-le-Petit was entrusted to „A‟ and „C‟ Companies of 7th Battalion 
Northamptonshire Regiment. They were to cross the Petit Aunelle by the very bridge kept 
intact by their comrades in „B‟ Company earlier that day, and “keeping their left on the main 
road” were to “push through the village and then onward to the high ground east of it”.204 
They went forward with „C‟ Company in front under 2nd Lieutenant J.C. Pike and „A‟ 
Company (Captain C.A. Williamson MC) in support. “Machine gun fire was met with but 
overcome by grenades and rifle fire and both companies established themselves well forward 
of the village”.205 
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Meanwhile, „D‟ Company of 9th Royal Sussex had pushed patrols forward through Wargnies-
le-Petit under Lieutenant P.R. Hill and 2
nd
 Lieutenant W. Aldridge at 1600 hours only to find 
that, as in other sectors, opposition had melted away after the initial resistance had been 
overcome and they established touch with the 7
th
 Northants to the east of the village by 1730 
hours. The latter battalion were tasked with one more problem before their work was 
complete for the day. Some German machine guns were still active in the Bois de Ferrière. 
These outposts were successfully overrun during the night and by dawn on 5 November “our 
troops had established themselves on the Red Line along the whole of the Brigade front”.206 
 
 
The two liberated villages, it was noted by the diarist of 7
th
 Northants, were “inhabited by a 
fair number of French civilians”.207 The 24th Division HQ Diary estimates the number at 
around six hundred. The same diarist lists 315 prisoners taken, 15 of whom were Officers.
208
 
The two „minenwerfers‟ of 73rd Light Trench Mortar Battery earlier employed on the high 
ground west of the Green Line were sent forward at 1900 hours “through Wargnies-le-Grand 
and took up positions for the night covering the BAVAY road”.209 
 
 
Casualty figures for the units involved that day were not assiduously recorded by all. Only 
the 9
th
 Royal Sussex noted detailed figures for the 4 November. They were estimated at: 
One Officer (Lieutenant H.G.Welham, „C‟ Company) killed, and, amongst Other Ranks, 35 
were killed, 95 wounded and 5 missing.
210
 
 
 
The 9
th
 Royal Sussex also recorded gallantry awards for the operations commencing 4 
November: 13 Military Medals were awarded to Other Ranks. (To two Sergeants, three 
Corporals, two Lance Corporals, two Signallers and four Privates). 
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Fatal casualties for the Division can be estimated as: 
 
17 Brigade 
1st Royal Fusiliers 5 
8th Queens  - 
3rd Rifle Brigade - 
 
73 Brigade 
9th Royal Sussex 42 
7th Northants  12 
13th Middlesex   8 
 
Total:   67 
211
 
 
 
72 Brigade, in reserve the whole day, suffered no fatal casualties. 
 
 
 
 
If the number of wounded were to be estimated at between two and three times the number of 
fatalities, the resulting figure would be between 134 and 201. Even if the upper figure were 
taken, the number of casualties for the day would still be classified as slight. 
 
Conclusion 
The tactics of fire and movement have been shown to be well understood and implemented 
successfully against some serious opposition, including machine gun nests and fortified 
villages. Such positions were outmanoeuvred and overrun, but commanders were mindful not 
to overstretch their troops, and the pause in front of the ridge and the villages of Eth and Bry 
was instrumental in reducing casualties. The withdrawals of German units in the face of this 
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final push demonstrated that they could not defend their positions in depth and would prove 
to be a common occurrence along the whole front. 
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Chapter 2 
XVII Corps 
 
Introduction 
This chapter shows how XVII Corps was able to adapt a plan of attack to suit the dynamic 
situation along its front, the line of the original first objective becoming the jumping off 
positions at very late notice. With no tanks available the attack was of the (by then) standard 
pattern: infantry units leapfrogging each other under a creeping barrage that began at Zero 
Hour in order to maintain surprise. Command and control was such that a pause could be 
successfully improvised prior to an advance against two fortified villages under an 
extemporised artillery barrage, allowing units to reach their final day‟s objectives with 
relatively few casualties. 
*          *          *          * 
The style of the coming attack was set by a conference of battalion and company 
commanders at 56 Brigade Headquarters on 2 November: “it was the duty of every unit to 
push on in order to gain ground and tactical features irrespective of whatever might be 
happening on the flanks [and] advances were to comprise a series of bounds from one tactical 
feature to another and [ ... ] the unit commander was to use his own discretion to make further 
bounds when he saw the opportunity to do so without waiting for orders. [ ... ] [T]he policy 
was to be to create salients wherever possible. It was to be realised that we were now fighting 
93 
 
against a beaten and partly demoralised enemy who was weak in effectives and therefore not 
likely to put in any strong or determined attack to regain ground lost”.213 
 
The Third Army front, which stretched from Jenlain in the north to just south of the village of 
Englefontaine, itself just west of the Forêt de Mormal, was divided between three Corps: 
XVII Corps (Fergusson), VI Corps (Haldane) and IV Corps (Harper). 
 
Fergusson‟s XVII Corps had been active in support of First Army on the ground between the 
villages of Jenlain and Villers Pol for the previous three days and had already taken some of 
the objectives given it for 4 November. 
 
At 1310 [3 November] XVII Corps had issued orders for divisions in the line to keep 
in touch with the enemy and form a jumping off place for the attack on 4
th
 November. 
At 1530 hrs 24
th
 Division reported their troops advancing to the BLUE objective (i.e. 
LE QUESNOY – JENLAIN road) and an hour later 19th Division reported their troops 
on this line and in touch with 11
th
 Division [First Army] at L.11.c.3.4. XXII Corps 
had reached the line of RAILWAY, JENLAIN – CURGIES with patrols pushed to the 
Aunelle River. 
By nightfall we held the LE QUESNOY – JENLAIN Road and the latter village. 
Hostile artillery fire became heavy from the region E of BRY – ETH. M.G. fire from 
G.8.a and c. The situation of the Corps on our right had not materially altered though 
hostile artillery which had heavily bombarded our positions in the early morning 
ceased about 0500 hrs.
214
 
 
 
The artillery arrangements for the attack required a creeping barrage with lifts of one hundred 
yards every four minutes (see Map 3a), but these were timed to reach the Blue Line two hours 
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after Zero. As this was now the jumping off line, hastily adjusted timings had to be sent out to 
the gunners.
215
 
 
 
19
th
 Division
216
 
The 19
th
 Division (Major-General G.D. Jeffreys) on the left of the Corps frontage had 
established themselves on the Blue Line by 1600 hours on 3 November, and “it was decided 
that the „Jumping Off‟ Line for the attack next morning would be the line of the main LE 
QUESNOY – VALENCIENNES road with the opening barrage 5-600 yards beyond it. This 
necessitated withdrawing forward posts and patrols, but it was considered preferable to do 
this than attempt to assemble East of the village”.217 
 
 
The division lined up with 58 Brigade (Brigadier-General A.E. Glasgow) on the left, 56 
Brigade (Brigadier-General R.M. Heath) on the right and 57 Brigade (Brigadier-General 
A.J.F. Eden) in reserve. 56 Brigade had decided at 1830 hours on 3 November that their 
troops on the picquet line along grid line L.18.a.0.0
218
 were to withdraw to the line of the 
Courgies – Jenlain road, this running approximately north-west from the latter village, and 
that the barrage opening line would be the original 163 minute line (see barrage map), this 
being chosen in preference to the line of the Petit Aunelle River (another 500 yards to the 
east) as it was impossible to know whether the houses on the eastern edge of the village still 
                                                 
215
 TNA:PRO WO95/943 War Diary XVII Corps 
216
 See Map 2 
217
 TNA:PRO WO95/2057 War Diary 19
th
 Division HQ. General Staff  
218
 See Appendix E: an explanation of contemporary map reference conventions. 
95 
 
concealed pockets of enemy troops. Orders were sent to the effect that the withdrawal of 
forward picquets should take place between 0430 and 0515 hours, and it was decided that 58 
Brigade would take over their portion of the front during the night instead of during the attack 
as had previously been arranged. The 2
nd
 Battalion Wiltshire Regiment took up their front 
line positions on the left, with 9
th
 Battalion Welsh on their right and 9
th
 Battalion Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers in reserve near the Ferme de Wult, ready to move to square L 16.a at Zero. 
All this was contained in a third Addendum to the original orders,
219
 which still at this late 
stage had Zero as 0530 hours. A signal was sent to brigades at 2015 hours (3 November) 
confirming the start line of the creeping barrage and changing Zero to 0600 hours. 
 
 
The rearrangement and subsequent movements were carried out with “considerable 
difficulties”;220 it was an intensely dark, moonless night and it was raining heavily for most of 
it. There were no guides available and the movements were made over unreconnoitred 
ground. Luckily, enemy shelling was conspicuous only by its almost total absence. 
Nevertheless, the brigade was formed up ready to attack by 0115 hours.
221
 Last in place was 
Brigade Headquarters, which was established at the Ferme de Wult at 0530. 
 
The barrage opened at six o‟clock, remaining on the new opening line for ten minutes before 
moving forward at the previously agreed rate. The rain had stopped, but there was a heavy 
mist lying in the valleys that hung around stubbornly for several hours. 
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The 2
nd
 Wiltshires began the attack on a one-company front as the Brigade frontage was only 
500 yards. This expanded rapidly to nearly 2000 yards on the Green Line Objective and 
necessitated the change to a two-company front as the Petit Aunelle River was crossed. The 
9
th
 Welsh were on a two-company front from the start. 
 
 
The War Diary of the 2
nd
 Wiltshires records that “little opposition was encountered until the 
Petit Aunelle River was reached”.222 This was a “deep stream running between high banks”223  
around ten yards wide and proved to be a “more serious obstacle than was expected”.224 
Bridging it was the responsibility of one section of 94 Field Company R.E.: initially they 
were to use “trees felled at the site or material brought from Jenlain”.225 Subsequently, “every 
effort [was to be] made to render the crossings practicable for guns and limbers”.226 
 
 
The enemy artillery reply was not heavy and could best be described as patchy: the Brigade 
HQ at the Ferme de Wult suffered more than most, this area being “fairly heavily shelled”227 
for the half hour after Zero. Gas shells bursting in the air both east and west of Jenlain gave 
rise to some consternation amongst the men of the reserve battalion (9
th
 Royal Welsh 
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Fusiliers) “caus[ing] a good deal of coughing and some sickness, as the valleys very soon 
became full of gas, but no casualties”.228 
 
 
Once on the banks of the Petit Aunelle, main resistance came, unsurprisingly, from enemy 
machine gun fire. The diary of the 2
nd
 Wiltshires puts it simply: “This was overcome.”229  
Once the first troops were across, resistance rapidly melted away, “the German gunners in 
most cases running away and abandoning their guns before the Infantry could get to close 
quarters. A number of machine guns were captured, but very few prisoners”.230 The Diary of 
2
nd
 Wiltshires reports sadly that “2nd Lt. W. F. Virgin “B” Coy was killed in the advance to 
the first objective”.231 
 
 
The men of 2
nd
 Wiltshires and 9
th
 Welsh were able to push on and reached the Green Line 
objective by 1015 hours. Second-Lieutenant French of 2
nd
 Wiltshires then took out a patrol 
and returned with nine prisoners from the outskirts of the village of Eth.
232
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 56 Brigade formed up with 9
th
 Battalion Cheshire Regiment on the left, 1/4
th
 Battalion 
King‟s Shropshire Light Infantry on the right and 8th Battalion The Prince of Wales‟s (North 
Staffordshire Regiment) in reserve. 
 
 
To the right of 56 Brigade front, 24
th
 Division commenced its opening barrage at 0530 and 
the enemy reply strayed into the area west of Jenlain where 1/ 4
th
 Battalion King‟s Shropshire 
Light Infantry, on the right brigade front, were waiting until 0600 before they could move. 
The “heavy annihilating barrage [caused] a large number of casualties”.233 Our barrage came 
down at 0600 and the forward troops moved off, keeping as close to it as they dared. Their 
experience was very similar to that of 58 Brigade to their left: machine gun fire was 
encountered from the eastern bank of the Petit Aunelle River and from the high ground to the 
north and east of the village of Wargnies-le-Grand.
234
 This was eventually suppressed by 
“covering fire from forward troops”235 and the advance continued. The 1/4th KSLI had 
encountered severe opposition during this phase of the action, suffering, according to the 
Battalion War Diary, 110 casualties “on arriving E. of Jenlain”.236 They reached the Green 
Line by 0730 and “consolidated on a line running N[orth] from Wargnies-le-Grand Rly 
Station”.237 
 
 
The 9
th
 Cheshires were able to keep up, although they too had encountered “considerable 
opposition [ ... ] from the river eastwards”.238 Between the two battalions they had bagged 
100 prisoners west of the river and the Cheshires had captured a German field gun which had 
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still been in action. They then became victims of their own guns: “on the capture of the Green 
Line considerable trouble was caused by our own barrage falling very short. Some casualties 
occurred and the left company withdrew for a short time”.239 In fact, the Cheshires had got a 
little ahead of themselves and were probably caught up in the protective barrage, where it 
paused in its advance ahead of the second objective (Green Line) and possibly victim to some 
60 pdr shells falling on the village of Wargnies-le-Grand “and its approaches”.240 
 
 
As soon as the protective barrage ceased, this company moved forward again, past its original 
objective and then swung south, moving down the Eth – Wargnies-le-Grand road, taking 
prisoners and capturing machine guns as it went. All this was done under its own covering 
rifle fire which was trying to suppress enemy fire emanating from the higher ground to the 
north-east of the village. (Square G15.d – see Map 2) 
 
 
We return briefly to the 58 Brigade sector: at noon, the 2
nd
 Wiltshires, still on the Green Line 
to the south-west of Eth, sent out more “strong patrols [ ... ] with a view to clearing the 
village”.241 They were met by considerable levels of retaliatory artillery and machine gun fire 
and had to return to their original positions. Similarly, patrols sent forward by the 9
th
 Welsh 
were able to reach the outskirts of Bry, but “were heavily fired on and forced to withdraw”.242 
At around the same time, the reserve battalion, 9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were ordered 
forward to occupy the ground in squares L12 a & c just to the west of the Petit Aunelle River. 
The move was completed within the hour and the battalion War Diary notes that they found 
more evidence that “the enemy had hastily evacuated, leaving half-consumed meals behind 
them”.243  
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It was becoming clear now that the villages of Eth and Bry, and more importantly the high 
ground to the east of them, were not going to be occupied without a coordinated assault with 
artillery support. An attack along the entire divisional front under a barrage was proposed for 
1630.  
 
The reserve battalion of 56 Brigade was the 8
th
 North Staffords. They had commenced their 
follow-up advance at 0540, this enabling them to cross the Blue Line at 0620. They were 
hampered slightly by thick mist but managed to maintain their direction of march and crossed 
the line only ten minutes late. It was at this point that they ran into the enemy artillery barrage 
of high explosive and gas shells between Jenlain and the Petit Aunelle. They pushed on and 
reached the Green Line, but had suffered a number of casualties including four of their 
officers.
244
 Their advance drew comment from other units: “The steadiness with which the 
8/N.Staffs R. moved forward through [the barrage] was very praiseworthy and was 
commented upon by officers of other units who observed it”.245 
 
 
Indeed, Jenlain was evidently still not completely clear of German troops as one company of 
the 8
th
 North Staffords was obliged to mop up an enemy machine gun post, taking eight 
prisoners in the process. 
 
 
Such tribulations meant that the battalion reached the Green Line twenty-five minutes late: 
their task was to leapfrog the 9
th
 Cheshires and continue the advance to the Red Line. Such 
was the rigidity of the artillery timetable that their protective barrage had already ceased and 
the men had to go forward with no artillery support at all. In spite of enemy machine gun fire 
and “close „Pip Squeak‟ fire from a Battery just behind Bry”,246 the leading companies were 
able to get forward, advancing by rushes under covering fire from rifles and Lewis guns 
across terrain offering “no cover of any description”,247 as far as the ridge to the north of the 
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track running from Wargnies-le-Grand to Bry through square G15 a., north-north-east of the 
village. An attempt was made by two platoons under Lieutenant Harris to force their way 
around the left flank into Bry itself, but they were driven back, having suffered a number of 
casualties. These troops had been out on a limb, their left flank in the air as there was still at 
this time a 600 yard gap to the right flank unit of 58 Brigade which was still struggling up to 
the Green Line. 
 
On the right of the 8
th
 North Staffords a platoon tried to force their way into the northern 
outskirts of Wargnies-le-Grand, but were halted by machine gun fire from the high ground 
east of the village. With the 24
th
 Division to the south still held up at the river, it was deemed 
appropriate to form a defensive flank facing the village. When the author of the 8
th
 North 
Staffords‟ “Account of Operations” was able later to walk the ground over which his 
battalion had advanced, he “counted 7 M.G. positions close to the WARGNIES-LE-GRAND 
– BRY road alone, each with a large pile of empty cases”.248 Up to this point it was estimated 
that the battalion had suffered over 100 casualties, including two officers killed and two 
others wounded. The author takes up the story again:  
 
I got forward a section of Vickers Guns, but could not find the Advanced Field Guns 
who were unable to cross the river till later. The Coys dug in, and I asked for Artillery 
Support, without which, until the 24th Division came up, I saw it would be impossible 
to advance. The gas through which the men had passed earlier in JENLAIN was 
beginning to affect some of the Officers and NCOs who had been compelled to take 
off their masks from time to time. At 1530 orders were received that the advance 
would continue under a barrage.
249
 
 
 
With the 24
th
 Division held up, and the right flank of the 19
th
 Division, that is the right of the 
8
th
 North Staffords, exposed to machine gun fire from in and around Wargnies-le-Grand, it 
fell to the 9
th
 Cheshires to remedy the somewhat precarious situation. An unidentified 
Company Commander “determined to mop up [ ... ] the village of WARGNIES-LE-GRAND 
and to attack in the rear some hostile MGs located near G15.d.5.0. This was accomplished, 
the whole village being mopped up (a considerable number of prisoners taken) and platoon 
posts established at G15.d.75.25 [on the Wargnies-le-Grand to Bry road] and G15 d.05.50 by 
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1000 hours”.250 Orders were given to consolidate the positions held and await developments. 
It was not yet 1030. At around quarter to eleven two sections of Field Artillery came up onto 
the high ground in square G8 (just to the  rear of the Green Line), were placed under the 
command of the 8
th
 North Staffords Commanding Officer and were to be ready to act as anti-
tank guns should the need arise. Just before midday, the guns commenced the first of three 
artillery shoots on the high ground to the west and south of Bry. These were timed at ten 
minute intervals and were designed to neutralise enemy machine gun posts in that area prior 
to the next assault. 
 
 
The orders for the 1630 attack were received at 1420: the advance would recommence under 
a creeping barrage. The order read as follows:  
 
1. 19th Division will continue the attack at 1630 hours today with the object of 
establishing the line of the road LA MARLIERE – BRY – WARGNIES-LE-GRAND. 
2. 58th Brigade will attack through G3 to G4 and thence along the spur to the road LA 
MARLIERE – BRY. 
3. 8/N.Staffs will attack due EAST to the road from G.16.a.0.0 to cross roads 
G10.d.3.7. 8/N.Staffs will exploit this attack if possible by sending patrols to occupy 
the spur in G16 central in order to make valley in G16.d and b untenable to the 
enemy. 
4. Attack will take place under creeping barrage moving at rate of 100 yds in 4 
minutes. Barrage will open on the line G15.b.9.0.to G9.d.7.0. to A27.c.3.0 and will 
rest on this initial line for 10 minutes. 
5. Heavy artillery and MGs will barrage Eastern slopes of BRY and ETH and sunken 
road in G16 d and G22 b. 
6. A battalion of 24th Division is passing through Southern portion of WARGNIES 
and endeavouring to establish a position in G15 d and G22 a this afternoon AAA 8 
N/Staffs will take advantage of this battalion as a flank guard if in position if not in 
position Staffords will form a defensive flank. 
  7. Zero hour will be 1630 hours. 
             8. Very urgent. Acknowledge.
251
 
 
 
It had been hoped that a smoke barrage would be put down on the slopes to the east of the 
two villages, but it turned out not to be possible in the time available.
252
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Brigade orders were then sent to reorganise the battalions for the attack: on the 56 Brigade 
front the 8
th
 North Staffords were to take over the whole of the Brigade front and spearhead 
the attack. The 1/4
th
 KSLI became the support battalion on the Green Line and 9
th
 Cheshires 
moved back to reserve positions on the Petit Aunelle. The 58 Brigade battalions were to 
remain unchanged, 2
nd
 Wiltshires and 9
th
 Welsh going into the attack. The rear companies of 
each battalion would pass through those currently holding the front line positions and lead the 
assault, the former leading companies following in support. The reserve battalion, 9
th
 Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, would occupy the vacated positions on the Green Line at Zero plus five 
minutes. 
 
 
The 1630 attack on the 56 Brigade front can be quickly told: the reserve and support 
companies of the 8
th
 North Staffords (A & D) leapfrogged their forward companies (B & C) 
and gained their objectives, an advance of 5-600 yards, with few casualties and were soon in 
touch with troops on both flanks. “The enemy apparently ran as soon as the barrage 
opened”.253 Captain A.H. Buch was wounded and Second-Lieutenant Platt missing. 
 
 
 58 Brigade did not have it so easy. The events are best told by the diarist of the brigade: 
 
The enemy reply to our barrage was heavy and very prompt, coming down on the 
ridge in G8 within two minutes of zero. The attack was also met by heavy machine 
gun fire the moment it started. Both Battalions however pushed on though suffering 
heavy casualties. The Support and Reserve Companies of the 9th Welsh Regt suffered 
most severely. The 2nd Wilts Regt also met with considerable opposition in the 
village of ETH itself, and also from machine gun fire from their left flank as the 
attack by the 11th Division [First Army] did not materialise. Eventually the Right 
Company of the 9th Welsh Regt established itself on the objective (the WARGNIES-
LE-GRAND – LA MARLIERE Road) where touch was gained with 56th Brigade. 
The Left Company swung back to join 2nd Wilts Regt who had captured ETH and 
established a line on the slopes East of it, but were unable to gain the crest of the spur. 
The left of the 2nd Wilts Regt was unable to get touch with anyone as (owing 
apparently to their orders not reaching them in time) the 32nd Brigade of the 11th 
Division had not attacked at all. The Support Company therefore formed a defensive 
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flank to protect the Left and Rear of the Battalion. About 50 prisoners were captured 
during this attack.
254
 
 
 
The diary of 2
nd
 Wiltshires also adds that “B” Company under Second-Lieutenant Auton had 
the job of mopping up the village after the leading companies had passed through: they 
captured fifty prisoners from the chateau, bringing their total up to sixty for the day, along 
with six machine guns.
255
 
 
The 19
th
 Division had effectively finished for the day. As darkness fell it held a line in 
advance of its Red Line objectives. On the right flank, a line on the road to the east of the 
spur of land north-east of Wargnies-le-Grand had been established where troops had strayed 
into 24
th
 Division territory. The line followed the road northwards to the north-east of Bry, 
whence it continued in a north-westerly direction, more or less on the 100 metre contour line, 
just shy of the crest of the ridge to the north-east of Eth. The remains of the day‟s objectives, 
and indeed the town of Roisin beyond them, were taken without opposition the following 
morning. 
 
 
Detailed casualty figures for 58 Brigade are not available, but fatal casualties for the 
battalions can be estimated as follows: 
 
 Officers  Other Ranks 
9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers -   - 
9
th
 Welsh Regt -   23 
2
nd
 Wiltshire Regt 1   16 
 
 
Similarly, for 56 Brigade: 
 
 Officers  Other Ranks 
9
th
 Cheshire Regt -   11 
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1/4
th
 King‟s Shropshire Light Infantry 1   11 
8
th
 North Staffordshire Regt. 3   19 
 
 
Detailed figures are available for 56
th
 Brigade for the period 2 – 9 November:  
 
 
Unit                                       Officers   Other Ranks 
                                  K              W             M               K             W            M 
9 Cheshires                1               8              -                 12           110          12 
4 KSLI                       2               2              -                 16           104          13 
8 N.Staffs                   4               7              1                21           101            9 
Total                           7             17             1                 49           315          34
256
 
 
 
That these figures can be considered „light‟ is backed up by a comment made by the diarist of 
the 9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers in their “Short Account of Operations”: “The country in this 
area was wooded and full of steep valleys with small streams through them and would, had 
the enemy meant to fight seriously, have been most difficult and costly to capture”.257 
 
 
 
24
th
 Division
258
 
 
To the south, 24
th
 Division (Major-General A.C. Daly) frontage was quite narrow; originally 
less than a thousand yards, and it was planned that the attack would be made on a single 
battalion front with the 9
th
 Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment leading the assault, the other 
battalions of 73 Brigade (Brigadier-General R.J. Collins) in close support. The frontage 
widened to two thousand yards at the first objective (the Blue Line) and to approximately 
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three thousand yards by the time the Red Line, which ran north-west to south-east, was 
reached. The northern divisional boundary snaked in a more or less east-north-easterly 
direction to include most of the village of Wargnies-le-Grand, and the southern boundary 
followed the east-west grid line on the map that ran just to the south of Wargnies-le-Petit. 
(See Map 3) As we have already seen, troops from 19
th
 Division had encroached into their 
neighbour‟s territory by attempting to clear the more northerly of the two Wargnies villages. 
The southern divisional / corps boundary was obviously purely artificial, not conforming to 
any geographical or strategic features and Operation Order No.39 issued by XVII Corps 
Heavy Artillery noted “the lines depicting objectives are purely diagrammatic, the tactical 
features in their neighbourhood form the real objectives, similarly, lines showing CORPS and 
divisional boundaries are only intended as a guide to frontages. They may always be crossed 
for tactical purposes by arrangement with neighbouring Divisions”.259 
 
 
Just as on the 19
th
 Division frontage, 24
th
 Division found themselves facing an enemy in 
retreat on 3 November: “Leading Brigade as advanced guard to push on and keep touch with 
enemy and if serious opposition is encountered an attack in strength supported by Artillery is 
to be carried out under Divisional arrangements”.260 The 13th Battalion Middlesex Regiment 
pushed patrols forward in accordance with a XVII Corps General Staff order issued at 1310 
hours requiring the advanced units eventually to “form a jumping off place”261 for the 
forthcoming attack and “reached the Blue Line (1st Objective) with little opposition”262 by 
three o‟clock that afternoon. They were ordered “not to advance beyond this line”,263 thus 
removing the possibility of heavy action that day. At 1515 hours the 9
th
 Sussex “were ordered 
to move forward and assemble 1000 yards in the rear of 13
th
 Bn Middlesex Regiment and be 
prepared to attack through the latter at dawn on the 4
th
 inst”.264 
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At 1930 hours on 3 November the modified orders for the attack on the following morning 
were issued. The original, Order No.259, had stated that the “73rd Brigade will capture the 
BLUE and GREEN LINES, as explained to all concerned at yesterday‟s [1 November] 
Brigade Conference. 17
th
 Infantry Brigade will then pass through the 73
rd
 Infantry Brigade 
and will capture the RED LINE”.265 A further advance was a possibility, but this “will 
however only be carried out on the first day on the initiative of Battalion Commanders by 
patrols to maintain touch with the enemy”.266 
 
 
Even at this stage, the new orders were not definitive. Order No. 259/1 still envisaged 17 
Brigade (Brigadier-General G. Thorpe) leapfrogging their comrades on the Green Line to 
take the two villages and the Red Line positions. The reality was fundamentally different: the 
advance all the way to the Red Line was to be the sole responsibility of 73
 
Brigade. The units 
of 17 Brigade got no further forward than the Blue Line on 4 November. Orders received at 
2200 hours that day required them to pass through the 73 Brigade‟s positions and continue 
the advance the following morning. Even so, as the 1
st
 Battalion Royal Fusiliers (17 Brigade), 
having spent most of 4 November in support positions in the valley west of Jenlain and 
Villers Pol (that is, still west of the Blue Line), entered Jenlain to occupy their billets for the 
night, they encountered enemy shelling which went on sporadically through the night.
267
 
“Casualties were caused as follows: Killed 5 O[ther] R[anks]       Wounded Lt. J.A. CASE 
and 20 OR”.268 
 
 
 
72 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General R.W. Morgan), in reserve, played no active role on 
the day. All three battalions were billeted on the night 4/5 November in the village of 
Sepmeries, some four miles south-west of Jenlain. The War Diary of the 1
st
 Battalion North 
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Staffordshire Regiment notes the great interest taken by members of the battalion in the 380 
or so “Boche prisoners” taken and sent back by 73 Brigade.269 Sepmeries was clearly very 
crowded that night, as the diarist of 8
th
 Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment felt it 
appropriate to comment on “very close billeting”.270 
 
 
The 9
th
 Royal Sussex moved forward to their jumping off positions from Sepmeries at 1600 
hours on 3 November. “The march to the Assembly Positions was made through a good deal 
of enemy shelling particularly in the vicinity of VILLERS POL. Enemy machine guns were 
very active whilst Companies were actually getting into their positions. A number of 
casualties were sustained before ZERO by [sic] these MGs”.271 The battalion lined up with 
„C‟ Company on the left, „A‟ Company in the centre, „B‟ Company on the right and „D‟ 
Company in support. 
 
The advance commenced, in artillery formation, along with the artillery creeping barrage, at 
0600 hours.
272
 The barrage advanced at a rate of 100 yards every four minutes: the 18 
pounders were firing 45 per cent High Explosive, 45 per cent Shrapnel and 10 per cent 
Smoke at a rate of two rounds per minute, the 4.5” Howitzers managing half that rate.273 The 
front line troops managed to evade the worst of the enemy counter barrage,
274
 but 
encountered very heavy machine gun fire, particularly as they crested the ridge to the west of 
the Brickfields (see map, Square G19 d). Casualties were heavy. At 0630 hours “airmen 
reported enemy apparently on the line G20 a 8.2 – G26 a 9.9 with our troops advancing to 
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this line in artillery formation”.275 „A‟ and „B‟ companies on the right were held up by 
machine gun fire from their right flank, but „A‟ Company 24th Battalion Machine Gun Corps 
were able to bring their guns forward to Square G26 c, “facing South East to fire across the 
valley in front.
276
 The 73
rd
 Light Trench Mortar Battery were also able to lend support: they 
sent one “Minenwerfer” under Captain H.H. L‟Estrange MC as far as the Jenlain – Villers 
Pol road and, “ascertaining that the 9th Royal Sussex Regiment were held up by hostile MG 
fire pushed forward to engage, picking up two „minenwerfers‟ on the way – Guns came into 
action at 300 yds range + engaged the MG‟s [ ... ] also 2 Heavy MGs later [ ... ] came into 
action on the right of the „minenwerfer‟ guns. The enemy retired over the river...”277 By 0715 
hours the troops were established on the Green Line, except on the extreme right where 
enemy machine gun fire was still a problem. 
 
 
The 7
th
 Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment had been detailed to support the advance of the 
9
th
 Sussex. „B‟ and „D‟ Companies, under Captains B.Wright and J.A. Elliman respectively, 
had moved off at 0300 hours and by 0800 hours had joined the front line troops in their 
positions overlooking the Petit Aunelle River, „B‟ Company supporting the left flank, „D‟ 
Company the right. „D‟ Company had been “caught in the Hun counter-barrage and a number 
of casualties were caused”.278 Captain Elliman was one of the wounded. „B‟ Company had 
“successfully eluded the counter-barrage on the left (N) flank and succeeded in establishing 
themselves in a position which dominated the small bridge over the river AUNELLE. The 
bridge [G21 c 3.9] carried the main JENLAIN – BAVAY road which separated Wargnies-le-
Grand and Wargnies-le-Petit and by concentrated Lewis Gun and rifle fire and by forward 
patrols they managed to keep it whole”.279 The Germans were still shelling the roads and the 
ridge was being swept by machine gun fire. The advance had stalled. 
 
 
                                                 
275
 TNA:PRO WO95/936 War Diary XVII Corps HQ. 
276
 TNA:PRO WO95/2201 War Diary 24
th
 Battalion Machine Gun Corps. 
277
 TNA:PRO WO95/2219 War Diary 73
rd
 Light Trench Mortar Battery. 
278
 TNA:PRO WO95/2218 War Diary 7
th
 Battalion  Northamptonshire Regiment. 
279
 Ibid. 
110 
 
At 1030 hours, BGC 73 Brigade issued verbal instructions to relieve the pressure by 
outflanking both villages: units of 13
th
 Middlesex were to “move round [the] northern 
outskirts of Wargnies-le-Grand and establish themselves on the high ground east of the 
village in G15 d – 16 c and 22 b. 7th Bn Northamptonshire Regt to dribble troops forward 
between the railway and the river in G21 d and then move forward and occupy the high 
ground in G29 central”,280 thus regaining touch with the 13th Middlesex. 
 
 
This assault was to be timed to coincide with the 19
th
 Division attack at 1630 hours, but the 
13
th
 Middlesex had moved forward from Le Coron, where they had concentrated that 
morning, and were able to advance through Wargnies-le-Grand, reaching its northern and 
eastern outskirts by 1545 hours, in effect mopping up positions already overrun by the 9
th
 
Cheshires (19
th
 Division) earlier in the day. Even so, the War Diary reports “considerable 
opposition being experience [sic] from machine guns. Capt. H.R. Mallett MC was 
wounded”.281 They established positions to the east of the village, as planned, by 1730 hours. 
 
The outflanking of Wargnies-le-Petit was entrusted to „A‟ and „C‟ Companies of 7th Battalion 
Northamptonshire Regiment. They were to cross the Petit Aunelle by the very bridge kept 
intact by their comrades in „B‟ Company earlier that day, and “keeping their left on the main 
road” were to “push through the village and then onward to the high ground east of it”.282 
They went forward with „C‟ Company in front under 2nd Lieutenant J.C. Pike and „A‟ 
Company (Captain C.A. Williamson MC) in support. “Machine gun fire was met with but 
overcome by grenades and rifle fire and both companies established themselves well forward 
of the village”.283 
 
 
Meanwhile, „D‟ Company of 9th Royal Sussex had pushed patrols forward through Wargnies-
le-Petit under Lieutenant P.R. Hill and 2
nd
 Lieutenant W. Aldridge at 1600 hours only to find 
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that, as in other sectors, opposition had melted away after the initial resistance had been 
overcome and they established touch with the 7
th
 Northants to the east of the village by 1730 
hours. The latter battalion were tasked with one more problem before their work was 
complete for the day. Some German machine guns were still active in the Bois de Ferrière. 
These outposts were successfully overrun during the night and by dawn on 5 November “our 
troops had established themselves on the Red Line along the whole of the Brigade front”.284 
 
 
The two liberated villages, it was noted by the diarist of 7
th
 Northants, were “inhabited by a 
fair number of French civilians”.285 The 24th Division HQ Diary estimates the number at 
around six hundred. The same diarist lists 315 prisoners taken, 15 of whom were Officers.
286
 
The two „minenwerfers‟ of 73rd Light Trench Mortar Battery earlier employed on the high 
ground west of the Green Line were sent forward at 1900 hours “through Wargnies-le-Grand 
and took up positions for the night covering the BAVAY road”.287 
 
 
Casualty figures for the units involved that day were not assiduously recorded by all. Only 
the 9
th
 Royal Sussex noted detailed figures for the 4 November. They were estimated at: 
One Officer (Lieutenant H.G.Welham, „C‟ Company) killed, and, amongst Other Ranks, 35 
were killed, 95 wounded and 5 missing.
288
 
 
 
The 9
th
 Royal Sussex also recorded gallantry awards for the operations commencing 4 
November: 13 Military Medals were awarded to Other Ranks. (To two Sergeants, three 
Corporals, two Lance Corporals, two Signallers and four Privates). 
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Fatal casualties for the Division can be estimated as: 
 
17 Brigade 
1st Royal Fusiliers 5 
8th Queens  - 
3rd Rifle Brigade - 
 
73 Brigade 
9th Royal Sussex 42 
7th Northants  12 
13th Middlesex   8 
 
Total:   67 
289
 
 
 
72 Brigade, in reserve the whole day, suffered no fatal casualties. 
 
 
 
 
If the number of wounded were to be estimated at between two and three times the number of 
fatalities, the resulting figure would be between 134 and 201. Even if the upper figure were 
taken, the number of casualties for the day would still be classified as slight. 
 
Conclusion 
The tactics of fire and movement have been shown to be well understood and implemented 
successfully against some serious opposition, including machine gun nests and fortified 
villages. Such positions were outmanoeuvred and overrun, but commanders were mindful not 
to overstretch their troops, and the pause in front of the ridge and the villages of Eth and Bry 
was instrumental in reducing casualties. The withdrawals of German units in the face of this 
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final push demonstrated that they could not defend their positions in depth and would prove 
to be a common occurrence along the whole front.  
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Chapter 3 
VI Corps 
 
 
Introduction 
VI Corps was faced with a situation comparable to that of XVII Corps to the north. This 
chapter shows how a similar plan of attack proved more difficult to implement. Objectives 
were altered at the last minute, requiring some battalions to advance much further than 
originally envisaged. Mist and rain made it difficult for some units to maintain direction and 
the obstinate defence of woods and farms by German machine gunners and some effective 
artillery fire held up the advance for a time. Nevertheless, the pragmatism of lower-level 
command is seen to prevail, as rivers were crossed and three villages captured by units well-
versed in platoon or company attack methods. 
*          *          *          * 
Order No. 401 was issued by VI Corps on 1 November, stating that the advance was to be 
continued “towards the line AVESNES – MAUBEUGE – MONS on a date and at an hour 
which have been notified separately to all concerned”.290 Once the Red Line was reached, the 
units of the Corps were ordered “to continue to press their advantage energetically” and to 
“be prepared to continue the operations on Z plus 1 and subsequent days”.291  The attack was 
to be carried out by the Guards Division on the left Corps front with 62
nd
 Division on the 
right. The 3
rd
 and 2
nd
 Divisions were held in reserve. The latter were to be “moved forward 
behind the leading divisions as the advance progress[ed]” and were to be prepared to 
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complete the task of the VI Corps, if required, in the Right and Left Sectors respectively”.292 
It seems as if the commanders were anxious to complete the job as soon as possible: “The 
advance is to be pressed with the utmost urgency”.293 
 
The ground over which the Corps would advance is described in the Official History: 
The country to be traversed rose gently, and was cut into spurs by four small streams, 
which ran across the front. Of these the westernmost, the Rhonelle, was passable by 
vehicles only at the bridges, which were down, or at a ford south-west of Villers-Pol. 
The Petite Aunelle (which runs into the Aunelle below Eth), though deep cut, with 30-
foot banks in places, had but little water in it. The other two streams were 
unimportant. The area contained a number of villages surrounded by orchards and 
fields enclosed by hedges or wire, but few woods. Most of the roads were sunken, and 
had as much as two feet of mud in them. The ground it would be thought favoured the 
defence; but in the event its difficulties aided the better soldiers, for the enclosures 
enabled the West Riding men [62
nd
 Division] and the Guards to manoeuvre round and 
outflank the defenders.
294
 
 
 
 
Zero hour was set at 0530 on 4 November. On 1 November „C‟ Company, 6th Tank Battalion, 
“consisting of 12 Whippet Tanks, was allotted to VI Corps, and I [Haldane] placed this 
company with the remainder of the Corps Cavalry and Cyclists under the command of the 
O.C. Oxfordshire Hussars”.295 The tanks and the cavalry were to play no part in the advance 
of 4 November: the decision as to their usefulness had already been taken: “Past experience 
had shown that there is little chance of using mounted troops in any numbers during the first 
day of operations, and I [Haldane again]therefore decided that the Corps Cavalry, Cyclists 
and Whippet Tanks [ ... ] should be concentrated in Corps Reserve in the vicinity of PONT 
DE BUAT, so as to operate in the later stages of the advance. The task of the mobile force 
                                                 
292
 Ibid. 
293
 TNA:PRO WO95/1214 War Diary 1 Guards Brigade. 
294
 J.E. Edmonds & R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Vol. V (London: 
HMSO, 1947) pp.484-485 
295
 TNA:PRO WO95/775 War Diary VI Corps HQ General Staff. 
116 
 
would be to exploit success in the direction of Maubeuge and to endeavour to seize the river 
crossings and railway before the enemy could destroy them”.296 
 
The pattern of artillery arrangements was similar to those of Corps to the north and south: 
prior to the assault there was to be “no marked increase in the normal daily volume of 
fire”.297 As was by now standard procedure, there was to be no “preliminary bombardment”: 
artillery action would begin as the infantry moved from their jumping off positions. 
According to the VI Corps „Gun Statement‟, timed at noon on 4 November, the number of 
guns in action were as follows: 
 
Field Artillery: Guards Div   62
nd
 Div 
    64  18 pdrs   86  18 pdrs 
    23  4.5” Howitzers  29  4.5” Hows 
 
 
Heavy Artillery: 46  6” Hows 
    5    8” Hows 
    12  9.2” Hows 
    21  60 pdrs 
    4 Mk. VII 6” guns 
    4 Mk.XIX 6” guns 
 
 
Totals:   Field Artillery: 202 guns 
    Heavy Artillery: 94 guns
298
 
 
 
Shells to be dumped at gun positions as follows: 
 
18 pounders:   400 rounds per gun 
4.5” Howitzers:  350 rounds per gun 
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6” Howitzers:   300 rounds per gun 
60 pounders:   300 rounds per gun 
8” Howitzers:   200 rounds per gun 
9.2” Howitzers:  150 rounds per gun 
6” Howitzers:   150 rounds per gun. 299 
 
 
 
The creeping barrage laid down by 18 pounders and extended in depth by 4.5” Howitzers and 
by three 6” Howitzer batteries per division was to be “formed by H.E. and Shrapnel, with 
approximately 10% of Smoke”.300 The barrage would move forward at a rate of 100 yards in 
four minutes as far as the Blue Line (see Maps 4 & 5). At Zero plus 135 minutes it would 
move on from the Blue Line at the faster pace of 100 yards in three minutes until it reached 
the Green Line at about Zero plus 235 minutes. The right of the 62
nd
 Division would pause 
for twenty minutes on the Blue Dotted Line (at Zero plus 185 minutes) before continuing the 
advance in conjunction with the New Zealand Division on their right. It was envisaged that 
the pause on the Green Line would be no more than fifteen minutes: thereafter the infantry 
advance would supported only by mobile artillery units moving up from their original 
positions. “CRAs would detail one 18 pdr and one 4.5” Howitzer battery and B.G. Heavy 
Artillery one 6” How. Battery to be at the direct call of the Brigadier of each attacking 
Brigade beyond the BLUE objective”.301 More detailed instructions followed: “special 
features and lines of approach should be selected for bombardment by batteries as they come 
into action. The time at which firing must cease on any particular objective must be arranged 
by the Infantry Brigadier in conjunction with the Field Artillery Group Commander and the 
Heavy Artillery Brigade Commander”.302 Artillery commanders were to get in “personal 
touch”303 with Infantry Brigade commanders prior to the assault to make the necessary 
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arrangements. It was possible for individual sections or even single guns to be used to deal 
with anti-tank guns, machine gun nests or other stubborn strongpoints. 
 
The Heavy Artillery would be used for counter-battery work: this would include gas shells, 
though it was noted that these could not be dropped closer to the barrage than 800 yards (300 
yards if the wind was within 20° of due west). Selected objectives ahead of the barrage were 
also to be shelled at the discretion of the BGHA as guns dropped out of the counter-battery 
programme. Aircraft from 12 Squadron RAF were in the air to work in conjunction with the 
artillery units, including one looking out for signs of German counter-attack preparations and 
„contact‟ planes observing flares from infantry units at Zero plus 2, 4 and 6 hours, and 
thereafter as required by Divisions.
304
 From daylight to Zero plus three hours, four aircraft 
were to be in the air, observing fall of shot for counter-battery units and communicating any 
corrections required.
305
  
 
The artillery were also to use „Thermit‟306 in the early stages of the attack on 62nd Division 
front, these shells being fired into the sunken road west of La Folie Farm and into the ravine 
running north to south to the east of the farm. The ravine running between the farm and 
Vieux Moulin and its extension southeast from the mill was to receive similar treatment. A 
general order was also issued to the effect that villages would be spared the destructive force 
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of high explosives: “Howitzers will not barrage through villages. Through villages only 
shrapnel will be fired”.307 
 
The approximate number of shells fired on VI Corps front on 4 November was as follows: 
18 pdr shrapnel: 21 050 
18 pdr HE:  21 750 
18 pdr smoke:    2 199 
4.5” How. HE:   6 050 
60 pdr Shrapnel:   1 573 
60 pdr HE:       764 
6” How. HE:    4 223 
6” How. Gas:       184 
6” Gun Shrapnel:      127 
6” Gun HE:       257 
8” How. HE:       195 
9.2” How. HE:      608 
 
Total:   58 980 
308
 
 
 
 
The orders sent down from Corps repeatedly emphasise the need to keep the attack secret:  
 
 
 
Attention is called to the necessity of preserving the strictest secrecy as to the 
operations, especially:- 
The movement of troops only under cover of darkness. 
No marked increase or decrease in artillery fire. 
No marked increase in wireless activity or in the number of stations in action before 
zero.
309
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At the same time, the overall policy is stated explicitly to be “to keep the Germans on the 
run”.310 It was envisaged that patrols would be pushed forward to the Brown Line311 by the 
evening of Z Day. 
 
The Guards (Major-General T.G. Matheson) and 62
nd
 Divisions (Major-General Sir R.D. 
Wigham) came into the line during the night 2 – 3 November, relieving  2nd Division. Neither 
of these Divisions had been in action since 22 October 1918.
312
 Strong patrols were then sent 
forward to try and gain touch with enemy units that were reported to be withdrawing. “On the 
right of VI Corps front, the 62
nd
 Division found no change in the enemy‟s positions. Machine 
gun fire was encountered from the copse in R.16.b, La Folie Farm; ORSINVAL appeared to 
be held in strength”.313 
 
Guards Division
314
 
On the left, the 2
nd
 Battalion Coldstream Guards, 1 Guards Brigade, (Brigadier-General C.R. 
Champion de Crespigny) and 1
st
 Battalion Coldstream Guards, 2 Guards Brigade, (Brigadier-
General B.N. Sergisson-Brooke) were sent forward to ascertain the situation on their fronts: 
reports were sent back to the effect that the enemy had withdrawn from the east bank of the 
Rhonelle River and in return orders were sent for two companies of 2
nd
 Coldstreams to be 
pushed across the river. The river was easily fordable
315
 and patrols entered the village of 
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Villers-Pol. They encountered some sniping
316
 or machine gun fire
317
 from the church but 
they were able to advance to within 400 yards of the Blue Line, where they dug in at 2330 
hours, “the high ground immediately in front being strongly held by the enemy”.318 
 
The 1
st
 Battalion Coldstream Guards received their orders at 1600 hours on 3 November to 
push forward and try to reach the high ground east of Villers-Pol. Patrols moved off 
accordingly at 1930. No.2 Company (Lieutenant R. Atkinson) encountered machine gun fire 
whilst attempting to cross the Rhonelle, but the machine gun post was taken by half of No.3 
Company (Captain G.Barry) on their left who had crossed the river without opposition. More 
machine gun fire was encountered in the village, but this was dealt with after “some sharp 
hand to hand fighting”.319  At about one o‟clock in the morning of 4 November the enemy put 
down an artillery barrage on the line of the river, and the leading companies had been held up 
on the eastern outskirts of the village. This situation was reported at 0200 hours in the hope 
that “a proper barrage could be arranged for the attack”.320 The original artillery barrage was, 
of course, meant to start well to the west of Villers-Pol. 
 
At 2359 hours, 3 November, urgent orders were sent from Divisional Headquarters informing 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Guards Brigades that Zero Hour would now be 0600. 62
nd
 Division would advance 
at 0530, as per the original plan. The Guards Division artillery barrage would start on the 
Blue Line at 0600. A telephone message to Guards Divisional Headquarters timed at 0500 
had placed troops along the line of the road R.5.b central to L34.b.2.6 (see Map 4) and “an 
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attempt was made to arrange for the barrage to start at 0600 hours on a line NE of this road, 
but this had to be abandoned as wires were down to left group and there was no time to 
arrange by D.R.L.S. 
321
 
 
On 1 Guards Brigade front, the 2
nd
 Coldstream, in a change to the original plan, was now 
tasked in taking both the Blue and Green Lines. The 2
nd
 Grenadier Guards would then pass 
through their positions and continue the advance to the Red Line. The 1
st
 Irish Guards were to 
follow in support. 
 
The barrage came down on the Blue Line at 0600: the high ground to the east of Villers-Pol 
was swathed in dense fog.
322
 The leading companies of 2
nd
 Coldstream headed for the Blue 
Line and were met with machine gun fire from the road and high ground to the east of it. 
“The resistance was overcome and about 200 of the enemy were taken prisoner”323 states the 
War Diary of  1 Guards Brigade rather matter-of-factly. The diary of the battalion skips this 
episode entirely. They advanced with No. 1 Company on the right (Captain Wilkinson), No. 2 
on the left (Captain Spencer), No. 4 in support (Captain Eccles) and No. 3 in reserve 
(Lieutenant R.V. Martin).
324
 In the fog, the battalion veered to the right, mistaking the woods 
around La Flaque Farm (see Map 4, M.2.a & b) for those further to the north-east (G.32 & 
33) and “the whole attack swung south-east”.325 “The objective was reached at 7 a.m.” 
continues the battalion War Diary, and “during the last 700 yards of the advance severe 
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fighting took place and very heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy including several 
gun teams. The Battalion also captured 200 prisoners, and 8 Field Guns, many machine guns 
and a few trench mortars”.326 The diary states that they “consolidated slightly south of their 
allocated positions”.327 In reality they had strayed far enough out of position for touch to be 
lost with the 2
nd
 Grenadiers following behind. The diary of the Guards Division views the 
situation even more seriously, stating that, at 1045 hours, “2nd Coldstream Guards [ ... ] 
cannot be found”.328 
The battalion‟s casualties for the day were not that heavy: Lieutenant J.R. Saunders was 
killed, Lieutenant J.C. Hayes and Second-Lieutenants Vincent and V.W. Eardle-Beecham 
were wounded. Captain Eccles was also wounded, but remained at his post. Among Other 
Ranks, five were killed, seventy-seven were wounded and three missing. 
 
The 2
nd
 Grenadiers had formed up on the Blue Line at 0720, No. 4 Company (Lieutenant 
C.C. Cubitt) on the left, No. 3 Company (Lieutenant R.H.R. Palmer) on the right, with No. 2 
Company (Lieutenant W.H.S. Dent) in support and No. 1 Company ( Captain L. St.L. 
Hermon-Hodge) in reserve. “The rain stopped in the early morning, but a heavy thick mist 
hung over the ground, and when the battalion advanced from the BLUE LINE at 7:30 a.m. it 
was only possible to see about 200 yards ahead”.329 Half a mile or so into their advance they 
had met no opposition, but could see troops ahead of them, “moving along behind our 
barrage”.330 It was assumed that these were men of the 2nd Coldstream heading for the Green 
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Line. Only later did they discover that they were retreating Germans. The Battalion War 
Diary continues the story: 
As No.4 Coy passed over the high ground in G.32.b the mist lifted and they came 
under heavy machine gun fire from the sunken road in G.27.c. Lt. C.C. Cubitt was 
wounded and the Coy suffered a considerable number of casualties. 2/Lt B.R. 
Osborne led two platoons forward by short rushes to a line running from G.27.c.1.1 to 
G.33.a.4.8. From this position further advance was impossible owing to intensity and 
accuracy of the machine gun fire. Field guns also fired from north-east of the village 
[Wargnies-le-Petit] over open sights at any movement of our troops. 2/Lieut. B.R. 
Osborne went forward to make a personal reconnaissance of the enemy positions and 
was killed by a machine gun bullet while returning to report the situation. No.4 Coy 
was now without an officer and No.18523 Sgt. E. Carter took charge of the Coy.
331
 
 
 
Meanwhile, No.3 Company advanced through the southern part of the wood in G.33.c and  
on debouching from the eastern edge came under severe machine gun and rifle fire 
from the enemy who were entrenched in slits 200 yds east of the wood. Lt. R.H.R. 
Palmer ordered his Coy to advance by short rushes covered by mutual supporting fire. 
By this method the enemy position was captured and the entire garrison was killed or 
taken prisoner. Three machine guns were captured and one minenwerfer. The Coy 
was unable to advance further as the forward slope was swept by enemy machine gun 
fire from the southern edge of the village.
332
  
 
 
 
Companies were dug in in positions in and around the wood by 1000 hours. Only on the right  
did Second-Lieutenant Harcourt-Vernon succeed in pushing his platoon forward to within 
200 yards of the road in G.33.d, more or less coinciding with the Green Line. No.2 Company, 
coming up in support, came under machine gun fire from the wood as they neared its western 
point and as the fog lifted, they were able to deal with those machine guns and “proceeded to 
clear the rest of the wood”.333 They then became involved in the fighting to the east of the 
wood and were able to take a number of prisoners, capturing three field guns in the process. 
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All companies were still taking casualties from machine gun and rifle fire from enemy 
positions on the Wargnies-le-Petit ridge (G.28.d & 29.c). 
 
Only once artillery had been brought forward during the afternoon and these enemy positions 
in and to the south of Wargnies-le-Petit had been fired upon were Nos. 2 & 3 Companies able 
to advance and take up positions along a line from G.34.a.1.1 to M.4.a.6.7. The 1
st
 Battalion 
Irish Guards passed through these positions at 1830 hours and the Grenadiers were 
subsequently assembled in the recently captured wood (G.33.a & c) and reorganised. Nos.3 & 
4 Companies were amalgamated into a Composite Company under Lieutenant Palmer. Total 
casualties for the day were recorded as follows: 
2/Lt B.R. Osborne killed (No.4 Coy) 
Lt. C.C. Cubitt wounded (No.4 Coy) 
2/Lt. C.J.N. Adams wounded (No.2 Coy) 
Other Ranks: 10 killed, 89 wounded, 9 missing.
334
 
 
The 1
st
 Battalion Irish Guards had the job of advancing in support of the 2
nd
 Grenadier 
Guards. Their advance from their starting positions well in the rear of Villers-Pol was not 
straightforward. As they moved eastwards along the road in Square R.4 they became mixed 
up with the 1
st
 Battalion Scots Guards of 2 Guards Brigade. On nearing the outskirts of the 
town they ascertained that the bridge over the Rhonelle was broken and they had to halt and 
take their Lewis Guns off their limbers as passage for wheeled transport was not possible. As 
they reached the bridge, the “last man of the 3rd Grenadier Guards [also 2 Guards Brigade] 
was just going over and the battalion was able to commence crossing straightaway. It was 
slow progress as only one man crossed at a time, being assisted up the bank by German 
prisoners”.335 The battalion then came under shell fire as they reached the crossroads at Les 
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Quatre Vents, but “by marvellous luck”336 suffered no casualties. They halted to reorganise 
into artillery formation before going over the crest in L.36.c. About a mile further on they 
found the 2
nd
 Grenadier Guards held up by machine gun fire. The Irish decided to dig in 
where they were [square G.32.c] and await developments. They had been there about an hour 
when they came under enemy trench mortar fire “from somewhere about G.32.d.9.9”.337 
They counted about a dozen rounds, these killing eight or nine horses belonging to Royal 
Engineer and Royal Field Artillery units in the vicinity. Sadly, they also caused a few 
casualties in the battalion, including Lieutenant A.L. Bain, who was killed.
338
 
 
“The situation remained unchanged on our immediate front until late in the afternoon”.339 At 
around 1630 hours, the battalion was ordered to advance through the 2
nd
 Grenadiers, as 2 
Guards Brigade was already across the stream on their right. Their diarist takes up the story: 
No.1 Coy was at once ordered forward preceded by a strong patrol – No.3 Coy 
followed in support. No.4 Coy about 400 yds behind No.3 Coy. No.2 Coy remained 
where it was. Skirting the S. Point of the wood in G.33.c, No.1 Coy crossed the 
stream at G.33.d.9.5. Bn HQ crossed just behind rear platoon of No.1 Coy. No.3 
crossed a little N[orth] as they were ordered to follow No.1 Coy slightly echeloned to 
their left to protect that flank as the situation there was obscure. The stream was a 
slight obstacle as it was boggy at the bottom and had steep overhanging banks of 
about 4 foot. The men crossed on stretchers laid across. It was now almost dark and 
the undergrowth exceedingly thick. Nos. 1 & 3 Coys halted on the top of the very 
steep slope on the 100 contour [line]. No.4 Coy remained at the foot. There had been 
no opposition beyond a little shelling.
340
 
 
 
 
It was becoming clear that enemy resistance was beginning to melt away and a patrol was 
sent out to see if they could gain touch with the 3rd Grenadier Guards at the crossroads at 
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M.5.a.5.9. This was achieved and No.1 Coy was sent forward to occupy the orchards north of 
Preux-au-Sart in G.35.a. No.3 Coy was sent across the Corps boundary into G.29.c  and touch 
was eventually established with 24th Division troops there, whilst No.4 Coy established itself 
along the road running north-west from the southern edge of the orchards. All this 
manoeuvring was done in “pitch dark” and was “v. difficult owing to orchards and very high, 
thick hedges.
341
  
 
 
The small village of Preux-au-Sart had fallen without much of a fight. There was some 
shelling of the forward Companies during the night and “No.1 Coy killed some Germans”.342 
 
No detailed casualty figures are available for the 1
st
 Irish Guards, but fatalities for the day 
number only three. The diarist is content to record a happy event from the following day: 
“The inhabitants on coming out of their cellars in the morning were delighted to find British 
troops and showed the greatest cordiality”.343 
 
On 2 Guards Brigade front, the advance was begun by the 1
st
 Battalion Coldstream Guards. 
The tone of the War Diary of this unit might suggest that the diarist was less than pleased by 
the events of the period: after recording the battalion‟s request for a “proper barrage”344 and 
presumably having had the request denied (as had his colleagues to the north), he noted that 
“the troops on our right [62nd Div.] refused to attempt to move forward so that a very 
                                                 
341
 Ibid. 
342
 Ibid. 
343
 Ibid. 
344
 TNA:PRO WO95/1219 War Diary 1
st
 Battalion Coldstream Guards. 
128 
 
awkward exposed flank had to be watched by the support and reserve companies”.345 His 
mood did not improve as zero hour approached. The 62
nd
 Division had advanced at 0530 as 
per the original orders and the 1
st
 Coldstream moved off under “a naturally rather ragged 
barrage”.346 They had No.2 Company (Captain G. Barry) on the right, No.3 Company 
(Lieutenant R. Atkinson) on the left, No.1 Company (Captain A.G. Salisbury-Jones) in 
support and No.4 Company (Lieutenant M.V. Buxton) in reserve.
347
 They were subject to 
“heavy machine gun fire”348 but pushed on, soon passing the Blue Line. The diarist of 2 
Guards Brigade does not back up our diarist‟s view of the intensity of enemy fire, describing 
it as “slight”,349 allowing the 1st Coldstream to “gain a line about 200 yds W of the Green 
Line”.350 During the advance, Captain A.G. Salisbury-Jones MC was hit in the arm and 
Second-Lieutenant C.W. Williams (No.4 Coy) was wounded in the leg. In the newly-won 
positions, the Coldstream came under “very heavy and accurate fire from enemy field guns 
which were firing over open sights”.351 During this period, Second-Lieutenant E.P.A. Moore 
(No.1 Coy) was killed.
352
 
 
The 1
st
 Coldstream Guards remained in these positions, still under heavy shelling, until 
permission was granted after dark to withdraw the leading companies into slit trenches near 
the La Buvette inn, where a “very cold night was spent”.353 
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It now fell to the 3
rd
 Grenadier Guards to continue the assault.
354
 They had breakfasted at 
0300 hours, moving off an hour and twenty minutes later. They too became embroiled in the 
log-jam that was the single plank bridge over the Rhonelle on the approach to Villers-Pol, 
sustaining one Other Rank casualty wounded by shell fire in the process, and reached their 
assembly positions in the rear of La Flaque Farm Wood by 0800. Half an hour later they 
came under fire: they immediately advanced through the Coldstream Guards positions and 
“captured” 355 the Green Line. In doing so, No.2 Company captured four 77mm guns and four 
4.2” Howitzers. “Touch was obtained with the 2nd Grenadier Guards”356 and patrols were sent 
across the Aunelle River. 
 
By 1000 hours leading companies were over the river and through into the orchards, though 
the high ground just beyond remained in enemy hands. The grenadiers were subject to heavy 
machine gun fire from that high ground, at a range of 3-500 yards.
357
 Finding the left flank of 
the battalion completely in the air, No.3 Company was pushed up to defend this area. By 
1500 hours the right company had worked around the flank of the enemy positions and 
attacked it under a smoke grenade barrage. The enemy gave up the high ground and the 
guardsmen were able to occupy the position. During this assault, Lieutenant C.C. Carstairs 
was wounded, and Second-Lieutenant G.R. Gunther was killed.
358
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Two hours later the battalion was able to capture Preux-au-Sart and take prisoners from an 
enemy defence line to the east of it. On the right the advance was pushed forward across the 
Gommegnies – Preux-au-Sart road and a line of enemy trenches occupied. Lieutenant K. 
Campbell was wounded during this action. At this stage, all the Officers in the Right 
Company had become casualties and Lieutenant F. Anson MC was “sent up to take command 
with orders to clear the M.G.‟s out of houses on the St. Aubert – Gommegnies road. 359 It 
took two attempts, the second, at 2200 hours, being successful. 
 
The battalion, which had „never succeeded in getting much further‟, had in fact advanced 
over two miles, capturing three defensive lines, crossing a river and occupying a village and 
some enemy positions beyond it. It had cost them 2 Officers
360
 and 15 Other Ranks killed, 4 
Officers and 91 Other Ranks wounded and 3 Other Ranks missing.
361
 
 
The 4
th
 Battalion Guards Machine Gun Regiment had also played its part: Nos. III & I 
Companies supplied two sections to 2 and 1 Guards Brigades respectively. The attack on 
Preux-au-Sart was to be assisted by machine guns from No. III company, but by the time the 
gunners got into the vicinity, the village had already been taken, so guns were deployed to the 
east and north of it. No.I Company had earlier sent one gun from No.3 Section forward to 
suppress enemy machine gun fire from the wood in G.33 and had fired 350 rounds. On going 
forward to recce the wood, the CO of No. 4 Section, Second-Lieutenant A.G. Hunt, was 
killed. Two of No.3 Section‟s guns were then sent to the north of the wood and “did good 
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work in silencing and inflicting casualties on the teams of the two German machine guns 
which were firing from the sunk road in G.27.c. central”.362 
 
The reserve battalion, the 1
st
 Battalion Scots Guards, played a limited rôle on the day: 
Battalion HQ made it as far forward as the southern edge of La Flaque Farm Wood, and „C‟ 
Company was called upon in the evening to move forward in support of the 3
rd
 Grenadier 
Guards. Nevertheless, thirty wounded and three killed was the price paid. Guardsmen 16876 
James Banks, 5821 John Reilly and 8786 Archibald White lie in Villers-Pol Cemetery 
Extension. The final positions reached on the day can be seen on the map. 
 
62
nd
 Division
363
 
The 62
nd
 Division had not been in action since 22 October. They had taken part in the attack 
on Havrincourt on 12 September, the town being part of the „Hindenburg Line‟ defence 
system, during which action Sergeant Lawrence Calvert (2/5
th
 KOYLI) won a Victoria Cross 
for single-handedly capturing two machine gun posts and killing their crews. Casualties had 
been heavy: 8 Officers and 199 Other Ranks killed, 34 Officers and 1 068 Other Ranks 
wounded, 228 Other Ranks missing. On 19 and 20 October they attacked the village of 
Solesmes, crossing the River Selle. Acting-Sergeant John Bruyton Daykins (2/4 York & 
Lancs) won his VC here – another two machine gun posts put out of action. Casualties here 
amounted to 57 Other Ranks killed, 10 Officers and 370 Other Ranks wounded.
364
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The much depleted Division was brought back up to strength by a large number of drafts 
during October: the 5
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s received 11 Officers and 248 Other Ranks, the 
2/4
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s 16 and 326 respectively, the 2/4 Hampshires 9 and 184. (A total 
of 794 for 186 Brigade.) 187 Infantry Brigade received a total of 743, distributed as follows: 
5
th
 KOYLI 12 Officers and 336 Other Ranks; 2/4
th
 KOYLI 10 and 135; 2/4
th
 York & Lancs 3 
and 247. 185 Brigade received a total of 883 men. Including Royal Engineers, Machine Gun 
Corps and other units, the total reinforcements for the Division amounted to 103 Officers and 
2 631 Other Ranks. To absorb these numbers in such a short space of time and yet remain a 
cohesive fighting force was a remarkable achievement.
365
  
 
For the assault, the Division lined up with 187 Brigade (Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie) on 
the left, 186 Brigade (Brigadier-General J.L.G. Burnett) on the right and 185 Brigade 
(Brigadier-General Viscount Hampden) in reserve. It was decided that each front line brigade 
would attack on a one battalion frontage. The front battalion would take the Blue Line and 
the second and third battalions would leapfrog through onto the Green and Red Lines 
respectively. “All battalions of the 186th and 187th Infantry Brigades reached their assembly 
positions without incident, a double Brigade Headquarters being established at RUESNES.
366
 
Patrols had been sent out at dusk on 3 November in order to determine if the enemy had 
withdrawn as they had on the Guards Division front to the north. It proved not to be the case: 
“patrols [ ... ] found touch immediately. On the front of this Division La Folie Farm and the 
Copse in R.16.b were reported held. [ ... ] The 62
nd
 Divn was to advance as previously 
arranged at 0530 hours so as to be in touch with the Guards Divn on the Blue Line. No 
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alteration was made in the barrage of the 62
nd
 Divn except that the heavy artillery and the 4.5 
Hows. were ordered to keep well within the Divisional Boundary”.367 
 
187 Brigade had 2/5
th
 KOYLI in the front line. Their jumping off positions were in the 
orchard in square R.9. „B‟ and „D‟ Companies were in front with „A‟ and „C‟ Companies on 
the line of the railway running along the south-western edge of the trees. “Directly after Zero 
hr a heavy mist fell and this coupled with smoke which crept across from the front of the 
New Zealand Division was a source of great inconvenience and direction was difficult to 
maintain”.368 
 
Their first problem was the German garrison in La Folie Farm (R.10.b.7.5). They put up 
some “serious resistance”,369 but the farm was in British hands by 0600, resulting from “tact 
on the part of the Officers & N.C.O.‟s in handling their men and the excellent dash of [the] 
men themselves”.370 A prisoner from the 1st Bn, 23rd R.I.R., 12th Reserve Dn captured at the 
farm revealed that his Division, coming down from Belgium, had relieved the 21
st
 Reserve 
Dn at the farm during the night of 3 – 4 November.371 It is interesting to note that these troops 
had no knowledge of the retirement of their compatriots to the north and that “their orders 
were to fight where they stood”.372 
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The next obstacle was the Rhonelle River: the first two companies waded across, but those in 
the second wave had time to use improvised bridges of planks and tree trunks. In order to 
help those units moving up later, these crossings were marked by means of tape by 
Regimental Scouts.
373
 The Germans put up stiff resistance in the Vieux Moulin (an old mill) 
on the river at R.11.c.2.4 and particularly in the northern part of the village of Orsinval, but 
with some help from trench Mortar fire, the positions were overcome and the village was 
taken by 0700.  
 
By 0745 hours, the 62
nd
 Division headquarters had still not received confirmation of this, 
“owing to communications being out”,374 but the Guards Division had reported 187 Brigade 
troops crossing the Blue Line at 0600 hours.
375
 During these operations the 2/5
th
 KOYLI 
claimed to have taken over 200 prisoners.
376
 The KOYLIs were to spend the night reasonably 
comfortably in billets in Orsinval. The attack had cost them only four fatal casualties. 
 
They were leapfrogged on the Blue Line by their sister battalion, the 2/4
th
 KOYLI. They had 
formed up on a 1500 yard frontage, but this was to narrow to half that distance on their 
objective. They advanced on a three company front, with „B‟ Company (Captain Clarke) on 
the left, „C‟ Company (Captain A. Fox) in the centre and „D‟ Company (Captain C. Fox) on 
the right. „A‟ Company (Captain Rooke) was in support. Each company placed two platoons 
in the front line and two in the second. As the front narrowed, „B‟ Company was “squeezed 
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out”377 and continued the advance in support of „C‟ Company. They moved off in the rear of 
2/5
th
 KOYLI at Zero plus 25 minutes in artillery formation and arrived on time at the Blue 
Line. They staggered their move off from this line from right to left, “owing to the barrage 
being curved”,378 companies moving at Zero plus 144, 156 and 135 minutes. The diarist also 
states, however, that “considerable opposition was encountered in Orsinval village, the 
mopping up having been neglected and „B‟ Coy sustained rather heavy casualties”379 as they 
cleared the area. 
 
Enemy shelling at this stage was “negligible”,380 but resistance stiffened as the battalion tried 
to advance further. This was chiefly in the form of machine gun fire from the copse in the 
centre of square M.9. Lewis Gun fire was returned and the position was taken along with 20 
prisoners. The two leading companies then pressed on to the Green Line. At this point they 
had reached the western outskirts of the village of Frasnoy and were greeted by a 
“considerable amount of machine gun fire”.381 This was “quickly silenced”382 and troops 
were able to get into the outskirts and mop up the first few houses. These dispositions were 
quite quickly judged to be somewhat restrictive and it was decided to “withdr[a]w to a line 
slightly in the rear of the Green Line, owing to there being a better field of fire”.383 The 
diarist logs one fatal officer casualty: Second-Lieutenant Campbell,
384
 along with 71 Other 
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Ranks. The Other Ranks figure must include wounded and missing, as the battalion suffered 
16 fatalities that day. 
 
The baton now passed to the 2/4
th
 York & Lancs. They had moved off from their shelters at 
0620 under command of Major J.E.D. Stickney MC. They moved on from La Folie Farm, 
moving directly eastwards, at 0800, „C‟ and „B‟ Companies in front, „A‟ and „D‟ in support, 
Lewis Guns carried on pack mules. “No information was known of the results of the attack of 
the two Bns in front”.385 As they crossed the Blue Dotted Line, „B‟ Company experienced 
some machine gun fire from their right flank where 186 Brigade “had not succeeded in 
keeping sufficiently far forward”,386 and „C‟ Company on the left came under artillery fire at 
around M.8.a.4.4. They pressed on and the leading companies reached the Green Line and 
immediately attacked the village of Frasnoy. Enfilade fire from the right continued to be a 
problem, but the attack was pressed home and “street fighting ensued”,387 but resistance was 
overcome, “killing or making prisoners of the enemy and capturing several guns, including 
an 8” howitzer”.388 „C‟ and „B‟ companies reached their objectives beyond the village along 
the line of the foot of the escarpment running northwest-southeast through squares M.10.b 
and M.11.c. „A‟ Company leapfrogged through „C‟ Company and pushed on the short 
distance to the main road in M.11.c. They got no further: their “flank [was] so exposed as to 
make further advance impossible”.389 A final outpost line was established from M.11.b.3.0 to 
M.11.b.3.7 and from M.6.c.2.0 to M.12.a.2.6., the latter point being just over the Red Line 
objective (see Map 5). 
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Meanwhile, „D‟ Company, under Second-Lieutenant Perkins, pushed out patrols towards the 
railway only to come up against artillery fire from the embankment. Two mounted German 
officers were spotted at this point and fired upon: the diarist claims that one of them was hit. 
Lewis Gun and rifle fire was directed “with good effect”390 at the artillery positions. The 
Germans were in the process of withdrawing the guns and such was their haste, that with both 
gunners and horses becoming casualties, they abandoned several guns. „D‟ Company was 
unable to follow up owing to heavy machine gun fire from their right flank and ended the day 
just short of the Red Line in M.11.d. Fatal casualties that day for the battalion numbered 
thirteen. Brigade casualties were estimated at 7 Officers and 295 Other Ranks.
391
 
 
On 186 Brigade front, comprising the southern sector of 62
nd
 divisional frontage, the first 
objective, the Blue Line, ran along the Orsinval to Le Quesnoy road and its capture was 
entrusted to the 2/4
th
 Battalion Hampshire Regiment. Again, a one battalion frontage was 
preferred, with the 2/4
th
 Battalion Duke of Wellington‟s taking the Green Line and the 5th 
Duke of Wellington‟s the Red. The early stages of the attack were also to be covered by an 
overhead machine gun barrage. Two sections of „D‟ Company, 62nd Battalion MGC were to 
advance and be ready to give covering fire from the high ground in squares M.15.d and 
M.17.a. to the later stages of the assault as the Red Line was approached. Support would also 
be available at this stage from the 186
th
 Trench Mortar Brigade who were to take two mortars 
and 100 rounds forward on pack animals and were to be used “as the occasion demanded”.392 
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The 2/4
th
 Hampshires were in their jumping off positions along the railway line in square 
R.16 by 2330 hours on 3 November.
393
 They lined up, ready for the off: „B‟ and „A‟ 
Companies in the front line, left and right respectively, „D‟ and „C‟ likewise in support. The 
front companies‟ objective was the ravine running from the Vieux Moulin down into square 
R.17.d. The support companies were to pass through and secure the Blue Line on the high 
ground along the Orsinval to Le Quesnoy road. As Zero Hour struck, the Germans put down 
an artillery barrage on the railway line. “Fairly heavy casualties”394 were inflicted before the 
men had even moved. 
 
„A‟ Company met with considerable opposition from machine gun fire as they set off for the 
ravine, and their Company Commander, Captain W. Brierley, was wounded. They were 
nevertheless able to take their objective “with fine dash”395 and captured three machine guns 
and 55 prisoners in the process. „B‟ Company also met with immediate opposition from an 
enemy strongpoint in the copse in square R.16.b. “After a sharp fight, the Enemy Machine 
Guns were silenced, the crews either killed or captured, and the advance continued”.396 They 
had found the ravine strongly held, but “the resolute bearing of the Company beat down the 
opposition”,397 taking one Officer and 80 Other Ranks prisoner. 
 
„D‟ and „C‟ Companies leapfrogged through as our barrage lifted at around Zero plus 30 
minutes and continued the advance up the slope. “The enemy held a very strong position with 
many machine guns, but the men were keen for the fight and the platoons were handled so 
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skilfully that the position was carried. Sergt. Hamilton greatly distinguished himself at this 
stage. At various positions on this company front, the enemy fought well, but the opposition 
was soon overcome”.398 The machine gun posts had been subdued largely by Lewis Gun fire. 
Connection was established with the New Zealand troops on their right and also with those of  
187 Infantry Brigade on the left, the Battalion was reorganised and the position consolidated. 
Their day‟s work was done, but fatal casualties had numbered fifteen. The War Diary details 
casualties for the month of November as 19 Other Ranks killed, 2 Officers and 70 Other 
Ranks wounded, 2 Other Ranks missing.
399
 
 
The 2/4
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s moved forward from their assembly positions in a sunken 
road, but as they approached the railway they were forced to deploy into artillery formation 
as the German guns were still putting down a barrage on this line. They reached their 
jumping off positions behind the 2/4
th
 Hampshires well before the allotted time. They passed 
through these positions at exactly 0751 hours, advancing on a two-company front. The right 
company came under harassing fire almost immediately from enemy machine guns, but 
“gradually worked forward”,400 capturing the guns and killing the crews. The left company 
came up against the strongly-held eastern bank of the Rhonelle River: by now „standard‟ 
tactics were employed. The enemy positions were engaged by Lewis Gun fire as platoons 
waded through the 30” deep water. Two platoons outflanked the position and a third mopped 
up. 
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The Belle Maison Farm on the slopes of the far bank was the next stumbling block. The 
attackers came under direct fire from machine guns and trench mortars, but the centre 
company was able to move forward using the farm walls as cover and forced their way into 
the farmhouse where they captured four machine guns and killed a number of Germans. 
 
Following the barrage closely they then took the sunken road in M.14.a & b and one platoon, 
working its way up the road into M.8.d, captured two field guns. 
 
At this point, the rear companies passed through their comrades‟ positions and set out for the 
Green Line. They advanced with little opposition for some distance. The right company was 
held up around M.15.c (at the road junction) for a while, but were able to overcome the 
enemy resistance, capturing 3 Officers, 73 Other Ranks and ten machine guns, and reached 
the Green Line at 1015 hours. The left support company arrived on the Green Line at much 
the same time, only encountering enemy fire once they had reached it. Battalion casualties for 
the month were recorded as 2 Officers and 17 Other Ranks killed, 3 Officers and 94 Other 
Ranks wounded, with 21 Other Ranks missing.
401
 On 4 November they had suffered 22 
fatalities, none of them an Officer. 
 
It was down to the 5
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s to complete the day‟s work: they had left their 
assembly positions at 0630 hours. On reaching the railway line they too were confronted by 
the continuing German barrage, though they were able to push through with “comparatively 
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few casualties”.402 The battalion paused to reorganise in the sunken road in R.17.a & c and 
then moved eastwards in “artillery formation of platoons”,403 „D‟ and „B‟ Companies (left 
and right respectively) in the lead positions. They were forced to deploy into a more extended 
formation as they came under machine gun fire on crossing the grid line between squares 
M.14 & 15. The German positions were in the orchards along the Green Line and were still 
holding up the 2/4
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s just short of their objective. 
 
The leading companies of 5
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s decided to leapfrog through their sister 
battalion and take the fight to the Germans. „D‟ Company were able to deal with the machine 
guns in the orchard to their front, but were held up briefly by others in R.16 a & b. These 
were “Successfully dealt with by Lewis Gunners and 2 machine guns fell into our hands”.404 
They were then able to establish a line on the high ground in M.17.a. “This company 
captured 90 prisoners, 8 4.2” Howitzers, 3 machine guns and a considerable amount of shells 
and other stores”.405 
 
„B‟ Company, on the right, found two companies of 2/4th Duke of Wellington‟s held up at 
around 0930 by machine guns firing from an orchard in M.15.c. The company Commander 
decided to take the matter into his own hands and press on: one platoon advanced on the 
German position frontally while another worked around the left flank. This latter manoeuvre 
precipitated a German withdrawal, but not before 20 prisoners had fallen into British hands. 
„B‟ Company were able to continue their advance at 1130, this time meeting “very little 
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further resistance”,406 and were able to establish a liaison post with the New Zealand Division 
at the Pont de l‟Alouette. (M.23.a.5.6).  
 
„A‟ Company were advancing in support of „D‟ Company on the left of the battalion frontage 
and eventually passed through the latter‟s positions in M.17.a, but then lost direction, veering 
drastically to the right. Attempts to readjust were thwarted by machine gun fire from a house 
at the railway bridge at M.17.b.6.0 and from the adjacent railway cutting,
407
 and with their 
Company Commander becoming a casualty, the manoeuvre was not accomplished. Two 
attempts to capture the house and the bridge were unsuccessful. 
 
„C‟ Company, advancing behind „B‟ Company, leapfrogged through them in M.16.d, but 
were held up by a machine gun in Gommegnies Church and by those in the house near the 
railway bridge. A further troublesome strongpoint was spotted in a house at M.18.c.7.0. An 
attempt was made to take this house by one platoon, but the building “proved to be held in 
strength and had machine guns on either flank as well as in the upper rooms and the platoon, 
after losing its commander and several men, had to fall back. The O.C. Company then 
decided to take up a line west of the Sunken Road running from Les Tous Verts [M.18.c.6.0] 
to Petit Marais [M.11.c.8.2]. A further attempt to take this house with three platoons of the 
NZ Division failed”,408 although the enemy were observed at one point to be waving a white 
flag from the skylight of the house.
409
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At dusk, the battalion line was reorganised, with „D‟ Company on the left, „C‟ Comapny on 
the right, with „A‟ Company holding a line of strongpoints linking the two (see map). „B‟ 
Company were in reserve in M.17.c. The diarist of the 5th Duke of Wellington‟s summarises 
the day and its denouement: 
 
The day‟s fighting had been hard, after a very long march up to the point where 
resistance was met. Direction was very difficult to keep owing to the numerous 
hedges which were very strong, and enclosed country, and in many cases platoons had 
to work around. Immediately after dusk the enemy came nearer and commenced 
digging in opposite our whole front, but on the New Zealand Division attacking Le 
Carnoy at 2130 hrs opposition ceased and no further machine gun fire was heard after 
2300 hours. The casualties of the battalion during the day amounted to 6 Officers and 
80 Other Ranks. 13 guns were captured, 220 prisoners were captured and 15 machine 
guns, besides large quantities of munitions, etc.
410
 
 
The original plan had envisaged 185
 
Brigade advancing eastwards from the Red Line that 
day, and they had followed the advance with this task in mind: at 2045 hours orders were 
issued delaying this move until 0600 hours on the following morning.
411
  5 November was a 
“miserable, wet day”,412 and the 185 Brigade “attacked, [ ... ] and, encountering no 
opposition, made a rapid advance”.413 The Red Line may not have been reached along the VI 
Corps front on 4 November, but in the end it did not matter: the damage had been done. The 
advance was turning into a pursuit. 
Conclusion 
Despite not quite reaching the day‟s final objectives before darkness forced a halt to the 
advance, VI Corps had been able to use well-practised small-unit tactics, including the 
effective use of Lewis Guns, trench mortars and rifle grenades to deal with both stubborn 
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resistance and difficult topographical and meteorological conditions. Once more, the 
assertions that German defence relied on natural features such as watercourses, woods and 
farms and that they could not defend in depth have been demonstrated. 
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Chapter 4 
IV Corps 
 
 
Introduction 
IV Corps orders reflect the complexity of the task facing it. On the left flank, the 
encirclement of Le Quesnoy and the subsequent advance into the Forêt de Mormal required a 
complicated artillery fire plan and a five-phase infantry assault. On the right, an attack 
initially supported by tanks would capture two villages surrounded by the ubiquitous orchards 
and hedges and then continue into the forest. The unreliability of the tanks was factored into 
divisional planning: 37
th
 Division presumed that armoured support might not materialise and 
were proved right. They were able to fall back on standard infantry / artillery tactics and once 
more German resistance cracked and then disintegrated in the face of superior numbers, 
tactics and weaponry, but not before some fierce hand-to-hand fighting had taken place. 
*          *          *          * 
IV Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Montague Harper) was responsible for just over four miles 
of front, stretching from the railway line north of the town of Le Quesnoy to the relatively 
open country south of the villages of Ghissignies and Louvignies. Ghissignies was in British 
hands, Louvignies was not. The left, or northern, Corps front was the responsibility of the 
New Zealand Division (Major-General Sir A.H. Russell).
414
 Twelve field and five heavy 
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brigades of artillery under Brigadier-General J.G. Geddes were in support. To the south was 
the 37
th
 Division. 
 
New Zealand Division
415
 
The jumping off line for the New Zealand Division (Major-General Sir A.H. Russell) units 
ran north-south, less than a mile to the west of the fortified town of Le Quesnoy. According 
to the Official History, “The town was enclosed by a seven-sided bastion enceinte, with a 
covered way tenaille (a continuous rampart of salients and re-entrants) outside it, the space 
between the two lines forming a dry ditch with mounds of earth, with trees growing on them, 
scattered over it”.416 These fortifications had long been obsolete in the face of modern heavy 
artillery and high explosive, but it was decided that the town would not be assaulted frontally, 
for three reasons: such an assault would be costly in terms of military casualties; the required 
bombardment would effectively destroy a picturesque medieval town‟s architecture and, 
perhaps most importantly, the town was full of French civilians. It made military and moral 
sense to precipitate the German garrison‟s surrender by encirclement. Once this phase of the 
operation was completed, the advance eastwards into the Forêt de Mormal would continue. 
The capture of Le Quesnoy would take on many of the aspects of classical eighteenth century 
siege warfare. 
 
The initial stages of the encirclement were entrusted to 3 New Zealand Rifle Brigade 
(Brigadier-General H.E. Hart), who had in the front line, north to south, its 2
nd
, 4
th
 and 1
st
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Battalions.
417
 1 New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General C.W. Melvill) would 
complete the encirclement from the north and then assume total responsibility for the advance 
from the Green Line to the Red Line objectives.
418
 
 
New Zealand Division Order No. 214, issued on 2 November, divided the assault into five 
phases: the first was the gaining of the Blue Line. This entailed the capture of the railway line 
to the west of Le Quesnoy, the railway triangle to the north and the large orchards to the 
south. The elaborate artillery barrage plan meant that the infantry were allowed two hours to 
complete this task.
419
 Phase two required the 3
rd
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade to 
leapfrog its sister battalion in the south and take the Blue Dotted Line. Twenty minutes or so 
later the 1
st
 Auckland Battalion (1 New Zealand Infantry Brigade) would skirt the northern 
suburbs of the town, trespassing briefly into 62
nd
 Division territory, and pass through the 2
nd
 
Rifles and onto the Blue Dotted Line, capturing the suburb of Ramponneau in the process.  
The third phase saw the 3
rd
 Rifles and the Auckland Battalion meeting at the crossroads at 
M26. d. 1.9. The units of 1 New Zealand Infantry Brigade would then extend their line 
southwards to the Divisional Boundary, thus occupying the whole of the Green Line. 
 
Phase four: “The 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade Group will, at ZERO plus 290 minutes, 
continue the advance from the GREEN LINE to the RED LINE, under a barrage of all 
available artillery. [ ... ] This barrage will die out on reaching the limit of the range of the 
                                                 
417
 This brigade was 7 officers and 969 other ranks under strength: all companies had been organised into three 
platoons, each averaging 28 men. TNA:PRO WO95/719 War Diary IV Corps HQ 
418
 See Map 6. 
419
 See Artillery Barrage Map 7a. 
148 
 
guns and the advance will be continued without a barrage, supported by Forward Sections or 
batteries”.420  
 
The first sentence of the orders for phase five began: “Should the enemy weaken, ...”421 Were 
this the case, units were to be pushed forward to the Red Dotted Line. The orders continued: 
“Should opposition be met with, a definite line will be established [ ... ] and Artillery brought 
forward preparatory to an attack by the 2
nd
 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Group during the 
afternoon”.422 As implied above, the final stages of the advance were to take the infantry 
beyond the range of their 18 pounder gun support. Order No. 108, issued on 2 November by 
the New Zealand CRA, stated: 
Immediately on the Blue Line being captured, the following Brigades will be prepared 
to advance by Batteries to the areas indicated, in order to carry the barrage on from 
the GREEN to the RED LINE. Continuity of fire on the Brigade task will be 
maintained, the remaining batteries being distributed over the Brigade front and 
increasing the rate of fire to compensate for the battery on the move; and each battery 
as it arrives resuming its task from its new position: 
211
th
 Brigade RFA  R.35. c 
72
nd
 (Army) Bde RFA R28. d & 34 b (Eastern Edge) 
210
th
 Bde RFA   R22 b & d (Eastern Edge) 
14
th
 (Army) Bde RFA  R16 d (Eastern Edge)
423
 
 
 
As will be seen from Map 7, this brings most of these batteries into positions just shy of the 
original outpost line, with 211
th
 Brigade east of the railway, a passage through the 
embankment having been dug by the Royal Engineers. 
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The New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion (specifically the Auckland and Otago Machine 
Gun Companies) were detailed to the “special tasks of enfilading the streets and 
RAMPARTS of LE QUESNOY”424 and “Q” Special Company Royal Engineers were to 
“project oil drums”425 onto the ramparts at Zero. The western ramparts were also to be 
subjected to a dense smoke barrage. The attack across the railway line was also “covered by 
the two medium trench mortar batteries and by two batteries of light trench mortars, whose 
barrages would conform with and advance 300 and 100 yards respectively in front of the field 
artillery barrage”.426 
 
The 2
nd
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade took over the left brigade frontage (about 1000 
yards) from the 4
th
 Battalion, having marched out from their billets in Beaudignies at 1700 on 
3 November. The relief was complete by 1830, although on the way one German shell 
landing right in the sunken road in R. 22. b. caused eleven casualties in one platoon of „C‟ 
Company. By midnight, Battalion Headquarters was established in the sunken road at R16. d. 
6.0. Almost immediately (at 0001 hrs) a patrol of four men under Rifleman Blaskett was sent 
out to “ascertain if the enemy was still in his forward positions”.427 A second patrol of one 
NCO (Lance Corporal Ollerenshaw) and three men went out at 0320 with an identical 
mission. Both patrols were able to report that the “enemy [was] still in his positions”.428 
During the night there was some heavy shelling from enemy artillery, but it fell harmlessly 
behind the assembly positions. 
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At Zero hour, 0530, “all guns opened out together, creating an awful din”429 and the men set 
off towards the railway triangle and their objective beyond it, „C‟ Company on the left, „A‟ 
Company in the centre, „D‟ Company on the right, with „B‟ Company in reserve. Almost 
immediately, „A‟ Company “met with considerable resistance on the high ground in R23. 
a.”,430 reporting heavy casualties, having been held up by fire from a machine gun just north 
of the railway junction at R17. c. 3.3. This machine gun was directly opposite a gap between 
„A‟ and „C‟ Companies and the confusion it caused resulted in some men of „A‟ Company 
advancing too quickly, passing through their own barrage. The machine gun was finally 
stormed by a party from „A‟ Company, but the company then encountered serious opposition 
in the railway triangle. The right platoon was particularly badly hit and it was up to Sergeant 
J.Grubb in the platoon on its left to cover the frontage with his own men. He cleared two 
machine gun posts and then overcame a nest of three more with the help of a light trench 
mortar.
431
 Seeing the disarray in front of him, Lieutenant L.H. Denniston, commanding „B‟ 
Company, brought his men forward to strengthen the line and “their timely assistance 
facilitated the capture of the objective”.432 
 
„C‟ Company, on the left, had it slightly easier: they were held up briefly by close-range 
machine gun fire, but Rifleman C. Birch, “a member of a light trench mortar team attached to 
the battalion, promptly volunteered to go forward and locate the machine gun. This he did 
with great coolness, and his comrades destroyed it with their mortar bombs. Birch thereupon, 
completing his reconnaissance of the locality, captured a German officer and 27 men”.433 „C‟ 
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Company was thus able to reach the Blue Line at 0620 without any further serious 
resistance.
434
 
 
„D‟ Company fought its way across the southern part of the railway triangle, meeting 
“considerable resistance”,435 but reached their objectives. They then sent patrols forward to 
the sunken road in R23. d. Met here by fire from another German machine gun, Sergeant 
W.P. McGillen “got his Lewis Gun into action, silenced the enemy gun and compelled the 
crew to retire to a house in rear of the German position. Quickly following up, McGillen 
personally rushed the house, killing 5 of the enemy with a bomb and capturing 14 more”.436 
 
Not content with occupying their assigned objective, „B‟ Company sent forward a patrol of 
one NCO and three men toward the ramparts. They managed to get across the moat (at 
approximately R23. d. 8.6) and capture a machine gun, throwing it into the moat. They were 
driven back out by superior forces, however. No.7 Platoon of „B‟ Company made another 
attempt to get across the moat with support from a platoon of „D‟ Company. Some of the men 
made it into the moat (dry at this point), but the supporting platoon was driven back and they 
were compelled to stay where they were, able “neither to get forward or to get out”437 until 
late that afternoon. The Blue Line was therefore gained along the whole of the battalion front, 
even if a machine gun nest in the triangle at Factory Corner was not overcome for a further 
three hours. One casualty sustained at this point was particularly unfortunate. “Our barrage 
was reported by all Coys to be very good. There were very few shorts until the objective was 
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taken. After that, shells fell short in considerable numbers, particularly on the eastern end of 
the railway triangle. 2
nd
 Lt. Bate DCM was killed at the assembly point by a short and several 
men were wounded”.438 
 
The 4
th
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade went into the line with a strength of 28 officers 
and 726 other ranks. Battalion Headquarters was in cellars in Chapel Farm, 1200 yards west 
of Le Quesnoy on the Ruesnes road. „A‟ Company, on the right, was in position along the 
hedge to the east of the Ferme de Béart. „B‟ Company, in the centre, was on the higher 
ground, and „C‟ Company, on the left, was astride the Le Quesnoy – Ruesnes road, about 300 
yards east of Battalion Headquarters. „D‟ Company was in reserve. The 18 pounder barrage 
opened “good and even”439 at 0530, while Stokes and Trench mortars drenched the railway 
line. This was the battalion‟s only real objective of the day and it was taken exactly to 
schedule: Order No. 214 (2 November) then required “patrols [to] be pushed forward to 
ascertain if the town is still occupied”.440 All three forward companies did as they were 
asked: on the left, „C‟ Company under Lieutenant C.N. Rathbone pushed forward to the 
southern section of the sunken road reached by 2
nd
 Rifles further to the north. Here they were 
pinned down by very accurate machine gun and mortar fire from the ramparts. Their situation 
is summed up rather poetically by the Official Historian:  
Even apart from this fire the way here was barred by a 40-feet broad expanse of deep 
water which reflected in an unbroken mirror the rich red of the brick rampart and the 
russets, browns and yellows of the trees. Here the company could make no progress, 
and here it remained practically isolated for the rest of the day.
441
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„A‟ and „B‟ Companies, under Lieutenants H.S. Kenrick and V.F. Maxwell respectively, 
made similar aggressive forays into the maze of moat, re-entrant, bastion, tree-topped islet 
and grassy bank. The nature of the ground allowed them freer movement than was possible 
further north. “The space between the outer and inner ramparts was dotted with a series of 
lofty islets crowned with trees and thick undergrowth. The sides of these islands were steep, 
faced with brick or stone and all of them about 20 to 30 feet in height. Boche snipers and 
machine gunners were very persistent in firing from these excellent positions”.442 
 
One platoon under Second-Lieutenant Evans “made a very daring advance”443 and after 
bombarding one of the „islands‟ with rifle grenades, used a scaling ladder to clamber onto and 
occupy it. Evans went forward with four men and a Lewis Gun and made it onto one of the 
inner bastions. There, at around 0900, they were seen by an enemy machine gun crew on top 
of the ramparts and pinned down in a hole by very accurate fire. “After a moment, on the 
machine gun‟s ceasing fire, Evans tried to scale the steep side of the inner bastion. He was 
immediately shot through the brain and rolled back dead into the hole”.444 A similar fate was 
met by his batman who tried to bring the Lewis Gun into action. The three remaining 
members of the patrol remained where they were, unable to escape, for six hours. The 4
th
 
Rifles paused for breath. 
 
                                                 
442
 TNA:PRO WO95/3711 War Diary 4
th
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade. 
443
 Ibid. 
444
 Stewart, The New Zealand Division 1916-1919 , p.588. Second-Lieutenant Francis Meredith Evans (age 24) 
is buried in Romeries Communal Cemetery Extension, Grave X.A.6 
154 
 
The 1
st
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade (Captain E.A. Harding MC)
445
 occupied the 
right brigade frontage: they had a ration strength on 1 November of 26 officers and 544 other 
ranks. They attacked with three companies in the front line: their objective line (see Map 6) 
ran north-west to south-east. The right company („D‟ Company) faced an advance of 1500 
yards to their target, the Landrecies road running south through squares 31 b & d. The left 
company had around a third of that distance to make. On the left, „B‟ Company‟s objective 
was the northern edge of the orchard largely in square 35. „A‟ Company, in the centre, was to 
gain the line between the orchard and the Ghissignies road. All companies initially faced the 
well-defended railway line and embankment. They were in position by 0525 and the barrage 
opened ten minutes later. Its first lift was at Zero plus three minutes and it crept forward at a 
rate of 100 yards every three minutes, the New Zealanders on its heels.“Several machine guns 
on [this] line pinned the attackers for some minutes to the ground”.446 Infantry tactics learned 
at platoon level served them well: machine gunners were pinned down by Lewis Gun fire, 
suppressed by rifle grenades and then outflanked and / or rushed. Sergeant R. L. Ferguson, 
Corporal M.J. Mulvaney DCM, Rifleman E.W. Hallett and CSM M.E. Olsen are all named in 
the Official History as having captured machine gun posts, some of them single-handed.
 447
 
Once across this obstacle, the companies were able to advance quickly to their respective 
objectives, „B‟ Company by 0640, „A‟ company by 0645 and „D‟ Company by 0825. „C‟ 
Company, in reserve, had, by just after 0610, moved forward to positions just east of the 
railway. There, it was “given the most piquant adventure that befell the battalion during the 
day”.448 
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A group of Germans counter-attacking the 37
th
 Division troops to the south feared 
encirclement and decided to withdraw. They attempted to get back to Le Quesnoy by 
following the railway line, clearly unaware of how far the New Zealanders had already 
advanced. As these troops appeared through the lingering fog, „C‟ Company detached a 
section under Corporal C. Taylor to deal with them. The Germans were so surprised to see 
their way blocked that the five officers and 150 men “threw up the sponge”449 and 
surrendered to Taylor and his men. 1
st
 Rifles casualties for the day totalled eighty-two. 
 
With the Blue Line securely held, it was time for the next phase of the attack to begin. It was 
the job of 3
rd
 Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade to advance through the 1
st
 Battalion 
positions in the south and gain the Blue Dotted and Green Lines. 
 
The 3
rd
 Battalion had started its move forward from its assembly positions at 0540 and, as it 
crested the ridge line just to the west of the original front line position, just as dawn was 
breaking, German artillery fire cost the battalion its only fatal casualties of the day: three 
other ranks from „B‟ Company and Second-Lieutenant P.M. Beattie of „C‟ Company.450 
 
By 0615 the battalion had crossed the railway line and was advancing with „A‟ Company on 
the right, „D‟ Company on the left, with „C‟ and „B‟ Companies in support. By 0710 they 
were poised behind the Blue Line positions. At 0729 the advance commenced, sections going 
ahead under the barrage in artillery formation. The diarist noted that a heavy mist had come 
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down by this time and visibility was down to twenty yards in places.
451
 German resistance 
would appear to have been minimal, as the Blue Dotted Line was gained at 0800, that is, 
ahead of time. The Official History states that “no other noteworthy incident marked the 3rd 
Rifles‟ progress to the Blue Dotted Line”.452 
 
At 0729, just as the battalion attack went in, Major Cockroft and his Intelligence Officer 
Second-Lieutenant E.C. Drummond, were some distance back, awaiting word from 
Advanced Battalion Headquarters to follow on, when they noticed a large number of men 
approaching from the south. Their first thought was that they were troops from 37
th
 Division 
who had lost direction, but the truth quickly dawned. They were Germans. Their presence 
threatened to separate the advancing companies from their supports, and just as they were 
preparing to set up their machine guns, Drummond charged forward and fired his revolver at 
them. The four officers and seventy men immediately surrendered to him. 
 
The Blue Dotted Line positions to the north-east of Le Quesnoy were to be taken by the 1
st
 
Auckland Battalion of 1 New Zealand Infantry Brigade. They had moved from their assembly 
positions just north of Beaudignies at Zero plus 15 minutes. As they crossed the Ruesnes to 
Le Quesnoy road (running east to west through square R21 b) an enemy plane was noticed 
overhead. “Immediately after, his artillery opened up and heavily shelled the line of advance, 
but very few casualties were caused”.453 
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The first companies (6
th
 Hauraki and 15
th
 North Auckland) reached the Le Quesnoy to 
Orsinval road (running north-south through squares 17b & 18d) at 0618, starting forward 
from there under cover of the artillery barrage on time at 0751. The battalion had been careful 
in its approach to leave at least 500 yards between it and the railway so as to avoid any 
enfilade fire. They were also shrouded by the mist and the smoke barrage on the ramparts. 
The suburb of Ramponneau was in their hands by 0836 for less than 50 casualties.
454
 Their 
companies swung to the right, linking up with the 2
nd
 Rifles on the right and reaching as far 
as the railway station on the left. The encirclement of Le Quesnoy was almost complete. The 
second phase of the attack had been successfully accomplished: the move onto the Green 
Line would now follow.  
 
To the south of the town, it was down to the two forward companies ( „A‟ & „D‟) of the 3rd 
Rifles to move forward from their positions on the Blue Dotted Line onto the Green Line. 
The author of the New Zealand Official History sets the scene in his customary style: “The 
sun was now well up in the east, the mist had dispersed and the day was bright and warm”.455 
„B‟ Company passed through „D‟ Company on the left flank and took up precautionary 
positions , establishing posts along the southern edge of the lakes, the Etang Neuf and Etang 
du Mayeur, which flanked the main causeway leading south-east from the Porte de 
Fauroeulx. This was to cover the increasingly unlikely event of a German counter attack 
emanating from Le Quesnoy itself. 
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The advance of „D‟ and „A‟ Companies to the Green Line is described very briefly in the 
battalion war diary: “At 8:47 a.m. the advance was again continued to the Green Line and 
although opposition was met with from enemy posts and machine guns the advance was only 
temporarily checked and the Green Line was gained on schedule time”.456 
 
The Official History goes into more detail where the „opposition met‟ is concerned: the New 
Zealanders were moving in more open country in the by now “clearer light”457 and presented 
much better targets to the German machine gunners. These machine gun posts proved 
difficult to locate and threatened to hold up the attack. “Rfmn N. Coop, a No. 1 of a Lewis 
Gun team, worked forward into the open to draw the fire of these guns and thus induce them 
to betray their exact positions. His fearless behaviour had the desired effect, and the No. 2 
was enabled to bring his gun forward and put the enemy guns out of action”.458 
 
It was „A‟ Company, on the right, under Captain F.E. Greenish, that faced the fiercest 
opposition. Moving forward from the vicinity of the Château de Montout (see map – M32 d), 
once they had crossed the Le Quesnoy to Jolimetz road they entered more open country 
“devoid of cover and swept by machine guns from a commanding ridge directly in front of 
the Chateau”.459 For once, the fabled determination of German machine gun teams was left 
wanting, it would seem: they either withdrew from the ridge or surrendered in the face of the 
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determined, unfaltering and fearless
460
 advance of Greenish‟s men. “The ridge was gained 
with surprising ease”.461 
 
The task of completing the total encirclement of Le Quesnoy fell to the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Wellington 
Battalions of 1 New Zealand Infantry Brigade  (Lt-Col. F.K Turnbull & Major H.E. 
McKinnon respectively). Their initial engagements met with very limited opposition: the 1
st
 
Wellingtons had reached their assembly positions in the sunken road in squares R17 a & c by 
0800. Here they came under fire from enemy artillery and their Adjutant, Lieutenant A.R. 
Blennerhassett, was killed
462
 and Second Lieutenant P.H.G. Bennett wounded. 
 
They left their assembly positions at 0802 with their sister battalion, 2
nd
 Wellingtons, on their 
left, passing through the 1
st
 Auckland Battalion men at 0856, West Coast Company on the 
right, Ruahine Comapny on the left. Apart from a “short fight”463 on the Villereau road,464 
they met with little or no trouble and were on the Green Line by 0925. The 2
nd
 Wellingtons 
arrived with them, having been held up by nothing more than the woods on the steep banks of 
the Rhonelle river. 
 
The 1
st
 Wellingtons then extended their lines to the south, the Taranaki Company (Captain E. 
White) on the right and the Hawkes Bay Company  on the left pushing through, the former 
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“taking over the frontage captured by the 3rd N.Z. (R) B”.465 Thus, 1st New Zealand Infantry 
Brigade was in position to begin the fourth phase of the attack. Le Quesnoy, now fully 
surrounded and bypassed, became, arguably, though still in German hands, a tactical nuisance 
but an operational irrelevance. 
 
As the final manoeuvres of „Phase 3‟ were being launched, the advancing troops witnessed an 
impressive moment in the scheduled artillery barrage‟s advance: the two leading edges of the 
enveloping wings of the creeping barrage met, precisely and on time at the crossroads to the 
east of the Etang du Mayeur (M26 d 1.9), coalesced and continued as one onto the Green 
Line. 
 
The two Wellington Battalions resumed the advance towards the Red Line at 1020
466
: four 
British artillery brigades, firing from the Ferme de Béart Wood, would supply the creeping 
barrage, advancing at a rate of 100 yards every three minutes. This barrage would, as 
mentioned earlier, peter out as the troops moved beyond the guns‟ maximum range. The 1st 
New Zealand Artillery Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Symon, was to advance around the 
northern outskirts of Le Quesnoy, but the intensity of the machine gun fire from the ramparts 
forced them abandon this route and go around the southern side of the town – quite a detour! 
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The 2
nd
 NZ Artillery Brigade suffered similar harassment, but merely edged further to the 
north and were able to take up positions at St Sepulchre, east of Villereau (M21.d.9.9) by 
1330. The 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Brigades arrived at positions in the vicinity some time later. 
 
The 2
nd
 Wellingtons, on the left frontage of the advance, reported the Germans as “being 
more content to withdraw more quickly than our troops could advance”.467 The 1st 
Wellingtons on the right encountered similarly demoralised resistance: “The enemy was in 
considerable strength on our front and fought well at some places, but in many instances 
seemed only too pleased to surrender”.468 
 
The 2
nd
 Wellingtons reached the Red Line more or less on schedule and began to reorganise 
their companies. On the way, a party of signallers under Lance-Corporal J.H. Griffiths, busy 
laying a telephone wire, happened upon three enemy 77mm guns still in action. Griffiths 
ordered his men to “drop their wire and charge the guns”.469 They captured the guns, along 
with two prisoners who had briefly attempted to keep the New Zealanders at bay with rifle 
fire. The other eight artillery men had fled at once. The signallers then resumed their wire-
laying. 
 
Patrols were sent forward from the Red Line, but were unable to get any further than 200 
yards on the left owing to flanking machine gun fire. The right flank proved more fruitful, 
patrols reaching the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal. At 1800, orders were received to 
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advance to the Red Dotted Line: under a light barrage at 2130, the West Coast & Ruahine 
Companies pushed forward, the Hawke Company in support. “The stunt was a complete 
success as the enemy had withdrawn at 1500 the same day”.470 A Forward Battalion 
Headquarters was established at M24.d.8.4 and it was whilst going forward to that location 
that the Battalion commander, Major McKinnon and his Adjutant, Lieutenant S. A. Murrell, 
were killed by an enemy shell.
471
 Captain D. S. Columb, commanding Taranaki Company, 
was sent for to take over the battalion. 
 
Final dispositions for the day show the companies in positions in the northern part of the 
Forêt de Mormal.
472
 Casualties for the day numbered 8 officers and 58 other ranks. 
 
The 1
st
 Wellingtons were on the Red Line by 1156 and patrols took the road running along 
the eastern edge of the forest. At 1415 they pushed on through the forest and met only a 
cavalry patrol, this being fired upon, resulting in four dead horses and two human prisoners. 
“The inhabitants of the villages through which the battalion passed welcomed us with joy and 
pressed coffee and fruit and milk on our men”.473 The Red Dotted Line was reached at 2330: 
only one enemy post had been encountered and “dealt with”.474 By 0130 on 5 November they 
had edged forward as far as the Sarioton road. 
 
Casualties for the day had been: 
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    Officers Other Ranks 
Killed   1  7 
Wounded  2  20 
 
They had captured: 45 field guns, 7 trench mortars, 60 machine guns, 100 rifles, 11 limbers, 2 
wagons, 1 water cart, 2 small carts, 14 horses and 1000 prisoners. 
The 2
nd
 Wellingtons‟ haul was: 29 field guns, 4 8” Howitzers, 5 trench mortars, 33 machine 
guns and 400 prisoners.
475
 
 
The advance, impressive as it was, could have been pushed even further: at 1530 the 2
nd
 
Wellingtons reported the enemy retreating east of the Red Dotted Line and requested 
permission to push on to the village of Le Sart. It took two hours for the message to reach 
Brigade HQ, however, and by the time the affirmative reply came back to the Wellingtons, 
the Germans had reoccupied the village. Back at Le Quesnoy, stalemate persisted, Stewart 
stating that “the persistent and obstinate efforts of the Rifle Brigade to clear Le Quesnoy had 
been for many hours frustrated by a tenacious defence and by the strength of the position”.476 
 
Each battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was vying for the honour of being the one 
to precipitate the surrender of the German garrison still ensconced behind the town ramparts. 
The 3
rd
 Battalion NZ Rifle Brigade had been able to withdraw their men from their forward 
positions on the Blue Dotted Line south of Le Quesnoy at around 1020 as the Wellington 
battalions of 1
st
 NZ Infantry Brigade moved off from the Green Line. They were soon in 
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positions facing the south-eastern sector of the town, the two lakes now directly in front of 
them. At 1100 they pushed patrols forward along the causeway between the two ‘Etangs’, but 
were immediately checked by heavy machine gun fire which caused several casualties and 
“as instructions had been issued to avoid casualties once the town was surrounded no 
offensive action was adopted”.477 Soon after, three captured Germans were sent in through 
the Porte de Fauroeulx to explain to their comrades that the town was surrounded, that the 
battle had passed well to the east of them and that surrender would now be the sensible 
option. No reply came back: indeed, for the next three hours the defenders sniped at the New 
Zealanders from the walls of the town. “At 3 p.m. two more German messengers were sent 
into the town with instructions to inform the Commander of the garrison that he could 
surrender his garrison by 5 p.m. if he wished and the garrison would be treated as ordinary 
prisoners. In the event of his not doing so by that hour, on his surrender later the whole 
garrison would be treated according as we see fit”.478 Half an hour later, the “emissaries 
returned”.479 The men were willing to throw in the towel. The officers were not and so the 
stalemate in the south-east persisted. It was around this time that an RE.8 (Aircraft No. 2869) 
from 59 Squadron RAF flew over Le Quesnoy, Lieutenants Dexter (pilot) and Rowley 
(observer) on board, at a height of only 200 feet, from where they dropped leaflets into the 
town. The leaflets read: 
AN DEN KOMMANDANTEN DER GARNISON VON LE QUESNOY. 
Die Stellung Le Quesnoy ist jetzt völlig eingeschlossen. Unsere Truppen sind weit östlich von 
der Stadt. Daher werden Sie aufgefordert, sich mit Ihrer Garnison zu ergeben. Die Garnison 
wird als ehrliche Kriegsgefangene behandelt werden.
480
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but produced no answer. 
 
The 2
nd
 Battalion NZ Rifle Brigade was still in positions facing the Porte de Valenciennes in 
the northern sector of the town. A party under Second-Lieutenant Kingdon had worked their 
way around to the bridge over the railway line in square R9 d and had found it still intact. 
They also sent an enemy prisoner across to negotiate a surrender, but they too received no 
reply. As if to emphasise their non-compliance, the Germans blew the span of the bridge 
nearest the town at 1345. New Zealand engineers spanned the gap with timber and “a dash 
was made to get into the town by some officers and men and one Pioneer. The latter actually 
did get into the town [ ... ] and shot one Hun”.481 The party was driven off by machine gun 
fire. A Stokes Mortar was brought up into position behind the crossroads in square R24 c at 
around 1500, but it took another hour for the appropriate ammunition to arrive. For half an 
hour subsequently, they shelled the ramparts. 
 
It was to the 4
th
 Battalion NZ Rifle Brigade that fell the honour of precipitating the collapse 
of German resistance. Patrols skirmishing amongst the islets, bastions and re-entrants to the 
west of the town had gradually driven the defenders back behind the main inner ramparts. 
These being close to 60 feet high, how the 30 foot scaling ladders that had been supplied 
were to be used was not immediately evident. Second-Lieutenants L.C.L. Averill MC 
(Battalion Intelligence Officer) and H.W. Kerr (14 Platoon, „D‟ Company) eventually found a 
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narrow bridge near a sluice gate between the two south-westerly protuberances of the 
ramparts,
482
 high enough and just wide enough to accommodate their ladder. The adjacent 
ramparts were shelled by trench mortars and swept by Lewis Gun fire to allow the two 
officers and their patrol to get to the inner wall unmolested. They raised their ladder: it just 
reached the top with a foot to spare, its top resting on the grassy bank that crowned the 
ramparts. It was around 1600. Averill and Kerr climbed the ladder. Averill reached the top 
and crawled onto the grass bank. He sent a revolver bullet after two retreating Germans and 
was soon joined by Kerr. The latter fired a shot at another group of Germans who 
immediately disappeared into an underground cavern under the ramparts. By now the rest of 
the battalion were swarming up the ladder, led by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel Barrowclough. “A few shots were fired and the Boche rapidly surrendered. The 
whole Battalion mopped up the town, all prisoners being collected in the PLACE D‟ARMES. 
The whole Battalion climbed up that single ladder”.483 
 
Fifteen minutes later, the 2
nd
 Battalion NZ Rifle Brigade was marching through the Porte de 
Valenciennes and within the hour “the cookers were in the town and the men got a good 
meal”.484 Around 700 prisoners were taken. 
 
Battalion diaries summarise the day‟s casualties as follows: 
     Officers    Other Ranks 
     K W M   K W M 
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483
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3 NZ Rifle Bde 
1
st
 Battalion   - 9 -   15 53 5 
2
nd
 Battalion   3 4 -   15 92 4 
3
rd
 Battalion   1 - -   3 45 - 
4
th
 Battalion   2 - -   11 42 2 
 
1
 
NZ Infantry Bde 
1
st
 Auckland   1 1 -   9 37 - 
1
st
 Wellington   1 2 -   7 20 - 
2
nd
 Wellington  2 6 -   13 45 - 
485
 
 
1
st
 Machine Gun Bn  - 2 -   6 20 - 
 
Total    10 24 -   79 354 11 
 
         Overall Total: 478 
 
37th Division
486
 
The 37
th
 Division (Major-General H. Bruce-Williams) frontage straddled the village of 
Ghissignies, being approximately 2500 yards in length, north to south. The attack would 
proceed due east and would entail, initially, the capture of the villages of Louvignies and 
Jolimetz. Beyond there, the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal crossed the axis of the 
assault at an angle of 45°, running south-west to north-east, though the Germans had felled 
the trees over quite a large area: this included most of the area up to the Red Line objective. 
(See map). Proper woodland would only be encountered on the approach to the Red Dotted 
Line, some 9000 yards from the jumping off positions. 
 
The infantry would advance behind the ubiquitous creeping barrage: 18 pounders from five 
RFA Brigades would supply this, supplemented by a line of 4.5” shells landing 150 yards 
ahead of the main belt. To add even more depth, one 18 pounder battery per brigade would 
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fire 250 yards in advance of the other batteries.
487
 Again, as usual, only shrapnel and smoke 
would be fired on villages.
488
 Heavy artillery would bombard certain areas of tactical 
importance ahead of the barrage (See Map 7b) and would be employed in counter-battery 
work: “heavy artillery brought neutralising fire to bear on 24 suspected hostile battery 
positions from zero onwards. [ ... ] Estimate of hostile strength on evening of 3
rd
 instant was 
about 35 batteries or say 100 guns and from guns captured, and evidence since obtained this 
estimate would appear to have been fairly correct”.489 Ammunition expended by the heavy 
artillery batteries during the 24 period from 1200 3 November to 1200 4 November was 
recorded as follows: 
60 pounders  2000 rounds 
6” Howitzers  4519 rounds 
8” Howitzers    228 rounds 
9.2” Guns    174 rounds 
6” Guns    244 rounds 
5.9 German guns     18 rounds 
Total   7183 rounds 
 
The barrage would open at zero hour and would move forward from its initial line (See Map 
8) at zero plus 4 minutes. It would advance as follows: 
Leave Opening Line:   zero + 4 minutes  (0534 hrs) 
Arrive Blue Line:   zero + 104 minutes  (0714 hrs) 
Leave Blue Line:   zero + 119 minutes  (0729 hrs) 
Arrive Blue Dotted Line:  zero + 167 minutes  (0817 hrs) 
Leave Blue Dotted Line:  zero + 197 minutes  (0847 hrs) 
Pause on Green Line:   12 minutes on left 
      120 minutes on right 
Leave Green Line:   zero + 342 minutes on left (1117 hrs) 
      zero + 449 minutes on right (1259 hrs) 
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The rates of advance of the barrage were: the first 700 yards, 100 yards every 4 minutes. 
From this point on, 100 yards every 6 minutes as far as the Green Line. It would revert to 100 
yards every 4 minutes thereafter.
490
 
 
Planning of the barrage was a collaborative process. Orders issued on 1 November stated that 
“37th & New Zealand Divisions will submit their plans for the barrage and notify any points 
they wish bombarded by the Heavy Artillery as soon as possible”.491 
 
The initial advance would fall to 111 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General S.G. Francis), with 
13
th
 Battalion Rifle Brigade in the van on the left and 13
th
 Battalion King‟s Royal Rifle Corps 
on the right. The 10
th
 Royal Fusiliers would be in support on the right brigade frontage. The 
13
th
 Battalion Rifle Brigade would advance to the Blue Line and the Blue Dotted Line. On 
the right, the 13
th
 KRRC would go as far as the Blue Line, with one company also responsible 
for the mopping up of the village of Louvignies, where the 10
th
 Royal Fusiliers would 
leapfrog them and continue the attack as far as the Blue Dotted Line. 112 Infantry Brigade 
(Brigadier-General W.N. Herbert) would carry on the assault from there, with the 8
th
 
Battalion Somerset Light Infantry attached from 63 Brigade. 
The attack plan included five tanks.
492
 The tanks were to move up into their positions (about 
1000 yards behind the infantry jumping off line) on the night of 3 / 4 November, the noise of 
their engines being masked from 0100 by low-flying aircraft. This was clearly not going to be 
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a massed tank attack as had been seen at Cambrai or Amiens, and on 25 October, in a 
document entitled “Notes on Recent Operations by the IV Corps”, Lieutenant-General G.M. 
Harper included a paragraph on co-operation with tanks: 
 
Mark IV tank commanders must realise that they are the „hand maidens‟ of the 
Infantry. They therefore must work in conformity with the Infantry. This implies that 
they must ascertain what the Infantry are expected to do and they must conform and 
not go off on independent missions.
493
 
 
Co-operation and liaison being the key, therefore, and with time for combined training non-
existent, the plans for the use of tanks were relatively straight forward and yet rather lacking 
in detail: they would 
“ (a) assist 111th Inf. Bde. In the capture of Louvignies 
(b) assist 112th Inf. Bde. In the capture of Jolimetz and the RED LINE. 
Tanks will move into assembly positions in rear of the attacking troops of 111
th
 Bde on 
the night 3/4
th
 Nov and will so time their advance that they can assist that Bde in the 
capture of Louvignies”.494 
 
111 Brigade were under no illusions as to the level of assistance the tanks might provide: 
  
Attacking Battalions will not wait for these tanks, but it is hoped that they will be in 
time to assist in clearing the orchards and enclosures West of Louvignies. They will 
not actually pass through the village.
495
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Both front-line battalions were billeted in the village of Salesches the day before the 
attack. 13
th
 Rifle Brigade moved out at 0030 on 4 November, 13
th
 KRRC an hour and a 
half later. Both were on the start line by zero minus 30 minutes. 
 
Aware that the Germans had withdrawn from their forward positions in some places north 
of Le Quesnoy, 37
th
 Division GSO2 visited 111 Bde HQ at 2030 3 November bringing 
orders from Divisional HQ. 63 Infantry Brigade, who were currently holding the front 
line east of Ghissignies, were to carry out “active patrolling” during that night to “ensure 
that touch with the enemy was not lost”.496 
 
Reports were to be wired to 37
th
 Division HQ hourly. Should no contact be made with the 
enemy by 0300, the Brigade would advance across the original start line at 0530, but with 
no artillery barrage, the guns being ready to provide one on “any line west of the Green 
Line” should it be deemed necessary. 497 As it turned out, the hourly reports revealed an 
enemy still in place and “intend[ing] to make a stand”.498 Enemy machine guns were also 
reported to be firing intermittently all night from the vicinity of the chapel in square X5 a. 
The Germans were clearly nervous and perhaps aware of the preparations to their front as 
their trench mortars were active through the night and a large number of Very lights were 
sent up into the night sky.
499
 
 
The 13
th
 Rifle Brigade, on the left of the brigade frontage, had „C‟, „A‟, and „D‟ 
Companies on the jumping off line, left to right, with „B‟ Company in reserve in cellars in 
Ghissignies. The barrage opened at 0530 and remained on the line of the railway for four 
                                                 
496
 Ibid. 
497
 Ibid. 
498
 Ibid. 
499
 Ibid. 
172 
 
minutes: it moved forward, as did the men, at 0534, whereupon 500 drums of oil were 
launched from positions in the Ghissignies orchards into the Chapel area. The German 
positions on the railway line were taken “after a fierce struggle and much hand to hand 
fighting”500 by „D‟ Company, supported by two platoons from „A‟ Company, resulting in 
the capture of around 50 prisoners and a dozen machine guns. Two platoons comprising 
„C‟ Company‟s right flank were held up at the railway line, but the other two platoons, 
plus one from „A‟ Company were able to continue the push forward and arrived on the 
Blue Line along with „D‟ Company “well up to schedule time”.501 The hold up in the left 
centre was caused by the machine guns securely dug in around the afore-mentioned 
chapel at X5 a 4.5. „B‟ Company moved out from their cellars at 0800 and approached the 
railway. The Company Commander, correctly assessing the situation, organised a two-
platoon attack of the position from the south, helped by a tank and a trench mortar section 
and had “thus cleared up the pocket of Germans by 09.15 hours. Several Machine Guns 
and 70 prisoners were [captured] in these pockets”.502 „B‟ Company and the remaining 
units of „A‟ and „C‟ Companies were then able to advance to the Blue Line, thus catching 
up with their colleagues. 
 
It transpired that the fiercest opposition had already been met: “In the attack on the 
Railway Line the casualties sustained were considerable, including two Company 
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Commanders and several Platoon Commanders”.503 Thereafter, shell fire was the only 
serious problem up to the Blue Dotted Line. The advance from the Blue Line commenced 
at 0800 (Louvignies village being reported clear of the enemy at 0815).
 504
 It is a recurring 
theme across the whole attack frontage of 4 November that the Germans held their front 
line positions strongly, but once these had been overrun, they were prone to either retreat 
or surrender. 
 
The enemy opposition was now broken, and prisoners were giving themselves up 
freely: only one or two isolated posts offered resistance, and these were quickly 
mopped up by Platoons or Sections being detailed to deal with them. The Blue Dotted 
Line was reached by 08.50 hours, and by 10.20 hours Companies had been 
reorganised and the line consolidated.
505
 
 
Enemy shell fire in reply to the British barrage had come initially just to the east of 
Ghissignies and this had lifted back to Louvignies at 0800. This was too far to the west to 
cause many casualties to the advancing infantry, but it played havoc with attempts to lay 
wire to the Brigade Advanced Report Centre: this was not accomplished until 1115 and 
“made communication with Battalions extremely difficult throughout the morning”.506 
Alternatives proved equally problematic: “Visual signalling was rendered quite 
impossible due to the mist. In addition the country between Battalion Headquarters and 
the line until a late hour, was heavily shelled, so that several runners became casualties 
and messages subsequently lost”.507 The problem of battlefield communication was never 
satisfactorily solved during the First World War. This aspect‟s „learning curve‟ was 
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probably one of the shallowest. Even by 4 November 1918, communication between 
soldier and tank on the battlefield, for example, consisted of the former waving his helmet 
on the end of his rifle to the latter. The latter hoisted flags of varying colour combinations 
to signal his intent to the former.508 
 
The Battalion War Diary summarises their casualties for the day as follows: 
    Officers Other Ranks 
 Killed   2  27 
 Wounded  5  90 
 Missing  -  14 
 
 
 
The 13
th
 Battalion King‟s Royal Rifle Corps had received their Operation Orders on 3 
November: the battalion was tasked with advancing to the Blue Line, capturing the village of 
Louvignies on the way. The former was in reality the road running north-south in square S8 
(the Le Quesnoy to Englefontaine road) and it would be assaulted by „A‟ Company (Captain 
E.J. Putman MC) on the left and „C‟ Company (Captain T.B. Craig MC) on the right. „B‟ and 
„D‟ Companies (Captains J.N. Evans-Jackson MC and H.A.C. Williams MC respectively) in 
support with the specific duties of mopping up the village behind their own advanced 
companies and those of 13
th
 Rifles. Their task was made easier by aerial reconnaissance: 
“Enlargements of air photos of the village were made and special areas were allotted to each 
platoon of the two supporting companies, so that each section could immediately make its 
own route direct to the scene of its operations”.509 The diarist adds a further detail, a mixture 
of pragmatism and logistical legerdemain:  
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As electric torches will be very necessary for this operation and none were [sic] 
provided by Ordnance, Sgt Hugkulstone set out for DOULLENS on Saturday 
morning [2 November]. He was unexpectedly successful in lorry jumping and 
returned to the Bn by mid-day on Sunday with his purchases having covered a 
distance of over 150 miles.
510
 
 
Three tanks were detailed to follow the infantry advance and assist in the mopping up of the 
orchards near Louvignies. Their help was not taken for granted, however, as we have already 
seen.
511
 The diarist adds that “The tanks detailed to operate behind the Battalion were not 
seen and fortunately their services were not required”. The five tanks of „C‟ Company, 2nd 
Tank Brigade allocated to 37
th
 Division were: 9117 (Second-Lieutenant W.D.B. Miller); 
9043 (Second-Lieutenant A. Harris); 9050 (Sergeant H.W. Thompson); 9389 (Second-
Lieutenant E.A. Hayes) & 9047 (Second-Lieutenant K.C. Skuce). The details of their 
involvement are less than impressive: 9050 broke a track on the approach and took no part in 
the operations. 
9117 advanced with 9043 to the north of Ghissignies and went into action west of the railway 
line, helping to clear German machine gun posts from the embankment. Here, it took an 
armour-piercing round to the auto-vac and was put out of action. 9047 moved off from its 
starting position to the south of Ghissignies at zero hour but became ditched and developed 
engine trouble at X 11. C. 3.2 and took no part in operations. 9389, suffering chronic 
mechanical trouble, never caught up with the infantry and, despite reaching the Blue Line, 
never came into action. 
 
 
As the men of 13
th
 KRRC approached their assembly positions just before 0330, the enemy 
put down a counter-preparation barrage and Second-Lieutenant Meikle of 111
th
 Trench 
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Mortar Battery was killed,
512
 and his whole section put out of action for some time. The 
advanced companies moved off close behind the barrage and almost immediately the 
commander of „D‟ Company, Captain Williams, was wounded. The men immediately came 
under heavy machine gun fire from the orchards and hedges in front of the village, but the 
attack “Was strongly pushed and the enemy severely handled”.513 The stream running across 
the axis of the advance proved not to be a serious obstacle and a message was received from 
„B‟ Company at 0715 (message sent at 0640) that „A‟ and „C‟ Companies had both crossed 
the main road in Louvignies and that “the attack was going well”.514 The diarist continues: 
“At 09.10 hrs messages were received from „C‟ and „A‟ Coys that they were on their 
objectives to time and in touch with both flanks”.515  
 
Opposition had been mixed: “In many cases, as soon as our men were within hand-to-hand 
fighting distance, the enemy surrendered, but here and there more determined resistance was 
met with and considerable bayonet work took place. The Field Ambulance informed our 
M.O. that an unusually large number of enemy wounded passed through suffering from 
severe bayonet wounds”.516 The gruesome nature of the diary intensifies as the business of 
„mopping up‟ is described. For the most part, it would appear again that the German garrison 
was eager to surrender to „B‟ and „D‟ Companies once they realised that the front-line action 
has passed well beyond them. However, “several gory individual contests took place in 
cellars. One N.C.O. of „B‟ Coy fought with 3 Huns in a cellar and killed the lot. His weapon 
was a small hand axe which he was carrying for cutting his way through hedges, and so the 
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good work went on!”517 The „good work‟ had cost the 13th KRRC 26 fatal casualties, and just 
under 100 wounded, but they had fought their last action of the war. 
 
The baton now passed to the 10
th
 Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 112 Infantry Brigade. Their War 
Diary gives us a glance at the processes by which orders were disseminated down the chain 
of command: there had been a Brigade Conference at 1800 on 31 October where 
Commanding Officers were informed of the forthcoming attack and of 37
th
 Division's role 
within it. On the following day, a Divisional Conference was held at Brigade HQ at Neuville: 
Brigadiers and Battalion Commanders were present to discuss the plans. The 2 & 3 
November were taken up by reconnaissance, the study of aerial photographs and organising 
their own smaller unit conferences. Order No. 274 was issued by 111 Infantry Brigade, 
setting out artillery arrangements, battalion movements and deployments, tank cooperation 
and battlefield objectives at 2100, 2 November. 
 
On the night 3 / 4 November, the battalion assembled on the railway line in X 10 d. and X 11 
a. (See map). All units were in place by zero minus thirty minutes, after having had a hot 
meal in Salesches at midnight. They came under intermittent shell fire through the night and 
suffered a number of casualties, including Lieutenant A.N. Usher MC,
518
 commanding officer 
of „A‟ Company, killed around 0500 as he was “Supervising the assembling of the company 
in the Railway Embankment”.519 
 
They moved off at 0530, „C‟ and „B‟ Companies (left and right) in the lead, „D‟ and „A‟ 
Companies fifty yards behind. “Each company will advance on a 2-Platoon frontage with the 
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third platoon in close support, Platoons advancing in Section „blobs‟”.520 A Stokes Mortar 
detachment advanced behind „D‟ Company and took up position in the sunken road at S 8 b. 
10.45., ready to deal with “any determined resistance”.521 The narrative of the attack is brief 
in all the relevant War Diaries:
522
 the troops leapfrogged the 13
th
 KRRC on the Blue Line and 
reached their objectives on the Blue Dotted Line on time at 0815. „D‟ Company “killed and 
captured a large number of the enemy” as they passed through the village of Louvignies, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Waters, writing the after action report simply records that “some hostile 
machine gun posts were met and dealt with”.523 „B‟ company occupied the right hand section 
of the objective, „C‟ Company in the centre and „D‟ Company on the left. One platoon of „A‟ 
Company was ready to fill in any gaps on „D‟ Company‟s frontage (which was the longest), 
the other two being ready to form a defensive flank on the right should it be necessary. The 
assault cost the battalion 7 fatal casualties and fewer than 50 wounded. The Brigade 
casualties were assessed as: 
    Officers  Other Ranks 
 
 Killed   8   49 
 Wounded  11   199 
Unaccounted for: -   26 
 
 
 
The advance would now be continued by units of 112 Infantry Brigade: 1
st
 Battalion Essex 
Regiment would take the lead on the left brigade front, with 1
st
 Battalion Hertfordshire 
Regiment on the right. Their objective was the Red Line (see map), pausing on the Green 
Line “to enable guns to be brought up”.524 From there, if the opportunity presented itself, the 
13
th
 Battalion Royal Fusiliers and 8
th
 Battalion Somerset Light Infantry (attached from 63 
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Infantry Brigade), would advance into the still wooded area of the Forêt de Mormal and push 
on to the Red Dotted Line.
525
 
 
1
st
 Essex on the left were delayed in reaching their jumping off positions on the Blue Dotted 
Line by the persistent enemy resistance in X 5 a (Chapel) and at one point found themselves 
behind their supporting battalion, 13 Royal Fusiliers. They eventually managed to cross the 
Blue Dotted Line at 1035, some ninety minutes behind schedule, having lost the barrage. 
They advanced on a three company front, „X‟ Company on the left (Captain Calverley MC), 
„Y‟ Company in the centre (Captain Attfield), „Z‟ Company on the right (Captain Walker) 
with „W‟ Company in reserve (Captain Gillett), the latter with orders to “mop up the village 
of Jolimetz and leave a garrison in same”.526 
 
„X‟ Company were able to advance quickly, and by 1050 they were well to the east of the 
cemetery in M 33 d. “The enemy appeared to be recovering from the effects of our barrage 
and were manning the orchards and houses and also the roads leading from Jolimetz”.527 
Their flank was turned by the speed of the left Company‟s advance, however, and “many 
prisoners and guns were taken”.528 The remainder took refuge in the village and were overrun 
by the centre company now arriving on the scene. The enemy were being pushed toward the 
south-east and were seen to be reorganising in square S 4 d., the area “being full of them”.529 
Enfilade fire from the left and rear as the left companies pressed on toward the Green Line 
and then frontal fire from „Z‟ Company forced the issue and after the Germans had suffered a 
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number of casualties they began to realise the hopelessness of their situation and 
“surrendered freely”.530 
 
The three front-line companies pressed on to the Green Line leaving „W‟ Company to its 
mopping up duties. They met with more resistance than they might have expected, but 
Lieutenant Harris‟ tank, „Job‟, arrived at the opportune moment and “worked down the main 
street mopping up any opposition that was encountered”.531 The village was “cleared of the 
enemy in a remarkably short and thoroughly workmanlike style. Those who came out at once 
were taken prisoners, those who did not were shot or bayoneted”.532 The reserve company 
claimed to have bagged 400 prisoners. 
 
At 1112, the battalion advanced from the Green Line “and reached the RED LINE with little 
difficulty, the enemy being completely bewildered as to the direction of our attack after the 
capture of Jolimetz, and surrendering freely the whole way across the Divisional front. 
Excellent targets were obtained by Lewis Gunners who pushed boldly forward”.533 
 
The battalion‟s commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel T.J.E. Blake, in writing the after 
action report, had no doubt as to the reasons for the success of the day‟s action: “The success 
of the operation was due to a thorough and complete understanding on the part of all ranks of 
the object and intention in view. All orders were, even under most difficult circumstances, 
readily assimilated and carried out and the battalion, despite the initial start arrived on its 
objective in the proper place at the right time. Company Commanders appreciated the various 
tactical situations with commendable accuracy and their many reports proved invaluable to 
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the Battalion Commander. Platoon Commanders fought their platoons well and displayed the 
greatest keenness and it was due to them that each man went into action knowing well where 
he had to go and what was expected from him at different places”.534 
 
On the right divisional front the 1
st
 Battalion Hertfordshire Regiment and 8
th
 Somerset Light 
Infantry reached their assembly positions on the Blue Dotted Line with no dramas or 
difficulties. The 1
st
 Hertfords commenced their advance at 0917. The attack was going well 
until they reached the stream and orchards in S 9 b. & S 10 c. “At this juncture [ ...] Nos 2 & 
3 Companies were held up by heavy MG fire. The nature of the country greatly favoured the 
defence, being very close, and therefore it was very difficult to locate the enemy”.535 The left 
companies were encountering machine gun fire coming “straight up the valley from 
approximately S 3. Central”,536 and the assault stalled. The men were unable to advance any 
further until the machine gun posts were overrun by the right company of 1
st
 Essex, who 
captured 16 machine guns and 40 prisoners in the area. The battalion then records that no 
further trouble was encountered until the men reached the area of the Forêt de Mormal where 
the trees had been felled (see Map 8), and ran into an “extremely thin enemy barrage put 
down in S11 b. & d”.537 This coincided with machine gun fire, but the latter lasted “only 
twenty minutes, at the end of which period the enemy retired”.538 The enemy retirement 
allowed the battalion to reach their final objective by 1500. 
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The advance from the Red Line was delegated to the 13
th
 Royal Fusiliers on the left and to 
the 8
th
 Somerset Light Infantry on the right. This movement took the men into the forest 
proper: tall, mature trees, thick undergrowth intersected by paths, or „rides‟, these classified 
in three categories: 13 feet wide metalled roads; 13 feet broad unmetalled lanes and 3 feet 
broad footpaths, with wired ditches marking the edge of the forest and clearings, and tree 
stumps also wired,
539
 the British troops could well have been forgiven for expecting  another 
„High Wood‟ or „Delville Wood‟ experience.540 The reality turned out to be very different. 
 
The 13
th
 Royal Fusiliers went into the attack well under strength: “owing to the extreme 
weakness of the battalion since operations of 24
th
 Oct. Battn. was reorganised on a two 
company basis – „A‟ & „B‟ Coys. – under command of Capt. G.G. Ziegler & Capt. M.O. 
Lewis respectively. Coys. about 100 strong each on new organisation”.541 Captain & Adjutant 
G. Chapman‟s after action report dated 8 November bemoans the lack of men: “It was found 
quite impossible to maintain constant touch on the flanks and even between companies 
during the whole operation. This was due (a) to the enclosed nature of the country (b) to the 
extreme weakness of the battalion. The Battalion was covering a frontage of 1000 yards, with 
2 Coys, each approximately 100 strong. This necessitated a platoon covering a frontage of 
250, i.e. about 12-14 yards per man. There is no doubt that had any serious resistance been 
made by the enemy it would have been quite impossible to reach the final objective. It is 
suggested that at least one man to every 3 yards is a sine qua non in operations in enclosed 
country such as the Forest of Mormal”.542 Movement proved difficult, but not due to enemy 
action: “Owing to the extremely thick undergrowth and trees, and to the rides being deep in 
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mud, progress was very slow. [ ... ] Darkness falling at about 17.00 hours naturally increased 
the difficulties”.543 Isolated pockets of resistance were overcome, the main body of the 
German units having long since melted away to the east. One platoon under Sergeant 8021 
W. Green proved far from “sticky”: it was Green, “who with great daring pushed [ ... ] right 
through the Forêt de Mormal in complete darkness, arriving on the final objective [Red 
Dotted Line] at 18.20 hours. No other patrols were able to come up with him during the night. 
However, he and his platoon remained on the objective & patrolled the ground for about 1000 
yards Eastwards until morning, when the 5
th
 Division pushed through”.544 
 
The „capture‟ of the forest had cost the battalion only one fatal casualty.545 
 
The 8
th
 Somersets lost two company commanders during their advance to their assembly 
positions: A/Captain Briggs and Second-Lieutenant Brooks “lost their lives reconnoitring 
forward with a view to merging with 1
st
/1
st
 Herts Regt in order to make a further attack”.546 
 
Advancing into the forest, the battalion encountered isolated pockets of resistance: rifle and 
Lewis Gun fire forced the enemy to retire, but the thickness of the forest, the darkness and 
their “ignorance of the way”547 prevented any swift pursuits. It was decided to push patrols, 
each one or two platoons strong, out eastwards along the rides.
548
 As on the 13
th
 Royal 
Fusilier‟s front, the enemy had gone. A line of outposts was set up to the west of the Red 
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Dotted Line and forward patrols were pushed on from there, reaching the eastern edge of the 
forest before dawn. Lieutenant-Colonel Sheringham, commanding 8
th
 Somersets, was able to 
advise 5
th
 Division that adopting attack formation on the western edge of the forest was a 
waste of time, the forest being clear of Germans. The 8
th
 Somersets‟ assault had cost them 8 
fatal casualties and 25 wounded. 
 
The timely advance of the support and reserve units of 37
th
 Division had been facilitated by 
the creation of five cross-country tracks. Praise for the work of the 152
nd
 Field Company 
Royal Engineers was fulsome:  
 
“The very enclosed nature of the country over which the operations of the last 24 
hours had been carried out, traversed as it was by thick hedges running diagonally to 
the line of advance, would have seriously hampered the forward movement of all 
troops following up the attack and would probably have caused them to lose direction, 
had not the 152nd Field Co. R.E. been employed on the construction and marking of 
Infantry and Artillery tracks. Commencing at 05.30 hours on the 4th Nov., this 
company worked until 03.00 hours on the 5th Nov”.549  
 
The diary of the R.E. Company was more matter-of-fact: “Attack 5.30 a.m. 5 Infantry tracks 
made from front line to final objectives. 3 men wounded”.550 
  
The 37
th
 Division had captured two defended villages and then followed a retreating army 
through the Forêt de Mormal, advancing 9000 yards. The total fighting strength of the seven 
battalions involved that day numbered 128 officers and 2936 other ranks.
551
 They had 
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encountered German units from 4
th
, 14
th
, 22
nd
 & 239
th
 Divisions and reported their enemy‟s 
average company strength to be forty-five.
552
 
 
37
th
 Divisional casualties were: 
    Officers  Other Ranks 
 
 Killed:   9   60 
 Wounded:  15   257 
 Missing:  -   27 
 
 Total:   24   344 
 
These figures equate to a casualty rate of 18.75% for officers, and 11.71% for other ranks. 
 
Since 21 August, (77 days), the Corps had advanced 48 miles, with 37
th
 Division responsible 
for 33 of those in 50 days in the front line. 
 
Conclusion 
The New Zealand Division proved more than capable of executing a complicated plan of 
attack. Whether the eventual capture of Le Quesnoy was brave and audacious or foolhardy 
under the circumstances remains a moot point. 
37
th
 Division, despite isolated incidents of obstinate defence, was able, without the help of the 
tanks, to push on against an enemy who was increasingly inclined to surrender. Although 
confronted with the difficult task of moving through the forest in pitch darkness, the 
withdrawal of German units allowed patrols to reach the day‟s objective line unopposed. 
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nd
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th
 Divs were met whilst later on the 239
th
 Div 
and 14
th
 Div predominated.” 26 officers and 1184 other ranks were taken prisoner. 
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Chapter 5 
V Corps 
 
 
Introduction 
V Corps‟ attack was to take the men deep into the Forêt de Mormal. This chapter highlights 
the differing fortunes of the two divisions involved. The under strength 17
th
 Division, short 
on training and perhaps lacking in innovative leadership, was unable to apply the tactics of 
fire, manoeuvre and infiltration and failed to reach their objectives. This was in total contrast 
to 38
th
 Division, themselves down on numbers, who showed dash and initiative in using the 
nature of the terrain to their advantage and eschewing frontal assaults, particularly in the 
latter stages of the advance, in order to gain their final objectives. 
*          *          *          * 
During the second half of October, V Corps (Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute) had been 
advancing in a north-easterly direction from the River Selle near Neuvilly, capturing the 
villages of Ovillers, Vendegies-au-Bois and, most recently, Poix-du-Nord, the latter occupied 
on 24 October by 21
st
 Division, the 33
rd
 Division on their right coming up just short of 
Englefontaine.
553
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 For details of the advance see Derek Clayton, From Pontefract to Picardy, (Stroud: Tempus Publishing), 
2004. Englefontaine was finally taken by 33
rd
 Division during the night of 25-26 October. 
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The allied armies paused for breath in the face of the Forêt de Mormal and the Sambre-Oise 
Canal and consolidated their lines in preparation for the next effort. The northern sector of V 
Corps‟ line ran north-west to south-east for almost three thousand yards from the Salesches to 
Louvignies road just south of the village of Ghissignies to the Englefontaine to Futoy road. 
This section was to be entrusted to the 17
th
 Division. The line then turned more or less due 
south and extended a further two thousand yards, just brushing the eastern outskirts of 
Englefontaine. 38
th
 Division was to advance from these positions. 
 
The planned assault would take both divisions deep into the Forêt de Mormal. This 
...is a forest of oak and beeches, about nine miles in length from north to south and 
from three to four miles broad. The woodland roadways through it were mostly 
narrow tracks, unmetalled or at the best with a light layer of unrolled stones or gravel. 
These tracks generally crossed each other on lines from north-east to south-west and 
north-west to south-east, marking off the forest into large diamond-shaped blocks. [ 
...] Before the war the forest had been well cared for by the woodmen of Locquignol, [ 
...] but during the years in which it had been in possession of the invaders they had 
made, here and there, extensive clearings by felling trees to provide timber for their 
entrenchments, huts, bridges and other work. [ ... ] In many of the clearings large 
quantities of timber were stacked ready for removal. [ ... ] In the uncleared parts of the 
wood little or nothing had been done to check the undergrowth, and in some places it 
had grown up into dense thickets. But there were fewer of these obstacles than 
expected.
554
 
 
The edge of the forest ran south-west to north-east along the dead-straight Englefontaine to 
Bavai road, and therefore lay at almost ninety degrees to the assembly positions of the 17
th
 
Division units.
555
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The overall plan for 4 November required the capture of four successive objective lines, Blue, 
Red, Brown and Green.
556
 Each division would attack on a single brigade front, and brigades 
would leapfrog: the front-line brigade would take the Blue Line, the next would move the 
assault onto the Red Line and the third-line brigade would take both the Brown and Green 
Lines. This was, in effect, a three-stage „bite and hold‟ operation that would take the line 
almost to the eastern edge of the forest.
557
 
 
The artillery barrage would be supplied by ten brigades of the Royal Field Artillery
558
 and 
five brigades of Royal Garrison Artillery
559
 and was composed as follows: two-fifths of the 
18 pounders would fire shrapnel 300 yards ahead of the advancing infantry, one round in 
every six being smoke. This line was to be supplemented by all available 6” Trench Mortars. 
One hundred yards ahead would fall shells from the 4.5” Howitzers and a further two 
hundred yards ahead the remaining 18 Pounders would fire High Explosive with 50 per cent 
Thermite. “60 pounders firing shrapnel and 6” Howitzers with 106 fuzes were to fire on 
tactical points not closer than 700 yards ahead of the rear line of the barrage”.560 Counter 
battery work had begun on 1 November, with a total of 32 guns
561
 doing their best to 
neutralise enemy batteries. 
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the advance on „Z‟ Day plus 1 as far as the Avesnes-Bavay road, with 38th and 17th Divisions joining in again on 
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 In the 17
th
 Division area by 78, 79, 94, 95 & 34 Brigades RFA and in 38
th
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artillery response would suggest that the counter battery work was not particularly effective. 
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The regular creeping barrage would only be available as far as the Red Line. Thereafter, the 
strength and efficacy of any artillery support would depend on how many guns could be 
pushed forward in time. “After the capture of the second objective, Divisions were to act 
independently with no set barrage. Artillery support was then to take the form of short rapid 
concentrations of all natures on edges of woods, ditches, etc. [ ... ] One Brigade RFA on each 
Divn front was to be specially allotted to the leading Bde of infantry for close support”.562 
 
The nature of the artillery barrage had been the subject of much discussion: “There was 
considerable danger to our infantry from bursts in the trees bordering the roads and in the 
Forest of Mormal owing to their being some 80 feet high, if the infantry attempted to follow 
the barrage closely. [ ...] Eventually it was decided to adhere to the normal shrapnel barrage 
and to warn the infantry not to try and get too close to it”.563 The plan went on: “In order 
further to reduce danger and to get a greater volume of fire effect on open spaces, barrages 
were not to creep through the wooded belts in the forest”.564 This was directly linked to a 
directive given to all „Subordinate Commanders‟ who were “warned of the impracticability of 
attempting to traverse densely wooded belts in extended order. Movement when the forest is 
reached should be by Platoon along the edges of wooded belts or of rides and tracks on which 
Artillery is being directed to concentrate its fire”. 565 
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It was destined to be a mainly infantry/artillery operation, but other branches of the services 
were involved: the infantry would be followed “at one hour‟s distance”566 by two Royal 
Engineer Companies and the Pioneer Battalions, whose job it would be to clear felled trees 
and other obstacles from roads and then to open up the main routes through the forest for 
motorised transport. 15
th
 Squadron RAF was to send out a contact patrol as soon after dawn 
as was practical and at “odd hours”,567 that is 0900, 1100, and so on. Infantry were required 
“on demand from contact aeroplanes”568 to light two red flares per company frontage. 
Counter attack patrols were also to be flown, and if such a development was detected, the 
aircraft was to drop a red smoke bomb “over the place where the enemy was seen”.569  
 
Attached from IV Corps as from midday 2 November was one squadron of 3
rd
 Hussars. They 
were “employed primarily in conducting prisoners of war from Division to Corps prisoner of 
war cages. They may also be employed, should the situation allow, in mounted 
reconnaissance duty, but will not be used for dismounted action”.570 
 
It was initially planned for six tanks of 9
th
 Tank Battalion to be attached to V Corps, three 
each being given to 17
th
 and 38
th
 Divisions. Divisional and Brigade commanders were 
determined not to build up their men‟s hopes in this area, however, as an addendum to 17th 
Division Order No.28, issued on 3 November demonstrates: “It will be impressed on the 
attacking infantry that ON NO ACCOUNT WILL THEY WAIT FOR THE TANKS whose 
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role is entirely separate yet supplementary to that of the infantry”.571 The actual involvement 
of the tanks will be dealt with later. 
 
 
17
th
 Division
572
 
 
The 17
th
 Division was “warned to take part in the next attack” on 31 October and were “to be 
ready to relieve 21
st
 Division on night 2/3
rd
 November”.573 The following day, the Corps and 
Divisional objectives were allotted and the Divisional Commander, Major-General P.R. 
Robertson, held a conference at 1700 hours and “explained the roles of all formations and 
units. G.Os C. Brigades, C.R.A., C.R.E., Signals Q., M.G.Bn, and as many Bn. Commanders 
as possible attending”.574 Divisional Orders for the attack were then issued on 2 November. 
52 Brigade (Major/Temp. Brigadier-General W.Allason DSO) would lead the attack, 51 
Brigade (Major/Temp. Brigadier-General R.M. Dudgeon DSO, MC) would be in close 
support, tasked with the Red Line objective, and 50 Brigade (Major/Temp. Brigadier-General 
J.F.R. Hope DSO) would complete the picture by taking the Brown and Green Lines.
575
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 The strengths of units in 17
th
 Division were as follows: 
  Officers  Other Ranks Total  Officers  Other Ranks   Total 
50 Brigade: 
10 West Yorks 21  826  847 
7 E. Yorks 25  843  868  74  2195          2269 
6 Dorsets 28  521  549 
 
51 Brigade: 
7 Lincolns 27  693  720 
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Zero hour was 0530, at which point an artillery barrage would open up on a line 300 yards 
ahead of the waiting infantry. It would remain there for four minutes before advancing “by 
lifts”576 at a rate of 100 yards every four minutes. Both 51 and 52 Brigade troops would 
advance at this time, both brigades under orders to “clear the starting line as quickly as 
possible”577 in the hope that both units could avoid the worst of any enemy retaliatory barrage 
that might fall on the jumping off positions. 
 
The line would, in effect, pivot on the right wing of the right hand battalion until the 
Englefontaine – Futoy road was reached, thus aligning themselves north-south. There, they 
and the artillery barrage would pause until Z + 45 minutes before an advance behind artillery 
lifts of 100 yards every six minutes would be resumed.
578
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Borders 24  625  649  78  2014         2092 
10 Sher Fores. 27  696  723 
 
52 Brigade: 
10 Lancs Fus. 28  604  632 
9 Duke of Well. 25  740  765  74  1954         2058 
12 Manchesters 21  610  631 
 
Pioneers: 
7 York & Lancs 32  706  738 
 
       Total: 258  6869         7127 
 
This puts the division at only two thirds of its full strength. Table quoted in Atteridge, History of the 17
th
 
(Northern) Division p. 453 
576
 TNA:PRO WO95/752 War Diary V Corps HQ 
577
 TNA:PRO WO95/1985 War Diary 17
th
 Division HQ 
578
 This pause was dual-purpose: it allowed the 17
th
 Division the tricky manoeuvre of swinging 45 degrees to the 
right and then reorganise if required, and also conformed with the 38
th
 Division on their right, whose 0615 zero 
hour had been set to match that of Fourth Army troops on their right. 
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The nature of the country across which the 17
th
 Division was to advance was described in 
their „Narrative of Operations‟: 
As far as the Louvignies road the country was comparatively open – Between the road 
and the MORMAL FOREST were a series of orchards enclosed by thick and high 
hedges very difficult to negotiate and obstructing view, several isolated farms, and the 
straggling village of FUTOY. Air photos disclosed a great many of the enemy‟s 
defences and enabled a shrewd guess to be made as to the whereabouts of his various 
lines of resistance, but the orchards and hedges afforded splendid cover for Machine 
Guns and machine gun defence so established was impossible to locate.
579
 
 
52 Brigade consisted of 10
th
 Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel G.L. 
Torrens), 9
th
 Battalion Duke of Wellington‟s (West Riding Regiment) (Lieutenant-Colonel A. 
Driver) and 12
th
 Battalion Manchester Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel S. Danby). All three 
battalions were to be in their assembly trenches “immediately after dark 3rd November, and 
cover themselves with outposts until zero minus 15 minutes, when outposts will be 
withdrawn”.580 They would advance with two companies in front and two in support between 
25 and 50 yards behind.
581
 Once they arrived on their objective (Blue Line) they were to push 
patrols forward “to the limit of the protective barrage”582 and be prepared to support the 
attack of 51 Brigade on the Red Line. At this point, two „Golden Rain‟ rockets per company 
would be sent up to signal their success to the watching RAF contact patrol aircraft. The 
momentum of the assault was emphasised in Brigade Orders: “Throughout, the barrage will 
be followed closely and points of resistance will be passed round and mopped up from the 
flank or rear”.583 
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An addendum to Brigade Orders issued on 3 November announced that three tanks would 
assist in the attack: one would advance “simultaneously with the leading infantry, breaking 
down hedges en route to facilitate the passage of the infantry and will assist in the clearance 
of enemy defences at road junction S.20 d. 1.0. This tank will then follow the leading infantry 
at a distance of 300 yards and assist in dealing with any strongpoints holding up the 
advance”.584 The other two tanks would also follow 300 yards behind the advancing 
infantry.
585
 
 
The brigade was drawn up with the Lancashire Fusiliers on the left, the Duke of Wellington‟s 
in the centre, and the Manchesters on the right. The depth of the initial advance varied, north 
to south, from 2 500 to 1 000 yards. “On the left, the country was quite open, with the 
exception of a hedged field, until the Louvignies Road was reached. From there onward lay a 
series of orchards enclosed by thick hedges, several isolated farms, and the straggling village 
of Futoy. The whole of the ground was carefully prepared for defence, machine guns being 
located in the most unlikely positions, under trees in the centre of fields, enfilading 
hedgerows, and in houses”.586 
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 Division, this left one for the 17
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The 10
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers, on the left, advanced on a two-company front, „D‟ and „C‟ 
Companies (left and right) in front, „A‟ and „B‟ Companies, respectively, in support. The 
initial moves were made in the dark, daybreak not coming until around 0845, and under cover 
of an “extremely heavy ground mist”.587 The first real opposition was encountered in the 
copses in S18 a & c and S13 d, resulting in the capture of two Officers and thirty-one Other 
Ranks, and in orchards in S14 d. „D‟ Company “charged”588 and captured the former, whilst 
the leading platoon of „C‟ Company dealt similarly with the latter before pushing on towards 
Futoy, these manoeuvres undoubtedly being helped by the mist. The orchard, where a number 
of prisoners had been captured in rifle pits, had been overrun by “using rifle grenades 
freely”.589 They reached the Louvignies road at 0606, „D‟ Company bypassing La Motte 
Farm, leaving it for „A‟ Company to mop up. This they did against “heavy MG fire” from a 
hole in the wall of the farm buildings complex. One platoon rushed the German post under 
covering Lewis Gun fire. “The remainder of the company moved to the east side of the 
buildings and were in time to capture several of the enemy emerging from an outhouse”.590 
 
The advance continued, close behind the barrage,
591
 and opposition on the western edges of 
Futoy was quickly overcome by the leading companies. The rest of the village was mopped 
up once the artillery barrage had lifted from the road running north-south in squares S14 a & 
c and was reported as captured by 0705. Hostile artillery had, until now, been concentrated on 
the original jumping off positions, but switched between 7 and 8 a.m. to the tracks and rides 
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in the area now occupied by the Lancashire Fusiliers. They were also under “desultory”592 
fire from machine guns near Pont à Vache in the 37th Division area to the north, but these 
were eventually neutralised by our own guns of the 17
th
 Machine Gun Company and a liberal 
sprinkling of rifle brigades. The battalion‟s final objective (Blue Line) was reached at 0800 
and positions were established east of the line, though the digging in was done under severe 
shelling. The War Diary quotes casualties for the month of November 1918 as 9 killed, 78 
wounded and 8 missing. Commonwealth War Graves Commission records show 13 fatalities 
for 4 November, including one officer.
593
 The 10
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers were in billets in 
Futoy by the evening. 
 
The centre battalion, the 9
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s (Lieutenant-Colonel A. Driver MC), had 
moved up from the village of Poix-du-Nord at 1930 on 3 November and were in their 
jumping off positions by 2300. On the way, „D‟ Company had been caught by enemy 
shellfire and suffered over forty casualties.
594
 They moved forward at 0530 on 4 November, 
the War Diary recording that “from the quickness of the enemy‟s reply to our barrage it is 
evident that the enemy expected our attack”.595 They also encountered very heavy machine 
gun fire from the Louvignies – Englefontaine road (S13 d), losing four officers killed with 
two others wounded, and “many other ranks [were] casualties”.596 They pushed on into the 
orchards, these being “carefully organised for machine gun defence, but, thanks to the mist 
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and the liberal use of rifle grenades, the attack progressed, many prisoners being taken and a 
considerable number of Germans killed”.597 
 
At this point, units must have become mixed up with those of the Lancashire Fusiliers, as two 
companies of the Duke of Wellington‟s went to the north of Futoy, the other two to the south 
of the village. The diary records the support companies mopping up the village while the 
forward companies pushed on to their final objective. The companies were then reorganised, 
gaining touch with units on both flanks. The attack, though ultimately „successful‟, was far 
from straightforward and was very costly: the battalion had attacked with 15 officers and 584 
other ranks. “Of these, 13 officers and 226 other ranks became casualties during the 
advance”.598 After deducting prisoner escorts, stretcher bearers, signallers and runners, the 
“fighting strength of the battalion was reduced 2 company officers and 200 men. That they 
were able, with these [ ... ] numbers to make good their final objective speaks highly of the 
determination of all ranks. Lieut-Col. Driver MC was up personally directing the attack and 
the success may be attributed largely to his leadership”.599 The Battalion War Diary records 
five officers killed and eight wounded,
600
 adding that two companies were “entirely without 
officers one hour after the attack started, and the remaining Coys had only one officer 
each”.601 
 
                                                 
597
 Ibid. 
598
 Ibid. 
599
 TNA:PRO WO95/2014 War Diary 9
th
 Battalion Duke of Wellington‟s (West Riding Regiment) 
600
 Ibid. Commonwealth War Grave Commission records show a total of 40 fatalities for 4 November, the five 
officers being: Temp/Captain George Douglas Gelder, age 24; Second-Lieutenant Claude Arthur Bouchier, age 
36; Second-Lieutenant Edwin Wilson, age 21; Second-Lieutenant Henry Woodhouse, age 19, all buried in 
Romeries Communal Cemetery Extension, graves VII A 2, VII A 5, VII B 13 & VII A 4 respectively, and  
Temp/Lieutenant William Charles Roche Rowland, age 23, buried in Ruesnes Communal Cemetery, grave I B 5 
601
 Ibid. 
199 
 
52 Infantry Brigade „Report on Operations‟ catalogues additional difficulties: 
The barrage was a very difficult one to follow as there were no natural features, such 
as parallel roads, on which it dwelt.
602
  The road in S20 a and S14 c had to be crossed 
by the right flank at 0554 and by the left flank at 0632. The advance had to be made 
for the first thousand yards with the left flank thrown back at an angle of forty-five 
degrees from the line of advance. This was further complicated by the enclosed nature 
of the country and necessitated constant reference to the compass bearing. The mist 
increased the difficulty of recognising the line the barrage had reached and it appears 
to have been a little thin. There was undoubtedly a certain amount of short shooting: 
Lieutenant-Colonel Driver reported at 1000 hours that he was at S21 a. Central and 
that 4.5” shells were falling in S20 b.603 
 
 
The 12
th
 Manchesters were on the brigade right. “Their task was a comparatively small 
one”.604 Their initial move to the „pause line‟ meant an advance of 500 yards for their left 
flank, and only 100 yards for their right. They were to halt just after the Englefontaine – 
Futoy road and advance at 0620 in conjunction with the 38
th
 Division on their right. 
The country on the right was very enclosed and had proved impassable during a 
previous attack by the 38
th
 Division. This was on account of the hedges being strongly 
staked and reinforced with plain wire the thickness of a slate pencil. This resisted any 
ordinary wire cutter. These hedges were flanked by a large number of carefully 
concealed machine guns. [ ... ] Special efforts were made to obtain „bulldog‟ wire 
cutters and additional cutting tools.
605
 
 
„D‟ and „B‟ Companies lined up on the road running diagonally through square 19 d, with 
„A‟ and „C‟ companies in close support. The attack went in on time, “assisted by [an] 
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excellent artillery barrage, supplemented at intervals by M.G. barrage”.606 The left flank was 
forced to move faster than the right, the latter being initially almost stationary, “in order to 
bring the line of the attack N-S”.607 An enemy barrage came down on the jumping off 
positions almost immediately and remained there for some time, as did some of the 
unfortunate infantry. The left companies “got away from under it”, but the right companies 
“suffered considerably”.608 As the advance moved on at 0620, the “enemy put up a 
determined resistance [ ... ] and his morale appeared good”.609 The hedges were a formidable 
obstacle, as feared, but some of the „bulldog‟ wire cutters had been acquired and “proved 
invaluable”.610 
 
The mist persisted for a good two hours after Zero and this “somewhat assisted the attack [...] 
as our front line troops were better able to surprise the Bosche in the closely wooded Forest 
of Mormal through which we were attacking”.611 During the advance, the right company‟s 
commander (probably Second-Lieutenant (Acting Captain) J.W. Barton MC) was wounded 
and captured, but the support company drove on and overran the position where he had been 
held prisoner and were able to release him. “The left Coys were able to advance from 
hedgerow to hedgerow making use of rifle grenades to deal with MG‟s and taking a 
considerable number of prisoners”.612 
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The Blue Line was gained on time, for an estimated casualty total of 6 officers and 100 other 
ranks. The battalion suffered 32 fatalities that day, all „other ranks‟. The whole brigade was 
thus on the Blue Line, ready for the 51 Brigade to move through their positions and assault 
the Red Line. Brigadier-General W. Allason, commanding 52 Brigade, made a number of 
important observations in his after-action report. He mentioned telephone lines and power 
buzzers being set up between the 12
th
 Manchesters and 52 Brigade HQ, but had to affirm that 
these were interrupted immediately at Zero hour by the enemy bombardment, adding that the 
first message to come through to Brigade HQ, other than by runner, was a wireless message 
timed at 1100 hours. Visual signalling was severely hampered by the mist, none of the 
„golden rain‟ rockets sent up were seen. The use of Thermit to mark the limits of the barrage 
was seen as a positive, particularly in view of the weather. It had been arranged that each man 
in the attack would carry five rifle grenades: a large proportion of these were fired and proved 
invaluable in getting forward through the enclosed country to the west of the forest. He 
pessimistically concludes, however, that “an attack in daylight would probably have failed 
with heavy casualties owing to the number of German machine guns well dug in and 
protected by strong fences”.613 His brigade had made their objectives, but had suffered the 
highest number of brigade fatalities recorded for 4 November: eighty-five, including six 
officers.
614
 52 Brigade losses from 4 – 11 November were as follows: 
    Officers   Other Ranks 
 
    K W M  K W M Total 
10
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 1 3 -  8 76 2 90 
9
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s 5 8 -  30 193 3 239 
12
th
 Manchester Regt.  - 6 -  23 104 9 142 
 
Totals:   6 17 -  61 373 13 471 
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The units of 51 Brigade were tasked with the capture of the Red Line. This followed the line 
of the road running north-south through squares S17 and S23 and was between 1500 and 
2000 yards east of the Blue Line. The battalions moved into their assembly trenches on the 
evening of 3 November, trenches “which had been dug by 21st Division running parallel to 
and immediately behind the front line trenches”.615 They were arranged with 10th Battalion 
Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire Regiment) on the left, 7
th
 Battalion 
Lincolnshire Regiment in the centre and 7
th
 Battalion Border Regiment on the right. The 
flanking battalions adopted a three-company frontage, and the Lincolns in the centre a two-
company frontage. As planned, the 51 Brigade units moved off at Zero, clearing the start line 
as soon as possible. In the event, this was an important decision, as the enemy barrage “came 
down very quickly and was the best that he had done since August 23
rd”.616 The 10th 
Sherwood Foresters had spent an uncomfortable night in the assembly trenches: enemy 
shellfire accounted for fourteen casualties, including Second-Lieutenant Taylor and the 
Regimental Sergeant-Major wounded, and the deaths of Captain A.Kerr and one other rank. 
 
They moved off from these trenches at 0520 in platoon columns and advanced 500 yards 
behind the 10
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers. „B‟ Company, (Lieutenant Holding MC) was on the left, 
„A‟ Company (Captain Brandt MC) in the centre, „C‟ Company (Lieutenant Lynch) on the 
right, with „D‟ Company (Second-Lieutenant Foster) in support. Movement was difficult: 
“the country was covered with thickly fenced orchards to the north of Futoy & the Battn had 
great difficulty in getting forward – particularly because the enemy very heavily shelled the 
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village for some long time. Companies moved by platoons in fours and in following up 2Lt. 
Wilson was killed, Lts. Holding & Lynch & 2Lt. Street were wounded”.617 Nevertheless, the 
battalion was formed up on the first objective by 0835. Twelve minutes later both they and 
the resumed creeping barrage set off for the Red Line. They reached their objective “without 
meeting much opposition”,618 capturing it “in magnificent style”.619 Lieutenant Winkley, the 
battalion Signalling Officer is singled out for particular praise, having done “exceptionally 
good work during the attack, and maintained touch with Bde HQ by telephone 
throughout”.620 „A‟ Company had managed to capture two field guns, complete with horse 
teams and officers, along with five machine guns, though their commanding officer, Captain 
Brandt, was wounded just as the objective was reached. Despite meeting “very little 
opposition”, indeed the battalion diary states that “throughout this attack there was very little 
MG or rifle fire”,621 the battalion suffered 102 casualties (4 officers and 98 other ranks). Such 
was the damage that „C‟ and „D‟ companies were amalgamated with Second-Lieutenant 
Foster in command, Second-Lieutenant Ross taking over „A‟ Company from the unfortunate 
Brandt. Fatal casualties for the day can be confirmed at seventeen. 
 
In the centre of the brigade front, the 7
th
 Lincolns had reached their assembly trenches on 3 
November by 2100 hours, after setting off from Poix-du-Nord at 1930 on a “dark and rainy 
night”.622 The diarist describes “heavy crashes of 5.9‟s and .77 HE” around the trenches 
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during the night, but adds that these did “no damage” and that “the men got some sleep in 
spite of the rain and cold”.623 
 
The rain had given way to mist by Zero Hour and the battalion moved off, „C‟ Company on 
the left, „A‟ Company on the right, „B‟ Company in support and „D‟ company in reserve. 
They crossed the Englefontaine – Le Quesnoy road “close on the heels”624 of the 9th Duke of 
Wellington‟s, but then halted for fifteen minutes in the orchards 200 yards beyond the road to 
“give the [Dukes] time to get forward”.625 The battalion then “moved forward in a fog so 
dense that it was impossible to see a man 20 paces off. „B‟ Company moved away to its right 
in this and got lost”.626 Reorganisation took place as the battalion crossed the road (S14 c and 
S20 a) and was here joined by a company of the 9
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s that had somehow 
detached itself from its own battalion, and took „B‟ Company‟s place in support. Moving 
forward from there, the mist and the oblique lines of hedges “deflected” 627 the whole 
battalion to the left and they found themselves at Futoy village: “2 Coys moved down each 
side of the village keeping clear of the road which was at the time being shelled by our own 
heavy artillery with great accuracy and effect”.628 Despite their detour, the 7th Lincolns (or at 
least three-quarters of them!), were on the Blue Line at 0835, ready to advance as per the 
timetable. „A‟ Company, with „D‟ Company in support, moved across the open629 in square 
22 c until they reached the Route St Hubert (S22 d. 1.3), whereupon they followed it as far as 
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the Red Line. „C‟ Company advanced through S16 c630 and then in a south-easterly direction 
along the Laie Hequet, rejoining the rest of the battalion on the Red Line (the Route 
Duhamel). During these manoeuvres, “very little opposition was met with, a little desultory 
rifle and machine gun fire”.631 The objective was reached at 1041. One hundred and twenty 
prisoners were sent back and ten field guns had been captured, along with eight machine 
guns. „B‟ Company had “meantime rejoined”.632 A message sent from the Red Line reported 
casualty figures: Second-Lieutenants W.T Epton, A. Cliff and S. Sheckell were wounded, and 
it was estimated that 96 other ranks were also casualties. Battalion strength was estimated at 
16 officers and 394 other ranks.
633
 
 
The 7
th
 Border Regiment had had a bad October. They had been in action in a night attack on 
the 20
th
 and had lost nine officers, including their commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.E. Thomas DSO MC, killed in a German counter attack. Overall casualties for the month 
numbered 247. 
 
 
 
On the morning of 4 November they moved forward, as per plan, at 0530, five hundred yards 
behind the 12
th
 Manchesters. “During this move, however, our „B‟ Coy found a gap between 
the Manchester Regt. and the 38
th
 Division on the right. The Officer commanding „B‟ 
Company got into the gap and succeeded in capturing 35 prisoners”.634 All companies were 
                                                 
630
 The main units had become separated by a distance of approximately 1000 yards, though the 51 Brigade HQ 
narrative relates that “skirmishers worked through the thick wood in S22.” TNA:PRO WO95/2006 War Diary 
51 Infantry Brigade 
631
 TNA:PRO WO95/2007 War Diary 7
th
 Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment 
632
 Ibid. 
633
 Ibid. Fatal casualties for the day totalled ten. Simple arithmetic would suggest that the battalion attacked with 
a strength of 19 officers and 490 other ranks. 
634
 TNA:PRO WO95/2008 War Diary 7
th
 Battalion Border Regiment. „Attack on Mormal Forest‟ 
206 
 
on the Blue Line ready for the advance at 0847: „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ Companies were in front, 
with „D‟ Company in reserve. They followed the creeping barrage and found it “pretty easy 
going”635 until they were within 100 yards of their objective. Here, they came under “fairly 
heavy”636 machine gun and rifle fire. One machine gun team, at S23 c 25.65 (directly on the 
road that marked the objective), was “very persistent”.637 Four of the team were killed and 
one wounded in the bayonet charge that finally put the gun out of action. This, it appears, was 
their only serious opposition and the Red Line was gained with no further alarms by 1040. At 
1417 they were ordered forward onto final positions just short of the Brown Line (between 
S23 b 80.35 & S24 c 3.3) where they spent a “very quiet”638 night. During the operation they 
had captured 127 prisoners, eight machine guns, one trench mortar and four field guns. 
“There were many dead Bosche to be seen in the wood”.639 The 7th Borders‟ casualties were 
three officers
640
 and fifty-five other ranks. Fatalities for the day were eighteen. 
 
 
 
The 51 Brigade diary summarises the Brigade‟s casualties for 4 November as follows: 
     Officers  Other Ranks 
 
7
th
 Lincolns   3   96 
7
th
 Border Regt.  3   55 
10
th
 Sherwood Foresters 6   98 
 
Total    12   249 
 
Of these, 45 were fatalities. 
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The capture of the Brown and Green Lines fell to the units of 50 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-
General J.F.R. Hope). This, after a pause of over two hours, during which artillery was 
brought up to support the operation, would take place almost entirely within the area of the 
Forêt de Mormal. On the afternoon of 1 November, Hope had given a lecture to all officers 
and NCOs in the Brigade on „Wood Fighting‟.641 The units of 50 Brigade, arranged north to 
south, were 7
th
 Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment, 6
th
 Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment and 
10
th
 Battalion The Prince of Wales‟s Own (West Yorkshire Regiment). Their assembly for 
the attack was carried out in stages: they moved off from the area around the village of Poix-
du-Nord at 0130 on 4 November and arrived at their first assembly point on the 
Englefontaine – Arbre de la Croix road (south-east – north-west in squares S28 & 29) at 
0430. By 0930 they were on the Englefontaine – Louvignies road (north – south in squares 
S24 & S13). “There was considerable hostile shelling at this time and some casualties were 
incurred, including Captain F.C. Tonkin DSO MC, Adjutant, 7
th
 East Yorkshire Regiment, 
who was fatally wounded”.642 The final stage, the assembly behind 51 Brigade on the Red 
Line, was completed by 1130. “This assembly was somewhat impeded by a barrage fired by 
our own guns apparently in answer to a RED Smoke bomb dropped by an aeroplane in S16 d. 
The barrage continued on Squares S22 b & d from 1200 to 1230 hours; it was luckily mostly 
behind our assembly position but caused some casualties to the 6
th
 Dorsetshire Regiment and 
the 51
st
 Infantry Brigade”.643 
 
                                                 
641
 TNA:PRO WO95/1999 War Diary 50 Infantry Brigade HQ 
642
 Ibid. Captain Frederick Cuthbert Tonkin, age 24, is buried in Forest Communal Cemetery, Grave C 34. 
643
 Ibid. 
208 
 
The brigade began its advance proper at 1300. The artillery support was less than 
satisfactory: it was, on the right, “as well carried out as could be expected under the 
circumstances, which rendered a barrage extremely difficult”.644 In the centre and on the left 
“it was not possible to recognise a barrage line. One or two batteries on the left fired 
consistently short from 01.00 hours to 2.30 hours [1300 – 1430]. This caused some 20 
casualties to the 7
th
 East Yorkshire Regiment and considerably hindered their advance. In the 
centre, no barrage opened at 01.00 hours but at 02.00 hours, Artillery commenced to fire 
roughly on an area along the grid line between S18 and 24 squares as far east as the ROUTE 
FLAQUETTE. The 6
th
 Dorsetshire Regt lost two killed and 14 wounded as the result of this 
shoot, which made touch difficult to maintain in the advance”.645  
 
The 7
th
 East Yorks, on the left, conformed only roughly to the Brigade assembly orders: they 
were gathered at 0300 to the north of Poix-du-Nord and moved to the first assembly position. 
There, at 0600, “all ranks were served with a hot breakfast”646 before moving off at 0715 to 
their second assembly position, their arrival there being reported to brigade HQ at 0850.They 
moved on from there at 1015, but came under machine gun and artillery fire “whilst passing 
through the orchards of Futoy in S14 a & b from the enemy who appeared to be still holding 
Louvignies. In order to avoid this fire I [Lieutenant-Colonel East King] took the main body 
through S15 c & d, with one Company detailed to watch the left flank but not to become 
involved outside our area”.647 . I will quote extensively from this document. It is written from 
a very personal viewpoint – that of Battalion Commander, by Lieutenant-Colonel East King – 
and allows us insight into the thinking of such a commander as he reacts to developing 
                                                 
644
 Ibid. 
645
 Ibid. 
646
 TNA:PRO WO95/2005 War Diary 7
th
 Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment. „Narrative of Operations in the 
Forêt de Mormal‟.  
647
 Ibid. 
209 
 
situations and guides his men to their objectives. A cynic may suggest that he puts himself in 
a favourable light. On arrival at the Red Line, East King found the left of the 10
th
 Sherwood 
Foresters in the air at S17 a 7.2, the 37
th
 Division on their left being nowhere to be seen. The 
enemy were still holding positions in square S10, that is, behind the 17
th
 Division‟s left flank, 
so he formed a defensive flank at around midday. Half an hour later he sent out two platoons 
to extend the line to the left and occupy the crossroads at S17 a 6.8. 
 
At 1259, the battalion began its move forward “despite the fact that the enemy was on and in 
rear of our left flank”.648 With this in mind, East King ordered his support company to 
advance on that flank “echeloned in rear of the leading company”.649 Almost immediately he 
received a message from the left company of the 6
th
 Dorsets on his right to the effect that 
their right was “held up and that they were not moving forward without further orders”.650 
East King “immediately sent a written order ordering them to move forward at once on [his] 
right flank failing direct orders from their CO to the contrary. This was done”.651 
 
By 1500, the leading troops of 7
th
 East Yorks were in squares S18 a & c, though East King 
was complaining bitterly that the “Barrage from our guns was most ragged, many shells 
falling were in rear of our Assembly Positions, [ ... ] shells falling on my Reserve Company 
when in S17 b as late as 1500 hours”.652 They were in touch with the Dorsets on the right, but 
the left flank remained a problem. “Here we were held up by heavy enemy machine gun fire 
from direction of wood in T13 a & c and some advanced posts in S18 b & d. [ ... ] By 
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outflanking the advanced posts and attacking them from the flank and rear, we had 
completely mopped these up by 1630 hrs, capturing 12 prisoners and 6 machine guns & 
killing 14 of the enemy machine gunners. These captured guns were then turned upon the 
enemy positions in the wood [ ...] and we continued the advance by short rushes”.653 One 
platoon was ordered to work its way forward to the crossroads at S18 b 5.9 in order to 
establish a liaison post with the Somerset Light Infantry of 37
th
 Division, but there was no 
sign of them until eight o‟clock that evening, when a post was finally created at S12 d 9.3. By 
that time, the 7
th
 East Yorks line ran from that point southwards to the road at T13 a 0.4, and 
from there south-eastwards along the road to approximately T13 c 4.9. With the Dorsets still 
not up, East King was forced to throw back a one company defensive flank from there to 
about S18 d .6.
 654
 “This line was reported to Brigade with a disposition map at 2100 hrs 
together with estimated casualties given as 2 Officers killed
655
 [ ... ] 2 Officers wounded
656
 & 
100 ORs.”657  
 
Battalion HQ was visited at 2230 by the Brigade Major, Captain Barbour, who “gave 
instructions that no further advance would take place so that 21
st
 Division would have a 
definite line to advance from the next morning”.658 These orders were cancelled at around 
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0200 on 5 November: it had become clear that the Germans in front of 7
th
 East Yorks had 
melted away in the darkness and that the advance could resume unopposed. East King 
completes the story: “I was ordered to establish the Line of Final Objective viz road running 
N & S through T18 a & d. [The Green Line] I took up three platoons at once and by 5.30 hrs 
we had gained final objective without further opposition”.659 The casualty figures recorded by 
50 Brigade HQ for 7
th
 East Yorks were: Officers – 2 killed, 2 wounded. Other Ranks – 13 
killed, 86 wounded, 9 missing.
660
 Battalion fatalities can be confirmed at 22.
661
 
 
The 6
th
 Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Weldon), in the centre of 
the Brigade front, left Vendegies at 0210 and suffered eight casualties from enemy shell fire 
even before they reached their assembly positions at 0400. They crossed the Englefontaine – 
Louvignies road at around 0920 and the diarist adds at this point: “Enemy on the run” and 
with “very little enemy shelling”662 to contend with, they were at their jumping off positions 
on the Red Line by 1230. They went into action with four Lewis Guns per company, twelve 
magazines per gun being taken into the line,
663
 but with “very little barrage from our own 
artillery”.664 Just over an hour later, at 1410, they had reached the north-eastern sector of 
square 24 b when “our 18 pounders put down a heavy barrage on our leading Coys, causing a 
number of casualties”.665 By half past three, the Dorsets‟ rather lacklustre assault was being 
held up by machine gun fire from the far side of the Route de la Flaquette (north-west to 
south-east through squares S18 d & T19 a) and from the village of Locquignol. One episode 
may show that the Dorsets were not totally devoid of fighting spirit: a patrol from „A‟ 
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Company, led by C.S.M. Britt, “rushed an enemy MG post to their front holding five MG‟s 
and a post 200 yards to their left flank holding two MG‟s. Seven of the enemy machine 
gunners were killed and seven MG‟s captured. This operation was successful chiefly owing 
to the cool, clear fire orders and gallant leadership of CSM Britt”.666 The Dorsets were able to 
take up positions facing the Route de la Flaquette, „D‟ and „A‟ Companies in front, „C‟ in 
support and „B‟ in reserve with Battalion HQ, but were “unable to continue the advance”.667 
Following the retreat of the Germans during the night, orders came at 0500 and a platoon 
from each company was sent forward to the Green Line objective, this being reached at 0700 
on 5 November. The 6
th
 Dorsets had suffered eight fatalities and 24 wounded, including two 
wounded officers.
668
 
 
The 10
th
 Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel W. Gibson) breakfasted at 
0700 on the morning of 4 November. Their subsequent approach to their jumping off 
positions on the Red Line were without incident and they moved off into the attack on time, 
“keeping close to the barrage”,669 „D‟ Company on the left, „A‟ on the right, „B‟ Company in 
support and „C‟ in reserve. Half an hour later, around 1330, they had reached the north-south 
grid line S24 a 0.0 – S30 a 0.0 having met “little or no resistance”.670 By quarter past two, „D‟ 
Company had reached the Institut Forestier (S24 d. 4.4) and cleared this building within 
twenty-five minutes, having killed the enemy garrison within. They then placed a Vickers 
Machine Gun on the roof to give covering fire to their next move forward. By 1500, however, 
both lead companies were held up by heavy machine gun fire from both flanks and from the 
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village of Locquignol, where the Germans had a machine gun firing from the church tower. 
„D‟ Company was in disarray, having suffered around 35 casualties, and were ordered to 
stand fast while „A‟ Company were moved north and then east around the Institut Forestier, 
passing through „D‟ Company to continue the advance towards the village. Meanwhile, „B‟ 
Company were to push forward through „A‟ Company‟s previous position and continue the 
advance south of, and parallel to, the road leading to Locquignol. It was dark by now, and 
both companies were eventually halted short of the village.
671
 At 1710, Captain Lawson and 
two other ranks of „B‟ Company patrolled to within 200 yards of Locquignol church, 
encountering two enemy soldiers whom they killed. They were fired upon by two machine 
guns south of the church and were forced to retire. „A‟ Company‟s Captain C. Archer MC 
was also able to push a patrol out a little way forward, but by then it had been decided that no 
further attack on the village would be made until artillery from 95
th
 Bde RFA and trench 
mortars could be brought up. Locquignol was to be assaulted from the north at 2200. It had 
not been possible to arrange the attack for any earlier, as communication with the artillery 
units had proved difficult.
672
  
 
During this halt in proceedings, the Brigade Major, Captain P.S. Barber, paid a visit to 
Battalion HQ (by now in the Institut Forestier) with orders issued at 1930 “stating that a 
definite line must be reported to Division before 2200 hours. This line was therefore reported 
as it stood and attack cancelled.”673 „D‟ Company were then moved forward and north in 
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order to fill the gap between „A‟ Company and the 6th Dorsets, “whose position on the left 
was uncertain”.674 
 
At 2300, two patrols were sent out, one to reconnoitre the village and another to try to 
establish a post at the major crossroads east of it. (T25 b 0.8). The former was able, by 
midnight, to report that Locquignol had been vacated by the enemy. The latter had 
established a post just west of the crossroads, one platoon strong, but in close touch with an 
enemy post just to the east of it. „C‟ Company was accordingly ordered forward to occupy the 
village and to establish posts to the east and south-east. By 0500, the enemy was seen retiring 
through the thicker parts of the wood east of the Green Line and „B‟ Company was ordered 
forward to establish platoons on the battalion‟s final objective. This was complete by 0630 on 
5 November. 10
th
 West Yorks casualties numbered one officer wounded, ten other ranks 
killed, thirty-five wounded and five missing. Fatalities can be fixed at twelve.
675
 
 
50 Brigade War Diary gives total casualties for the day as: 30 killed, 150 wounded and 17 
missing, a total of 197. 
676
 The diary also estimates the number of Germans killed on the 
Brigade front to be 100, with 74 machine guns captured. 
 
Total fatalities for the 17
th
 Division on 4 November amount to 172, and wounded can be 
estimated at 710. This is a casualty rate of almost 14 per cent amongst the engaged infantry 
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battalions. The 17
th
 Division War Diary concludes its account of 4 November with a section 
entitled “Remarks on the Attack.” It begins: “The attack worked to plan in the early stages, 
but not in the later stages”.677 The early stages, although „successful‟, had been the most 
costly. The report continues: 
The mist undoubtedly assisted the attack in the earlier stages by obstructing the view 
of the enemy Machine Gunners, but it made the Artillery barrage difficult to follow 
and there is no doubt that the most advanced troops, who had the difficult task of a 
change of direction to carry out during the attack, ran into our barrage and incurred 
casualties from it.
678
 
 
The next section dwells on the “failure of 50th Brigade to gain its objectives rapidly”.679 It 
suggests that a daylight advance against a large number of machine guns in relatively open 
ground can only be successful if the attack is on a wide front and has “effective” artillery 
support. The implication is that the Artillery messed up: “The artillery barrage in support of 
50
th
 Brigade was not a success: on the right the barrage was reported good – in the centre an 
hour late, and on the left several batteries to be shooting consistently short”.680 The idea of 
rushing sections of 18 pounders forward so quickly along a small number of available routes 
and expecting a viable barrage at the end of it is described as “questionable”.681 The fact that 
this later barrage was not to move through the denser parts of the forest, but was to 
concentrate on the rides, tracks and borders of the cleared areas, made it an almost impossible 
task for the gunners.
682
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The success of the attack (based purely on objectives gained) came at a price: the 17
th
 
Division‟s casualties were the heaviest divisional casualties of the day.683 
 
Far from being an all-arms attack, on this divisional sector, and particularly in the 50 Brigade 
sector, it descended into an infantry versus infantry fight where the fire power of the platoon 
and the drive, skill and courage of individual commanders became deciding factors. These 
factors, evident to some extent in both flanking battalions of 50 Brigade, though apparently 
largely lacking in the centre, were not enough to ensure the timely execution of the plan. Its 
ultimate completion was down to the withdrawal of German troops during the night, this 
allowing a final unopposed advance of some 2000 yards.  
 
38
th
 Division
684
 
 
The task of the 38
th
 Division (Major-General T.A. Cubitt) was very similar to that of the 17
th
: 
the three infantry brigades, 115, 113 and 114 were allocated, respectively, the Blue, Red and 
Green objective lines. The attack would involve an advance of between six and seven 
thousand yards, largely through the Forêt de Mormal, on a frontage of approximately two to 
two and a half thousand yards. There were no settlements or villages of any size in this sector 
of the forest, but the criss-cross pattern of rides and tracks was repeated, and these were to be 
used to great advantage by the troops of this division. 
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“The plan was perfectly straightforward”.685 The author goes on: “Owing to the very enclosed 
nature of the country the execution of the plan was not so simple”.686 Even so, their 
experience was to be very different from that of the 17
th
 Division. 
The timetable for the attack was as follows: 115 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H.D. De 
Pree) would begin their advance at Zero + 45, that is 0615, in order to conform with the 18
th
 
Division on their right.
687
 They would arrive on the Blue Line an hour later on the left flank, 
but not until 0800 on the right. The 113 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H.E. ap Rhys-
Price) was scheduled to complete the assault on the Red Line by 1030, and 114 Infantry 
Brigade (Brigadier-General T.R.C. Price), after a pause of between 90 and 110 minutes, 
would continue the advance, arriving on the final First Phase objective, the Green Line, at 
1540 on the right and 1710 on the left. 
 
The artillery would supply a creeping barrage, advancing 100 yards every six minutes “to 
give the infantry plenty of time to work their way through the enclosed country and forest”.688 
This would continue as far as the Red Line. Thereafter, the efficacy of the barrage available 
to the advancing troops would depend on RFA Brigades being able to move their guns 
forward in time to lay down a barrage conforming to the final stages of the assault. 156 and 
162 Brigades RFA would begin their moves forward as soon as the Blue Line was captured, 
taking up new positions east of Englefontaine in squares A.2 and S.26 respectively. 121 
Brigade RFA would move its guns to squares A.3 and A.9 once the Red Line was in allied 
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hands. 122 Brigade RFA would perform a similarly-timed move to squares S.27 and A.3.
689
 
“In this ingenious and skilful manner, Brigadier-General Topping, CRA 38th Division, 
arranged a powerful barrage to break the crust at the opening of the attack, and the infantry 
were provided with a reasonable barrage continually in front of them afterwards”.690 By 
sacrificing intensity, Topping had ensured continuity of the barrage, keeping enforced halts 
on the objective lines to a minimum. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the 17
th
 
Division‟s attempts to provide a barrage for the latter stages of their attack had met with 
mixed fortune. 
 
The 38
th
 Division barrage was supplemented initially by Stokes Mortars, which subsequently 
moved forward with their respective Infantry Brigades, and by the 38
th
 Machine Gun 
Battalion who fired over the village of Englefontaine onto the western edge of the forest and 
onto the Blue Line. They too then moved forward in order to protect lines occupied during 
the advance before finally coming under command of Brigadier-General H.E. ap Rhys-Price 
of 114 Infantry Brigade, in support of the final move onto the Green Line. 
 
A section of four tanks of the 9
th
 Tank Battalion was allocated to 38
th
 Division, and were to 
act under the orders of Brigadier-General H.D. De Pree, commanding 115 Infantry Brigade. 
“They were to advance with the infantry and assist them by breaking down hedges and by 
engaging any hostile posts holding up the advance among the orchards, on the edge of the 
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forest or in the houses in A.2.c and S.26.a. As soon as the infantry had entered the forest, they 
were to withdraw to their rendezvous of the night before [West of Englefontaine]”.691 
 
On 2 November, a conference took place at Divisional Headquarters at 1700 hrs, when future 
operations were discussed, brigade commanders being present.
692
 Earlier that day, tactical 
training had taken place in Vendegies Wood, involving troops of 115 Brigade, whilst those of 
113 Brigade were practising “wood fighting”.693 The following morning, at 1030, the War 
Diary of 114 Brigade records a conference at their HQ where “CO‟s of all units 
concerned”694 were made party to the details of the forthcoming attack. Detailed orders 
(Order No. 250) came down from Division on that day, accompanied, tellingly, by „Tactical 
Instructions‟. Troops were warned not to follow the barrage too closely in the wooded areas, 
being liable to injury from shells bursting in the tops of trees, and to expect hostile gas 
bombardments. Most importantly, however, point 7 details the method of advance to be 
adopted: 
 
“It is to be impressed upon all down to Company Commanders that in thick woods loss of 
direction and control is to be expected, therefore extensions are quite out of place and 
advances are to be made on narrow fronts by Companies under the personal command and 
control of the Company Commander and if necessary the Battalion Commander with one 
Company as advanced guard.” This was reinforced by Order No. S.S. 149/12, issued on 3 
November: 
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Brigadiers should impress upon all Battalion Commanders the importance of getting 
forward, in tomorrow‟s attack, as rapidly as possible and as fast as the barrage 
permits. It is quite possible that, as we are attacking more by blocks of platoon or 
companies, as opposed to widely extended order, we shall leave pockets of enemy in 
places in the woods. This does not matter, [my emphasis] many other troops will be 
continually passing through from rear to front and the surrender of such pockets is 
ensured. The most important point is to get and get on quickly, deliberately leaving 
gaps and keeping our own men together and in hand.
695
 
 
 
 
Also on 3 November, Major-General Cubitt, commanding 38
th
 Division, was able to visit 
most of the battalions under his command.
696
 
 
“The attack was a splendid success”697 states the War Diary of 115 Infantry Brigade. The 
brigade had lined up on their jumping off positions, just to the east of the village of 
Englefontaine, on a three battalion front, 17
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the left, 10
th
 South 
Wales Borderers in the centre, and 2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the right. Each battalion 
placed two companies in the front line, whose objective was the western edge of the forest. 
The two rear companies of each battalion would then “leapfrog on this line and move direct 
to the final objective, the Blue Line”.698 It was the job of the original front companies to mop 
up any enemy defensive positions left in action along the edge of the forest, and then to 
reform and move forward in support of their comrades. They would fill in any gaps between 
units on the Blue Line: each battalion was operating on a frontage of around 700 yards, but 
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companies were ordered “not to move on a greater front than 200 yards” 699 each, thus 
making gaps in the line inevitable. 
 
The 17
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. Beasley) on the left of the Brigade 
front, after practising „wood fighting‟ on 1 November, had taken over positions from 14th Bn 
Welsh Regt. in the Englefontaine line on the following day. They passed “a quiet day” on the 
3
rd
, before attacking at 0615 on the 4
th
.
700
 All accounts
701
 of this advance are brief, but agree 
that it was very successful: both objectives were taken “well up to time”702 and casualties 
were light, totalling one officer and seven other ranks killed,
703
 three officers and forty-one 
other ranks wounded. 
 
In the centre, the 10
th
 South Wales Borderers (Lieutenant-Colonel A.L Bowen) had also gone 
into the line on 3 November, but had been subjected to enemy artillery fire, suffering some 
casualties,
704
 but no fatalities. They attacked in a dense fog with „B‟ and „A‟ Companies in 
front (left and right respectively), with „D‟ and „C‟ Companies in support. They were assisted 
by two tanks of 9
th
 Tank Battalion, one of which appears to have “strayed”705 slightly to the 
north from the 2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers area. One tank “proceeded to S.26.a.6.7 and cleared 
up machine gun positions, then continuing to the NW edge of the MORMAL forest, where it 
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again dealt with several m.g. posts and broke down hedges to make passages for the 
infantry”.706 It subsequently developed engine trouble. The other headed straight for the edge 
of the forest, flattening hedges and neutralising machine gun posts as it went. It then entered 
the forest, strictly against orders, and became “bellied on a tree stump. The infantry 
commanders on the spot expressed themselves as particularly well pleased with the action of 
this tank”.707 
 
The battalion‟s final objective, some 800 yards inside the forest, was reached by 0715. 
Opposition from elements of the 16
th
 and 58
th
 German Infantry Divisions was described as 
“very weak and easily overcome”.708 The “junior officers and NCO‟s had ample 
opportunities for showing their capacity to use ground and take advantage of the cover which 
hedges and enclosures offered”.709 Special praise goes to “Corporals Dover and Parker and    
[ ... ] Lance Corporal Apps who were prominent in dealing with the machine gun posts”.710 
The attack had cost the battalion 42 casualties, ten of which were fatal, including Second-
Lieutenant H. Jones
711
 and the battalion Medical Officer, Lieutenant Cassell of the USA 
Medical Corps. By nightfall, they were in billets in Englefontaine.  
 
On the right of the brigade front, the 2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel G.E.R. 
de Miremont) was formed up in their jumping off positions by 0500 on 4 November, „D‟ and 
„C‟ Companies in front, (left and right respectively), with „A‟ and „B‟ companies in support. 
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Their advance was complicated by having the Ruisseau des Eclusettes on its right boundary. 
This stream “twists a great deal in its course”,712 meaning that the jumping off positions were 
on a frontage of only 500 yards, but their Blue Line objective was 1200 yards wide. This 
meant that once the leapfrog line (edge of the forest) had been reached, a third company had 
to push forward into the front line. „A‟ Company would push through „D‟ Company on the 
left, but „B‟ company would become the new right front company, extending the battalion 
line southwards, leaving „C‟ Company in the centre front line. With only „D‟ Company now 
left in support, it was deemed that they were insufficient in number to complete the mopping 
up operations required behind the Blue Line, and Battalion HQ was made responsible for 
mopping up the houses bypassed at the start of the attack in square A.2.c.  
 
The attack commenced on time behind a “very heavy and accurate barrage”.713 The mist 
hampered the battalion, making it difficult to keep direction, but it “hampered the enemy‟s 
movements considerably and was helpful to the Battalion in overcoming opposition, which 
was particularly heavy in MG and TM fire”.714 The tank allocated to the 2nd Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers failed to materialise, but one from the 18
th
 Division area that had lost its way was 
commandeered and gave valuable assistance: a gap of some 400 yards appeared between the 
right of the battalion and the left of 18
th
 Division, and the Germans were able to enfilade the 
Fusiliers‟ attack with machine gun and trench mortar fire from this area. The tank helped to 
neutralise the menace, but „B‟ Company suffered particularly and it was only through the 
“skilful handling”715 of Captain Butler that the company made it to its objective. Once the 
Blue Line had been secured, „D‟ Company, from its position in support, crossed the Ruisseau 
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des Esclusettes and cleared the enemy from their positions, pushing as far back as the 
outskirts of the village of Hecq, dropping posts as they went to form a defensive flank. 
 
The battalion had killed around fifty of the enemy and had captured four officers and 120 
other ranks. Their own casualties were reported as one officer
716
 and ten other ranks killed, 
with sixty-five other ranks wounded or missing.
717
 
 
Brigade casualties for the day can be estimated at: 
     Officers  Other Ranks 
     K W  K W & M 
17
th
  Royal Welsh Fus. 1 3  16 41 
10
th
 South Wales Borderers 2 1  8 32 
2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fus.  1 -  10 65 
 
   Total:  4 4  34 138 Overall: 180 
 
 
 
The task of taking the Red Line fell, as noted earlier, to 113 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-
General H.E. ap Rhys-Price). They were to move off from the Blue Line at 0830, 16
th
 Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers on the left, 14
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers in the centre and 13
th
 Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers on the right.  
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They had all reached their jumping off positions, some 200 yards behind the men of the 115 
Brigade, by 0500.
718
 They were instructed to dig in on these positions as protection against 
any German counter barrage, but only had half an hour to do so. 
 
The 16
th
 and 14
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers were to make a “straightforward” attack.719 With two 
companies in the front line, and two behind, the leading units were to capture the line of high 
ground between A.4.a.0.0 and S.28.a.0.2 and the road running northwest from the latter 
point.
720
 The support companies would then leapfrog through and gain the final objective. 
They were expecting most resistance from the edges of the blocks of trees remaining in this 
sector of the forest and were advised to move along their edges and “clear them up from a 
flank”.721 
 
The instructions for the 13
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the right were very different: one 
company was to take the high ground in A.10.a. The other three companies would move in 
column along the path of the stream in squares A.3.d, A.4. c & d and link up with the 8
th
 
Royal Berkshires (18
th
 Division) just south of the big six-way road junction in A.10.b., thus 
pinching out the open ground to the south of the stream.
722
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The men going into the attack would wear packs instead of haversacks and would carry one 
day‟s preserved meats and biscuits. They would have thirty sets of wire cutters per battalion 
as well as billhooks and axes divided up amongst platoons.
723
 Leaving their assembly 
positions respectively at 0845, 0700 and 0715, the 16
th
, 14
th
 and 13
th
 Battalions moved off in 
artillery formation in good time to form up on the Blue Line, ready to attack at 0830. 
 
The 16
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Davies) had suffered “heavy 
casualties”724 at their assembly positions, but “very few casualties in the Forest”.725 The 
battalion War Diary is very matter of fact, stating simply “All objectives gained”.726 They 
suffered over 100 casualties on the day, including thirty killed. Three officers were recorded 
as wounded: Second-Lieutenants Gwilym Rees and Hugh Skyrme and the Reverend Irwin 
MC. The battalion spent the night of 4 and 5 November in their positions on the Red Line. 
 
The 14
th
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers moved into the attack at 0845. Their Commanding 
Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel B.W. Collier, had gone on leave on 3 November, but his stand-
in, Major W.P. Wheldon DSO, was wounded as he left Battalion HQ early on the morning of 
the attack. Two other officers were killed by the same shell.
727
 Major Wheldon managed to 
carry on until Lieutenant-Colonel Collier was recalled and was able to take over around one 
o‟clock in the afternoon. 
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„C‟ Company, (Captain C.J.S. Nicholls), and „D‟ Company, (Lieutenant C.C. Danes) attacked 
first and captured the high ground in squares A.4.a and S.28.c before „A‟ Company 
(A/Captain W.D. Roderick MC) and „B‟ Company (Second-Lieutenant R.C. Seel) 
leapfrogged and reached the Red Line “without serious opposition”.728 The only officer 
casualty was Captain Roderick who received a slight wound. They had suffered 8 other ranks 
killed during the day. 
 
The 13
th
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Leman), on the right wing 
of the brigade attack, had also suffered a few casualties in the assembly positions from the 
German barrage, but were able to move off at 0615. They were harassed by machine gun fire 
from the south as they advanced through the orchards in square A.2 to the Blue Line, but 
were able to deploy on time and move off into the attack. The isolated “batches of enemy 
who were still hiding in the undergrowth”729 cared little for the fight and proved no obstacle 
to the advance. Once early opposition had been overrun, the Fusiliers were able to “swe[ep] 
onto their objectives well up to time”.730 Most casualties had occurred in the earlier stages of 
the assault and amounted to 10 killed and 65 wounded.
731
 
The 113
th
 Brigade War Diary only contains casualty figures for the period 4 – 10 November 
1918. They are as follows: 
 
        Officers         Other Ranks 
 K W M   K W M 
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731
 The one officer killed was Captain Francis Jones-Bateman, age 22, who is buried in Cross Roads Cemetery, 
Fontaine-au-Bois, grave III D 22. 
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 3 8 -   39 272 20 
 
 
Brigade fatalities for 4 November can be confirmed at 50.
732
 
 
 
114 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General T.R.C. Price), tasked with the final objective of the 
day, the Green Line, consisted of the 13
th
, 14
th
 and 15
th
 Battalions Welsh Regiment, 
commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonels H.F. Hobbs, G.F. Brookes and E. Helme. 
The method of advance proposed was unique amongst units of Third Army that day: all three 
battalions would assemble on the far right sector of the Red Line positions (squares A.9.b and 
A.10.b) and would advance by companies in artillery formation along the rides through the 
forest, gradually fanning out to occupy previously-designated localities on the Brown and 
Green Lines.
733
 
 
It is interesting to note the strengths of the three battalions and the numbers that actually went 
into battle: 
    13 Welsh  14 Welsh  15 Welsh 
    Off. OR  Off. OR  Off. OR 
Battalion Strength 29 837  27 775  30 855 
Battle numbers 14 543  17 558  16 537 
734
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Original orders envisaged the Brigade moving off from its assembly positions in the forest at 
0930, but “the situation in front being somewhat obscure”,735 orders were received to hold 
fast await further instructions. Unfortunately, it was during this waiting period that the troops 
suffered “a certain amount of shelling”.736 Indeed, it was here that most of the day‟s 
casualties were incurred.
737
 Orders for an immediate move came at 1100. By midday the 14
th
 
Welsh were in their jumping off positions on the Route du Chene Cuplet. The 13
th
 and 15
th
 
Battalions were in their positions 1000 yards to the rear along the track running north-south 
through A.9.b fifteen minutes later. 
 
At 1220, the Brigade attacked behind a creeping barrage, the 15
th
 Welsh on the right moving 
on a two-company front, („A‟ & „C‟ Companies left and right in front, „D‟ & „B‟ Companies 
in support),
738
 astride the Route d‟Hecq, accompanied by two sections of the 38th Machine 
Gun Battalion and two Stokes Mortars. They were followed initially at a distance of 500 
yards by the 13
th
 Welsh. The 14
th
 Welsh, advancing at 1300, became the left front battalion 
with twin spearheads moving north-east along parallel tracks. Opposition proved to be slight, 
though the 14
th
 Welsh on the left encountered problems when confronted by machine gun fire 
across the open space in A.5.d. Retaliation from the machine gun section attached to the 15
th
 
Welsh soon neutralised the threat and the advance was able to continue to their objectives on 
the Brown Line (Route de Raucourt) relatively unchallenged. Once on the Brown Line, the 
14
th
 Welsh had completed their day‟s work. Subsequent advances by the other two battalions 
of the brigade left them in position as Brigade Support. They did later push patrols into the 
orchards on the south-western outskirts of Locquignol, where they encountered some 
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desultory but ineffective small-arms fire from houses in the village. Casualties for the day 
totalled one officer (Lieutenant V.G. Gundrey MC) and 58 other ranks wounded. Only eight 
fatalities were suffered, and both leading battalions were on the Brown Line by 1415, slightly 
ahead of schedule. The 15
th
 Welsh had captured ten enemy guns on the way, and these were 
handed over to the artillery, who turned them on the German positions. 
 
At 1440, the two support companies of 15
th
 Welsh („D‟ & „B‟ Companies) passed through the 
leading companies and headed for the Green Line. Simultaneously, the 13
th
 Welsh advanced 
across the Brown Line on a one-company front on the north side of the Route d‟Hecq. 
“Enemy resistance was of similar character as that encountered during the BROWN LINE 
advance”.739 That is to say, minimal. 
The 15
th
 Welsh were established on the Green Line by 1540. By 1715, three companies of 
13
th
 Welsh had positioned themselves along the portion of the Route d‟Hecq that ran to the 
south-east of Locquignol and established themselves as the northern sector of the brigade‟s 
Green Line target, having encountered their only real resistance from a machine gun firing 
from the crossroads at B.1.d.4.9. A fourth company branched off to the north and made 
tentative moves towards the southern outskirts of Locquignol. One patrol made it as far as the 
church, but found the village unoccupied. “They fired a few shots to attract attention, but with 
no results”.740 
 
Infiltration tactics had worked splendidly, albeit against less than tenacious defenders. 
Casualties in the 13
th
 Battalion amounted to two fatalities and around a dozen wounded. They 
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had captured 137 prisoners. The 15
th
 Welsh fatal casualties come to five, the one officer 
concerned dying of wounds later in the day.
741
 Around fifty were wounded, including 
Lieutenant-Colonel Helme DSO. 
 
At around 2230, the 13
th
 Welsh reported that their patrols could find no enemy troops within 
2000 yards of the crossroads in T.26.b, which marked their left flank. „A‟ and „B‟ Companies 
were ordered to advance at 0220 on 5 November and were able to push east as far as the 
villages of Croix Daniel and Sarbaras, a further two miles. On the way, they managed to 
capture 40 prisoners along with a German Field Ambulance with 32 wounded Germans and 
one wounded soldier of the 14
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers and ten staff. 
 
Major De Pree sums up the Brigade performance thus: 
Three companies were on the move from 0700 on the 4
th
 November till the same hour 
on the 5
th
, during which time they had covered a distance of 11½ miles, the first half 
of which was traversed under shell fire, and the second in continuous contact with the 
enemy. As a result of their efforts, troops of the 38
th
 Division had penetrated to a 
depth of about 4 miles further than the divisions on the right and left, and had overrun 
the first objectives of the next day‟s attack. 
The final advance of „A‟ and „B‟ Companies, 13th Welsh was a very good example of 
a commander promptly seizing an opportunity as soon as it presented itself.
742
 
 
The Brigade‟s approximate casualties for the day can be put at: 15 killed (one officer) and 
120 wounded. 
 
This brings the 38
th
 Division totals to: 
                                                 
741
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   Killed  Wounded  Missing 
 
 Officers 8  14   - 
 Other Ranks 87  529   23 
 
 Total  95  543   23 
 
 Overall total: 661 
 
 
A report on the exploits of 13
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment reached General Sir Julian Byng, 
commanding Third Army, and he sent a congratulatory note back down to 38
th
 Division 
Headquarters, dated 11 November 1918: 
This report illustrates the proper application of the methods of open warfare. The 
determination to get on and not to stop and consolidate a line which would never be 
attacked resulted in the capture of 137 prisoners with practically no casualties. 
The action of the Company Commanders is most commendable and I hope will be 
copied by leaders in other units.
743
 
 
The attacks made by both divisions in V Corps were ultimately successful, but close scrutiny 
reveals the difference in methods applied and the resultant difference in casualties suffered. 
17
th
 Division seemed unable or unwilling to embrace the tactics of infiltration, preferring to 
advance in line, and always aware and therefore restricted by the success, or lack of it, of 
units on companies‟ flanks. They allowed themselves to be pinned down by machine gun fire, 
eschewing the opportunities to outflank positions by use of the rides and tracks that criss-
crossed the forest. Too much respect was paid to a defensive force that needed little in the 
way of encouragement to surrender or retire. 
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38
th
 Division were happy to employ tactics appropriate to both the topography and the 
strength of enemy defences. The artillery movement orders were effective and a good 
creeping barrage was available for the latter stages of the attack. Battalions and Companies 
were allocated objectives and their commanders were allowed to get on as best they could, 
making decisions on the spot, largely unaffected by the fortunes of flanking units. Daring and 
dash had maximised the acreage captured and minimised the casualties sustained, but the 
remaining unanswerable question is that of how two divisions, in receipt of the same basic 
orders from Corps, were able to interpret them so differently.  
 
 
Conclusion 
17
th
 and 38
th
 Divisions occupy very different places on the „learning curve‟. V Corps orders 
had required units to advance rapidly along the tracks and rides through the forest, but only 
38
th
 Division showed the confidence to do so. 17
th
 Division, and particularly 50 Brigade, 
proved tentative. This chapter illustrates and confirms Jonathan Boff‟s assertion that training 
and performance was uneven amongst the units of the BEF. 
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Chapter 6 
XIII Corps 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter highlights the flexibility in both stages of an assault – the planning and the 
execution. The basic formula for the advance demonstrated by most of the units of Third 
Army was altered almost beyond recognition, resulting in the most complicated plan of the 
entire attack frontage. The basic infantry / artillery combination would be supplemented 
successfully by the use of armoured support and the Royal Engineers would play a central 
role in the success of the attack. The ability of the artillery to provide an enfilade barrage 
within an otherwise standard pattern, the infantry tactics of envelopment as opposed to linear 
progression, and the ingenuity of the engineering companies in assuring dry passage across 
watercourses all demonstrate a very capable, dynamic and confident command hierarchy, 
able to tackle any problem that either the enemy or battlefield topography could pose. 
*          *          *          * 
The Fourth Army front at the beginning of November 1918 stretched from its junction with 
Third Army just south of the village of Englefontaine to include the section of the Sambre-
Oise Canal just north of Oisy. Its two Corps, XIII and IX, held a front of approximately 
fifteen miles, XIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir T.L.N. Morland) on the northern sector of 
six miles, and IX Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir W.P. Braithwaite) on the nine mile wide 
southern sector. The country that faced Fourth Army, and therefore the obstacles that it was 
tasked to overcome, was very varied. In the north, units faced the southern part of the Forêt 
235 
 
de Mormal with the ubiquitous orchard-surrounded and closely-hedged villages at or near its 
western edge. The countryside then opened out somewhat before the town of Landrecies, 
which straddled the canalised River Sambre. The challenge here, as further south, was the 
crossing of this seventy feet wide waterway. The German defences lay, for the most part, on 
the eastern banks of this canal, and the British infantry, relying to a large extent on the 
inventiveness of their Royal Engineer colleagues, would be required to fight their way across, 
in the open, using improvised bridges and pontoons. At the locks at Landrecies, Ors, Catillon 
and „Lock No.1‟,744 the canal narrowed to only seventeen feet, making them obvious places 
to attempt large-scale crossings. The German defenders were only too well aware of this, of 
course, and had reinforced those localities appropriately. They also held ground to the west of 
the canal at Landrecies, the Happegarbes Spur, Ors, Le Donjon and Catillon. By 2 November, 
the village of Ors had been cleared of the enemy. The other locations remained in German 
hands.
745
 
 
The day‟s objectives would take XIII Corps about 3000 yards into the Forêt de Mormal and 
to its eastern edge further south, and IX Corps, once over the canal, to a line well to the east 
of it in countryside devoid of any major settlements, but which “bore a striking resemblance 
to that of a dairy-farming county in England. There is little or no cultivation, the fields being 
pasture land; scattered farmsteads were frequent, and the villages, for the most part tucked 
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away in the valleys, were of a very much better type than those to be found in the Somme 
area before the war wrought its devastation”.746 
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Morland, commanding XIII Corps, aware of the depleted 
strengths of his units,
747
 decided to use three of his divisions in the initial assault. These were, 
north to south, 18
th
 Division (Major-General R.P. Lee), 50
th
 Division (Major-General H.C. 
Jackson) and 25
th
 Division (Major-General J.R.E. Charles).
748
 The 18
th
 and 50
th
 Divisions 
would advance into the Forêt de Mormal and 25
th
 Division would be given the task of 
capturing Landrecies.  
 
The standard field-artillery barrage would cover the first half of the advance.
749
 It would 
commence at Zero Hour and, after remaining on the start line for four minutes, would creep 
forward at a rate of 100 yards every six minutes. It would pause on the Red Dotted Line, 
putting down a protective barrage. A cessation of fire for five minutes followed by four 
minutes of intense fire on that line would “indicate to the infantry the hour for the next 
advance”.750 The original procedure would then be repeated up to the Red Line. From there, 
“Divisions will arrange for the rapid advance of an adequate proportion of Field Artillery to 
support the attack between the Red and Green objectives”.751  
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Various roads and areas would be targeted by the Heavy Artillery
752
 and strict instructions 
were given that the guns must lift from these areas four hundred yards in advance of the 18 
pounder barrage, that is some 6-800 yards ahead of the advancing infantry. 
 
Counter battery fire began on the evening of 3 November, fifty rounds per target being fired 
by 0300 the following morning. British commanders could thereafter order specific targets to 
be treated to five minutes „rapid‟ and five minutes „normal‟ fire should the enemy artillery 
prove troublesome. The total number of guns available to XIII Corps was as follows: 
Field Artillery: 40  18-pdr batteries 
    12 4.5” Howitzer batteries 
Heavy Artillery: 6 60-pdr batteries 
    12 6” Howitzer batteries 
    3 8” Howitzer batteries 
    3 9.2” Howitzer batteries 
    5 6” gun batteries. 
 
This does not include the ten batteries of Heavy Artillery available for the counter-battery 
work.
753
 
 
Each division was allocated a number of tanks: ten Mk.V tanks from 14
th
 Tank Battalion 
were attached to 18
th
 Division; the 9
th
 Tank Battalion were able to muster fourteen Mk.V 
tanks, ten of which went to 50
th
 Division, the remaining four to 25
th
 Division. One supply 
tank
754
 each was given to 50
th
 and 18
th
 Divisions. 25
th
 Division received four, so that they 
could bring bridging materials forward to the canal at Landrecies. 
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The 18
th
 and 50
th
 Divisions were also allotted two armoured cars each from 17
th
 Armoured 
Car Battalion.
755
 Only the armoured cars would be allowed to advance beyond the edge of the 
forest: the tanks were restricted to clearing enemy machine guns in the villages to the west of 
the forest and on the edge of the forest itself. The armoured cars were free to roam along the 
main roads in the forest and cause as much mischief as they could. 
 
18
th
 Division
756
 
Orders for the assault were issued by Corps on 30 October: they included the requirement 
that 18
th
 and 50
th
 Divisions perform an enveloping manoeuvre. The village of Preux-au-Bois 
was not to be attacked frontally: 18
th
 Division would take on the lion‟s share of the task, 
assaulting it from the north, with units of 50
th
 Division swinging to the north to help mop up 
the southern outskirts. It was decided that the thick hedges running north-south through the 
orchards to the west of the village would be better taken in the flanks, as this would allow the 
infantry to advance more easily and would restrict the fields of fire of the German machine 
guns hidden within them. Captain G.H.F. Nicholls, in his history of the 18
th
 Division, deems 
this aspect of the attack worthy of mention: 
For the first time the 18
th
 Division was to carry out an enveloping manoeuvre by order 
of a Corps. All previous enveloping movements, for which the Division so justly had 
become noted, were initiated and carried through by General Lee in spite of, rather 
than by order of the Corps in which the Division happened to be serving.
757
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Major-General Lee imparted details of the operation to his subordinates on 30 October and 
Brigade Conferences took place the following day. 
 
The 18
th
 Division lined up on an initial frontage of 3000 yards, with 53 Brigade (Brigadier-
General M.G.H Barker) on the left, 54 Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel K.C. Weldon) on the 
right, with 55 Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel A.P.B. Irwin) in support. The jumping off 
positions were parallel to, and a little to the east of, the Englefontaine to Robersart road and 
zero hour was set for 0615. The weather was clear at that time, but a thick fog came down 
twenty minutes later and did not clear until around 0900. “Our infantry turned it to 
account”.758 
 
53 Brigade was to capture the “straggling”759 village of Hecq, the responsibility for this 
falling on one battalion, the 7
th
 Royal West Kents. The carrying of the assault to the Red Line 
objective was job of the 8
th
 Berkshires and the 10
th
 Essex: to arrive at their jumping off 
positions required a tricky preliminary manoeuvre, however. These positions ran north-south, 
but were to the east of the village of Preux-au-Bois,
760
 which was, as previously mentioned, 
being attacked in the flank, north to south, by 54 Brigade. Any delay in the 54 Brigade 
advance would require the Berkshires and Essex battalions to move along the northern edge 
of the village, possibly under enfilade fire, and then deploy to their right in the rear of 
positions still held by the enemy. The move would require nerve and determination. 55 
Brigade would then leapfrog through the advanced units of 53 Brigade on the Red Line and 
continue the attack through the forest as far as the Green Line, the day‟s ultimate objective. 
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The three battalions of 53 Brigade were far from being at full strength, their total numbers 
adding up to 858 officers and men.
761
 
 
The 7
th
 Royal West Kents (Lieutenant-Colonel L.H. Hickson) formed up along the road 
running north-south in squares A7 b & d. Each company was allocated an objective: „C‟ and 
„D‟ companies were to reach the road on the eastern outskirts of Hecq (running north-south 
through squares A8 b & A9 c), left and right respectively. „B‟ and „A‟ companies (again left 
and right respectively) were to advance a further 600 yards to the road running through 
squares A9 b & A9 d. Their advance was to be assisted by three tanks of 14
th
 Tank 
Battalion.
762
 These tanks were seen going into action at 0610 and „C‟ and „D‟ Companies 
advanced five minutes later as the artillery barrage began. The first resistance they met was 
after 600 yards or so in trying to cross the road running along the western outskirts of the 
village, but two platoons of each company were able to establish positions along the road and 
mop up enemy posts in the vicinity. The other two platoons advanced to their final objectives 
“but met with considerable opposition in the village of Hecq and “D” Coy had particularly 
bitter fighting”.763 
 
The three tanks that had advanced with the battalion were out of action by this time: Second-
Lieutenant Robinson, commanding Tank 9557, had helped to knock out two enemy machine 
                                                 
761
 Fighting strengths were recorded as follows by Brigade HQ: 
     Officers  Other Ranks 
 10
th
 Battalion Essex Regt  12  270 
 8
th
 Battalion R.Berks. Regt 15  243 
 7
th
 Battalion R.W.Kent regt 18  300 
TNA:PRO WO95/2036 War Diary 53 Brigade HQ 
762
 These formed Lieutenant C. Lockwood‟s section: 9557 Second-Lieutenant R. Robinson; 9590 Second-
Lieutenant W.White; 9877 Second-Lieutenant D.W. Ormsby. 
763
 TNA:PRO WO95/2040 War Diary 7
th
 Royal West Kents. „Battle Narrative‟. 
241 
 
gun posts, one at the crossroads in A8 a, the other 200 yards further east. “He then traversed 
the orchards on the west side of this road and fired into the houses along the roads, causing 
many of the enemy to surrender”.764 At this point, Robinson somehow lost the Royal West 
Kents and ended up helping the Royal Welsh Fusiliers to clear a machine gun nest to the 
south of Englefontaine. On his way back to Hecq, he cleared two machine guns near the 
Ruisseau des Eclusettes before meeting up with Second-Lieutenant Chittenden (Tank 9185 – 
see below) who, with a party of Royal West Kents, was being held up by an enemy 
strongpoint consisting of two machine guns and two trench mortars. He managed to 
neutralise one machine gun before his tank took a bullet in the radiator. With this pierced, the 
engine stopped, and with “hostile fire being so heavy, he decided to evacuate his tank (taking 
two machine guns with him) and withdraw to a cottage with the Royal West Kents, then went 
in turn to look for assistance in taking the strongpoint”.765 During this action, the strongpoint 
eventually falling by 1500, Robinson and his 1
st
 Driver took over a captured German machine 
gun, turned it on the enemy and captured twenty-eight prisoners.
766
 Robinson was then able 
to return to his tank and replace the machine guns. 
 
Second-Lieutenant White‟s tank (9590) managed to advance about 400 yards before 
receiving a direct hit which wounded him and one of the drivers, Private Brown. Sergeant 
Button remained in charge of the tank while the wounded were escorted back. Although the 
tank was “not fit for action”,767 nine Germans came over to it and surrendered. 
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The third tank, (9877), commanded by Second-Lieutenant Ormsby, was able to knock out 
German machine guns in a farmyard in Hecq before three of his crew were rendered 
unconscious by fumes. He and his driver were also affected and Ormsby took over the 
driving as the former also succumbed. Ormsby stalled the engine, however, and was found 
immobile by the section commander, Lieutenant Lockwood. “He [ ... ] borrowed a driver 
from another tank and made four German prisoners help him to crank up and start it again. 
However, engine trouble developed and a track broke”.768 The machine played no further part 
in the action. 
 
„A‟ and „B‟ companies of the Royal West Kents advanced from their jumping off positions at 
0625. They passed through „D‟ Company, “caught up with the barrage, and attacked the 
western edge of the Foret de Mormal, puching [sic] through to their final objective which 
they reached to time. A considerable number of the enemy were killed and many prisoners 
taken”.769  
 
Hecq was reported clear of the enemy by 0945, but later that morning a party of about thirty 
Germans, led by two officers, who had avoided the mopping up operations, attacked „A‟ 
Company in the rear. “By a cleverly executed flank movement, O.C. „A‟ Coy completely 
rounded up this party, who, when their officers had become casualties, surrendered”.770 
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Other than a slight adjustment to their line, these companies remained in position until 
relieved the following morning, whereupon the battalion was able to gather in Hecq. 
Casualties had been light. Two officers were killed
771
 and two wounded.
772
 Seven other ranks 
were killed, with 33 wounded and five reported missing. 53 Brigade War Diary praises the 
battalion‟s efforts: “Men of this Battalion deserve great praise for the method in which they 
carried out this attack. Their task was a difficult one, and it was entirely due to the fighting 
spirit displayed by all ranks that the operation was so completely successful”.773 
 
The next phase of the attack was down to the 10
th
 Essex (Lieutenant-Colonel R. Forbes) and 
8
th
 Royal Berkshires (Lieutenant-Colonel N.B. Hudson). They moved off in artillery 
formation, 10
th
 Essex first at 0725, the 8
th
 Royal Berkshires ten minutes behind them, and 
headed for their jumping off positions to the east of Preux-au-Bois. The fighting in Preux 
delayed the advance of the 10
th
 Essex and the two right companies of the 8
th
 Royal 
Berkshires: „C‟ Company, on the left, was however able to follow the 18-pounder barrage as 
it set off from the Red Dotted Line at 0907, advancing along the Route d‟Hecq. It met no 
opposition for some 400 yards, but the firing from the left was soon suppressed and they 
reached the stream in square A10a just as the enemy blew up the bridge, wounding a few of 
the men in the leading platoon. They were able to keep moving, however, and reached the 
high ground in A10 b, where they came under fire from field guns in the wood to their left. 
They “gallantly pushed on”,774 reaching their Red Line objective by 1037, “after having 
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rushed a strong enemy post by the building at A10 b 9.2”.775 This last effort had cost the 
battalion five other ranks wounded and the death of Second-Lieutenant L.J. Field.
776
 
 
Second-Lieutenant F.J. Powell DCM MM, commanding „C‟ Company, sent a message back 
to Battalion HQ announcing his arrival on the objective, and his intention to stay there, 
despite having both flanks in the air. „D‟ company had advanced to their rear, as ordered, and 
established posts along the Route d‟Hecq, the furthest forward being at A10 central. Small 
arms ammunition and Lewis Gun drums were successfully taken forward by a tank of 14
th
 
Tank Battalion, under command of Second-Lieutenant Borrow, now playing the role of 
„supply tank‟, all of his guns having been put out of action. 
 
„A‟ and „B‟ Companies of the 8th Berkshires, following units of the 10th Essex, encountered 
problems in squares A14 a & b, coming under fire from enemy positions to the south that 
should, by that time, have been cleared by troops of 54 Brigade. Orders to detour to the north 
were issued to both battalions, but were cancelled when “Forbes, [ ... ] in command of the 
10
th
 Essex, brought off a swift and brilliant manoeuvre”.777 
 
The account continues: 
Reconnoitring in the labyrinth of orchards and plantations that reached the edge of 
Preux, Forbes discovered an opening, some two hundred yards wide, in the enemy 
line. He determined to push the 10
th
 Essex through this gap. He led them in person 
through a gate within the German posts, [ ... ] pushed on, formed up the battalion 
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behind the enemy‟s front line, and advanced to the attack [ ... ] while the German‟s 
forward posts were still in action. This surprise manoeuvre had an immediate effect. 
The young lads of the 8
th
 Berks operated in the same way on the left of the 10
th
 Essex; 
the advance completed the enveloping movement; the enemy‟s escape from Preux 
was rendered impossible.
778
 
 
 
The War Diary of the 8
th
 Royal Berkshires narrates a sequence of events more harrowing than 
Nicholls would have us believe: 
 
Time being now short, and the barrage being now lost, the Company Commander            
[Captain T.K. Pickard MC] determined to fight his way to the second assembly 
position [ ...] and thence on to his final objective on the Red Line. The next three 
hours (11.00 to 14.00) were spent in working round hostile machine guns, in rushing 
posts and in neutralising the enemy fire, which was considerable. The casualties of 
„A‟ Company during this period were comparatively heavy and the behaviour of 
section commanders and individual private soldiers was from every point of view 
beyond praise.
779
  
 
 
 
It is possible that the extensive training undertaken during the October by the battalion, 
concentrating on the tactical use of the Lewis Gun in the attack, had proved useful. 
 
The leading company was then able to work forward from the jumping off positions “without 
much opposition”,780 reaching its final objective at 1505, where they were able to gain touch 
with „C‟ Company on their left. „B‟ Company, following in its wake, had established posts 
along the left battalion boundary, but was not involved in any fighting. The attack had cost 
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the Berkshires two officers killed,
781
 ten other ranks killed, thirty wounded and seven 
missing. 
 
The 10
th
 Essex had been able to move forward from their jumping off positions some time 
before the 8
th
 Berkshires, and after some hard fighting along the Route Duhamel, were able to 
reach their objective at 1430. By this time, any resistance had disappeared and they pushed 
forward a further 400 yards on the right to the Route du Pont Routier in order to keep touch 
with troops (1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I.) of 50
th
 Division on their right. Three companies held this line, 
with the other in close support. At 1520, “two armoured cars passed through the battalion”782 
and headed up the Route de Preux deeper into the wood. Ten minutes later, troops of 55 
Brigade passed through in order to continue the advance. 
Two armoured cars of 17
th
 Armoured Car Battalion under Lieutenant J.A.E. May had 
advanced along the Route de Preux, “passing through our attacking infantry at the entrance of 
the forest”.783 They proved to be “of great assistance in putting such pockets of the enemy as 
remained in the 55
th
 Brigade area to flight”.784 They did not escape unscathed, however, as 
one car ditched at B13 a 2.8 and the crew were forced to evacuate the vehicle, taking the 
machine guns with them. They were able to find cover and “remained there until our Infantry 
passed them. Both cars had considerable amount of shooting and fired 1200 rounds S.A.A. at 
enemy infantry in the wood”.785  
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The day had been relatively kind to the 10
th
 Essex, their casualties amounting to two officers 
wounded, four other ranks killed, with eighteen wounded and six missing, and 53 Brigade 
casualties for the day can be calculated at: 
    Killed   Wounded  Missing 
 Officers  4   4   - 
 Other Ranks  21   81   18 
 Total   25   85   18 
 
       Overall total  128 
 
 
 
The overall total amounts to almost 15% of those engaged.  
The task of 54 Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel K.C. Weldon
786
) looked fairly straightforward on 
paper: to clear the village of Preux-au-Bois. On a map, the complicated nature of the assault 
is evident: as mentioned above, the direction of the attack was to be north to south, that is, at 
right angles to the day‟s general advance. A conference was held at 54 Brigade headquarters 
on 31 October where details of the plan were disseminated to unit commanders.
787
 
 
It fell to the 6
th
 Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, on the left, to clear the orchards to the 
north of Preux Village, in squares A14 a & b and A15 a, so that these areas could serve as 
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assembly positions for the troops designated to clear the village itself. Two companies of 6
th
 
Northants would then swing to their right and consolidate positions to the north-east of Preux. 
 
The main assault on the village was entrusted to the 2
nd
 Bedfords: the men would follow the 
advance of the 6
th
 Northants, form up to the north of the village, facing south, and then follow 
a creeping barrage through the village until they met the 2
nd
 Munsters (50
th
 Division) coming 
up from the south. On the right, a composite company of the 11
th
 Royal Fusiliers would also 
work their way south, this time on the western edge of Preux, whilst the other companies 
would stand fast in their original positions, facing east, but tasked only with “demonstrat[ing] 
from the west”.788 They would “open fire with L.G. [Lewis Guns], rifles and rifle grenades 
along the whole front in order to deceive the enemy as to the point of attack”.789 
 
The creeping artillery barrage would commence at Zero plus 113, remaining on the opening 
line for five minutes before moving south at a rate of 100 yards every five minutes. It would 
reach its southern limit at Zero plus 158.
790
 One 18-pounder, firing over open sights, would 
shell the house on the main road at A20 a 0.8 as soon as it was light enough to see it, this 
therefore being “denied to the enemy” before it then accompanied the infantry down the road 
in A20 central “to deal with targets as they occur.” Thirty-two machine guns of 18th Battalion 
MGC would be “employed on indirect fire to enfilade the streets of Preux-au-Bois”.791  
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Four tanks from 14
th
 Tank Battalion were attached to 54 Brigade to assist in the mopping up 
of Preux-au-Bois, one each to the 6
th
 Northants and 11
th
 Royal Fusiliers, two to the 2
nd
 
Bedfords. “Tanks will accompany the Infantry, but will not precede them”.792 
 
The thrust made by 6
th
 Northants (Lieutenant-Colonel R. Turner) was to prove relatively 
costly: they were at their forming up positions two hours before zero. At 0615 “ „D‟ Coy 
attacked due EAST with Royal West Kents on left and no-one on right”.793 This meant that 
the right flank of the company was enfiladed “quite hotly”794 by German machine gun fire. 
Nevertheless, with „A‟ Company following 100 yards behind, „D‟ Company made it to a 
north-south line running through A14 b 8.0 by 0730, an advance of 1500 yards. „A‟ Company 
leapfrogged them and then swung to the south, arriving on an east-west line just inside the 
eastern fringes of the forest by 0815. „C‟ Company then appeared in worm formation, “two 
lines of platoons”,795  and they arrived at “the point of the wood at A15 a 4.0”796 and then 
worked their way down the edge of the forest in a south-easterly direction until they reached 
the stream. Their job was done: their only subsequent encounter with the enemy was to beat 
off a one-company-strength counter-attack at around 0915. Although it is not mentioned in 
the Battalion War Diary, it seems that one tank, ditched at A15 a 7.5 was able to help break 
up this counter-attack. This was tank 9267, commanded by Lieutenant D.J. Gillies. He had 
advanced through the southern part of Hecq with the 10
th
 Essex before turning south into 
Preux-au-Bois. There he had attempted to deal with a number of German machine gun 
positions by firing his 6-pounder gun. This and four of his Hotchkiss machine guns were 
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subsequently damaged, so he withdrew to effect repairs before returning to finish the job. He 
then steered to the apex of the forest, before following its south-western edge, seemingly in 
conjunction with „C‟ Company of 6th Northants, as his intervention, prior to ditching, 
“enabled the infantry to continue their advance”.797 In attempting to unditch his machine, the 
left track broke.
798
 The day‟s action cost the 6th Northants 3 officers wounded, 20 other ranks 
killed, with 96 wounded and one missing. 
 
The men of the 2
nd
 Bedfords (Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Percival) moved off from their 
assembly positions at 0650 “in rear of the 6th Northamptonshire Regt, who made an excellent 
and spirited attack and cleared the whole area over which the Battalion had to advance”.799 
 
The front-line companies, „A‟ Company on the left and „C‟ Company on the right, lined up to 
the north of the stream in square A14 d and waited for the barrage to begin. “A very heavy 
enfilade barrage, with 4.5” howitzers beyond, came down on the brook”800 at 0807 and 
commenced its forward creep four minutes later. „C‟ Company (Capt[ain] R.L.V. Doake 
MC), closely followed by „D‟ Company (Second-Lieutenant W. Pennington) encountered 
opposition from enemy posts in the orchards, but was able to overcome them, “many small, 
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local attacks and enveloping movements being organised on the spur of the moment and 
successfully carried out”.801 
 
„C‟ Company made it to its objective in square A20 b. just after the scheduled time, allowed 
„D‟ Company to leapfrog them and then supported their comrades‟ advance through the 
village as far as the church, where they were able to get in touch with the 2
nd
 Munsters 
arriving from the south. Lieutenant-Colonel Percival, writing the after-battle narrative, puts 
the success of the right wing of the attack down to “the splendid leading of the Officers”, 
singling out Captain Doake, Second-Lieutenant Vaughan and Second-Lieutenant Ashton of 
„C‟ Company, and Second-Lieutenants Pennington and Whittingham of „D‟ Company.802 
 
Doake also merits a mention in Nichols‟ 18th Division history: 
He was creeping through the orchards towards the village, his batman with him, when 
through a hedge not twenty yards away he saw four Germans and a machine gun. 
Captain Doake and his batman opened fire so rapidly and with such accuracy that it 
required only four rounds to bring all four Boche down. Doake got his DSO in this 
battle.
803
 
 
 
On the left of the attack, „A‟ Company (Lieutenant A.F. Aldridge) was held up almost as 
soon as it had started forward by machine gun fire from the road junction at A15 c 0.5 where 
the Germans had laid a tree trunk across the road. They were quickly in danger of losing the 
barrage. A tank (probably the one commanded by Second-Lieutenant H.K. Blaker) made 
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attempts to deal with this strongpoint, but was unable to put it out of action. Lieutenant W.J. 
Holbrook MC was able to lead the two right platoons of „A‟ Company in a flanking 
manoeuvre to the west of the strongpoint and “after a spirited struggle”804 cleared the enemy 
from the cemetery. This enabled the two right platoons of „B‟ Company (Second-Lieutenant 
H.B. Lang) to “move forward and clear the main street as far as the road junction at A21 c 
3.8”.805 An isolated machine gun nest about 250 yards to the north-east of this position was 
also mopped up by a party led by Second-Lieutenant Lang. 
 
Meanwhile, the two left platoons of „A‟ and „B‟ Companies (Lieutenant A.E. Aldridge and 
Second-Lieutenant S. Goble respectively) had outflanked the original troublesome German 
strongpoint to its eastern side and began to clear the houses and cellars along the lane running 
north-west to south-east in square A15 c. By this time, the Germans in the strongpoint, 
having been outflanked on both sides and now being attacked in the rear, gave in. It was 
discovered that the stubborn machine gun crew had been firing through two well-
camouflaged holes in the wall of a house. 
 
The aforementioned failure of the tank to deal with German strongpoint is the only point at 
which tanks feature at all in the 2
nd
 Bedfords‟ own narrative. Their involvement deserves 
more detailed treatment, however, their contribution being described as “awe-inspiring” by 
Nichols.
806
 Indeed, the 14
th
 Tank Battalion‟s account of the action begins: “The infantry they 
[the tanks] were working with were weak in numbers and the capture of PREUX must be 
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largely ascribed to the tanks”.807 The three tanks in question were commanded by Second-
Lieutenant H.K. Blaker, Second-Lieutenant J.T. Borrow and Second-Lieutenant H.I. 
Isaacs.
808
 
 
Isaacs‟ tank, on the right of the attack, managed to overcome a handful of machine gun posts 
before becoming ditched at A20 a 8.7. A temporary withdrawal of the accompanying infantry 
meant that the machine was almost surrounded by German soldiers, prompting the crew to 
make a fighting withdrawal of their own, abandoning the tank. “They returned to the tank 
immediately the Infantry again came on, but were unsuccessful in their attempts to unditch. 
No blame can be ascribed for the ditching, as the ground was extremely treacherous and its 
marshy character was not apparent”.809 The storyline inspires little in the way of awe so far... 
 
Blaker and Borrow, it is true, fared rather better: 
2
nd
 Lieut. H.K. Blaker‟s tank advanced in front of the infantry, who were digging 
in,
810
 and after hard fighting to which the condition of the tank testifies, 2
nd
 Lieut. 
H.K. Blaker broke down the opposition, went back and brought the infantry on. He 
continued clearing the east side of PREUX, and completed his task. His resource and 
determination in the action called for special mention.
811
 
 
 
 
Second-Lieutenant Borrow‟s tank became “separated from the infantry in the mist”,812 and 
his position became critical for a while. He was “surrounded by the enemy. Three of his 
M.G.‟s were out of action and his 6-pdr gun was badly jammed through enemy fire. He 
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fought the tank with revolvers, as the enemy pushed up his remaining M.G.‟s and even 
climbed on the top of the tank to bomb him”.813 Borrow and his crew emerged victorious in 
this squabble and were able to continue, completing his task of clearing the west side of 
Preux-au-Bois village. It would appear that both the infantry and the tanks tended to 
underestimate the contributions of their sister arm. 
 
The 2
nd
 Bedfords‟ action on 4 November cost them one officer killed814 and three wounded. 
Twelve other ranks were killed, along with 33 wounded and three missing. They had 
liberated some 1400 French civilians in Preux-au-Bois. 
 
The 11
th
 Royal Fusiliers, (Lieutenant-Colonel K.D.H. Gwynn), on the right of the brigade 
frontage, attacked with a composite company, commanded by Captain P. Hope, and formed 
from their original „C‟ and „D‟ Companies. They formed up in the sunken road in square A13 
d two hours before Zero and then moved to their jumping off positions at Zero plus thirty 
minutes, platoons in extended order, facing south, almost along the east-west line separating 
squares A14 a and A14 c. The artillery barrage opened at Zero plus 113. “rather wide of the 
mark and we suffered a few casualties”.815 They moved off, accompanied by Second-
Lieutenant Isaac‟s tank five minutes later. The tank broke down two hedges for the advancing 
infantry, but, once across the stream, it veered off to the left and broke down. “Beyond 
engaging the enemy with the 6-pdr gun it was of no further use to us”.816  
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The infantry now found it difficult to negotiate the many hedges in their way, but battled on, 
encountering little in the way of enemy artillery fire. Machine gun fire from strongpoints 
along the road in A20 a halted their progress, casualties began to mount and “the position 
became serious”.817 One platoon had already been sent to the crossroads at A20 a 0.9 with 
orders to outflank the machine guns, but they were making little progress. It fell to Private D. 
Sale to rescue the situation: He “pushed straight forward, regardless of all danger, with his 
Lewis Gun and knocked out the enemy MG at A20 a 2.8”.818 He was immediately followed 
by his colleagues who promptly captured thirty prisoners. The momentum was now with 
them, despite their numbers having been reduced to twenty effectives, and they pressed on 
down the main road, through orchards on its left hand side, collecting prisoners from the 
houses as they went, that number rising to over 100, including five officers. They finally 
halted, with posts at A26 a 6.7, where they established touch with the Inniskillings,
819
 and at 
A20 c 8.3. 
 
By midday, Preux-au-Bois was cleared of the enemy. Captain Hope was awarded the DSO. 
The 11
th
 Royal Fusiliers‟ War Diary does not detail casualties for that day, but the 54th 
Brigade HQ estimated them at one officer and 29 other ranks. Fatalities for the action can be 
confirmed at six other ranks.
820
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The 54
th
 Brigade had attacked with a total strength of just over one thousand men, that is, 
equal to one full-strength battalion, but managed to take an enemy-held village, capturing 
around 770 prisoners, six trench mortars, three anti-tank rifles, one field gun and seventy 
machine guns. It had cost them 202 casualties,
821
 including 39 fatalities: 
            Officers                 Other Ranks 
     K W M  K W M 
11
th
 Royal Fusiliers  - 1 -  6 23 - 
2
nd
 Bedfords   1 3 -  12 33 3 
6
th
 Northants   - 3 -  20 96 1 
   Total  1 7 -  38 152 4 
 
The advance to the Green Line, the day‟s final objective, on a front narrowing to around 1500 
yards, was down to 55 Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel A.P.B. Irwin).
822
 The original timing had 
assumed an advance from the Red Line at 1131. Delays meant, however, that battalions were 
not able to move off from their assembly positions near Petit Planty until after 1230. 
 
The plan of advance was to see the 7
th
 Queen‟s (Royal West Surrey Regiment), (Major H.J. 
Tortise) on the left and 7
th
 Buffs (East Kent Regiment), (Major W.H. Stronge) on the right, 
moving forward through the forest. The 55
th
 Brigade HQ diarist likened it to a pheasant 
shoot: “[a] bold approach covered by powerful rifle, Lewis Gun and Machine Gun fire was to 
be made along the roads and rides running in an E.N.E. direction through the forest, whilst 
specially detailed parties “beat” the successive rectangular patches of wood”.823 
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These battalions would establish themselves along a line 1200 yards short of the Green Line, 
whereupon the 8
th
 East Surrey Regiment (Major W.H. Baddeley) would leapfrog onto the 
final objective. 
 
The 7
th
 Queen‟s,824 with „D‟ and „B‟ Companies in front, left and right respectively, were 
moving up to their jumping off positions on the Red Line when they came under hostile 
machine gun fire unexpectedly at A16 c 9.7. They had assumed that this ground had already 
been swept by the 8
th
 Berkshires, but these had veered to the left during their advance, 
leaving a narrow section of enemy line unchallenged. No.5 Platoon, „B‟ Company, was sent 
forward to deal with the enemy posts and “all these hostile guns were knocked out by this 
platoon‟s fire”.825 The units were now able to re-organise along the Route Duhamel (in A16 
b), capturing a field gun as they did so, before moving forward once more “on each side of 
the track in sectional rushes, sections giving covering fire as far as crossroads at A17 a 7.8. 
During the advance [„B‟] Company captured a complete battery of field guns, at least two 
machine guns and their teams being knocked out, as well as various transport wagons, etc. A 
German runner on a bicycle was also shot here”.826 
 
On arriving at their original jumping off positions on the Red Line, the two forward 
companies swapped sectors, „B‟ Company now being on the left, „D‟ on the right. „A‟ and 
„C‟ Companies were in support. They attacked “in one wave”,827 „D‟ Company going 
forward with the Route de Preux as their right hand boundary, and reached their objectives 
without encountering any serious opposition. They were then given permission to move 
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forward again, but they finished some 500 yards short of the Green Line, deciding to dig in as 
darkness began to fall along a line stretching through squares B7 b & d. 
 
The 7
th
 Buffs were finally let off the leash at 1250, with orders to “start moving forward 
gradually, and at 1330 hours to rush on at once with all speed”.828 They had reached their 
jumping off positions without incident by 1540. The Battalion‟s “Report on Operations 4th-6th 
November 1918” sums up the rest of their day: 
After the first stubborn resistance offered in the morning, the enemy had retired 
hurriedly through the FORET DE MORMAL and put up no fight in face of our 
advance. The battalion reached its objectives [ ... ] without opposition at 17.15.
829
 
 
The 8
th
 East Surreys received information at around 1400 that the 7
th
 Buffs and 7
th
 Queen‟s 
were advancing to their objectives against very little resistance and so proceeded in columns 
through Preux-au-Bois and thence along the Route de Preux as far as Mon Fre de la Cabine 
(B7 d 4.4). By 1800, „A‟ and „B‟ Companies were establishing themselves on the Green Line, 
capturing four enemy field guns along the Chemin de Raucourt as they did so. Only „C‟ 
Company on the right met with any opposition, machine gun fire from their right from the 
Carrefour de l‟Ermitage holding them up but briefly. 
 
At 0230, 5 November, the positions of „D‟ Company were counter-attacked by a “strong 
enemy patrol”,830 but rifle and Lewis Gun fire saw the enemy retreat after sustaining a 
number of casualties. The troops of 55
th
 Brigade were destined not to have a peaceful night: 
“A few enemy aeroplanes came over in the early night and dropped bombs in the area 
occupied by the Brigade. These, however, inflicted no casualties on us”.831 
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The 55 Brigade accounts are littered with phrases such as “slight opposition”. Their advance 
was made against a retreating and demoralised enemy whose resolve had vanished once the 
village of Preux-au-Bois had fallen. The Battalion War Diaries do not bother to list casualty 
figures for 4 November 1918. The fatalities can be confirmed, however: the 8
th
 East Surreys 
suffered none; the 7
th
 Buffs incurred three, and the 7
th
 Queen‟s two, including one officer.832 
 
 Nichols sums up the 18
th
 Division‟s passage through the Forêt de Mormal: 
As has been shown, much of the progress through the great Forest, „this formidable 
obstacle,‟ as Lord Haig called it in his Victory Despatch, had been swift and 
apparently fairly easy, thanks to the growing demoralisation of the enemy. Yet it has 
also been made clear that in the early part of the advance the fighting was stiff and the 
enemy resolute.
833
 
 
 
50
th
 Division
834
 
 
After the Battle of the Aisne, 27-30 May 1918, the 50
th
 Division had been reduced to 700 
effectives. A month later it was reduced, this time by orders, to cadre strength and on 15 July 
it was decided that the three brigades would be re-constituted. In the end, however, not one of 
the original battalions remained, the only trace of the men from the old division being found 
in the Sappers and Field Ambulance.
835
 A considerable number of the new men had been 
withdrawn from Salonika and a significant proportion of them were suffering from malaria. 
Their continuing medical treatment only allowed for four hours training per day. This routine 
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continued for several weeks and after joining Fourth Army the „new‟ division saw its first 
action at the Battle of Beaurevoir, 3-5 October, commanded by Major-General H.C. Jackson. 
Prior to assembly for the Battle of the Sambre, the 50
th
 Division units had only spent fourteen 
days in the line together.
836
 
 
50
th
 Division Instruction No.1 was issued on 2 November 1918. The first objective, the Red 
Line, was to be captured by 150 Brigade on the left and 149 Brigade on the right. The latter 
would make “every endeavour”837 to push on to the spur in squares G 12 d and H 7 c838 and 
thus be in a position overlooking the town of Landrecies, 25
th
 Division‟s target, and be able 
to “enfilade the Canal from both directions”.839 
 
The advance to the Red Line would be supported by ten tanks of 9
th
 Tank Battalion, four 
allocated to 150 Brigade and six to 149 Brigade. The tanks would move off at 0545, half an 
hour before the infantry, their job being to “advance in touch with the infantry [ ... ] to W. 
Edge of FORET DE MORMAL, with the object of overcoming Machine Gun resistance and 
making tracks through the hedges for the infantry”.840  
 
At Zero plus 300 minutes, 151 Brigade would continue the advance from the Red Line. 
 
The assault was to be supported by six brigades of artillery: the creeping barrage would begin 
at Zero, resting on the start line for four minutes before advancing at a rate of 100 yards every 
six minutes. The 250
th
 Brigade RFA would be attached to 151 Brigade in order to support its 
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advance to the Green Line. The 4.5” howitzers would bombard the Landrecies-Englefontaine 
road, the Ruisseau de l‟Hirondelle and the western edge of the forest and would then keep 
200 yards ahead of the 18-pounder barrage. The 60-pounders were to enfilade the roads 
running east-north-east through the forest whilst the 6” howitzers concentrated on important 
crossroads.
841
 To the south of Preux-au-Bois, an enfilade barrage, including smoke shells, 
would protect the left flank of 150 Brigade for the first two hours of the attack, whence it 
would begin its creep northwards in conjunction with the 2
nd
 Munsters‟ attack. 
 
On the morning of the attack, all units were reported to be in their assembly positions by 
0545. 150 Brigade on the left, had been able to confirm all their troops in position at 0351, 
but also that one tank had already “ditched itself on the way up”.842 
 
By 0615, zero hour, the tanks had already been on the move for half an hour. One of them 
was hit by an enemy gas shell whilst still behind the infantry start line, its entire crew hors de 
combat. The Section Commander gathered together a scratch crew from members of the 2
nd
 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers and was able to move off again at 0750, catching up with the infantry 
an hour later. “In spite of the fact that the crew of the tank (with the exception of the Tank 
Commander and 1 other rank) was entirely new to tank work, it was able to do excellent work 
and was responsible for the destruction of a great many m.g.‟s”.843 
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The 150 Brigade diarist begins with a weather report, announcing a misty but dry start to the 
day. This “prevented observation and greatly added to the difficulties of the attack”.844 
 
On the left Brigade front were the 2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers, “prepared to take on a special 
task previously allocated to them”.845 They were to mop up an area to the south of Preux-au-
Bois and east of Robersart and then turn north to meet the troops of 18
th
 Division coming in 
the opposite direction through Preux. 
 
The battalion had moved to Fontaine-au-Bois at 0130 that morning, only to be heavily 
shelled, suffering three casualties in „A‟ Company. „B‟ Company advanced at zero, ten 
minutes behind the left wing of the 2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers and began their mopping up 
operation in what turned out to be a rather thickly-wooded sector of the forest, a task they 
accomplished by 1300. 
 
Meanwhile, at Zero plus 120, „A‟ Company (Captain Livingston) with „C‟ Company on its 
left, met up with the three tanks that had made it across the start line and set off toward 
Preux-au-Bois, “mopping up the open country to the west of the forest”.846 The area had been 
subject to heavy shelling, but one or two enemy strongpoints still held out and needed to be 
neutralised. “During this minor operation great confusion was caused in the enemy ranks who 
broke and fled in a North-westerly direction, at least 120 prisoners being taken in the vicinity 
of Preux”.847 Their advance northwards continued and “Capt Livingston met an officer of the 
2/Bedfords close to the village of PREUX at 13.15 soon after the meeting of the two Barrages 
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which had been advancing towards each other. At 14.30 Capt Livingston reported his task 
accomplished and all the enemy mopped up and liaison posts established. Part of „C‟ 
Company lost their way in the mist in the morning and didn‟t join up till next day”.848 The 
battalion was able to spend the night bivouacked in the western sector of the forest. 
Casualties for the day were one Officer
849
 and eight other ranks killed, two officers and 59 
other ranks wounded. 
 
To the 2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers (Major A.W. Muir)
850
 fell the responsibility of gaining 
the Red Line objective on the left Brigade front. They paraded at 0100 on the morning of the 
attack and advanced to their assembly area in squares G 2 a and c., completing the move by 
0345. They moved off at 0615, „C‟ and „D‟ Companies in front, (Lieutenant Snailham and 
Captain Price), with „B‟ Company (Lieutenant W.H. Barrass) in support and „A‟ Company 
(Lieutenant Redwood) in reserve, preceded by their tank,
851
 behind a barrage that “proved 
very effective”.852 The German counter barrage, “although very heavy, was wild and 
scattered and did very little damage”.853 By 1000, with the help of the tank, they had reached 
the western outskirts of the forest. Twenty minutes later 150 Brigade HQ received a report to 
that effect, the main body of the battalion being on the Hirondelle River, with detachments 
already advancing into the forest.
854
 The advance was steady thereafter, the intermediate 
objective being reached by 1200, with “no part of the attack being held up”,855 and the final 
line reached by 1530. A number of enemy machine guns had been captured, along with 150 
                                                 
848
 TNA:PRO WO95/2837 War Diary 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers. 
849
 Second-Lieutenant William Stone, commanding „A‟ Company, having died of his wounds, is buried in Le 
Cateau Military Cemetery, grave II B 2. 
850
 Former commander of „C‟ Company, promoted to Major on 23 October 1918. See H.R. Sandilands, The 
Fifth in the Great War. A History of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Battalions, Northumberland Fusiliers, 1914-1918 (Dover: 
Grigg & Sons, 1938) p.293 
851
 Sandilands, The Fifth, p.293 
852
 TNA:PRO WO95/2836 War Diary 2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers. 
853
 Ibid. 
854
 TNA:PRO WO95/2833 War Diary 150 Brigade HQ. 
855
 TNA:PRO WO95/2836 War Diary 2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers. 
264 
 
prisoners. „D‟ Company had gained the additional prize of a field gun. Casualties amounted 
to three officers wounded, Lieutenants Barrass, Snailham and Mouat,
856
with 85 other ranks 
killed or wounded. The day‟s fatalities can be confirmed at twenty-three, including nine 
NCOs. 
 
On the right of the brigade frontage were the 7
th
 Wiltshires (Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. 
Hodgson), „D‟ and „C‟ Companies in front, left and right, „A‟ in support 150 yards behind 
and „B‟ in reserve a further 300 yards back. The move to the edge of the forest was made in 
artillery formation, with the creeping barrage scheduled to reach there at Zero plus 82 on the 
right and Zero plus 75 on the left. From there, there would be no creeping barrage as such, 
due to the density of the trees in that area, and artillery would confine itself to enfilading the 
roads and tracks 500 yards ahead of the troops. The men themselves would move in file down 
the sides of the roads with an “advanced guard thrown out in front”.857 The final push to the 
Red Line was across a cleared area, so the creeping barrage was able to resume there from 
Zero plus 172. Each front company would have its own tank: „D‟ Company had a female tank 
(I.36) and „C‟ Company a male (T.39).858 They were to precede the infantry but were strictly 
forbidden from going any further than the edge of the forest. Infantry could communicate 
with the tanks in two ways: “if a tank is required for a special task a smoke bomb will be 
lighted by the infantry requiring assistance and fired in the direction in which the tank is 
required to go”.859 Should more detailed information need to be imparted to a tank 
commander, “messages can be handed in through a trap door in rear of the tank”.860 
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It appears that the attack went largely to plan, the only real stubborn resistance being 
encountered early on at the Landrecies-Englefontaine road. In the end, the line gained and 
consolidated at around 1145 was just yards short of the Red Line, although they had outposts 
thrown out ahead directly on the objective. Casualties had totalled five officers and 67 other 
ranks. Twenty-six prisoners and twenty machine guns had been captured. Fatalities for the 
day were one other rank.
861
 
 
150 Brigade total casualties for the engagement can be calculated as follows:  
            Officers       Other Ranks 
     K W M  K W M 
2
nd 
Royal Munster Fusiliers 1 2 -  8  59 - 
2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers - 3 -  23 62 - 
7
th
 Wiltshires   - 5 -  1 67 - 
   Total  1 10 -  32 188 - 
 
 
 
149 Brigade (Brigadier-General P.M. Robinson) were responsible for the right wing of the 
division front. They attacked with 13
th
 Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)
862
 on the left, 3
rd
 
Royal Fusiliers on the right, and 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers in support. The Red Line was the 
goal of the front two battalions, the Dublin Fusiliers having been given a special task. 
Conditional on their sister battalions‟ success, they were to advance and take the spur of land 
in squares H 13 a and H 7 c. This would effectively outflank the town of Landrecies to the 
north and enable the Sambre Canal to be enfiladed both to the north and the south, which may 
have proved useful to the 25
th
 Division, who were assaulting the town itself and needed to 
force a crossing of the canal in doing so. 
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The 13
th
 Black Watch (Lieutenant-Colonel P.J. Blair), on the left, already had „C‟ Company 
holding the line on the night of 3-4 November. „A‟, „B‟ and „D‟ Companies moved up during 
the hours of darkness into previously prepared trenches to the rear of their comrades. Just 
before zero, „C‟ Company withdrew to their support position behind „B‟ and „A‟ Companies, 
(front line, left and right respectively), „D‟ Company being in reserve. Each company would 
advance on a frontage of 150 yards, each on a one-platoon front, this widening to two 
platoons as the attack progressed. „C‟ Company would remain 200 yards in the rear, in 
Diamond Artillery formation. Even before they moved off at zero, they were subject to heavy 
shelling. The 149 Brigade diarist attributes this to the 0545 start of IX Corps on their right 
and the German artillery response to this: “Enemy‟s reply was heavy on our forming up line 
and casualties were sustained especially by the reserve battalion”.863 
 
Moving off at 0615, the Black Watch‟s initial progress was slow, hampered by the mist, the 
enemy barrage and heavy machine gun fire. Their left company reached „Drill Ground 
Corner‟864 at around 0945, and it was about then that the German resistance “which was 
entirely MG apart from the artillery fire”,865 slackened and the mist lifted. The “operation 
became much easier”866 and with the tanks “g[iving] great assistance”,867 the Red Line was 
reached about noon.  
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Casualties were documented as follows: one officer killed,
868
 with two wounded. Twenty-
eight other ranks killed and ninety-nine wounded. Other ranks fatalities can be confirmed at 
35 for the day‟s fighting. The battalion was able to billet at Hachette Farm in the forest that 
night, only just behind the Green Line objective, but due to the bad state of the roads and the 
volume of traffic on them, it was very difficult to get rations up to them. They eventually 
arrived by pack animal. 
 
On the brigade right were the 3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel M.O. Clarke), formed 
up with No.4 Company (Lieutenant D.S. Corlett) and No.1 Company (Captain R.M. Large) 
in front, left and right, No.3 Company (Lieutenant R.E. Pudney) in support and No.2 
Company (Lieutenant B.W. Tanner) in reserve. They had three tanks of „A‟ Company, 9th 
Tank Battalion, four hundred yards behind them, Tanks Nos. 13, 14 and 18. “Their objective 
[was] the line of trees in G 11 b and G 12 a & d and thence working southwards to the canal 
bank to establish posts in H 7 c”.869 
 
No. 1 Company was reported in position by 0525 on 4 November, but they became victims of 
the German barrage before they had a chance to move: “Captain MURRAY LARGE870 
reported killed by shell fire, and half of No. 1 Platoon casualties on tape line”.871 When our 
                                                 
868
 Second-Lieutenant James Robertson Gibb (6
th
 Battalion Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, attached 13
th
 
Black Watch), is buried in Cross Roads Cemetery, Fontaine-au-Bois, grave I A 10. 
869
 TNA:PRO WO95/2831 War Diary 3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers. 
870
 Lieutenant / Acting Captain Ronald Murray Large, age 21, (7
th
 Royal Fusiliers, attached 3
rd
 Battalion) is 
buried in Cross Roads Cemetery, Fontaine-au-Bois, grave I B 18. 
871
 TNA:PRO WO95/2831 War Diary 3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers. 
268 
 
own barrage did come down at 0615, it “caused a thick fog, preventing one from seeing more 
than 20 or 30 yards”.872 
 
All communication was cut at the moment of zero hour, “all lines being down”,873 and the 
only information getting back to Battalion Headquarters was going to be by runner, it 
seemed. Two officers, Lieutenant Balding and Second-Lieutenant Bean were despatched at 
0815 to get in touch with the advancing troops, but it was Private Town who arrived back at 
headquarters with nine prisoners at 0830 who was able to shed the first light on the rate of 
progress. He was able to confirm that the “Tanks were [ ... ] doing good work” and that 
“troops were about 500 yards across the road in G9 a central. [ ... ] Casualties were reported 
not very heavy after moving off and hostile artillery fire light, [ ... ] our men had not reached 
G 9 d by 0800”.874 
 
Bean and Balding had run into shell fire around 0930 and had been forced to “scatter”, 
according to Balding‟s servant. Balding returned, a shrapnel wound in his stomach, at 1000. 
Bean managed to get a message back at 1045 to the effect that “‟B‟ Company of the R. Fus 
were held up in square G10 a and were being reinforced by „C‟ Company”.875 A telephone 
message to Battalion Headquarters from the Brigade Major, timed at 1150, was cause for 
optimism: “The Bosche are on the run and Units are to push on”.876 
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This series of messages and the ones that follow illustrate the communication difficulties 
typically encountered once an advance had begun, and the impossibility of reacting 
appropriately and in time: ten minutes after the Brigade Major‟s telephone call, a message 
from Second-Lieutenant Savours, now commanding No.1 Company, timed at 1120, arrived at 
Battalion Headquarters reporting “objectives gained and consolidation being carried out on 
RED LINE. In touch with No.4 Company on left”.877 Also at noon, a message timed at 1130 
from Lieutenant Tanner, (No.2 Company), reported the arrival on the Red Line of his 
company, along with No.3 and No.1 on left and right respectively. 
 
The confusion was then compounded: “Later a message was received from OC No.3 
Company (Lieut[enant] Pudney) timed at 1345 hours stated „The battalion reached its 
objectives at 1010 hours – we are consolidating – in touch with SCOTTISH HORSE on our 
left and the WARWICKS on our right – we have captured a battery of Field Artillery 
complete with horses and limbers.‟ The message was not understood owing to the difference 
in timing (1 hr 20 minutes) with the other companies”.878 
 
Whatever the true sequence of events, the end result seems clear: the Red Line was reached 
and consolidated by midday. An after-battle report compiled by Company Commanders did 
eventually agree on 1130 as the time of arrival on the Red Line. No.2 Company was later sent 
forward to occupy the line of trees in G 12 a. No.3 Company later came up to support them, 
installing themselves on the high ground in G 12 c. 
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The tanks, it seemed, had played an important role in the initial phase of the action: 
In this portion of the front [ ... ], the enemy appears to have had a very complete 
system of m.g. defence, and the infantry ascribed their success in overcoming these 
and being able to continue the advance, largely to the co-operation of Tanks. The 
value of the training carried out with the infantry before the battle was many times 
demonstrated, the position of many machine guns being indicated to the tanks by the 
infantry”. Co-operation had mutual benefits: “On one occasion a Tank was warned of 
an anti-Tank gun by an officer.
879
 
 
This battalion also had difficulties getting rations up to the men: 
Hot soup was taken up to the Battalion on pack mules at 1900 hours and rations which 
had been delayed owing to the late arrival of the Supply Train, were taken up on 
limbers at about 0100 hours, together with water. Owing to the bad state of the roads 
and blocks caused by Artillery which was moving up, each journey took about 6 or 7 
hours.
880
 
 
Casualties were estimated at the time to be one officer and seven other ranks killed, three 
officers and 102 other ranks wounded, with seven other ranks missing. Fatalities can be 
confirmed at one officer and twenty other ranks. 
 
The 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Trasenster), in Brigade reserve, 
moved forward to Fontaine-au-Bois at Zero hour, some 800 yards behind the attacking 
battalions. “The Battalion almost immediately came under a heavy barrage and suffered 
heavy casualties”.881 They moved off “immediately after zero hour to avoid the heavy 
shelling”.882 At 1500,883 they received orders to take the spur in squares H7 c and H13 a and 
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d. It was taken by „D‟ Company under Captain J.N. Barry and about ten men from „C‟ 
Company under Second-Lieutenant S.A. Morris. In doing so, they also captured “a battery of 
enemy field guns attempting to come into action near the canal bank”.884 The horses and 
drivers were shot and the Battery Commander captured. The diary of 149 Brigade asserts 
however that the spur was taken “without opposition”.885 
 
Casualties were estimated to be one officer killed,
886
 along with ten other ranks; three officers 
and around 100 other ranks were wounded, with three other ranks reported missing. Fatalities 
for the day can be finalised at one officer and thirteen other ranks. 
Brigade casualties can be estimated at: 
             Officers       Other Ranks 
     K W M  K W M 
13
th
 Black Watch  1 2 -  35 92 - 
3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers  1 3 -  20 90 7 
2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers 1 3 -  13 100 3 
 
  Total:   3 8 -  68 282 10 
 
 
The reasons for the success of the Brigade‟s recent attacks were summed up by the diarist of 
13
th
 Black Watch: 
On all occasions the tactics of our troops, which proved successful, were mutual 
support between sections, platoons and companies, with covering rifle and L.G.
887
 fire 
and a gradual working forward by sections and platoons here and there, wherever the 
opportunity offered. The value of well-trained scouts was emphasised on all 
occasions. The necessity for full-sized tools was always brought out – the Entrenching 
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Implement was found to be of little value. Air photographs were most useful. An 
understanding of the situation by NCOs and men and their capacity to use their own 
initiative was at times an outstanding feature. On all occasions the consciousness of 
their superiority over the enemy was a great factor towards success.
888
 
 
 
The capture of the day‟s final objective, the Green Line, on 50th Division front, was down to 
151 Brigade (Brigadier-General R.E. Sugden). Of the three brigades in 50
th
 Division, this one 
was nearest to being at full strength. Figures for 2 November 1918 were as follows: 
 
       Officers  Other Ranks 
6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers  20     718 
1
st
 King‟s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 24     943 
4
th
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps   31     617 
     Total:  75   2278 
 
The original orders, issued 1 November, were for an advance on a two battalion front, with 1
st
 
K.O.Y.L.I. on the left and 4
th
 K.R.R.C. on the right. One company of the 6
th
 Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, “to which a specific task is allocated”,889 was to be under command of 
the 4
th 
K.R.R.C. , the rest of this battalion being in reserve. This was to change as the 
situation developed. 
 
The 1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I. (Lieutenant-Colonel H.Mallinson) was to assemble near Drill Hall Corner 
at Zero plus 120 and then form up for the attack at Zero plus four and a half hours on the Red 
Line astride the Route de Fontaine, with its right-hand company on the Laie du Mont Carmel. 
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The 4
th
 K.R.R.C. (Major G.A. Tryon MC)
890
 followed a similar route and timetable before 
deploying to the right of 1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I. astride the track running north-east from the rifle 
range through square B25 central.
891
 
 
The 6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel G.G.F.F. Greville), less one 
company, were to form up 500 yards behind 1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I., astride the Route de Landrecies. 
The detached company, („D‟ Company), would move to the extreme right of the brigade front 
and advance along the railway line running parallel to and to the north of the River Sambre, 
establishing a series of posts as it went, these being supported by machine guns, their purpose 
being to “assist the RE in throwing bridges over the Sambre at these points if the situation 
demands”.892 
 
There would, of course, be no proper 18-pounder creeping barrage to support this stage of the 
attack: 60-pounders would “barrage all routes in the FORET DE MORMAL in enfilade” and 
6” Howitzers “will bombard cross roads and other selected targets”.893 250 Brigade RFA 
under Lieutenant-Colonel F.G.D. Johnston DSO would be rushed forward to support 151 
Brigade, with officers meeting at Drill Ground Corner to liaise at Zero plus three hours. Two 
18-pounder guns each would be allotted to 1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I. and 4
th
 K.R.R.C. “to be used by the 
Battalion Commander as he may direct”.894 
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Orders for the advance were issued at 1115 on 4 November, and the two lead battalions 
crossed the Red Line at about 1330. “The advance progressed well, the resistance offered by 
hostile Machine Gunners being effectively overcome by rifle and lewis gun fire”.895 The 1st 
K.O.Y.L.I. diarist describes the action in the briefest of terms: 
 
The Bn moved by the ROUTE DE FONTAINE through the forest, meeting a 
considerable amount of opposition from enemy machine gun [illegible]. The Enemy 
retired in front of the Bn until dark”.896 They dug in just short of the Green Line and, 
having veered slightly to the north, were partly outside the northern divisional 
boundary. The attack had cost them nine fatalities, including one officer.
897
 
 
 
The 4
th
 K.R.R.C. went forward astride the Route de Landrecies, „B‟ Company (Captain G.K. 
Wells) as the advanced guard, „A‟ Company (Captain Buller) as right flank guard, with „C‟ 
and „D‟ Companies (Captain Truter and Second-Lieutenant Methven) forming the main body. 
HQ Company (Lieutenant Burgoyne) brought up the rear. 
 
First contact with the enemy was made at A 29 c 4.4 as they ran into machine gun and rifle 
fire. “A number of casualties were incurred in dislodging the enemy from the position. 
Considerable assistance was received here from an armoured car moving along the Route de 
Landrecies”.898  
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The artillery was also able to play a vital supporting role: 
 
The 18-pdrs working with the Battalion were of great assistance where any organised 
resistance was met with; one instance of their value is worthy of special mention here. 
The 4
th
 K.R.R.C. were being held up on their whole front by nests of hostile machine 
guns in A 29 b.; at the time the 18-pdrs supporting this Battalion were at G4 b 6.8. On 
receipt of instructions from O.C. 4
th
 K.R.R.C., Lt. Garry got his guns into action with 
marked rapidity and shelled the above area with some 60 rounds after which the 
advance was resumed and continued almost uninterruptedly.
899
 
 
The 4
th
 K.R.R.C. diarist continues the story: 
 
From this point onwards more or less continuous touch was maintained with the 
enemy who appeared to be fighting a rear guard action with Cavalry Machine 
Gunners. The ground afforded ample cover for this procedure & made a rapid 
advance difficult. It was not until 15.45 that our advanced guard reached the E. Edge 
of the wood in B19 b. On debouching from the wood it was found that the enemy was 
making a determined stand on the high ground in B14 c, the Advanced Guard coming 
under heavy MG fire. It was found impossible to get forward under the fire so „D‟ 
Company were ordered to work round on our right flank, through the wood in B20 a 
and to dislodge the enemy by working up the ridge on his flank. This manoeuvre was 
entirely successful and the crest of the ridge was captured just as dusk was falling at 
about 1700 hours.
900
 
 
The battalion was then ordered to move to the right before consolidating their position after 
capturing the Green Line, but it was now dark and the Commanding Officer decided to stay 
put and consolidate the ridge. He placed „C‟ and „D‟ Companies in the old German trench 
just on the reverse slope of the crest, with „B‟ Company 200 yards behind in support, and „A‟ 
Company in reserve. They sat out the night there, under intermittent shelling and “occasional 
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bursts of harassing MG fire”.901 Casualties were estimated at three officers and thirty other 
ranks. Five other ranks had been killed. Neither battalion had quite made it to the Green Line, 
but they had been ordered in any case “to dig in before dusk whether they had gained the 
objective or not”.902 
 
Even before the main assault, the 6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had been in action on 4 
November. „B‟ and „C‟ Companies had been given the task of mopping up some buildings on 
the Englefontaine-Landrecies road at A26 a 9.4. They had completed this by 0840 and the 
battalion was at their assembly point at Drill Ground Corner by 1215. 
 
At 1310 they leapfrogged the 13
th
 Black Watch and advanced through the forest in Artillery 
formation, left flank on the Route de Landrecies, right flank on the railway, with „C‟ 
Company on the left, „A‟ Company in the centre, „B‟ on the right and „D‟ in support. Only 
slight opposition was encountered from machine guns and “snipers”.903 By 1530 they had 
received orders to establish a line extending southwards to the canal from B21 d 2.4. They 
consolidated this as darkness fell. During the night, Second-Lieutenant L. Briggs-Lawrence 
was “evacuated to Hospital [ ... ] suffering from Shell-shock”.904 
 
The advance was to be continued the next day, and a conference of commanding officers took 
place at 2000 to decide on plans. The 151 Brigade diarist concludes his narrative by 
highlighting the role of the non-commissioned officers in the November fighting: 
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It is impossible to close this Narrative without making special mention of the 
magnificent leadership displayed by N.C.O.‟s of all Battalions in the Brigade. This 
was most significant in the case of the 6
th
 R.Innis. Fus. Who had only 8 officers going 
into action with Companies on the 3
rd
 instant and the 1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I. who had 10. Of 
these the former lost 5 and the latter 7 but in spite of this these Battalions never failed 
to capture their objectives.
905
 
 
The battle plan had worked well. The initial artillery barrage proved effective and the reduced 
and improvised nature of artillery support beyond the Red Line was sufficient (and, as seen 
above, sometimes crucial), as it coincided with the collapse of determined enemy resistance: 
a full creeping barrage was no longer necessary by that stage of proceedings. Tanks and 
armoured cars were able to work in concert with the infantry where terrain allowed for it, and 
leeway within planning and tactics meant that battalions were able (and willing) to take 
independent action where necessary, with infantry pushing on through the forest, along the 
roads and tracks, feeling confident enough to abandon linear advances in favour of infiltration 
and outflanking manoeuvres, points of resistance being either bypassed and mopped up later, 
or taken by bold manoeuvre with mobile machine gun and artillery support. After the 
November fighting, the diary of 50
th
 Division listed a number of „lessons learnt‟, including 
the statement “it is essential that the principles laid down in SS.135 Section IV be in no way 
modified”.906 The recently re-formed division had learnt its lessons quickly and well. 
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25
th
 Division
907
 
 
25
th
 Division (Major-General J.R.E. Charles) was to assault the German positions on a front 
of around 2000 yards: their first, and main objective was the capture of the town of 
Landrecies, but this first entailed an advance of about one and a half miles across the familiar 
enclosed terrain of orchards, fields, hedges and, on the northern flank, the straggling suburb 
of Faubourg-Soyères. Then came the crossing of the Sambre-Oise Canal. The Red Line 
objective was to the south and east of the town, and the Green Line was a further two miles to 
the east.
908
 The move to this second objective “was, however, contingent on the successful 
advance on the right by the 32
nd
 Division”.909 
  
The most formidable obstacle was, of course, the canal, and it fell to the Royal Engineers to 
devise ways of getting the infantry across the water. On 31 October, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Done, CRE 25
th
 Division, visited his counterpart at 46
th
 Division to find out how they had 
crossed the St Quentin Canal at Bellenglise five weeks earlier. Done afterwards muses on the 
problems facing his men: 
 
To begin with, the CANAL itself was known to be 53‟ to 55‟ wide, with a depth of 6‟ 
or 7‟.  The infantry would have to fight their way through a very enclosed country, a 
distance on the right of 2,300 yards; and on the extreme left a distance of 3,200 yards, 
before reaching the CANAL. Swimming was ruled out by the G.O.C. as a feasible 
manner of crossing. At this time of year the water was too cold to expect the men to 
swim a canal and to advance and fight, and remain holding the line during the night in 
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wet clothes. Further more after the men had fought their way for an average distance 
of 2,700 yards, on arriving at the CANAL, unless means were provided for them to 
get across, they might think that they had done all they could reasonably be expected 
to do; and there was some likelihood that the advance would come to a stop on the 
CANAL bank. The G.O.C. desired the R.E. to have ready on the CANAL bank with 
the first Infantry, some means of passing the Infantry over dry. 
Since the Bridging Material was required on the CANAL with the leading infantry; 
and because it is possible neither to drive up Bridging Wagons and Teams by day in 
face of shell and M.G. fire; nor to carry Pontoons over 1½ miles, the regular Bridging 
Equipment would not be suitable for the passage of the Infantry. Besides, to attempt 
to cross a wide Canal by Bridging it at one, or possible two places, is to ask for 
trouble, and to court failure. An unlucky shell, or the fire from one MG may stop the 
whole operations. There is only one sound way to attempt such a crossing; which is, 
to continue to advance on a wide front.
910
 
  
Done‟s visit to 46th Division had confirmed his aversion to using cork floats: they would be 
far too heavy to be carried the required distance to the canal. He was, however, buoyed by the 
idea of using rafts with empty petrol tins as floats, and, once he had Major-General Charles‟ 
approval, he promptly put in a requisition for 3,000 tins. 
 
The responsibility for designing and building the rafts was given to Major Richards, 105
th
 
Field Company, RE. By the afternoon of 31 October, Richards had designed and built a 
prototype. This was tested “by being dropped some feet on to the ground, two or three times. 
It stood the test well. [ ... ] The raft was then carried to HONNECHY pond and tried. It was 
found to be sufficiently buoyant and quite handy”.911 Time was short, however: all the rafts 
had to be built in three days. Men in 105
th
 Field Company RE had been falling ill with 
influenza, so they were supplemented by men from 106
th
 Field Company. Indeed, on 3 
November, Major Richards himself “was obliged to go sick”.912 All the rafts were completed 
by midday on 2 November. Each raft was made from sixteen petrol tins, weighed 95 
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pounds,
913
 and with a buoyancy of 220 pounds, could take the weight of one fully-equipped 
soldier, even if one or two tins were perforated by bullet or shrapnel. 
 
That afternoon, a demonstration was organised on the River Selle, using six rafts: 
The Selle River was about 32‟ wide, but served for our purpose. A platoon of 
infantry
914
 made a demonstration attack on it followed by Sappers carrying rafts and 
superstructures. On reaching the River, the Sappers duly paddled across, the platoon 
of Infantry was ferried across and the rafts were made into a bridge. The realistic 
nature of the operation was somewhat marred by the enormous crowd of spectators; 
who found amusement in the efforts of one or two of the Infantry to balance 
themselves on the rafts. There was some general feeling of doubt, I think, as to 
whether the operation would be feasible under fire. One C.O. gave it as his opinion, 
that it would be a “Sporting Event.915 
 
The Engineers had not put all their eggs in one basket, however: intelligence received from 
civilian residents in Landrecies told that the main bridge over the canal was still intact, 
though mined. To the north-east, the Germans had built a wooden bridge suitable for horse 
transport and to the south-west there were three single-plank footbridges. All this was 
confirmed by aerial photographic reconnaissance. The capture of any of these bridges would 
provide alternatives to the rafts, but just in case the main bridge should be blown up by the 
Germans, Done arranged for two light footbridges, capable of spanning the 17 foot-wide 
Lock, to be carried forward. 
 
There was one more water hazard to be negotiated: to the west of Landrecies, and north of the 
Canal, was the „Ancient River‟,916 the path taken by the River Sambre prior to its canalisation 
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in 1818, twenty feet wide in places and four to five feet deep. There were, therefore, in the 
end, three Bridging Parties: 
No.1  Party.  To bridge the Ancient River. It was decided to put three floating bridges 
across it. This would require 15 rafts and 18 pieces of superstructure.
917
 
 
No. 2 Party  To bridge the CANAL between the Lock and the right Divisional 
Boundary. This party would have 30 rafts. 
 
No. 3 Party  To bridge the CANAL between the Lock and the left Divisional 
Boundary. This party would have 35 rafts.
918
 
 
 
 
A procedure for their delivery to the canal and their deployment was worked out:  
Each raft would have three men: two Pioneers would carry it and a Sapper with a hand-axe 
would either help to carry it, or cut a pathway through hedges as required. Then, “on reaching 
the CANAL the groups were to spread out, so that the rafts would be about 20 yards apart 
along the whole front of the CANAL. The rafts would be launched, the Sapper on each raft 
would paddle himself across on it, a line being paid out by the Pioneers. On reaching the far 
bank, the Sapper would take the 2
nd
 line, which was fast to the front of the raft, and securing 
it to the bank, the raft would then be pulled backwards and forwards by the Sapper and the 
Pioneers, an Infantry Soldier being put across on each trip. As soon as the first wave was 
across the rafts were to be collected and formed into permanent floating bridges. [ ... ] All the 
Infantry destined to cross on rafts were provided with lifebelts in case they should get 
wounded while actually crossing”.919 
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The three bridging parties would total 311 men, 110 of whom were Royal Engineers. No. 1 
Party would be under command of Second-Lieutenant A.L. Armstrong, No. 2 Party was 
commanded by Second-Lieutenant Wells, and No. 3 Party by Second-Lieutenant J.M Petty. 
Three Supply Tanks were allocated to the Royal Engineers: fearful that a breakdown or 
enemy shell fire could put a tank out of action and therefore jeopardise the whole operation, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Done decided that he would entrust the transportation of only the bridge 
superstructures to the tanks.
920
 
 
Finally, a section of the 182
nd
 Tunnelling Company RE was attached to Done‟s force: they 
were to be used in an attempt to capture the existing bridges over the canal. “Two parties of 3 
Sappers each were to rush the H[orse] T[ransport] bridge and the footbridges NE and SW of 
LANDRECIES respectively; and 1 N.C.O. and 10 Sappers were to rush the main bridge at 
Landrecies.
921
 Once there, they were to remove any explosive devices. 
 
The Bridging Parties formed up behind the Infantry Battalions: No.3 Party would advance 
with the 1/8
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Nos. 1 & 2 Parties would be with the 1/5
th
 
Gloucestershire Regiment. 
 
The infantry assault was to take place on a single-brigade front, and the honour fell to 75 
Brigade (Brigadier-General C.W. Frizell). It lined up with 1/8
th
 Royal Warwicks (Lieutenant-
Colonel P.H. Whitehouse) on the left, 1/5
th
 Gloucesters (Lieutenant-Colonel D. Lewis) on the 
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right, and four Companies of 1/8
th
 Worcestershire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. 
Clarke) spread out behind them across the whole brigade frontage.
922
 Two companies of 21
st
 
Battalion Manchester Regiment (7 Brigade) would mop up the area north of the canal on the 
extreme right flank near the hamlet of Happegarbes. 
 
74 Brigade (Brigadier-General H.M. Craigie-Halkett) would follow up the advance of 75 
Brigade and be ready to continue the advance to the Green Line objective, whereas 7 Brigade 
(Brigadier-General C.J. Hickie) were held in reserve, near Pommereuil on the far side of the 
Bois L‟Eveque, but ready to move at fifteen minutes‟ notice. “The fighting strength of the 
infantry of the Division was now 4 190 rifles”.923 
 
All battalions were in position on the morning of 4 November by 0415 and a “noise 
barrage”924 was opened by our machine guns at 0545 to coincide with Zero Hour of IX Corps 
on 25
th
 Division‟s right. By way of reply, a German counter barrage fell, causing ten 
casualties amongst the Gloucesters. 
 
At Zero Hour, 0615, our main barrage opened and solicited a short-range reply from German 
positions just across the canal. A German despatch captured later that morning seemed to 
indicate the German Officers had assumed, until the 25
th
 Division troops arrived at their 
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positions, that the assault would be confined to the 32
nd
 Division front, as it had been the 
previous morning.
925
 
 
On the left, the 1/8
th
 Warwicks had the furthest to go, and this across “very difficult 
country”,926 and were soon well behind the barrage.927 They had encountered their first 
opposition from enemy machine gun posts at the crossroads at G 9 a 6.1, but these were 
quickly dealt with by one of the two tanks that made it any distance over the jumping off 
line
928
 and by Lewis Gun fire. They had reached the line of the light railway in squares G 15 
b & d by around 0730. 
 
Half an hour later, the Warwicks were held up by machine gun and „minenwerfer‟929 fire 
from Faubourg-Soyères, and there began a “fight for fire supremacy”.930 Again, with the help 
of tank No. 9107, (Second-Lieutenant Knowles), but chiefly due to the action of Lance-
Corporal W. Amey and his section,
931
 the German resistance in this area was overwhelmed, 
three „minenwerfers‟ being captured, and the advance was able to continue. Amey and his 
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section overran a German strongpoint containing several machine guns, capturing fifty 
prisoners. Then, after finishing off another machine gun post, Amey single-handedly captured 
the Chateau in the village, along with its garrison of about twenty German soldiers. 
 
During the fighting, Lieutenant J.G. Eccles became separated from his Company quite early 
on and was captured, only to turn up at battalion headquarters three hours later with eight 
prisoners of his own. Eccles was in command of „B‟ Company, 1/8th Royal Warwickshires. 
„A‟ Company was commanded by Second-Lieutenant H. Fawke, „C‟ Company by Captain 
E.S.C. Vaughan and „D‟ Company by Lieutenant A.P. Hack. 
 
By 1030, the 1/8
th
 Warwicks were at the canal, some in Landrecies itself, some to the north-
east, the former just in time to see the main bridge over the canal blown up by the Germans. 
On the right, the 1/5
th
 Gloucesters lined up with „C‟ and „A‟ companies in front, left and 
right, (Lieutenant G.H West and Second-Lieutenant W.H. Robbins), with „D‟ Company 
(Captain G.E. Ratcliffe) as “moppers up”932 and „B‟ Company (Captain V.B. Bingham-Hall) 
in reserve. They set off in the mist and before long „A‟ Company had become “somewhat 
split up”933 amongst the hedges and orchards, but „B‟ Company were pushed forward into the 
gap and the momentum of the attack maintained. „C‟ Company had, meanwhile, come up 
against a machine gun post at G 16 a 1.1, but was able to overrun it with the help of a tank 
and „A‟and „B‟ Companies of the Worcesters. 
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  By 0730, „B‟ Company had reached the crossroads at G 15 d 9.1: they then turned south and 
arrived at the railway line. “Here, much opposition was met with”,934 but enemy fire 
slackened as our barrage advanced and with the help of two tanks, the Gloucesters were able 
to reach the „Ancient River‟. The bridge over it, earlier pinpointed by aerial photography, was 
found “intact, though mined”.935 Sergeant Wood and Sapper Barbour, both of 105th Field 
Company RE, were first there and were able to withdraw the charges. „B‟ Company 1/8th 
Gloucesters and No. 1 Bridging Party arrived at the canal to find one out of the three single-
plank bridges still standing. 
 
The job of the 1/8
th
 Worcesters was to follow the leading battalions and, once the latter had 
secured the crossings over the Sambre, to leapfrog them, “capture Landrecies [and] occupy 
the Red Line”.936 The battalion‟s four companies were deployed as follows: on the left was 
„C‟ Company (Captain J.O. Walford); „A‟ Company (Captain L.R. Bomford) was in the 
centre, with „B‟ Company (Second-Lieutenant J.A. Bullock) slightly behind them in support, 
and „D‟ Company (Lieutenant E.Wedgbury) was on the right flank. 
 
„C‟ Company‟s first task was to reach the canal bank south of Les Etoquies, but they were 
caught up in the fighting amongst the ruined houses of Faubourg Soyères and suffered a 
number of casualties, including two officers of the leading platoon wounded. Some of these 
casualties were caused by pushing on too quickly and getting too close to their own creeping 
                                                 
934
 TNA:PRO WO95/2232 War Diary 25
th
 Division CRE 
935
 Ibid. 
936
 TNA:PRO WO95/2251 War Diary 1/8
th
 Battalion Worcestershire Regiment. 
287 
 
barrage. “Sgt Faulkner took command of both platoons and led them resolutely forward”.937 
Faulkner earned himself a DCM: when both platoons were held up by machine gun fire,
938
 he 
led a Lewis Gun team round to a flank position and “opened a sharp burst of enfilade fire”,939 
which dispersed the enemy machine gun team and allowed the rest of the company to move 
forward. Eventually, after clearing up more machine guns along the line of the railway, this 
time with the help of a tank, the canal was reached (about G 17 d 0.4). They came under fire 
from enemy field guns situated just across the water, but these were “silenced by LG fire”.940 
 
„A‟ Company, with „B‟ Company close behind, found themselves mixed up in the fighting 
for the enemy front line positions along with platoons of the Gloucesters. They were being 
held up by machine gun fire from a ruined Chateau on the outskirts of Faubourg Soyères, (G 
16 a 1.1): “Captain Bomford went back quickly to find the supporting tanks. One tank was 
placed at his disposal, and he guided it personally to the Chateau. The rest of „A‟ Company 
followed close behind the tank as it rumbled forward up to the ruined building, terrorising the 
defenders; who surrendered in a few minutes – some forty in all including a Battalion 
Commander”.941 
 
„A‟ Company was now somewhat behind schedule, and as they advanced from the railway 
station toward the main bridge at Landrecies, a German officer on a black horse was seen to 
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gallop down to the canal edge, where he detonated a mine, blowing the bridge up.
942
 The time 
was exactly 1030. 
 
Lieutenant Wedgbury, commanding „D‟ Company on the right, led his men “rapidly down 
the slope through the mist, in the hope of securing the footbridges”.943 Four minutes into the 
attack, at 0619, Wedgbury was wounded “by one of our MG bullets”944 and Second-
Lieutenant P.N. Coleman took command. They encountered enemy artillery and machine gun 
fire from the south bank of the canal as they crossed the railway line, but the fire was “largely 
unaimed, for the bank was smothered in dense clouds of smoke from shells and from bombs 
dropped by British aeroplanes”.945 A patrol was sent forward to the canal, and a footbridge at 
G 22 d 0.5 was found intact.
946
 
 
As we pause, with soldiers poised at various points along the northern bank of the canal, the 
story of one particular tank is worth telling: Second-Lieutenant Donald Fraser Crosbie 
(Commander of Tank 6084) was in charge of three Supply Tanks of 2
nd
 Tank Supply 
Company, which were carrying bridging material to the Lock at Landrecies.
947
 As he 
approached the railway station, he realised that the infantry were held up by machine gun fire 
from a house nearby. 
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As no good purpose could be served by remaining where he was, this officer pushed 
forward with his Tanks along the road west of the Station. The German machine 
gunners apparently thought that fighting tanks were upon them and surrendered.
948
  
 
 
Crosbie then led his tanks on to the Lock, where he successfully unloaded his cargo. For this 
action, Crosbie was awarded the Military Cross. 
 
The race to the canal had, it seems, many winners: the identity of those arriving first at its 
banks varies depending on the account read. On the left flank, to the north-east of Landrecies, 
No.3 Bridging Party RE was reported to have reached the canal bank at 1010, the party under 
Second-Lieutenant Petty. This officer had had a difference of opinion with an infantry 
company commander “as to the best line of approach”,949 had „borrowed‟ a platoon of 
infantry, minus its officers, and headed for the canal: he left the infantry platoon at the 
railway embankment to cover his advance and took his bridging party to the water‟s edge. 
These, according to the 25
th
 Division CRE War Diary were “the first troops to reach the canal 
bank”.950 
 
“The rafts were launched and the Sappers paddled across as per programme”.951 Two Sappers 
were hit by enemy machine gun fire from houses in Landrecies, but covering fire from 1/8
th
 
Worcestershire men “made the enemy shooting ineffective”.952 
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 Battalion Worcestershire Regiment. „Narrative of Operations‟. 
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If Stacke is to be believed, the first men across the canal at this point were from the 1/8
th
 
Worcesters, who had passed through the Royal Warwicks on their way to the canal, and 
“Corporal W. Roberts („C‟ Company) actually won the race across”, with Captain Walford 
close behind, the latter arranging the “ropes and tackle to pull the tin rafts to and fro”.953 In 
any case, within ten minutes, “about a Company”954 were ferried over, this being a mixture of 
a few Warwicks and a large number of Worcesters. The time was 1045. Second-Lieutenant 
Petty then collected the superstructures from the Supply Tanks and proceeded to build two 
floating footbridges. These were later used by more of the Worcesters. 
 
As soon as the company of Worcesters was over the canal, they continued their advance 
“against desultory MG fire”955 and captured the hospital at G 23 a 8.2, along with five 
officers, forty men, three ambulances, two limbers and six horses, before pushing on to the 
Red Line objective. On the right, south-west of Landrecies, „D‟ Company 1/8th Worcesters 
“rushed for the [intact] footbridge [over the canal], crossed it and seized the further bank”956 
at around 0950.
957
 They were followed almost immediately by „A‟ Company of the 
Gloucesters, who formed up behind them.  
 
                                                 
953
 Stacke, The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War, p.481. It is possible, of course, that the operation 
was going as planned, and that more than one raft was being ferried back and forth. 
954
 TNA:PRO WO95/2232 War Dairy 25
th
 Division CRE. 
955
 TNA:PRO WO95/2251 War Diary 1/8
th
 Battalion Worcestershire Regiment. 
956
 Stacke, The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War,p.480. The Bridging Party of Royal Engineers 
following up here, realising that rafting was not required, proceeded to install two floating footbridges. 
957
 TNA:PRO WO95/2251 War Diary 1/8
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„D‟ Company moved on again behind the artillery barrage at 1033, “meeting with little 
enemy resistance”.958 A strongpoint at G 22 d 7.5 was overrun, capturing over fifty prisoners 
“before they could man their weapons”.959 They had reached the Red Line by 1115. The rest 
of the Gloucesters then crossed the canal and formed a defensive flank on their right, facing 
south. 
 
In the centre, in the town of Landrecies, units had been held up by the blowing of the main 
bridge. But not for long: the lock gates remained intact, however, and 130 Field Company RE 
(under Second-Lieutenant Wells) managed to get two footbridges in place across it. The 
artillery barrage now halted on a line 300 yards east of the canal. This curtain of shell fire and 
support from machine guns pushed forward, showering the southern bank with both direct 
and indirect fire, allowed men of 1/8
th
 Warwicks and 1/8
th
 Worcesters to cross at around 1245 
and move into the town. The enemy garrison, realising that they were being outflanked on 
both sides by this time, “gradually slipped away”960 and the town was mopped up with “many 
German stragglers [giving] themselves up”.961 The only real resistance was encountered at 
the crossroads south-east of the town centre: a sharp fight soon put an end to this, but both 
Captain Bomford and Captain Walford of 1/8
th
 Worcesters were wounded here.
962
 
 
Two German artillery batteries were situated on the high ground to the east of Landrecies and 
they continued to bombard the abandoned town. Second-Lieutenant A. Coe led „B‟ Company 
1/8
th
 Worcesters forward to deal with them. He sent a Lewis Gun section out onto a flank to 
                                                 
958
 Ibid. 
959
 Ibid. 
960
 TNA:PRO WO95/2249 War Diary 75 Brigade HQ. „Narrative‟. 
961
 Stacke, The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War,p.481. 
962
 Bomford was awarded the DSO and Walford a Bar to his MC for their work that day. 
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provide covering fire, whilst he and his men took the position in enfilade from the opposite 
flank, surprising the gunners and capturing both batteries intact, along with forty prisoners. 
Coe was awarded the Military Cross for this action. 
 
For such a bold enterprise, the casualty figures for 75 Brigade must be regarded as 
remarkably light: the 1/8
th
 Warwicks had lost one officer
963
 and twenty-one other ranks 
killed. The Gloucesters had suffered two officers
964
 and 19 other ranks killed. The Worcesters 
escaped with eleven other ranks killed. Total casualties for 75 Brigade for the day can be 
estimated at: 
 
             Officers       Other Ranks 
     K W M  K W M 
1/8
th 
Warwicks  1 2 -  21 108 - 
1/8
th
 Worcesters  - 4 -  11 48 7 
1/5
th
 Gloucesters  2 4 -  19 41 2 
   Total:  3 10 -  51 197 9 
 
 
They had taken 20 officers and 815 other ranks prisoner. 
 
On the division‟s right, the 32nd Division had not made enough progress for the envisaged 
advance toward the Green Line objective on the 25
th
 Division front to take place. The task of 
74 Brigade therefore became much less demanding. A telephone message from 25
th
 Division 
headquarters at 0925 resulted in 11
th
 Sherwood Foresters (Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Corall) 
                                                 
963
Captain Joseph Richards, age 26, is buried in Landrecies British Cemetery, grave A 31. Oddly, none of the 
contemporary or later accounts mention this officer‟s name, other than in a list of casualties compiled at the end 
of November by the 25
th
 Division QMG. TNA:PRO WO95/2228 War Diary 25
th
 Division QMG. 
964
 Second-Lieutenant Valentine Scroggie, age 26, and Captain Stanley Frederick Hill, age 30, are buried in 
Landrecies British Cemetery, graves A 59 and A 70 respectively. 
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being ordered to follow 75 Brigade and “if not involved in fighting”965 to cross the canal and 
take up positions in squares G 24 a & d. The 9
th
 Yorkshire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel 
R.S. Hart) and 13
th
 Durham Light Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Faber) were ordered to 
move up to the railway in G 22 a and be ready to cross the canal when required. 
 
At 1240, the 11
th
 Sherwood Foresters were able to report that they were over the canal and 
pushing forward to the Red Dotted Line. At 1530, 74 Brigade ordered its battalions forward 
to positions between Bouillette Farm and Catillon Farm. The 9
th
 Yorkshire Regiment were to 
be on the left, 11
th
 Sherwood Foresters on the right, straddling the Landrecies-Maroilles road. 
As the 11
th
 Sherwood Foresters advanced, they did encounter some enemy opposition: they 
took harassing machine gun fire from their right flank and „B‟ Company captured one officer 
and twenty-one other ranks in the skirmish. At 1730, the three forward companies („A‟, „B‟ 
and „D‟), on their way to their final deployments, concentrated on the road junction at G 30 a 
9.8, just in time for a large delayed-action mine to blow up “just in front of „A‟ Coy, making 
a huge crater in the centre of the road., but happily [this] did not cause any casualties”.966 The 
day‟s advance had cost them one other rank killed, however, with four wounded. Brigade 
casualties were negligible. The 13
th
 DLI were not even required to cross the canal: they took 
up positions along the north-western bank of the canal in square G 22 b. 
 
7 Brigade began the day in positions just south of Pommereuil (7000 yards west of 
Landrecies). Two companies („A‟ and „C‟) of 21st Manchesters, under Captain Miller MC, 
were placed temporarily under command of 74 Brigade, their task being to advance on the 
                                                 
965
 TNA:PRO WO95/2245 War Diary 74 Brigade HQ. 
966
 TNA:PRO WO95/2247 War Diary 11
th
 Battalion Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire 
Regiment). 
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right flank of the attack and mop up the area around the hamlet of Happegarbes. This task 
was completed “without a hitch”,967 the companies reporting their objectives gained at 
0745.
968
 Thereafter, it joined its sister battalion, the 20
th
 Manchesters, on the railway line 
north-west of the canal. Signs of the recent fighting were evident: “There were many large 
buildings on fire in the area occupied by the Battn”.969 
 
The 9
th
 Devonshires was the only battalion of 74 Brigade to cross the canal that day: they 
were ordered forward at 1635, crossed by a trestle footbridge near the Lock, and were in 
position by 2300. They had suffered seventeen casualties, “all by one shell”,970 including two 
other ranks killed. One officer had been killed during the morning.
971
  
 
A few days later, there was a ceremonial march through the town. The mayor of Landrecies 
issued a notice to its citizens, asking them to line the „Grande Rue‟ at 1:30 p.m. for the march 
past. They were instructed to deck their houses with flags as best they could, and to give the 
soldiers the ovation they deserved, showering them with flowers as they passed. It was 
announced that day that one of the boulevards in the town would be renamed „Boulevard 
Charles‟ in honour of the Division and its commander.972 
 
                                                 
967
 TNA:PRO WO95/2242 War Diary 74 Brigade HQ. „Narrative of Operations‟. 
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th
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th
 Battalion Devonshire Regiment 
971
 Lieutenant Cecil Howard Brock, age 26, is buried in Pommereuil British Cemetery, grave A 3. 
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 A monument to 25
th
 Division and Major-General Charles still stands at the southern end of the main bridge 
over the canal in Landrecies, though its claim to be honouring the „600‟ who fell drastically over-estimates the 
numbers. The author can find no evidence that the boulevard name-change ever took place. (Email 
communication with the office of the Mayor of Landrecies, June 2013) 
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Stacke concludes his account in typical dramatic style:  
Everywhere the enemy‟s last line of resistance had been broken; everywhere the 
German armies were huddling back in confusion through the open country to the 
north-east. Behind them the whole British Army moved forward in pursuit.
973
 
 
In essence, he was right. 
 
Conclusion 
XIII Corps‟ plan has been demonstrated to be audacious. The BEF showed itself capable of 
executing combined arms methodology with a high degree of competence, even if battlefield 
communications proved less than satisfactory in places. Isolated from higher command, 
battalion, company and platoon commanders were able to show initiative and improvise at 
the tactical level in order to ensure operational success. 
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Chapter 7 
IX Corps 
 
Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates just how thin the line between success and failure can be. One 
canal crossing went exactly to plan; another was rescued by individual initiative and bravery, 
while a third failed, not for the lack of bravery, but owing to inferior bridging equipment and 
German obstinacy. The difficult situations along the Corps front were rectified by pragmatic 
decision making in the face of setbacks and by a little luck. Decisions made by experienced 
and capable officers turned impending failure into ultimate victory. 
*          *          *          * 
The men of IX Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Walter P. Braithwaite) were faced with one 
major task on the morning of 4 November 1918: forcing the crossing of the Sambre-Oise 
Canal. The German defences, consisting largely of machine gun teams, “concentrated in the 
forward area”,974 concealed amongst the hedges and orchards and lined up along some sectors 
of the eastern canal bank, were backed up by isolated batteries and sometimes single field 
guns. German units still held three positions west of the canal: the village of Catillon, the 
Happegarbes Spur and the site of the medieval castle motte known as Le Donjon. 
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 TNA:PRO WO95/2372 War Diary 32
nd
 Division HQ “Report on Operations”. 
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The crossing of the canal was to be attempted at just five locations: on 32
nd
 Division front, on 
the Corps left, 96 Brigade would bridge the waterway just south of the ninety-degree bend in 
the canal two miles south-west of Landrecies and 14 Brigade would cross at the existing 
bridge in Ors village. On 1
st
 Division front, 3 Brigade would cross at Catillon after capturing 
the village, 1 Brigade would bridge the canal half way between Catillon and Lock No.1, the 
latter being where 2 Brigade would throw their bridges across the narrow lock walls. 
 
IX Corps set the timing of the assault and the objective lines, but methods of attack, and more 
specifically the method of crossing the canal, were delegated to division and even brigade 
level. This necessity was dictated by the varied topography, the state of the enemy‟s defences 
and on a more mundane and practical basis, on the amount, quality and types of bridging 
materials available to the Royal Engineers in each sector. 1
st
 Division had been lucky enough 
to capture a German engineering store intact at Bohain and its myriad contents were jealously 
guarded from other units, much to the detriment, so it turned out, of 32
nd
 Division. 
 
The planning of the artillery barrage was a divisional responsibility, though counter battery 
work and distribution of resources remained the domain of Corps. 32
nd
 Division were 
allocated thirty-five batteries of field artillery
975
, and 1
st
 Division thirty-three.
976
 Heavy 
artillery across the Corps frontage totalled 244 guns, well over half of these being 6” 
Howitzers.
977
 The guns were to be brought forward gradually, under the cover of darkness if 
                                                 
975
 Three 13- pounder batteries, twenty 18-pounder batteries and seven 4.5” Howitzer batteries. TNA:PRO 
WO95/842 War Diary IX Corps HA. 
976
 Twenty-five 18-pounder batteries and eight 4.5” Howitzer batteries. Ibid. 
977
 60-pounders – 84 
   6” Howitzers – 188 
   8” Howitzers – 32 
   9.2” Howitzers – 28 
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possible, camouflaged and “kept silent”.978 The amount of artillery action in the days leading 
up to the assault was to remain normal: any increase or diminution could alert the enemy to 
the imminent attack. Short periods of silence were also built in to the schedule to allow sound 
ranging units to locate hostile batteries.
979
 
 
 
 
32
nd
 Division
980
 
On 2 November, 32
nd
 Division (Major-General T.S. Lambert) issued, down to company and 
artillery battery level, a document entitled “Notes on Future Operations”. These were to 
inform planning and tactics and included notes on enemy dispositions. Commanders down to 
platoon level were also issued with aerial reconnaissance photographs of ground to the east of 
the canal.
981
 The notes concluded that there would be a “very large concentration of machine 
guns and infantry close to the canal and within about 2,000 yards of it”, and the Germans had 
“orders to hold on to the Canal Bank at all costs”, although we held “strong doubts as to the 
moral of his troops if surprised and attacked with determination”.982  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
   6” Guns - 12 
978
 TNA:PRO WO95/842 War Diary IX Corps HA. 
979
 The silent periods of half an hour were as follows: 
 30/31 October: 2215 – 2245 & 0200 – 0230 
 31 Oct-1 Nov: 2130 – 2200 & 0115 – 0145 
 1 /2 November: 2300 – 2330 & 0230 – 0300 
 2/3 November: 2230 – 2300 & 0130 – 0200 
 3/4 November: 2100 – 2130 & 0030 - 0100  
980
 See Map 14 
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 Imperial War Museum: Private Papers of Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert. Document 4723 
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Tellingly, it also said “we cannot expect every detail in the attack to take place as 
planned”.983 It goes on: 
The first phase
984
 will require the highest determination of all ranks to force a landing 
with perhaps hand to hand fighting on the other bank”. [ ... ] 
The second and third phases
985
 will largely depend on the initiative of individuals. [ 
...] farms, villages, hollow roads and crossroads are likely to be the chief centres of 
resistance. They should be dealt with by turning one or more flanks and concentrating 
Lewis and Machine Gun Fire on them, preferably at ranges of 300 yards or more if 
possible. Stokes Mortars and rifle grenades will be valuable if quickly available. [ ... ] 
During the third phase, the enemy‟s resistance is likely to be almost entirely from 
machine guns. These are best attacked in flank or in rear.
986
 
 
The advance to the Dotted Blue Line would be supported by a field artillery barrage. Its 
opening line, on which it would rest for five minutes, was the eastern bank of the canal. It 
would then lift 300 yards and stand for a further thirty minutes. Thereafter it would creep to 
the Yellow Line at a rate of 100 yards every six minutes. After a fifteen minute pause 300 
yards east of that line, it would recommence its movement, at the above rate, to the Dotted 
Blue Line, halting once more 300 yards to the east of it, for forty-five minutes. 
 
East of this line Field Artillery action supporting the attack to the Blue Line will be 
arranged direct between Infantry Brigades concerned and their affiliated Artillery 
Group Commanders.
987
 
 
In reality, for fear of bursting the canal banks and inundating the terrain into which the 
British were going to advance, the standing artillery barrage „on the eastern bank‟ of the canal 
was in fact tens of yards beyond it. German machine gun positions on the bank, and also 
                                                 
983
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 The advance to the Blue and then the Red Line. 
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many of those within 300 yards of it, missed when the barrage lifted rather than crept to its 
next pause, were left untouched and were, in places, to provide severe opposition to the first 
waves of troops attempting to cross. 
 
32
nd
 Division lined up with 96 Brigade (Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood) on the left and 14 
Brigade (Brigadier-General L.P. Evans VC
988
) on the right. 97 Brigade (Brigadier-General 
G.A. Armytage) were held in reserve, except for two companies of 2
nd
 King‟s Own Yorkshire 
Light Infantry (KOYLI), which were sent forward to reinforce the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
on the extreme left of 96 Brigade‟s attack.989 
 
The division‟s available fighting strength on 2 November 1918 was calculated as follows: 
             Officers        Other Ranks 
14 Brigade 
 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots (Lothian Regt)  23   598 
1
st
 Dorsetshire Regt.    29   654 
15
th
 Highland Light Infantry   21   579 
     Total  73   1831 
 
96 Brigade 
 
15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers   29   621 
16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers   25   621 
2
nd
 Manchester Regt.    28   701 
     Total  82   1943 
 
97 Brigade 
 
1/5
th
 Border Regt.    33   721 
2
nd
 KOYLI     29   805 
                                                 
988
 Evans won his VC at Zonnebeke, Ypres Salient, on 4 October 1917. 
989
 96 Brigade had carried out operations on 2 & 3 November to try and take the Happegarbes Spur. Both times 
they had succeeded only to be driven out again by German counter attacks. These had inflicted heavy casualties 
on the brigade. TNA:PRO WO95/2401 War Diary 97 Infantry Brigade HQ. 
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10
th
 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 31   717 
     Total  93   2243 
 
16
th
 Highland Light Infantry (Pioneers) 18   691 
32
nd
 Battalion Machine Gun Corps  33   726 
 
    Overall Total  299   7434
990
 
 
On the extreme left of 96 Brigade front, the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.E.R.G. Alban), with „A‟ and „C‟ Companies of 2nd KOYLI (Lieutenant-Colonel L. 
Lamotte) were to advance onto the Happegarbes Spur and occupy the western bank of the 
canal. They were not to attempt to cross here,
991
 but finally taking this ground would rob the 
Germans of high ground from which they were able to overlook the canal as far south as 
Catillon. The threat of enfilade fire from this location would be eliminated. The attack would 
be supported by two tanks from 10
th
 Tank Battalion.
992
 
 
The 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers were being asked, fundamentally, to repeat their „minor‟ 
operation of two days before: 2
nd
 KOYLI had received orders at 1135 on 3 November to 
“detach two companies to the aid of the 96th Brigade”,993 and accordingly „C‟ Company 
(Captain B.V. Pring) slotted into the front line of the attack in the centre, with „A‟ Company 
(Captain H.J. Knight) in support. They were clearly destined for more than a supporting role. 
 
                                                 
990
 TNA:PRO WO95/2374 War Diary 32
nd
 Division QMG. The 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers had suffered 52 
fatalities on 2 & 3 November. The number of wounded is not recorded, but this probably exceeds one hundred. 
991
 Original orders (2 November) did include a crossing of the canal as a possibility, but left the final decision to 
the Brigadier-General. TNA:PRO WO95/2396 War Diary 96 Infantry Brigade HQ. Order No. 494. 
992
 The original plan was for three tanks. All three had gone in with the preliminary attack here on 2 November, 
but one had ditched in a pond in Happegarbes village. The successful German counter attack meant that this 
tank had to be abandoned. It was recovered, undamaged, two days later. TNA:PRO WO95/102 War Diary 2
nd
 
Tank Brigade. 
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The barrage opened at 0545 and the troops waiting in the jumping off positions caught “the 
fringe”994 of it and suffered over thirty casualties before they could move off. 
 
The war diary of 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers describes the action in the briefest of terms, 
acknowledging the intensity and accuracy of the German defensive barrage and the heavy 
cost. The 96 Brigade diary states that “at 0700 the whole of the W. Bank of the CANAL [ ... ] 
was in our hands”.995 
 
The 2
nd
 KOYLI diarist allows himself considerably more latitude: 
 
In a dense natural fog the Companies moved forward through hedges and railway 
cuttings and across a marsh to the Canal Bank. The enemy‟s barrage came down with 
great intensity and caused many more casualties to the advancing Companies. In spite 
of the enemy‟s fire and difficulties of obstacles the Companies gallantly continued on 
their way and gained their objectives in quick time: the other Companies of the 
Lancashire Fusiliers were worn out somewhat with their previous heroic exertions and 
„A‟ and „C‟ companies were the only Companies who were able to cross the canal.996 
The two Companies most tenaciously stuck to their positions [and] the tenacity of 
Yorkshire troops secured the day.
997
 
 
The two tanks, whilst receiving no mention in any of the infantry unit diaries, did good work, 
clearing up enemy strongpoints and machine gun posts in and around Happegarbes before 
“advanc[ing] parallel with the railway embankment, overcoming considerable opposition in 
that quarter, ultimately enabling the Infantry to cross the embankment. As had been proved 
by the heavy fighting in this area in the previous operations, the enemy laid great stress on 
retaining this portion of the high ground, and that [sic] fact that it was captured with such 
                                                 
994
 Ibid. 
995
 TNA:PRO WO95/2396 War Diary 96 Infantry Brigade HQ. 
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rapidity was largely due to the co-operation of tanks”.998 It was whilst returning to the 
rallying point after the action that 2
nd
 Tank Brigade suffered its only officer fatality of the 
day, Major F.A. Robinson MC.
999
 
 
The 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers had lost a further five other ranks killed for the reclaiming of 
this high ground. The number of wounded other ranks is not recorded, but three officers were 
wounded.
1000
  The 2
nd
 KOYLI estimated their losses for the day at one officer killed,
1001
 with 
one wounded. Six other ranks were killed, with eighty wounded and twenty-four missing.
1002
 
 
By 0700 on 4 November, the canal bank from G27 a 1.1 to G28 a 1.6 was in the hands of the 
32
nd
 Division. Orders were later received for the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers to cross the canal at 
Landrecies and form a defensive flank on the right of 25
th
 Division positions. By dusk they 
were on the line G29.a.0.0 to G34 a 4.9 
1003
 and were able, after a quiet night, to advance to 
the Red Line (the Landrecies – Oisy road) at dawn on 5 November. 
 
The main event for 96 Brigade was the crossing of the canal. Two battalions lined up 
between G26 c 4.7 and L36 c 7.2, 16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel J.N. 
Marshall) on the left, and 2
nd
 Manchester Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Robertson) on 
                                                 
998
 TNA:PRO WO95/102 War Diary 2
nd
 Tank Brigade. 
999
 T/Captain A/Major Frederick Andrew Robinson MC and Bar is buried in Highland Cemetery, Le Cateau, 
grave VI E 2. Total Tank Brigade fatalities for 4 November 1918 amount to one officer and three other ranks, 
the other ranks coming from 9
th
 Tank Battalion.  
1000
 Between 1 & 4 November the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers suffered 15 officer casualties, killed, wounded or 
missing. This represents approximately half of their strength. TNA:PRO WO95/2374 War Diary 32
nd
 Division 
QMG. 
1001
 Second-Lieutenant Harry Leonard Colley MC, age 24, West Yorkshire Regiment (Prince of Wales‟ Own), 
attached 2
nd
 KOYLI, is buried in Landrecies British Cemetery, grave A 20. 
1002
 Commonwealth War Graves Commission records indicate twenty-one other ranks‟ fatalities for 4 November 
1918. 
1003
 See Map 14. 
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the right, their jumping off positions being about 400 yards from the canal bank. Their 
attempts to cross here were destined to fail. 
 
The bridges over which the infantry were to cross had been constructed by 218
th
 Field 
Company, Royal Engineers, and were of a pontoon style, resting on cork floats. The 
engineers (forty-two of them) and „A‟ Company of 16th Highland Light Infantry (Pioneers) 
would carry the two bridges forward and then push them out across the water under the 
covering fire of the infantry. They were to walk into a heavy enemy artillery barrage and 
intense machine gun fire from a range of about thirty yards coming from the opposite bank of 
the canal.  
 
Some of the retaliatory barrage directed against both the Happegarbes Spur and the bank of 
the canal occupied by 96 Brigade came from a battery commanded by Leutnant Erich 
Alenfeld located some 600 yards from the canal opposite the Spur. His guns had helped to 
break up the earlier attempts to take the spur and his orders were to stay in position: his 
commanding officer, Major Wilhelmi, was confident that the British would not be able to 
force a crossing of the canal: “Unsere M.G.‟s und einige Karabiner würden jeden Engländer 
vertreiben”.1004 At six o‟clock on the morning of 4 November Alenfeld was woken by the 
British artillery barrage and immediately replied, his men firing “auf Teufel komm raus” (like 
crazy). His battery was soon engulfed in the British smoke screen and news arrived that the 
enemy were on the canal bank.
1005
 
 
                                                 
1004
 “Our machine guns and a few riflemen would repulse all English attacks” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, 
Freiburg, BA-MA: MSG 2/1291 p.4. This document is a letter to his parents dated 6 November 1918 written by 
Battery Commander Leutnant Erich Alenfeld in which he details his experiences of the battle. 
1005
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On the 16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers front, the engineers and pioneers somehow managed to get a 
bridge across the canal within around thirty minutes, but shell fire broke it before any of the 
infantry could cross. At this point, Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall came forward and began to 
organise parties of volunteers to repair the pontoons. His citation for the Victoria Cross 
continues the story: 
 
The first party were soon killed or wounded, but by personal example he inspired his 
command, and volunteers were instantly forthcoming. Under intense fire and with 
complete disregard for his own safety, he stood on the bank encouraging his men and 
assisting with the work, and when the bridge was repaired attempted to rush across at 
the head of his battalion, and was killed by so doing.
1006
 
 
“The enemy‟s M.G.‟s made it absolutely impossible to force a crossing”1007 and the 16th 
Lancashire Fusiliers remained pinned down behind the western bank of the canal. 
 
The 2
nd
 Manchesters on their right fared little better: they attacked with two companies in the 
front line, one in support and one in reserve. After the preliminary five minute bombardment 
of the far canal bank, they dashed forward into the same withering fire experienced by their 
colleagues on their left. 
 
The men of 218
th
 Field Company RE performed heroically to get a pontoon bridge across the 
canal. At this point, this bridge was also hit and destroyed by shell fire. Major A.H.S. Waters, 
commanding 218
th
 Field Company RE, and one of his men, Sapper A. Archibald, rushed 
forward and worked desperately, under point blank machine gun fire, to repair it. “The fire 
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 Quoted in G.Gliddon, VCs of the First World War The Final Days 1918 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 
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was so intense that it seemed impossible that the two men could escape with their lives”.1008 
But escape they did, though Archibald collapsed from the effects of gas as soon as he had 
completed the work and made it back to the bank. Both men were awarded the Victoria 
Cross.
1009
  
 
They were helped by the efforts of Second-Lieutenant J. Kirk of the Manchesters. He paddled 
a raft across the canal, under intense fire, taking a Lewis Gun with him. He made it to the far 
bank and proceeded to fire at a German machine gun post at a range of ten yards. Once all of 
his ammunition was expended, more was somehow got across to him on the raft and he 
continued to give covering fire to the engineers toiling in and on the water. The bridge was 
completed and two platoons of the Manchesters were able to rush across. In the meantime, 
however, Kirk had been wounded in the arm and face, yet had continued to fire until hit in the 
head and killed.
1010
 
 
It was decided, after suffering around 200 casualties, that further attempts to cross the canal 
here should be abandoned, and the remainder of the men retreated the few yards needed to 
take shelter behind the western canal bank. Under their covering fire, with the one repaired 
bridge still intact, the two platoons which had managed to get over the canal were 
withdrawn.
1011
 
 
Four Victoria Crosses had been won, probably within sight of each other, during this abortive 
attempt to force the canal crossing. The action also cost the life of one other noteworthy 
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officer. The poet Wilfred Owen, Lieutenant, 2
nd
 Manchesters, was shot and killed whilst on a 
raft with some of his men, ferrying planks out to assist with the repairs to the pontoon 
bridge.
1012
 
 
The battle was probably not yet much more than an hour old, and a decision had to be taken 
as to what to do next. Double runners were sent out in both directions along the canal to find 
out if it might be possible to cross elsewhere. There was no joy to be had to the north, of 
course, but it was soon learned that a successful crossing had been established south of Ors 
village. The 16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers, now under the command of Captain J.B. Dunn, had 
also received orders to move south and cross by this bridge. 
 
Both battalions crossed at Ors, 2
nd
 Manchesters first. This battalion was instructed to turn 
sharp left and head north, before pushing on to the Yellow Line, which was reached by 
1130.
1013
 There was opposition from the left flank in the vicinity of La Motte Farm, but 
orders came to push on to the Blue Line, leaving this pocket of resistance to the moppers up. 
By dusk they were 400 yards beyond the Blue Line.
1014
 The „moppers up‟ turned out to be the 
16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers, who followed the Manchesters over the bridge at Ors and dealt with 
“stiff resistance from enemy MG nests and snipers”,1015 finishing the day facing north-east, 
with its left on the canal and its right in touch with the Manchesters.
1016
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Erich Alenfeld‟s artillery battery had not been directly assaulted and he was bothered more 
than anything else by the strafing he was taking from low-flying aircraft. The British barrage 
had long since moved on well behind his positions when he received the disconcerting news 
from a pale and breathless stretcher-bearer that Landrecies had been taken. Alenfeld gave the 
order to his nine surviving unwounded comrades to destroy the breechblocks on his two 
remaining serviceable guns and move out. He had no horses to haul his guns. He had reached 
Maroilles by 7 p.m. where he saw “countless columns of men marching” in the same 
direction – away from the front. He managed to acquire a lift in a lorry which took him as far 
as Marbaix, where he had chance to reflect on his day: he mourns the two dead, seventeen 
wounded and five missing of his battery, bemoans the fact that his guns were placed too far 
forward, sure that from his previous position he could have helped to prevent the fall of 
Landrecies. “The end has come”, he concludes, “our „heroic‟ infantry can no longer hold 
on”.1017 
 
The British advance had not reached the Red Line, but initial setbacks, which could have 
ended in complete disaster, were circumvented, literally, and the mission rescued. The 
attempt to cross the canal had been a valiant one, but commanders on the spot saw sense and 
allowed pragmatism to prevail. 
 
The cost had been high, however: the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers on the extreme left had 
escaped relatively unscathed, suffering only five fatalities. The 16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers fared 
much worse: officer casualties were five killed,
1018
 five wounded and one missing. Other 
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ranks fatalities totalled forty-seven. The 2
nd
 Manchesters estimated their casualties at three 
officers killed,
1019
 five wounded, with twenty-two other ranks killed,
1020
 eighty-one wounded 
and eighteen missing. 
 
 
96 Brigade casualties for 4 November were therefore as follows: 
 
 
    Officers Other Ranks 
 
 Killed   10  83 
 Wounded  24  373 
 Missing  6  157 
   Total 40  613
1021
 
 
14 Infantry Brigade, on the divisional right, had 1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment (Lieutenant-
Colonel H.D. Thwaytes) and 5/6
th
 Royal Scots (Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Fraser) in the front 
line, left and right respectively, with 15
th
 Highland Light Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel V.B. 
Ramsden) in support. The strengths of the units on 31 October 1918 were: 
     Officers  Other Ranks 
 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots  30   755 
1
st
 Dorsets   42   794 
15
th
 HLI   35   737 
  Total  107   2286
1022
 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Busigny Communal Cemetery Extension, grave II C 19; Second-Lieutenant Joseph Morris, „C‟ Company, 
age 19, buried in Pommereuil British Cemetery, grave B 60. 
1019
 The third officer was Captain Angus McKenzie MC & Bar, age 42, buried in Ors Communal Cemetery,  
grave A 5. 
1020
 Commonwealth War Grave Commission records verify 23 other rank fatalities. 
1021
 The officer fatalities include Lieutenant Ralph Miller Hardy, age 24, 16
th
 HLI (Pioneers), buried in Ors 
British Cemetery, grave B 14. He was born in Sydney, Australia. The overall figure represents a casualty rate 
for the brigade of almost 32 per cent. 
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The 1
st
 Dorsets were to “force the passage of the canal and carry the first objective”.1023 They 
would attack at the village of Ors and would also attempt a crossing of the canal by kerosene 
tin pontoon bridge some short distance to the south. The old bridge at the lock was not intact, 
but an attempt to seize it and span it with “an improvised bridge”1024 would be tried. One 
platoon of „C‟ Company was also to attempt to cross the canal to the north of the village 
using a collapsible boat. 
 
Once over the water, the Dorsets would continue the advance to the Blue Dotted Line. The 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots, on the right, were to launch what the Official Histories called “feints and 
small attacks”.1025 Two platoons of „A‟ Company would attempt to seize Le Donjon, the 
ancient mound on the western bank of the canal by attacking at Zero plus 5 along the one 
causeway through the marshy land that surrounded it on three sides. They were to cross the 
canal “either here or behind the 1st Dorset Regt”.1026 Should a crossing at Le Donjon prove 
impossible or impractical, the officer commanding „A‟ company could decide to cross at Ors 
“without reference to Bn HQ except to notify the fact that he had done so”.1027 Whichever 
way, Rue Vert hamlet (M12 b 3.6) was the battalion‟s first objective. They would then work 
south along the canal bank before turning east and advancing to the Red Line whilst acting as 
right flank guard. The 15
th
 HLI would “cross the canal in rear of 96 or 14 Infantry Brigades, 
according to circumstances” and then “carry the Blue and Red Lines”.1028 
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The responsibility for forcing a crossing of the canal on 14 Brigade front fell squarely in the 
lap of 1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment. They were deployed as follows: „B‟ Company assembled “in 
an orchard in rear of 2/Manchester Regt”.1029 One platoon of „C‟ Company was on the canal 
bank north of Ors, one platoon was behind a house close to the main bridge and two platoons 
were sixty yards from the canal, 200 yards south of the village. „D‟ Company had two 
platoons to the north of the church and two to the south, “ready to cross by whichever means 
was available”.1030 „A‟ Company was in support to the west of the village. 
 
In addition to the planned artillery barrage, one 18-pounder was brought up and placed near 
Ors church “from which it could fire point blank at the main [ ... ] bridge if necessary”.1031 
Eight Vickers machine guns could also supply direct fire, four on the canal bank north of the 
village, four similarly placed to the south. Four Stokes Mortars near the church would deluge 
the eastern side of the village with rapid fire from Zero to Zero plus three minutes.
1032
 
 
At 0545, the morning mist was intensified by the opening of the artillery barrage and the 
Stokes Mortar shells. Three minutes later, the „C‟ Company platoon nearest the bridge rushed 
forward with the sappers, the latter carrying the improvised bridge with them. They were met 
not only by intense machine gun fire, but by rounds from a German field gun firing at them 
straight along the road from “point blank range”.1033 Several attempts were made to get the 
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bridge in place, but when one shell scored a direct hit on it, wounding the sapper officer, it 
was decided to abandon any further efforts. Seven other ranks had also been wounded in 
trying to force the crossing, and a message was sent back to Battalion Headquarters saying 
that it would be “impossible to get the bridge across”.1034 
 
The mayhem at the main bridge kept the Germans‟ attention away from what was happening 
200 yards to the south: the floating bridge was brought forward and launched “under the 
covering fire of the two platoons [of „C‟ Company] detailed”.1035 
The enemy, while putting up an accurate fire on all known crossings, did not locate 
this work until too late, with the result that the whole of this battalion [1
st
 Dorsets] 
were able to cross with but little opposition.
1036
 
 
The final „C‟ Company platoon, to the north of the village, succeeded in launching their 
collapsible boat in spite of heavy machine gun fire. The boat capsized at the cost of five 
casualties. 
 
By 0610 „C‟ and „D‟ Companies had orders to cross immediately by the bridge south of the 
village and by 0700 were on the Yellow Line. „B‟ and „A‟ Companies were then ordered to 
wait until the 2
nd
 Manchesters had crossed before joining their comrades on the eastern side, 
but the entire battalion was reported over the canal by 0800. Two platoons of „D‟ Company 
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had meanwhile worked their way south as far as Rue Vert, “advanc[ing] through the main 
street of the village capturing 80 prisoners”.1037 
 
An unplanned prolongation of the pause on the Yellow Line was ordered: 
 ... the Companies received order to reorganise and consolidate as a temporary 
measure until the position was less obscure on the 96
th
 Bde front. The protective 
barrage 300˟ in front of the Yellow Line was called for and continued until it was 
considered safe for it to die down.
1038
 
 
On the right brigade front, at Zero plus five minutes, two platoons of „A‟ Company, 5/6th 
Royal Scots, attacked along the causeway towards Le Donjon. This was the only track across 
the marsh and attracted very concentrated defensive machine gun fire, this very quickly 
putting paid to the assault, despite one other platoon moving up in support. 
 
Their orders stated that “if a crossing is impossible at this point, the canal will be crossed at 
Ors”.1039 The remaining platoon of „A‟ Company and „C‟ Company did exactly that, but „B‟ 
Company were able to outflank Le Donjon on the right and cross by a bridge there. „D‟ 
Company had crossed “by a bridge NORTH OF CATILLON”1040 and by 1045 the troops in 
Le Donjon, realising that they were now surrounded, gave themselves up. 
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By 1330 the 15
th
 Highland Light Infantry (HLI) had crossed the pontoon bridge south of Ors: 
all three battalions of the brigade were now over the canal, and the advance to the Blue Line 
could begin. This move was timed at 1345 and “as there was very little enemy opposition no 
barrage was considered necessary”.1041 This line was reached and the 15th HLI passed 
through the Dorsets “almost immediately”.1042 
 
The 1
st
 Dorsets set about consolidating their positions on the Blue Dotted Line and in effect 
settled down for the night.
1043
 The day‟s fighting had cost them seven other ranks killed, with 
around fifty wounded, including one officer.
1044
 
 
With 15
th
 HLI on the left and 5/6
th
 Royal Scots on the right, the advanced continued toward 
the Blue Line. On arriving there, they were held up by machine gun fire from Wallaheim and 
Locquignol Farms, but these were successfully overcome by 15
th
 HLI, their captures 
producing thirty prisoners. As night fell, it was decided that they and the Royal Scots should 
hold their positions on the Blue Line.
1045
 
 
Casualties had been extremely light: the 5/6
th
 Royal Scots suffered only one fatality
1046
 and 
did not even bother to record the number of wounded. The “Germans were so utterly 
dispirited by their failure to prevent us from crossing the river [sic], that they put no sting into 
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their resistance”.1047 The 15th HLI suffered no fatalities and only seventeen in total for the 
month of November 1918.
1048
 
 
The fate of 32
nd
 Division fits neatly into the premise established by this thesis: initial 
resistance from German defenders was stiff along the front line, in defence, on this occasion, 
of the canal. The heavy casualties suffered by 96 Brigade, and by the two companies of 2
nd
 
KOYLI (97 Brigade) were almost all inflicted on the canal bank where attempts to force the 
crossing failed. Initial resistance on 14 Brigade front, at Ors in particular and also at Le 
Donjon, were similarly fierce, but the successful bridging of the canal here and the 
subsequent outflanking of German front-line units resulted in the almost predictable 
dissipation of fighting spirit and the relative ease with which subsequent objectives were 
ceded. The successful forcing of the canal at this one point south of Ors saved the lives of 
many 14 Brigade men. 
 
The overall divisional casualties for the day are impossible to calculate with any certainty due 
to the incomplete returns in the War Diaries, but they can be estimated at fewer than 50 
officers and just over 700 other ranks. Fatalities can be confirmed at 125, if 16
th
 HLI 
(Pioneers) and 32
nd
 Battalion Machine Gun Company figures are included. 
 
The last word on casualties can be left to 32
nd
 Division diarist: 
Though the casualties in the left brigade had been severe, those of the right brigade 
had been insignificant and, taking into account the magnitude of the operation, the 
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losses sustained by the Division in this day‟s fighting may be considered small in 
comparison with the great results obtained.
1049
 
 
And on the success: 
This success was undoubtedly due to the admirable co-ordination of all arms and to 
the readiness of all ranks to make bold decisions on the spot where occasion 
demanded without reference to higher authority.
1050
 
 
 
1
st
 Division
1051
 
On 1 November Major-General E.P. Strickland, commanding 1
st
 Division, held a conference 
at Divisional Headquarters at which “final arrangements”1052 for the forthcoming attack were 
made. Present were “all three Brigadiers, CRA, CRE, O.C. 1st Bn M.G.C.. O.C. Signals and 
Army Wing Commander”.1053 
 
On the following day, the 1
st
 Battalion Cameronian Highlanders (1
 
Brigade), in tandem with 
23
rd
 Field Company Royal Engineers, gave a demonstration of bridging arrangements to 
Strickland and his subordinates. 
 
The three brigades of 1
st
 Division, spread across a frontage of 7000 yards, had essentially the 
same task before them on 4 November: to get across the canal. In detail, however, their 
undertakings were very different. On the left, 3 Brigade (Brigadier-General E.G. St Aubyn) 
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was to capture the village of Catillon on the western bank of the canal, cross at the bridge by 
the lock that carried the Route Nationale No. 39 and form a bridgehead to the east. To further 
complicate the issue, the village would be attacked from the south. 
 
1 Brigade (Brigadier-General L.L. Wheatley) had a similar job to that of 96 Brigade, 32
nd
 
Division: cross the canal on pontoons in a relatively open, unpopulated area and then exploit 
the breakthrough. 
 
2 Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Johnson, acting
1054
) on the right, was tasked with similar 
exploitation on the eastern side of the canal, but was to cross at the relatively well-defended 
Lock No. 1.
1055
 
 
The artillery barrage was to be supplied by five brigades of Royal Field Artillery (298
th
, 39
th
, 
25
th
, 30
th
 & 23
rd
), supplemented by 5th Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, 3
rd
 Australian & 46
th
 
Divisional Artillery. The initial barrage would stand for three minutes on the eastern bank of 
the canal, (within the distance limits discussed earlier), and then for seven minutes 300 yards 
further on, before advancing to the Blue Dotted Line. This barrage would be supplemented by 
over 100 Vickers Machine Guns. Specific arrangements between 298
th
 Brigade RFA and 3 
Infantry Brigade would produce an initial northward-creeping barrage through the village of 
Catillon. Once the Blue Dotted Line had been reached, there would be a pause of one and a 
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half hours, during which 39
th
, 25
th
 3
rd
 Australian artillery brigades would move forward so as 
to be in position to supply the creeping barrage beyond it. 
 
The Royal Engineers regarded it as their responsibility to get the infantry across the canal: a 
conference of Field Company commanders had been held on 21 October
1056
 to allow 
preliminary discussions on how best to bridge it. Commanders were then to “go into the 
question thoroughly”1057 and submit their plans for consultation and approval. 
 
These plans were crystallised into an initial plan on 27 October when the crossing sites for 2 
& 1 Infantry Brigades were decided. Once the sites were identified, “it was possible to 
determine the types of bridges to be used at each; some experimental material was prepared 
and a preliminary demonstration was given on 28
th
 October”.1058 Final instructions were 
issued the following day and bridge construction began in earnest. During this preparation 
time, “the battalions detailed for the assault carried out practices with some of the bridges, 
over a model of the canal constructed at one of the Field Company billets”.1059 
 
It was decided that bridges for the 1 Brigade crossing north of the bend in the canal at M 31 
central would be of a floating pontoon style, supported by German steel floats.
1060
 Four of 
these would be constructed:  
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The several bays of each bridge were hinged together in such a way as to give the 
maximum vertical flexinility (sic), to avoid any difficulty in passing over the canal 
banks and the head of each bridge was fitted with a ladder, to enable the far bank to 
be scaled with ease”.1061 It had been decided that these bridges would be “carried up 
bodily from the assembly positions to the site as bridges and that no constructional 
work should be necessary on arrival.
1062
 
 
For crossing the lock on 2 Brigade front, where the distance to be spanned was only 
seventeen feet, single-span bridges were constructed “as light as possible consistent with their 
being able to support 4 to 6 men on them at one time. They were fitted with a lever and a pair 
of wheels so that they could be launched from the near abutment without requiring anyone on 
the far side to receive them”.1063 
 
More substantial bridges would be brought up later which would fit into the lock walls, 
requiring coping stones to be prized out. A section of 1
st
 Australian Tunnelling Company 
(Captain Woodward MC) would build a tank bridge over the lock later that day, “as soon as 
the tactical situation permitted”.1064 A number of smaller bridges would be used to cross 
streams and ditches to both west and east of the canal. 
 
The transportation of all this material to the assembly points on 3 November came to forty-
four wagon loads, all of which had then to be manhandled into positions to within 5 – 600 
yards of the canal. Then, gaps had to be cut in the wire and the hedges. By the lock, all was 
ready by 0130, 4 November. To the north, it was 0330 by the time all was in place. At these 
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two southern crossings, it would be the engineers that would spearhead the assault: they 
would be first to reach the canal bank. 
 
On 3 Brigade front, at Catillon, the engineers of 26
th
 Field Company RE (Lieutenant 
Fitzhenry) would move forward behind the infantry, ready to construct or repair bridges 
should they be needed. The attack by 1 & 2 Brigades would be led by 23
rd
 Field Company 
RE (Major Smith) and 409
th
 Field Company RE (Major Findlay MC) respectively. Their 
fortunes would prove to be very different. 
 
3 Brigade consisted of 2
nd
 Battalion Welch Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Badham), 1
st
 
South Wales Borderers (Lieutenant-Colonel C.L. Taylor) and 1
st
 Gloucestershire Regiment 
(Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Guild).
1065
 2
nd
 Welch, separated from the rest of the brigade, was 
placed in the line on the extreme right of the divisional front.
1066
 Their job was to protect the 
right flank of 2 Brigade‟s attack by firing at German units from their positions along the canal 
bank, and particularly to pin down the “German garrison at the house in S 9 c 0.5”.1067 To 
help in this, two Stokes Mortars were attached to the battalion. In the event, this task was 
extended to forming a bridgehead over the canal on their extreme right, near Cambresis, 
crossing the waterway by the route nationale heading north towards Hautreve. This was 
accomplished by two platoons of „C‟ Company under Lieutenant J.A. Roberts at the cost of 
six other ranks wounded. The battalion remained there until relieved at 2130 that evening.  
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               Officers         Other Ranks 
1
st
 South Wales Borderers   19  581 
1
st
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2
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The operation by 3 Brigade to capture the village of Catillon is described in 1
st
 Division HQ 
Diary as a “subsidiary” one,1068 but they would have one section of three tanks from 10th 
Tank Battalion to assist them. Once over the canal, troops would advance along the route 
nationale and “hold the houses in M 20 a until touch is gained with 32nd  Division on the left 
and 1
st
 Inf. Bde. on the right”.1069 
 
The main attack on the village was to be made by 1
st
 Gloucesters and two platoons of 1
st
 
South Wales Borderers. The job of these two platoons was to clear the orchards to the west 
and south of the village. The rest of the Borderers were to “pin down any German garrison 
there may be in the Western outskirts of CATILLON until the mopping-up parties arrive”.1070 
 
The Gloucesters were to “seize that part of Catillon which lies to the east of the road running 
North South through the church”.1071 Their second task was to force a crossing of the canal at 
the bridge at M 19 b 6.8, form a bridgehead and simultaneously mop up the rest of the 
village. They were in their assembly positions, from the road junction at R 30 a 3.0 eastwards 
to the canal, by thirty minutes before Zero, with „D‟ and „C‟ Companies in the front line, left 
and right, „B‟ Company in support behind „D‟ Company and „A‟ Company in reserve. One 
section of „D‟ Company, 1st Battalion Machine Gun Corps, two Stokes Mortars and one 
section of 26
th
 Field Company RE were attached to „C‟ Company and were to follow them 
into the village. 
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They moved off at 0545 behind a creeping barrage of shrapnel and indirect machine gun fire 
and made “excellent progress”1072 despite the heavy fog. „D‟ Company, with its left on the 
main north-south road, overran three machine gun posts in the orchards and then headed for 
the church. At this point they were overtaken by a tank.
1073
 The tank, with „D‟ Company now 
close on its heels, turned right at the church and worked around the south of the eastern sector 
of the village until they reached the lock. „C‟ Company advanced along the road running 
north-south around 100 yards west of the canal. “They encountered heavy machine gun fire 
from the hedgerows and orchards and eventually captured 9 or 10 machine guns with their 
teams”.1074 They pushed on into the town and approached the bridge. There was a German 
machine gun post in a house nearby. This was communicated to „their‟ tank, which engaged 
the strongpoint at close range, putting it out of action. 
 
They had reached the crossing slightly ahead of time, as the creeping barrage was still falling 
on the canal. The company commanders decided not to wait for the barrage to lift, but agreed 
to “work round [it]”1075 and get across as quickly as possible. They succeeded in this venture, 
but were met on the bridge by “a formidable obstacle in the shape of a number of farm 
implements piled together and entwined with barbed wire”.1076 As the barrage lifted, a 
number of Germans emerged from cellars in which they had been sheltering and were 
immediately taken prisoner by the Gloucesters. 
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Now across the canal, „D‟, „C‟ and „B‟ Companies pushed on along the route nationale “in 
the face of heavy machine gun fire”1077 and reached the road junction that was their final 
objective. Meanwhile, „A‟ Company had managed to mop up the rest of the village. This 
action had cost the Gloucesters two officers wounded, four other ranks killed and thirty-six 
wounded.
1078
 
 
1
st
 South Wales Borderers lined up to the west of Catillon with „B‟ and „C‟ Companies given 
the role of pinning down the Germans on the western edge of the village whilst two platoons 
of „D‟ Company tackled the orchards. This operation proved remarkably easy, despite the 
fog, against “very little opposition”.1079 They did suffer casualties from shell fire, however. 
Later in the day, the companies closed in to form a cordon around the village and in doing so 
captured two officers and 121 men. The cost was seven other ranks killed, one officer and 
fifteen other ranks wounded. 
 
The 3 Brigade attack had gone very much to plan. All companies of both battalions had 
accomplished their allotted tasks and reached their objectives to time. The attempt by the 
German defenders to block the bridge by dumping farm machinery on it smacks of 
desperation from dispirited units effectively abandoned to their fate on the western bank of 
the canal, aware that the only certainty that day was their eventual envelopment. The machine 
gunners put up the expected resistance, but the haul of over 500 prisoners speaks volumes. 
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3 Brigade had suffered very minor losses: 
 
     Officers   Other Ranks 
     K W M  K W M 
 
1
st
 Gloucesters  - 2 -  5 36 - 
1
st
 South Wales Borderers  - 1 -  7 15 - 
1
st
 Welch  - - -  - 6 - 
 
                     Total   - 3 -  12 57 - 
       Overall 72 
 
 
On 1 Brigade front, the initial assault was entrusted to 1
st
 Battalion Loyal North Lancashire 
Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Berkeley DSO) and 1
st
 Queen‟s Own Cameron 
Highlanders (Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Methuen), left and right respectively. The 1
st
 Black 
Watch (Lieutenant-Colonel F. Anderson) were in support and would subsequently move 
through the Loyal North Lancs on the Blue Dotted Line to resume the advance from there. 
 
The canal crossing just north of the bend in the canal at M 31 b 0.0 was to be made across 
four pontoon bridges, two per battalion, put in position by 23
rd
 Field Company RE. They 
would be carried from jumping off positions just inside the orchards some 5-600 yards from 
the bank.
1080
 The bridges had been sent up over the previous three nights and “dumped under 
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trees and hedges”.1081 At 2130 on 3 November, the men of 23rd Field Company RE “began to 
put the bridges together and to carry them to their final assembly positions. This company 
also had to make the necessary holes in hedges, involving in some cases the cutting of trees 
up to 9 inches in diametre (sic), and to lay the subsidiary bridges over the small stream west 
of the canal”.1082 All of the work was completed two and a quarter hours before Zero. 
 
At 0540, the engineers “stood to at their bridges”1083 A platoon of „D‟ Company 1st Loyal 
North Lancs accompanied the northern pair of bridges. The southern pair had a platoon of „B‟ 
Company 1
st
 Cameron Highlanders to assist. At 0545 the artillery barrage opened on the 
eastern canal bank and remained there for three minutes.
1084
 By 0550, the bridges were at the 
canal bank. 
 
On the left, one other platoon of 1
st
 Loyal North Lancs “detailed as a covering party to hold 
the WEST (our bank) of the CANAL doubled forward and commenced to carry out their 
duties”.1085 The two bridges were in place within five minutes and a Lewis Gun section was 
sent across first to cover the crossing.
1086
 They came under retaliatory machine gun fire from 
short range, but were able to silence these guns and capture the teams. The rest of the 
battalion doubled forward and crossed the two bridges, „A‟ Company first, followed by „B‟ 
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and „C‟ Companies. „D‟ Company remained on the western bank to help the engineers launch 
more bridges. The three companies were across the canal within fifteen minutes of Zero. 
 
On the right, one platoon of „D‟ Company 1st Cameron Highlanders, under Second-
Lieutenant G. Bryson, went to the canal bank ahead of the engineers to provide covering fire 
for the bridging operations. One German machine gun post, with its crew of five men, was 
found on the western bank here, but “Sgt Cook of 23 F Coy RE rushed them, killing three and 
capturing the other two”.1087 The bridging was completed in quick time and Second-
Lieutenant Bryson, “the first man of any unit across the canal”,1088 was on the far bank by 
Zero plus six minutes.
1089
 The 23
rd
 Field Company RE had suffered one other rank killed,
1090
 
one officer and eight other ranks wounded. Three companies followed Bryson across the 
canal, „C‟ Company first, followed by „A‟ and „B‟ Companies: they were all on the eastern 
side by 0610 and quickly advanced on the hamlet of Bois de l‟Abbaye, occupying it and 
capturing a number of prisoners. 
 
It seems clear that the Germans did not have the manpower to defend every sector of the 
canal: the 1 Brigade troops had crossed almost unopposed, certainly helped by the mist, but 
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mostly by the paucity of defenders. The enemy‟s retaliatory artillery barrage fell behind the 
attackers and “did no damage”.1091 
 
Once across the canal, the units of 1
st
 Loyal North Lancs reorganised: „A‟ Company was to 
move north, parallel to the canal; „B‟ Company would be on their right, moving more or less 
north-east; „C‟ Company would advance due east and „D‟ Company would remain in reserve. 
Opposition to these moves once again proved less than robust. “The enemy, when seeing 
themselves in danger of being outflanked, showed themselves disposed to surrender and only 
in a few cases put up a strong resistance”.1092 The diarist describes the type of encounter 
experienced and praises the conduct of the new recruits: 
Owing to the thickness of the mist, the operations developed into a series of hand to 
hand combats between small parties. Although 50% of the men of the Bn had never 
been in action before, their superior morale & fine example set them by the 
experienced Officers, NCO‟s and men of the Bn, enabled them to deal, with slight 
loss, with these numerous parties. In several cases parties of 15 & 20 were surrounded 
in houses. The first few occupants who were encountered were disposed of with bomb 
& bayonet & the remainder surrendered.
1093
 
 
Companies reached their objectives on the Blue Dotted Line at around 0930 or slightly later, 
with „A‟ Company on the Catillon road and in touch with troops of 3 Brigade. The barrage 
now halted in front of this line for ninety minutes and thereafter 13
th
 Black Watch 
leapfrogged the 1
st
 Loyal North Lancs and continued the advance to the Blue Line. The Loyal 
North Lancs were effectively “squeezed out”1094 and apart from „C‟ Company receiving 
orders to go forward in case they were required to assist the 1
st
 Cameron Highlanders,
1095
 “no 
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further developments took place”.1096 By 2300, all companies had been relieved and early on 
5 November the battalion marched back to billets in Molain, some five miles west of the 
canal. The War diary claims seven other ranks killed, forty-one wounded and four 
missing.
1097
 The battalion had fought its last action of the war. 
 
The 1
st
 Cameron Highlanders reached their first objective, the Blue Dotted Line, by 0830, but 
“nothing could be seen on account of the mist which was still thick”.1098 The mist began to 
clear rapidly at around 0900. During the ninety minute pause, they reorganised, putting „B‟ 
and „A‟ companies into the front line, left and right, ready to continue the assault. They 
moved off behind a barrage described as “excellent to start with”,1099 and were not held up 
until they reached the village of Robelmetre, where they came under heavy shelling. „A‟ 
Company stalled here, but „B‟ Company moved around the left flank of the shelled area, 
reached the road south of Grand Galop Farm and attempted to outflank a strongly held enemy 
position at La Cambotte. They came under heavy machine gun fire from three directions
1100
 
and the decision was taken to withdraw a short distance and consolidate. „A‟ Company was 
eventually able to move up and continue the line to the south, but „D‟ Company had to throw 
back a defensive flank in order to conform with the left of 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Sussex 
Regiment. The final line was therefore just to the east of Robelmetre.
1101
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The battalion was relieved by 4
th
 Leicestershire Regiment (46
th
 Division) after dark and 
moved back to billets in Mazinghien. Their trophies amounted to twenty-five machine guns, 
four field guns, six trench mortars and around 500 prisoners. The War Diary does not 
mention casualty figures, but fatalities can be calculated at fifteen other ranks.
1102
 
 
The 1
st
 Black Watch had been in their assembly positions west of the canal in square R 35 
since 2330 on 3 November. They crossed the canal the following morning at 0730 and moved 
up to their jumping off positions along the Catillon-Hautreve road. During the advance they 
were forced to capture two occupied houses that had been bypassed by the first wave: „B‟ 
company mopped up ten enemy soldiers in a house at M 26 d 4.4 and „C‟ Company were 
“compelled to organise an attack”1103 to take the house at M 27 a 4.0. The occupants did not 
resist for long, and three officers and fifty other ranks were captured, but at the cost of 
Lieutenant W. Wilson DCM, commanding „C‟ Company, being wounded by machine gun 
fire. 
 
Companies lined up on the Blue Dotted Line as follows: „B‟ Company on the left, „C‟ in the 
centre and „D‟ on the right. The barrage that preceded them in their advance became ragged 
and slow, and as a result “many faint-hearted Germans, who would otherwise have been 
captured, were enabled to make good their escape”.1104 
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„B‟ Company, on the left, met little resistance until they reached the village of Mézières, but 
they caught the defenders by surprise and two German officers who tried to escape on 
horseback were killed. Fifty prisoners were taken, along with twelve horses, although two 
limber teams were shot at the road junction east of the village (M 2 b 9.9). Touch was made, 
eventually, at 1715, with 14 Brigade troops on the left, and a joint post established at the 
bridge just north of the settlement. 
 
In the battalion centre, „C‟ Company advanced towards Boyau de Leu and then swung north, 
their left flank on the La Groise – Landrecies road. Their progression was untroubled until 
they came up against some stiff opposition from the houses in M 22 central. By 1215, all the 
houses as far as M 22 b 5.2 had been cleared, but the Germans were determined to hold the 
line of the stream where it crossed the main road. Their accurate machine gun fire effectively 
covered all northern exits from the village, and with no sign of 32
nd
 Division advancing on 
the left, any attempts to advance further along this road were abandoned. Instead, they 
attempted to capture some field guns a little further off to the east, around M 22 b 8.2: 
“indeed, the gunners held up a white flag, but as the party advanced the enemy opened rifle 
fire. 2/Lt W.H. GRANT was wounded in the arm and in the leg”.1105 Two guns were 
captured. The fate of the crews was not recorded. 
 
„D‟ Company, on the right, headed for Petit Galop and Grand Galop Farms, these situated 
neatly on the Blue Line, about 500 yards apart. On the way forward, one platoon had to be 
detached to deal with machine gun fire coming from orchards on their right flank. One 
platoon was detailed to capture Petit Galop Farm and it “secured its objective after a short 
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struggle in which several of the enemy were killed. Four prisoners and three 77mm guns were 
taken”.1106 
 
As the main body approached Grand Galop Farm, thirty or so of the enemy were seen 
“fleeing”1107 from the buildings. A number were brought down by Lewis Gun fire. The farm 
was in British hands by 1138, success flares fired, the rest of the garrison captured. This 
amounted to one officer and ten other ranks, “each of whom wore the ribbon of the IRON 
CROSS”.1108 
 
One enemy strongpoint near M 29 central seemed determined to hold out, retreating only 
marginally to a second prepared position after fifty rounds of trench mortar fire had dislodged 
them. From here they continued to fire with rifle and machine guns along the road running 
north-west to Grand Galop Farm, but once more it was deemed unnecessary for the Black 
Watch to push on further, and two Vickers machine guns and two platoons of „A‟ Company 
were brought up to face and contain this stubbornly held position, ready to attack should the 
need arise. It didn‟t, and the line solidified for the night. During the night, the battalion was 
relieved by 5
th
 Lincolnshire Regiment (46
th
 Division) and they withdrew to billets in 
Mazinghien. They had captured, in total, five officers and 128 men, eleven horses and five 
77mm guns. Casualties amounted to three officers wounded, six other ranks killed, with 30 
wounded. 
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1
 
Brigade had taken almost all its objectives, and the most dangerous part of the operation, 
the canal crossing, had passed with few alarms. The contrast with the experience of 96 
Brigade to the north is startling. 1 Brigade had been very lucky: they had chosen a crossing 
point that was not well defended. The two crossing points share a similar topography, but on 
that day the fates of the attackers were wildly disparate. 96 Brigade had suffered 643 
casualties (equivalent to a whole fighting battalion) on 4 November, 93 of them fatal. Figures 
for 1 Brigade are incomplete, but with a total of six officers and 146 other ranks,
1109
 they can 
be estimated at: 
      Officers  Other Ranks 
      K W  K W 
 
1
st
 Loyal North Lancs   - ?  13 41 
1
st
 Cameron Highlanders  - ?  15 41? 
1
st
 Black Watch   - 3  6 30 
     Total - 6  34 112 
     Overall    152 
 
 
The 2 Brigade attack would be carried out by 2
nd
 Royal Sussex (Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. 
Johnson) on the left, 2
nd
 Kings Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) (Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.E. Smith) 
on the right, with 1
st
 Northamptonshire Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel G. St G. Robinson) in 
support. The actual bridging of the canal was the responsibility of 409
th
 Field Company RE 
(Major G. de C. E. Findlay DSO, MC). 2
nd
 Royal Sussex would cross at the lock, 3000 yards 
south of Catillon (S 1 d 1.5). Sketch Map 2 shows the location in detail: there was one small 
derelict building on the western bank and three, including the lock keeper‟s house, on the 
eastern side. The lock itself was seventeen feet wide and 170 feet long. To get there, the men 
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would have to cross a stream some fifteen feet wide and then climb a sixteen foot high bank. 
Their final objective was 3000 yards to the east. 
The country on both sides of the canal was very enclosed with hedges and orchards 
making it impossible to distinguish any marked tactical features
1110
 or pick out any 
landmarks which would serve as distant direction guides during the advance. A liberal 
supply of excellent aeroplane photographs, however, were found to be of the greatest 
assistance and these were issued in time for officers and N.C.O.‟s to make a thorough 
study of the ground they would be required to advance over.
1111
 
 
On the right, „A‟ Company of 2nd KRRC would attempt a “subsidiary crossing”,1112 using an 
existing wooden bridge 100 yards south of the lock. Should the bridge prove unusable, they 
should “endeavour to improvise a crossing with Berthen Boats”.1113 They had been supplied 
with four of these by the Royal Engineers: they were collapsible rowing boats, in two 
sections, requiring assembly before use, each capable of carrying six men. They came with 
fore and aft tow ropes, but no oars. They would have to be propelled by shovels.
1114
 
 
The 1
st
 Northamptonshires would cross the canal in the wake of its two sister battalions, 20 – 
25 minutes after Zero and then be responsible for capturing the village of Fesmy on the right 
flank of the advance beyond the Blue Line and should “join hands with the French”1115 at La 
Justice (S 11 d 5.5). 
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The artillery barrage was as described earlier, supplemented by a machine gun barrage on the 
eastern bank of the canal for the first thirty seconds after Zero, and by eight 3” Stokes 
Mortars firing on the canal bank, extending 300 yards north and south of the lock from Zero 
to Zero plus three. Four 18-pounders had “been told off to deal by direct fire at ZERO Hour 
with the houses at the LOCK”.1116 
 
The timings for the crossing at the lock were very tight: the whole of 2
nd
 Royal Sussex and 
one section of 409
th
 Field Company RE, along with one section of 1
st
 Battalion Machine Gun 
Corps and two companies of 2
nd
 KRRC were to be across the water by Zero plus fifteen and a 
half minutes. The bridges were to be clear, that is the whole brigade across, by Zero plus 
thirty-three. 
 
The assault bridges, the „supplementary‟, shorter bridges for spanning the streams both west 
and east of the canal and the more substantial pack transport bridges were sent up in four 
wagon loads on the evening of 3 November and were taken to the forward dumps at X 5 a 7.2 
and X 5 b 7.0, where they were unloaded at around 1800. Men of 409
th
 Field Company RE 
then carried them forward to the final assembly positions where they were “all laid out in the 
proper order by 0130”.1117 
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The 2
nd
 Royal Sussex had been practising “moving rapidly over dummy bridges”1118 and then 
deploying into their bridgehead positions for two days when they marched off in the late 
afternoon of 3 November, bivouacking for a few hours in the vicinity of La Vallée Mulatre. 
They approached the canal under cover of darkness along the road from the village of Rejet 
de Beaulieu
1119
 and were in their jumping off positions, 250 yards from the lock, at 0400. 
“Shelling was not heavy and no definite counter preparations fell upon the assembled troops. 
The assembly was so well and silently carried out that the enemy failed to notice anything 
unusual”.1120 
 
They lined up with „C‟ Company on the left, „B‟ Company on the right, „A‟ in support and 
„D‟ in reserve. The barrage began on time, although the machine guns were a few seconds 
early again, and “length was excellent, with the exception of one gun on the right which was 
dropping about 150 yards short”.1121 This meant that „B‟ Company had to edge slightly 
northwards as it began to advance, with „C‟ Company, “in two lines of platoons in single 
file”.1122 The southern Royal Engineer bridging party, carrying the subsidiary bridges to put 
across the stream, under Sergeant McLaren, were reported to be “well away at zero”1123 and 
fifty to one hundred yards ahead of the infantry. On the left, the northern bridging party under 
Lieutenants Elmslie and Kelly, came across a small stream.
1124
 They immediately used one of 
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their smaller bridges to span this, to allow the assault bridges to be carried over. The first, 
Corporal Dow in charge, got across, but as the second one was about to be dragged over, an 
enemy shell landed amongst the party, wounding Lieutenant Elmslie and all but one of the 
men carrying it. 
 
By around 0550 both leading engineer parties and infantry units were reaching the stream 
west of the lock: they found it clogged with fallen trees, tree roots and barbed wire. By this 
time, enemy shells were falling amongst the men and casualties were beginning to mount, as 
was the level of confusion thus caused, with the rear waves of infantry coming on and getting 
mixed up with those stalled at the stream. “So intense was the enemy‟s fire that even the 
stoutest troops hesitated, and it seemed impossible for any man to get to the lock and yet 
live”.1125 
 
It was discovered that the section of the stream to the north of the ruined house on the 
western bank was largely clear of debris, and a crossing was attempted there. The stream was 
wider than anticipated, however, and two of the smaller bridges had to be placed together in a 
„V‟ shape in order to span it. One of the assault bridges meant for the lock was also placed 
over the stream.
1126
 While this was happening, some infantry had waded the stream, 
scrambled up the bank and “silenced the enemy post in the ruined house [ ... ] which up to 
this time had caused much trouble and some casualties by bombs”.1127 
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Back at the stream, under the shelling, the situation remained very confused. It fell to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson and Major Findlay to restore order, by organising “scratch 
parties”1128 to manhandle the bridges and by getting some infantry across to cover the next 
stage of the advance. “Men soon crossed [the stream] and lined the bank of the canal,1129 
engaging the enemy on the opposite bank with fire – some of the Lewis Gunners standing on 
top of the bank firing their Lewis Guns from the hip, traversing as they did so”.1130 The 
diarist of 409
th
 Field Company RE substantiates this almost hero comic-book scenario, 
praising the Lewis Gunners, who “stuck their ground throughout, even when others fell back 
and it is largely due to them that the bridging was able to proceed”.1131  
 
Under this covering fire, Major Findlay organised a mixed party of sappers and infantry to 
drag Corporal Dow‟s assault bridge across the other one already laid across the stream and up 
the canal bank. It was almost 0610. They quickly attached the wheels
1132
 and the launching 
lever, but one of the steel guys had been shot away, requiring it to be lowered rather more 
gently than originally envisaged across the lock. It was successfully placed, however, and 
Major Findlay and two of his NCOs rushed across, closely followed by men of 2
nd
 Royal 
Sussex, including Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, and set about neutralising the Germans in the 
lock buildings. It was a “brisk fight [that] ensued at the Lock houses with the enemy garrison, 
but these quickly surrendered themselves”.1133 Even whilst this was going on, Corporals 
Wardrop and White of 409
th
 Field Company RE crossed the lock and managed to place two 
subsidiary bridges over the stream east of the canal behind the lock buildings. By 0613, three 
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more bridges had been placed over the lock, and with a further three there by 0625, and the 
enemy position overrun, the rest of the infantry were able to cross.
1134
 
 
On the right, „A‟ Company of 2nd KRRC had advanced to the canal at Zero plus six, but 
reconnaissance the previous afternoon had shown that the wooden bridge by which they were 
hoping to be able to cross the canal had been badly damaged. Any crossing here would have 
to be by boat. They had dragged the Berthen boats across a six foot dyke and up a six foot 
bank only to discover on arrival at the bank that their assembly was far from straightforward. 
“A quarter of an hour was spent toiling at these unwieldy engines, and then, as they were still 
unassembled, the Company Commander decided to waste no further time, dumped the boats 
and led his men to the Lock”.1135 Here, they were able to cross with the rest of their battalion. 
 
The infantry crossings were completed by around 0635,
1136
 and the engineers set about 
tidying the lock crossings, spacing the bridges out and checking the area for hidden mines. It 
was whilst completing these tasks that Lieutenant Kelly was killed by an enemy shell.
1137
 At 
0720, a Pack Transport Bridge was across the canal and at 0800 the 1
st
 Australian Tunnelling 
Company started work on the Tank Bridge, which was completed, after 0900 under 
intermittent shell fire, by 1000.
1138
 
                                                 
1134
 Major George de Cardonnel Elmsall Findlay, commanding  409
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Graham Johnson, commanding 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, were awarded 
the Victoria Cross for their exploits at Lock No. 1. See Appendix D for the full citations. 
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 TNA:PRO WO95/1268 War Diary 2 Infantry Brigade HQ. 
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 This was only eighteen minutes behind schedule. 
1137
 Lieutenant John Lawson Kelly MC, age 24, is buried in Le Rejet de Beaulieu Communal Cemetery, grave B 
11. 
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 One supply tank came forward along the road from Le Rejet de Beaulieu to use this bridge, having a load of 
supplies to dump near Bois de l‟Abbaye, but no-one had seen the necessity of constructing a bridge over the 
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The Engineers had suffered the following casualties during the day: 
       Officers  Other Ranks 
       K W  K W 
 
23
rd
 Field Company Royal Engineers  - 1  1 10 
26
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers  - -  1 8 
409
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 1 3  12 18 
1
st
 Australian Tunnelling Company  - -  3 8 
 
     Total  1 4  17 44 
 
     Overall Total     66 
 
The 409
th
 Field Company RE casualties represented 45 per cent of other ranks engaged.
1139
 
 
2 Brigade had a little catching up to do: although the crossing of the lock had resulted in “a 
certain amount of confusion of Units”, because “all the men had been thoroughly instructed 
in what direction (right or left) to go, by the time the battalions reached the line of the road in 
S 2 a & c, they were fairly reorganised and were covering their full frontages according to 
plan”.1140 Enemy resistance “was small and beyond rounding up a few machine guns which 
gave battle here and there, there was no infantry fight worthy of mention as the enemy 
infantry seemed only too ready to „Kamerad‟”.1141 When the fog lifted at 0900 the men were 
                                                                                                                                                        
stream west of the canal strong enough to take a tank. The tank commander proceeded to try to cross by the 
Horse Transport Bridge and both bridge and tank ended up in the stream, the latter completely „ditched‟. 
1139
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on the Blue Dotted Line, along the road running through Sans Fond, having caught up with 
the barrage. “It was clear that there was no enemy immediately in front”.1142 
 
The men of 1
st
 Northants had crossed the canal at about 0615
1143
 and took up positions in 
support to the west of the Blue Dotted Line, though they were asked to send two companies 
forward to bolster the depleted 2
nd
 Royal Sussex. After the ninety minute pause on this line, 
the artillery barrage resumed its forward movement, the infantry following, 2
nd
 Royal Sussex 
on the left, 2
nd
 KRRC in the centre and 1
st
 Northants on the right. The “enemy surrendered 
freely and put up a poor fight”.1144 The 2nd Royal Sussex and 2nd KRRC took up final 
positions a little short of the original objectives
1145
 and it was noted that “there were no 
counter attacks” and enemy shelling was “negligible”.1146  
 
At 1400 the 1
st
 Northants went forward to capture the village of Fesmy. „B‟ and „D‟ 
Companies were able to clear all but the eastern outskirts where resistance from German 
machine guns proved “determined”,1147 but by 1630, after trench mortar fire had been 
directed onto these strongpoints, the entire village was in British hands. It was beginning to 
get dark, and there was still one pocket of Germans out on the right and this made liaison 
with the French 66
th
 Division problematic. A patrol was sent out to the pre-arranged 
„international post‟ at La Justice, but there was no French presence. It was decided that the 
Northants should consolidate their current positions, with „B‟, „C‟ and „D‟ Companies in the 
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front line and „A‟ Company remaining behind in support. A link with the French was 
established at La Justice at 0500 on 5 November. 
 
1
st
 Northants had lost one officer killed,
1148
 and three wounded, with eleven other ranks killed 
and twenty-two wounded. 2
nd
 KRRC had lost two officers killed,
1149
 2
nd
 Royal Sussex 
one.
1150
 
Total casualties for 2 Brigade can be calculated at: 
      Officers  Other Ranks 
      K W  K W 
 
2
nd
 Royal Sussex   1 7  12 86 
1
st
 Northamptonshire Regt  1 3  11 22 
2
nd
 KRRC    2 1  12 60 
    Total  4 11  35 168 
 
      Overall Total   218 
 
1
st
 Division, despite the perceived difficulty of the tasks given them, rank only eighth in the 
list of divisional fatal casualties for 4 November. 
 
      Officers  Other Ranks 
      K W  K W 
 
1 Brigade    - 6  34 112 
2 Brigade    4 11  35 168 
3Brigade    - 3  12 57 
    Total  4 20  81 337 
                                                 
1148
 Second-Lieutenant Lewis James Morten, age 26, is buried in Le Rejet de Beaulieu Communal Cemetery, 
grave D 15. His wife, Charlotte, lived in Slough, in a house called “Catillon”. 
1149
 Lieutenant Herman Grant Oxley, age 25, and Second-Lieutenant S. Burroughes are buried side by side in 
Highland Cemetery, Le Cateau, graves VI E 6 and VI E 5 respectively. 
1150
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D13. 
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      Overall Total   442 
 
 
The division had advanced its line over 4000 yards on a 5000 yard frontage, forced the 
passage of the Sambre canal and liberated nine villages and hamlets. They had taken 49 
officers and 1649 other ranks prisoner, and captured over twenty field guns.
1151
 Major-
General Strickland, in his „Special Order of the Day‟, dated 5 November, is quite sure of the 
reasons for success: 
The task that the Division was called upon to perform yesterday was one entailing the 
utmost forethought for every detail, the most careful and precise Staff work in all 
branches, a thorough and precise organisation in BNs of the most minute detail, and 
gallantry, tact and endurance on the part of all troops engaged. 
The complete success of the operations is very greatly due to the skill, ability, rapidity 
and completeness with which the Bridging arrangements were completed and 
perfected.
1152
 
 
IX Corps, in the end, got away with it. The crossing at Lock No. 1 succeeded, but it took the 
resolve of the commanding officers to redeem a plan that was in danger of becoming, if not a 
failure, a more costly enterprise. The forcing of the canal at Ors by 14 Brigade was only 
courtesy of a secondary bridge veiled in the morning mist and thus not spotted by the 
defenders, a crossing in the end used by many more units than had originally been envisaged. 
The attempt by 96 Brigade to cross the canal further north was a disaster rescued only by the 
pragmatism of officers willing to call off the frontal attacks and, in effect, outflank the 
problem. The taking of the Happegarbes Spur was a third, and still relatively costly attempt at 
this operation. Only at Catillon did everything go more or less to plan, and here the objectives 
were much more closely defined, the bridgehead being the limit of the day‟s work. 
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As in many other places along the front, the German forward positions provided the only real 
solid opposition to the attackers: once this crust was broken through, it became apparent that 
there was little behind it. Is this too harsh? Battle plans rarely survive first contact with the 
enemy, and the resourcefulness through which the eventual success was achieved should also 
be trumpeted alongside the misgivings. The British Army of 1918 has received praise
1153
 for 
the pragmatism of its leaders, for the attributes of its „middle leaders‟, those in command at 
division, brigade and even battalion level, for the ability of the „man on the spot‟ to assess, 
plan, and then adapt an operation in order to ensure its ultimate success. IX Corps men 
certainly exhibited these traits on 4 November and should be recognised for this. 
 
Conclusion 
This all serves to confirm the assertion that the combined arms methodology was not only 
well understood by the officers and men tasked to implement it, but also that those men were 
skilled enough in the arts of war not to be tied irrevocably to plans that, during the middle 
years of the war, often proved to be an immovable millstone around the neck of flexibility. 
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Conclusion 
 
In battle, you do not have to be perfect, just better than your enemy.
1154
 
 
The plan for the Battle of the Sambre was still evolving as officers‟ whistles blew to send 
their men forward, reflecting the dynamic nature of the fighting of the last weeks of the Great 
War. It continued to do so as the battle progressed: in every chapter of this work there are 
examples of alterations and adjustments to the original plans, of decisions taken „on the spot‟ 
to extend, curtail or re-direct a unit‟s efforts, to react to the efficacy of enemy resistance, and 
a seemingly instinctive knowledge – either conscious or unconscious – amongst commanders 
that it was fine to call a halt, where necessary, before final objectives had been reached, 
knowing that the job had been done.  
 
This thesis has shown that the Battle of the Sambre did not go entirely to plan, but also that it 
was not essential that it do so in order to be counted as a success. Of the thirteen divisions in 
the front line on 4 November, only five reached or exceeded their final objectives.
1155
 The 
relative „failures‟ of the other seven were, in the end, irrelevant: it was vital that the forward 
German defences be overrun, but the lack of available German reserves rendered the risk of 
counter-attack negligible. „Bite and hold‟ became a series of „bites‟ with the „hold‟ phase 
                                                 
1154
 Dr Peter Lieb, Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, during a lecture at the Western 
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largely untested. Where the British settled for positions short of their objectives on the 
evening of the battle, the Germans, knowing they were beaten, mostly melted away during 
the hours of darkness, allowing units to move forward largely unopposed onto and beyond 
their original targets in the early hours of the next morning. 
 
Ultimate operational success was therefore achieved, but performance at tactical level was 
uneven. The BEF was probably at its operational and tactical zenith during August and 
September 1918:
1156
 by November, logistical, meteorological and topographical issues 
restricted the range of new technologies available to planners, thus limiting the tactical scope 
for forthcoming attacks.  
 
Aerial support was restricted by diminishing hours of daylight and deteriorating weather 
conditions and much of the RAF‟s work was done prior to the day of the attack: it provided 
hundreds of aerial photographs which gave invaluable information to the attacking units on 
the ground. By the time the aircraft were able to become airborne on the day of the attack, 
once daylight had arrived and fog had dispersed, much of the infantry‟s work had been 
completed. The planes were able to fly contact patrols to check on the rate of the infantry 
advance, to spot German troop concentrations and therefore warn of impending counter 
attack and to help direct artillery fire. Offensive actions appear to have been limited largely to 
bombing and strafing columns of retreating German infantry and vehicles. 
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The use of armour was limited by the paucity of serviceable machines and by the topography 
of the battlefield. That tanks were not a decisive element in this battle is down to the small 
number of serviceable machines available, the difficulties in delivering these machines over 
long distances to the battlefield, and by the terrain they would face. It proved impractical to 
supply tanks any further north than 37
th
 Division. They were then restricted by orders not to 
enter the forest
1157
 and by the impossibility of crossing the canal. They proved useful against 
hedgerows, machine gun posts and fortified positions in villages, but were still plagued by 
mechanical unreliability, navigational difficulties and vulnerability to basic anti-tank 
measures. Infantry commanders welcomed the assistance, but their plans were careful not to 
rely on the tanks‟ presence. They undoubtedly saved lives of attacking infantry at places like 
Landrecies, Preux-au-Bois, Catillon, Jolimetz and Hecq, and in places were able to speed up 
or reinvigorate a stalled advance, but it is difficult to argue that they were vital to the ultimate 
success of the battle. Attacks, it seems, were no less successful where no tanks were 
available. The infantry‟s opinion of them is perhaps best summed up by the 17th Division 
orders which reminded troops that the role of the tank was “entirely separate yet 
supplementary to that of the infantry.” The men were not to “wait for the tanks”.1158 
 
The major players on 4 November 1918 were therefore the infantry, the artillery and the 
engineers. The question of where the BEF lay on the „learning curve‟ in the final days of the 
war does not rely for its answer solely on the range of the latest weaponry available and the 
inventiveness of its deployment, but on the fact that the abilities of the BEF‟s commanders, 
who were experienced enough and skilled enough to go with what they had, allowed them – 
sometimes in the face of impending failure – to win the day. 
                                                 
1157
 One that did almost immediately „bellied‟ itself on a tree stump. 
1158
 TNA:PRO WO95/1985 War Diary 17
th
 Division HQ 
347 
 
 
Small unit infantry tactics were well understood, and it is tempting to adopt the view that 
British infantry of late 1918 was a cohesive, well-trained and innovative fighting force. This 
was true to a certain extent: the army had come a long way since the summer of 1916 and had 
learnt many lessons. Increased firepower and better tactics had changed the nature of the 
attack beyond recognition and German machine gun posts were no longer insuperable 
obstacles to a successful advance: suppressing fire, infiltration and the flanking manoeuvre 
were by then not only instinctive, but very effective. However, Jonathan Boff asserts
1159
 that 
training and the subsequent adoption and successful implementation of such tactics was 
patchy. A brief evaluation of the work of two divisions (both V Corps) on 4 November will 
serve as examples. 
 
17
th
 and 38
th
 Divisions attacked side by side through the Forêt de Mormal. Their fates were 
quite different.
1160
 On 17
th
 Division front, an initial re-alignment manoeuvre had cost a large 
number of casualties as units fell victim to an effective enemy counter barrage. Orders had 
directed troops to bypass areas of strong resistance, but 50 Brigade, hampered by less than 
effective artillery support, was held up in the forest when confronted by German machine gun 
fire and when units were reluctant to manoeuvre, preferring the comfort of secure flanks. 38
th
 
Division, to their south, employed the very tactics recommended: 114 Brigade, in particular, 
used the tracks and rides to great effect and reached their objectives with limited 
casualties.
1161
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17
th
 Division should be viewed as something of an anomaly, however: most attacks 
demonstrated that the BEF had learnt its lessons, was able to adapt and improve its tactics 
and use its increased firepower effectively – there are many examples in the text of the very 
effective use of rifle grenades, mortars and Lewis Guns as German positions were repeatedly 
overrun. 
 
The engineers are deserving of praise: they worked wonders to clear paths through 
hedgerows, to bridge rivers and streams behind the lines to facilitate the movement of troops, 
and to come up with the ideas and the hardware required to force the passage of the canal. If 
they can be criticised, it would be for not sharing ideas, knowledge and, crucially, materiel, 
across divisions. The fact that 32
nd
 Division was not able to approach the waterway with pre-
constructed pontoons – they were left with the heavy and unwieldy cork floats that other 
divisions
1162
 did not want and which required bridges to be constructed from their constituent 
parts once the canal was reached, and therefore under enemy fire – cost them dear. As 
illustrated by the successful crossings of the canal at other points, the speed with which the 
bridging operations were completed was the vital element crucial to the success of the 
undertaking. 
 
Artillery provision for the 4 November attack was more than ample. Thirty-one Royal Field 
Artillery brigades, nineteen heavy and thirteen siege batteries added up to over one thousand 
guns. Arrangements for artillery support for the later phases of the assault, once infantry had 
passed beyond the range of the initial creeping barrage, were down to liaison between 
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gunners and brigade or battalion commanders. Some plans were very effective, some less so, 
but in places enemy opposition was so slight that infantry were able to move forward with 
minimal or no support from the guns. There was no artillery bombardment prior to Zero 
Hour, thus helping to ensure surprise. Silent registration on targets was accepted practice. The 
creeping barrage had become a sophisticated entity by this time in the war, and gunners were 
able to provide barrages at right angles to the general axis of advance, such as at Preux-au-
Bois and Catillon. Towns and villages were only subject to shrapnel fire, in order to prevent 
civilian casualties and Le Quesnoy was not bombarded at all.
1163
 Counter battery work had 
been hampered by poor visibility prior to the assault – the RAF were unable to fly on 2 and 3 
November – and infantry were greeted by stiff enemy barrages in a number of sectors. When 
combined with Trench Mortars and long-range indirect fire from Machine Gun Companies, 
the overall effect of British creeping barrages was demoralising for the defenders. 
 
Was it necessary for the BEF to fight the Battle of the Sambre? It is possible, with hindsight, 
to suggest that the Germans were already beaten and that the Allies were by this time pushing 
against an already open door, that an armistice was imminent anyway. Neither politicians nor 
military leaders of the time were blessed with infallible clairvoyance, however: Field-Marshal 
Haig wrote on 2 November that “the determined fight put up by the Enemy today shows that 
the German Army is not yet demoralised!”1164 On 3 November, General Rawlinson wrote in 
his diary that “He [the Germans] evidently means to put up a fight tomorrow” and on the day 
of the battle “I don‟t think the Boche can stick out very much longer”.1165 They could not 
have known that this major offensive was to be the last on that scale, even if that was what 
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they were hoping. Politicians were still contemplating the possibility of the war lasting into 
the spring and summer of 1919 and orders for vast numbers of tanks for the next spring 
offensive were being considered. The German Army was not about to withdraw voluntarily 
from its defensive positions west of the Forêt de Mormal and along the Sambre-Oise Canal: 
the BEF would be obliged to force the issue. 
 
The BEF‟s victory on the Sambre was decisive. On a tactical level, the growing reliance on 
the part of the Germans on machine guns and artillery, combined with the paucity of support 
and reserve positions – behind the canal these consisted mainly of fortified farmhouses and 
hamlets – meant that the overwhelming strength of British artillery, the tried and tested 
infantry tactics for dealing with such strongpoints, and numerical superiority coupled with 
better morale, were always going to prove successful. Even where tactics were less than 
cutting-edge, the final result was the same. With objectives mostly, or almost, reached on the 
day, or at least by the following morning, the battle must also be declared an operational 
success. The Germans were pushed off what was to be their final „prepared‟ defensive line: 
subsequent actions had all the attributes of a pursuit.  At the strategic level, the British 
success removed any chance of the Germans holding out for a negotiated peace in the spring 
of 1919 and OHL leaders knew that it was vital to secure an armistice as quickly as possible 
and at any price. 
 
 
This thesis illustrates the dynamic and complicated nature of war. It is important to show that 
by 4 November 1918 the BEF was no longer at the high-point of its 'learning curve': the 
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logistics system was strained; manpower was limited; tactical competence could be variable 
and all-arms tactics were curtailed by the unavailability or paucity of aircraft and tanks, 
unsuitable ground and the autumn weather. The stubborn resistance of a depleted enemy 
determined to hold the line of the forest and the canal required confidence in the planning, 
along with superiority of method, morale and materiel, but these prerequisites had to be 
combined with improvisation, ingenuity and pragmatism in order for the BEF to prevail. 
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 Field Companies, Royal Engineers 
WO95/1203 LXXIV Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/1203 LXXV Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/1214 1 Guards Brigade 
WO95/1215 2
nd
 Grenadier Guards 
WO95/1215 2
nd
 Coldstream Guards 
WO95/1216 1
st
 Irish Guards 
 
WO95/1218 2 Guards Brigade 
WO95/1219 3
rd
 Grenadier Guards 
WO95/1219 1
st
 Coldstream Guards 
WO95/1219 1
st
 Scots Guards 
 
WO95/1222 3 Guards Brigade 
WO95/1223 1
st
 Grenadier Guards 
WO95/1223 2
nd
 Scots Guards 
WO95/1224 1
st
 Welsh Guards 
 
WO95/936 XVII Corps HQ, General Staff 
WO95/943 XVII Corps CRA 
WO95/944 XVII Corps Heavy Artillery 
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WO95/2057 19
th
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2062 19
th
 Division CRA 
WO95/2066 19
th
 Division CRE 
WO95/2058 19
th
 Division QMG 
WO95/2071 19
th
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2069 81
st
 & 82
nd
 Field Companies Royal Engineers 
WO95/2070 94
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2067 LXXXVII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2067 LXXXVIII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2077 56 Brigade 
WO95/2078 1/4
th
  King‟s (Shropshire Light Infantry) 
WO95/2082 8
th
 The Prince of Wales‟s (North Staffordshire Regiment) 
WO95/2079 9
th
 Cheshire Regiment 
 
WO95/2084 57 Brigade 
WO95/2085 10
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
WO95/2085 8
th
 Gloucestershire Regiment 
WO95/2086 3
rd
 Worcestershire Regiment 
 
WO95/2089 58 Brigade 
WO95/2092 9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
WO95/2092 9
th
 Welsh Regiment 
WO95/2093 2
nd
 Wiltshire Regiment 
 
WO95/2192 24
th
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2195 24
th
 Division CRA 
WO95/2196 24
th
 Division CRE 
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WO95/2194 24
th
 Division QMG 
WO95/2201 24
th
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2199 103
rd
, 104
th
 & 129
th
 Field Companies Royal Engineers 
WO95/2197 CVI Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2197 CVII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2205 17 Brigade 
WO95/2207 1
st
 Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) 
WO95/2208 8
th
 Queens (Royal West Surrey Regiment) 
WO95/2206 3
rd
 Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort‟s Own) 
 
WO95/2212 72 Brigade 
WO95/2215 9
th
 East Surrey Regiment 
WO95/2213 8
th
 The Queen‟s Own (Royal West Kent Regiment) 
WO95/2213 1
st
 The Prince of Wales‟s (North Staffordshire Regiment) 
 
WO95/2217 73 Brigade 
WO95/2219 9
th
 Royal Sussex Regiment 
WO95/2218 7
th
 Northamptonshire Regiment 
WO95/2219 13
th
 The Duke of Cambridge‟s Own (Middlesex Regiment) 
 
 
WO95/439  Fourth Army Headquarters 
WO95/440 Fourth Army Headquarters 
WO158/242 Fourth Army Headquarters 
WO53/572  Fourth Army Headquarters 
WO95/579 Fourth Army Headquarters 
 
WO95/837 IX Corps HQ, General Staff 
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WO95/841 IX Corps CRA 
WO95/842 IX Corps Heavy Artillery 
 
WO95/1234 1
st
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/1241 1
st
 Division CRA 
WO95/1246 1
st
 Division CRE 
WO95/1238 1
st
 Division QMG 
WO95/1256 1
st
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/1252 23
rd
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/1253 26
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/1254 409
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/1248 XXV Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/1249 XXXIX Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/1139 2
nd
 Dragoons, Scots Greys 
 
WO95/1262 1 Brigade 
WO95/1264 1
st
 The Queen‟s Own Cameron Highlanders 
WO95/1266 1
st
 Loyal North Lancashire Regiment 
WO95/1263 1
st
 Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 
 
WO95/1268 2 Brigade 
WO95/1269 2
nd
 Royal Sussex Regiment 
WO95/1273 2
nd
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps 
WO95/1271 1
st
 Northamptonshire Regiment 
 
WO95/1277 3 Brigade 
WO95/1278 1
st
 Gloucestershire Regiment 
WO95/1280 1
st
 South Wales Borderers 
WO95/1281 2
nd
 Welsh Regiment 
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WO95/2372 32
nd
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2376 32
nd
 Division CRA 
WO95/2379 32
nd
 Division CRE 
WO95/2374 32
nd
 Division QMG 
WO95/2385 32
nd
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2383 218
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2383 206
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2676 465
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2677 466
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2678 468
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2380 CLXI Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2381 CLXVIII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2391 14 Brigade 
WO95/2392 5/6
th
 Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment) 
WO95/2392 1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment 
WO95/2393 15
th
 Highland Light Infantry 
 
WO95/2396 96 Brigade 
WO95/2397 2
nd
  Manchester Regiment 
WO95/2397 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
WO95/2397 16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
 
WO95/2401 97 Brigade 
WO95/2402 2
nd
 King‟s Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry) 
WO95/2402 1/5
th
 Border Regiment 
WO95/2402 10
th
 (Princess Louise‟s) Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 
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WO95/897 XIII Corps HQ, General Staff 
WO95/900 XIII Corps HQ, A & Q 
WO95/902 XIII Corps CRA 
 
WO95/2227 25
th
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2230 25
th
 Division CRA 
WO95/2232 25
th
 Division CRE 
WO95/2228 25
th
 Division QMG 
WO95/2235 25
th
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2235 105
th 
& 106
th
 Field Companies Royal Engineers 
WO95/2237 130
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2233 CX Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2234 CXII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2245 74 Brigade 
WO95/2247 11
th
 Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire Regiment) 
WO95/2247 9
th
 Green Howards. Alexandra, Princess of Wales‟s Own (Yorkshire 
  Regiment) 
WO95/2247 13
th
 Durham Light Infantry 
 
WO95/2249 75 Brigade 
WO95/2251 1/8
th
 Worcestershire Regiment 
WO95/2251 1/5
th
 Gloucestershire Regiment 
WO95/2251 1/8
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
 
WO95/2242 7 Brigade 
WO95/2244 9
th
 Devonshire Regiment 
WO95/2244 20
th
 Manchester Regiment 
WO95/2244 21
st
 Manchester Regiment 
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WO95/2812 50
th
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2814 50
th
 Division HQ CRA 
WO95/2816 50
th
 Division CRE 
WO95/2813 50
th
 Division QMG 
WO95/2823 50
th
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2821 7
th
, 446
th
 & 447
th
 Field Companies Royal Engineers 
WO95/2817 CCL Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2819 CCLI Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2827 149 Brigade 
WO95/2831 3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) 
WO95/2831 13
th
 Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 
WO95/2831 2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
 
WO95/2833 150 Brigade 
WO95/2836 7
th
 The Duke of Edinburgh‟s (Wiltshire Regiment) 
WO95/2836 2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers 
WO95/2837 2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers 
 
WO95/2839 151 Brigade 
WO95/2843 6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
WO95/2843 1
st
 King‟s Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry) 
WO95/2843 4
th
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps 
WO95/2840 6
th
 Durham Light Infantry 
 
WO95/2017 18
th
 Division HQ, General Staff 
WO95/2021 18
th
 Division HQ CRA 
WO95/2023 18
th
 Division CRE 
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WO95/2018 18
th
 Division QMG 
WO95/2028 18
th
 Bn Machine Gun Corps 
WO95/2027 80
th
 Field Company Royal Engineers 
WO95/2069 81
st
 & 82
nd
 Field Companies Royal Engineers 
WO95/2024 LXXXII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
WO95/2025 LXXXIII Bde Royal Field Artillery 
 
WO95/2036 53 Brigade 
WO95/2040 7
th
 The Queen‟s Own (Royal West Kent Regiment) 
WO95/2038 10
th
 Essex Regiment 
WO95/2037 8
th
 Princess Charlotte of Wales‟s (Royal Berkshire Regiment)  
 
WO95/2042 54 Brigade 
WO95/2042 2
nd
 Bedfordshire Regiment 
WO95/2044 6
th
 Northamptonshire Regiment 
WO95/2045 11
th
 Royal Fusiliers 
 
WO95/2048 55 Brigade 
WO95/2049 7
th
 Queens (Royal West Surrey Regiment) 
WO95/2049 7
th
 Buffs (East Kent Regiment) 
WO95/2050 8
th
 East Surrey Regiment 
 
WO158/332 Machine Gun HQ 
 
WO95/95 Tank Corps Headquarters 
WO95/102 2
nd
 Tank Brigade 
WO95/107 9
th
 Tank Battalion 
WO95/103 10
th
 Tank Battalion 
WO95/103 14
th
 Tank Battalion 
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WO95/103 1
st
 Company 14
th
 Tank Battalion 
WO95/106 17
th
 (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion 
 
1.1.2 Maps: 
 
WO153/333 Sambre: Situation Map 
WO153/332 1
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WO153/331 XXII Corps Dispositions 
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Appendix A 
 
Order of Battle 
The formations and units are listed, down to divisional level, in the order in which they 
occupied the front line on 4 November 1918, moving north to south. 
 
Third Army  GOC  General Hon. Sir J.H.G. Byng 
   MGGS  Major-General L.R. Vaughan 
   MGRA Major-General A.E. Wardrop 
   DA & QMG Major-General A.F. Sillem 
   CRE  Major-General W.A. Liddell 
 
XVII Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General Sir C. Fergusson 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General W.D. Wright VC 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General E.H. Willis 
   CHA  Brigadier-General N.G. Barron 
   DA & QMG Brigadier-General R.F.A. Hobbs 
 
19
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General G.D. Jeffreys 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Montgomery 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General E.J.R. Pell 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. Hawes 
 
56 Brigade    Brigadier-General R.M. Heath 
1/4
th 
Shropshire L.I.   Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Bowen
1166
 
8
th
 North Staffordshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel H.W. Dakeyne 
                                                 
1166
 Bowen was in command up to 2 November 1918. The author has been unable to trace the name of his 
replacement. 
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9
th
 Cheshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Raymer
1167
 
 
57 Brigade    Brigadier-General A.J.F. Eden 
10
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regt Lieutenant-Colonel F.B Follett 
8
th
 Gloucestershire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel W. Parkes 
3
rd
 Worcestershire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel P.R. Whalley 
 
58 Brigade    Brigadier-General A.E. Glasgow 
9
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel Lt-Col L.F. Smeathman 
9
th
 Welsh Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.L. Jones 
2
nd
 Wiltshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel P.S.L. Beaver 
 
 
24
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General A.C. Daly 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Longmore 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General H.G. Lloyd 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. R.H. Collins 
 
17 Brigade    Brigadier-General G. Thorpe 
1
st
 Royal Fusiliers   Lieutenant-Colonel W.W. Chard 
8
th
 Queen‟s    Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.C. Peirs 
3
rd
 Rifle Brigade   Lieutenant-Colonel E.R. Kewley 
 
72
 
 Brigade    Brigadier-General R.W. Morgan 
9
th
 East Surrey Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Cameron 
8
th
 Royal West Kent Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Wenyon 
                                                 
1167
 Raymer was in command up to 14 October 1918. The author has been unable to trace the name of his 
replacement. 
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1
st
 North Staffordshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Stamer 
 
73 Brigade    Brigadier-General R.J. Collins 
9
th
 Royal Sussex Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel M.V.B.Hill 
7
th
 Northamptonshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel E.S.C. Grune 
13
th
 Middlesex Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.H.Hebden 
 
 
VI Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General Sir J.A.L. Haldane 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General R.H. Kearsley 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General J.G. Rotton 
   CHA  Brigadier-General A. Ellershaw 
   DA & QMG Brigadier-General J.B.G. Tulloch 
 
Guards Division GOC  Major-General T.G. Matheson 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel E.W.M. Grigg 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General F.A. Wilson 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel F.G. Alston 
 
1 Guards Brigade   Brigadier-General C.R. Champion de Crespigny 
2
nd
 Grenadier Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel C.F.A. Walker 
2
nd
 Coldstream Guards  Lieutenant-Colonel E.P. Brassey 
1
st
 Irish Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel R.R.C.Baggallay 
 
2 Guards Brigade   Brigadier-General B.N. Sergisson-Brooke 
3
rd
 Grenadier Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel Viscount Lascelles 
1
st
 Coldstream Guards  Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. E.K. Digby 
1
st
 Scots Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel V.A.F. Mackenzie 
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3 Guards Brigade   Brigadier-General C.P.Heywood 
1
st
 Grenadier Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. W.R. Bailey 
2
nd
 Scots Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Stirling 
1
st
 Welsh Guards   Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.C. Luxmoore-Ball 
 
62nd Division  GOC  Major-General Sir R.D. Whigham 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Gossett 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General A.T. Anderson 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Lea 
 
185 Brigade    Brigadier-General Viscount Hampden 
1/5
th
 Devonshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.V. Bastow 
1/8
th
 West Yorkshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel N.A. England 
2/20
th
 London Regiment  Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. Craddock 
 
186 Brigade    Brigadier-General J.L.G. Burnett 
5
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s  Lieutenant-Colonel J. Walker 
2/4
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s  Lieutenant-Colonel P.P. Wilson 
2/4
th
 Hampshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brook 
 
187 Brigade    Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie 
2/4th K.O.Y.L.I.   Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Chaytor 
2/5
th
 K.O.Y.L.I.   Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Peter 
2/4
th
 York & Lancaster Regt  Major J.E.D. Stickney 
 
IV Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General Sir G.M. Harper 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General R.G. Parker 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General J.G. Geddes 
   CHA  Brigadier-General T.E. Marshall 
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   DA & QMG Brigadier-General W.H.V. Darell 
 
N. Zealand Division GOC  Major-General Sir A.H. Russell 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Wilson 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General G.N. Johnston 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Avery 
 
1 New Zealand Brigade  Brigadier-General C.W. Melvill 
1
st
 Wellington Battalion  Lieutenant-Colonel F.K. Turnbull 
2
nd
 Wellington Battalion  Major H.E. McKinnon 
1
st
 Auckland Battalion  Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Alderman 
2
nd
 Auckland Battalion  Major W.C. Sind 
 
3
rd
 New Zealand (Rifles) Brigade Brigadier-General H.E. Hart 
1
st
 New Zealand Rifle Brigade Captain E.A. Harding 
2
nd
 New Zealand Rifle Brigade Lieutenant-Colonel L.H. Jardine 
3
rd
 New Zealand Rifle Brigade Major G.W. Cockroft 
4
th
 New Zealand Rifle Brigade Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Barrowclough 
 
37
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General H. Bruce Williams 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel W. Platt 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General F. Potts 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Reid 
 
63 Brigade    Brigadier-General A.B. Hubbock 
8
th
 Lincolnshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel A.T. Hitch 
8
th
 Somerset Light Infantry  Lieutenant-Colonel C.J. de B. Sheringham 
4
th
 Middlesex Regt    Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Chapman 
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111 Brigade    Brigadier-General S.G. Francis 
10
th
 Royal Fusiliers     Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Waters 
13
th
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Johns 
13
th
 Rifle Brigade    Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Mostyn-Owen 
 
112 Brigade    Brigadier-General W.N. Herbert 
13th Royal Fusiliers    Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Smith 
1
st
 Essex Regt    Lieutenant-Colonel T.J.E. Blake 
1/1
st
 Hertfordshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Heselton 
 
 
V Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General R.H. Mangles 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General R.P. Benson 
   CHA  Brigadier-General A.M. Tyler 
DA & QMG Brigadier-General H.M. de F. Montgomery 
 
17th Division  GOC  Major-General P.R. Robertson 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Birch 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General P. Wheatley 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel A.E.J. Wilson 
 
50 Brigade    Brigadier-General J.F.R. Hope 
6
th
 Dorsetshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Weldon 
7
th
 East Yorkshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. King 
10
th
 West Yorkshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel W.Gibson 
 
51 Brigade    Brigadier-General R.M. Dudgeon 
7
th
 Lincolnshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.Sargent 
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7
th
 Border Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel P. Kirkup 
10
th
 Notts & Derby Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel T.W. Daniel 
 
52 Brigade    Brigadier-General W. Allason 
10
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel G.L. Torrens 
12
th
 Manchester Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel S. Danby 
9
th
 Duke of Wellington‟s  Lieutenant-Colonel A. Driver 
 
38
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General T.A. Cubitt 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Munby 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General T.E. Topping 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel H.R. Lee 
 
113 Brigade    Brigadier-General H.E. ap Rhys-Price 
13
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Leman 
14
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Major W.P. Wheldon 
16
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Davies 
 
114 Brigade    Brigadier-General T.R.C. Price 
13
th
 Welsh Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Hobbs 
14
th
 Welsh Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel G.F. Brooke 
15
th
 Welsh Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel E. Helme 
 
115 Brigade    Brigadier-General H.D. de Pree 
10
th
 South Wales Borderers  Lieutenant-Colonel A.L. Bowen 
2
nd
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel G.E.R. de Miremont 
17
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. Beasley 
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Fourth Army  GOC  General Sir H.S. Rawlinson 
   MGGS  Major-General A.A. Montgomery 
   MGRA Major-General C.E.D. Budworth 
   DA & QMG Major-General H.C. Holman 
   CRE  Major-General R.U.H. Buckland 
 
XIII Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General Sir T.L.N. Morland 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General I. Stewart 
   CHA  Brigadier-General J.D. Sherer 
   DA & QMG Brigadier-General S.W. Robinson 
 
18
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General R.P. Lee 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel G. Blewitt 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General T.O. Seagram 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel R.H.L. Cutbill 
 
53 Brigade    Brigadier-General M.G.H. Barker 
7
th
 Royal West Kent Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel L.H. Hickson 
10
th
 Essex Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel R. Forbes 
8
th
 Royal Berkshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel N.B. Hudson 
 
54 Brigade    Lieutenant-Colonel K.C. Weldon 
2
nd
 Bedfordshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Percival 
6
th
 Northamptonshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel R. Turner 
11
th
 Royal Fusiliers    Lieutenant-Colonel K.D.H. Gwynn 
 
55 Brigade    Lieutenant-Colonel A.P.B. Irwin 
7
th
 Queen‟s     Major H.J. Tortise 
7
th
 East Kent Regt   Major W.H. Stronge 
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8
th
 East Surrey Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Baddeley 
 
50
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General H.C. Jackson 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel A.K. Grant 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General W. Stirling 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel A.C.H. Duke 
 
149 Brigade    Brigadier-General P.M. Robinson 
3
rd
 Royal Fusiliers    Lieutenant-Colonel M.O. Clarke 
13
th
  Black Watch    Lieutenant-Colonel P.J. Blair 
2
nd
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers  Major J. Luke 
 
150 Brigade    Brigadier-General G. Rollo 
7
th
 Wiltshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Hodgson 
2
nd
 Northumberland Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel A.C.L.H. Jones 
2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Williams 
 
151 Brigade    Brigadier-General R.E. Sugden 
6
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers Lieutenant-Colonel G.G.F.F. Greville 
1
st
 K.O.Y.L.I.    Lieutenant-Colonel H. Mallinson 
4
th
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps  Major G.A. Tryon 
 
25
th
 Division  GOC  Major-General J.R.E. Charles 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel D.F. Anderson 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General K.J. Kincaid-Smith 
   AA &QMG Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. E.P.J. Stourton 
 
7
 
 Brigade    Brigadier-General C.J. Hickie 
9
th
 Devonshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.I. Storey 
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20
th
 Manchester Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Pilkington 
21
st
 Manchester Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.N. Lomax 
 
74 Brigade    Brigadier-General H.M. Craigie-Halkett 
11
th
 Notts & Derby Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Corall 
9
th 
Yorkshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Hart  
13
th
 Durham Light Infantry  Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Faber 
 
75 Brigade    Brigadier-General C.W. Frizell 
1/8
th
 Worcestershire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Clarke 
1/5
th
 Gloucestershire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel D.Lewis 
1/8
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regt Lieutenant-Colonel P.H. Whitehouse 
 
IX Corps  GOC  Lieutenant-General Sir W.P. Braithwaite 
   BGGS  Brigadier-General A.R. Cameron 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General G. Humphreys 
   CHA  Brigadier-General G.B. Mackenzie 
   DA & QMG Brigadier-General J.C. Harding-Newman 
 
32
nd
 Division  GOC  Major-General T.S. Lambert 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel E. FitzG. Dillon 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General J.A. Tyler 
   AA &QMG Lieutenant-Colonel J.P.B. Robinson 
 
14 Brigade    Brigadier-General L.P. Evans VC 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots    Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Fraser 
1
st
 Dorsetshire Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. Thwaytes 
15
th
 Highland Light Infantry  Lieutenant-Colonel V.B. Ramsden 
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96 Brigade    Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood 
2
nd
 Manchester Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Robertson 
15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.R.G. Alban 
16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers  Lieutenant-Colonel J.N. Marshall 
 
97 Brigade    Brigadier-General G.A. Armytage 
2
nd
 K.O.Y.L.I.    Lieutenant-Colonel L.Lamotte 
1/5
th
 Border Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel H.N. Vinen 
10
th
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders Lieutenant-Colonel H.G. Sotheby 
 
1
st
 Division  GOC  Major-General E.P. Strickland 
   GSO1  Lieutenant-Colonel E.N. Tandy 
   BGRA  Brigadier-General H.F.E. Lewin 
   AA & QMG Lieutenant-Colonel H.H. Spender-Clay 
 
1 Brigade    Brigadier-General L.L. Wheatley 
1
st
 Cameron Highlanders  Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Methuen 
1
st
 Loyal North Lancashire Regt Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Berkeley 
1
st
 Black Watch    Lieutenant-Colonel F. Anderson 
 
2 Brigade    Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Johnson 
2
nd
 Royal Sussex Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Johnson 
2
nd
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps  Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.E. Smith 
1
st
 Northamptonshire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel G. St G. Robinson 
 
3 Brigade    Brigadier-General E.G. St Aubyn 
1
st
 Gloucestershire Regt  Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Guild 
1
st
 South Wales Borderers  Lieutenant-Colonel C.L.Taylor 
2
nd
 Welsh Regt   Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Badham 
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Royal Engineers 
 
XVII Corps      Brigadier-General W.D. Waghorn 
19
th
 Division ( 81 / 82 / 94 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel P.E. Hodgson 
24
th
 Division (103 /104 / 129 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Prior 
 
VI Corps      Brigadier-General R.N. Harvey 
Guards Division (55 / 75 / 76 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel E.F.W. Lees 
62
nd
 Division (457 / 460 / 461 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel L. Chenevix-Trench 
 
IV Corps      Brigadier-General C.M. Carpenter 
NZ Division (1 / 3 Field Companies, NZ RE) Lieutenant-Colonel H.L. Bingay 
37
th
 Division (152 / 153 / 154 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Jackson 
 
V Corps      Brigadier-General A.G. Stevenson 
17
th
 Division (77 / 78 / 93 Field Companies)  Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Ferguson 
38
th
 Division (123 / 124 / 151 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel T.E. Kelsall 
 
XIII Corps      Brigadier-General C.A. Elliott 
18
th
 Division (80 / 81 / 82 Field Companies)  Lieutenant-Colonel C.B.O. Symons 
50
th
 Division (7 / 446 / 447 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel P. de H. Hall 
25
th
 Division (105 / 106 / 130 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Done 
 
IX Corps      Brigadier-General R.A. Gillam 
32
nd
 Division (218 / 206 Field Companies)  Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Pollard 
        & (465 / 466 / 468 Field Companies) Lieutenant-Colonel W. Garforth 
1
st
 Division (23 / 26 / 409 Field Companies)  Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.P. Sankey 
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Appendix B 
 
Commanders’ Length of Service 
Commanding Officers down to Brigade level are listed with date of appointment to that post 
and number of days in post. Where the exact day is not known*, the 15
th
 of the month is 
assumed to be date of appointment, thus giving an accuracy of plus or minus 15 days. 
           (Days) 
Third Army  General Hon. Sir J.H.G. Byng  9.6.17  514 
 
XVII Corps  Lieutenant-General Sir C. Fergusson  25.5.16 894 
19
th
 Division  Major-General G.D. Jeffreys   22.9.17 410 
56 Brigade  Brigadier-General R.M. Heath  7.4.18  212 
57 Brigade  Brigadier-General A.J.F. Eden  30.8.18 67 
58 Brigade  Brigadier-General A.E. Glasgow  10.1.17 664 
24th Division  Major-General A.C. Daly   15.9.17 416 
17 Brigade  Brigadier-General G. Thorpe   7.6.18  151 
72 Brigade  Brigadier-General R.W. Morgan  13.12.17 327 
73 Brigade  Brigadier-General R.J. Collins  15.7.18 113 
 
VI Corps  Lieutenant-General Sir J.A.L. Haldane 8.8.16  819 
Guards Division Major-General T.G. Matheson  11.9.18 55 
1 Guards Brigade Brigadier-General C.R. Ch. de Crespigny 22.9.17 409 
2 Guards Brigade Brigadier-General B.N. Sergisson-Brooke 25.4.18 194 
3 Guards Brigade Brigadier-General C.P.Heywood  26.10.18 10 
62
nd
 Division  Major-General Sir R.D. Whigham  28.8.18 69 
185 Brigade  Brigadier-General Viscount Hampden 21.8.17 441 
186 Brigade  Brigadier-General J.L.G. Burnett  3.12.17 337 
187 Brigade  Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie  3.4.18  216 
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IV Corps  Lieutenant-General Sir G.M. Harper  11.3.18 239 
New Zealand Division Major-General Sir A.H. Russell  ?.11.15 1086* 
1 NZ Brigade  Brigadier-General C.W. Melvill  8.6.17  515 
3 NZ Rifle Brigade Brigadier-General H.E. Hart   ?.2.17  628* 
37
th
 Division  Major-General H. Bruce Williams  9.11.16 726 
63 Brigade  Brigadier-General A.B. Hubbock  21.10.18 15 
111 Brigade  Brigadier-General S.G. Francis  19.10.17 382 
112 Brigade  Brigadier-General W.N. Herbert  27.9.18 39 
 
V Corps  Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute  28.4.18 191 
17
th
 Division  Major-General P.R. Robertson  13.7.16 845 
50 Brigade  Brigadier-General J.F.R. Hope  23.9.18 43 
51 Brigade  Brigadier-General R.M. Dudgeon  30.5.18 159 
52 Brigade  Brigadier-General W. Allason  14.4.18 205 
38
th
 Division  Major-General T.A. Cubitt   23.5.18 166 
113 Brigade  Brigadier-General H.E. ap Rhys-Price 17.10.17 384 
114 Brigade  Brigadier-General T.R.C. Price  6.8.18  91 
115 Brigade  Brigadier-General H.D. de Pree  5.9.18  61 
 
Fourth Army  General Sir H.S. Rawlinson   5.2.16  1004 
 
XIII Corps  Lieutenant-General Sir T.L.N. Morland 12.4.18 207 
18
th
 Division  Major-General R.P. Lee   15.1.17 659 
53 Brigade  Brigadier-General M.G.H. Barker  24.4.18 560 
54 Brigade  Lt-Col K.C. Weldon    25.10.18 11 
55 Brigade  Lt-Col A.P.B. Irwin    24.10.18 12 
50
th
 Division  Major-General H.C. Jackson   23.3.18 227 
149 Brigade  Brigadier-General P.M. Robinson  7.6.18  151 
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150 Brigade  Brigadier-General G. Rollo   29.9.18 37 
151 Brigade  Brigadier-General R.E. Sugden  7.6.18  151 
25
th
 Division  Major-General J.R.E. Charles  4.8.18  93 
7 Brigade  Brigadier-General C.J. Hickie  31.5.18 158 
74 Brigade  Brigadier-General H.M. Craigie-Halkett 31.3.18 219 
75 Brigade  Brigadier-General C.W. Frizell  1.10.18 35 
 
IX Corps  Lieutenant-General Sir W.P. Braithwaite 13.9.18 53 
32
nd
 Division  Major-General T.S. Lambert   31.5.18 158 
14 Brigade  Brigadier-General L.P. Evans VC  10.6.18 148 
96 Brigade  Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood  20.8.17 442 
97 Brigade  Brigadier-General G.A. Armytage  6.10.18 30 
1
st
 Division  Major-General E.P. Strickland  12.6.16 876 
1 Brigade  Brigadier-General L.L. Wheatley  22.9.18 44 
2 Brigade  Lt-Col D.G. Johnson    26.9.18 40 
3 Brigade  Brigadier-General E.G. St Aubyn  6.10.18 30 
 
Corps Commanders‟ average time in post:  400 days   (c. 13½ months) 
Divisional Commanders‟ average time in post: 445 days   (c. 14½ months) 
Brigade Commanders‟ average time in post:  203 days   (c. 6½ months) 
 
Numbers who took up post in: 
     1915 1916 1917 1918 
 Divisional Commanders 1 3 3 6 
 Brigade Commanders  0 0 10 28 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Total fatalities: 1203 
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Sapper A. Archibald 
218
th
 Field Company, Royal Engineers. 
For most conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice on 4
th
 November 1918, near Ors, when with 
a party building a floating bridge across the canal. He was foremost in the work under a very 
heavy artillery barrage and machine-gun fire. The later was directed at him from a few 
yards’ distance while he was working on the cork floats; nevertheless, he persevered in his 
task, and his example and efforts were such that the bridge, which was essential to the 
success of the operations, was very quickly completed. The supreme devotion to duty of this 
gallant sapper, who collapsed from gas-poisoning on completion of his work, was beyond all 
praise. 
 
Adam Archibald was born on 14 January 1879 in Leith, Scotland.  He married Margaret 
Lander Sinclair in Edinburgh on 6 June 1902: they had four children, three girls and a boy. 
He joined the Army under the Derby scheme on 4 November 1915 and after initial service 
with the Durham Light Infantry joined the Royal Engineers. He went to France in September 
1917. 
His recovery from gas-poisoning delayed his return home until April 1919, but he still 
managed to serve in the allied expedition to Archangel before demobilisation later the same 
year. 
He returned to his pre-war employers, Stuart‟s Granolithic Works in Edinburgh, becoming 
manager of the Duff Street Works. He retired in the early 1940s and died at his Edinburgh 
home on 10 March 1957. 
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After the war he commanded 2
nd
 Royal Sussex as part of the Army of Occupation in 
Germany. Further commands included the 2
nd
 North Staffs and the 12
th
 (Secunderbad) 
Infantry Brigade. He was ADC to King George VI from September 1936 to January 1939. 
He was GOC of 4
th
 Division at the outbreak of the Second World War and served in France 
and Belgium, being evacuated from Dunkirk. 
He was GOC Aldershot Command from 1940 and Colonel of the South Wales Borderers 
from 1944 until 1949. After retirement, he became a borough councillor in Fleet, Hampshire. 
Johnson died on 21 December 1975 at the age of ninety-one and is buried in Church 
Crookham Churchyard in the same grave as his wife, who had died in 1950. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

